The Social Dimension of Mysticism: A Study of the Meaning and Structure of Religious Experience in the Philosophy of William Ernest Hocking by Woods, Richard
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
1978
The Social Dimension of Mysticism: A Study of the
Meaning and Structure of Religious Experience in
the Philosophy of William Ernest Hocking
Richard Woods
Loyola University Chicago
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1978 Richard. Woods
Recommended Citation
Woods, Richard, "The Social Dimension of Mysticism: A Study of the Meaning and Structure of Religious Experience in the
Philosophy of William Ernest Hocking" (1978). Dissertations. Paper 1767.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/1767
\ 
THE SOC!ll.L DI.HENSION OF NYSTICISM: 
A STIJDY OF THE EEANING AND STRUCTURE 
OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING 
by 
Richard J •. Woods, O.P. 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Loyola University of Chicago in Part~al Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 




To attempt to comprehend even a single theme in the 
thought of a philosopher, especially one whose interests 
were as extensive as his career was long, approaches the 
bounds of presumption. This study represents an effort to 
delineate the major outlines of Hocking's position regard-
ing the meaning and structure of mystical experience as he 
slowly and carefully formulated it in his numerous writings 
and addresses. As such, and despite its deficiencies, it is 
a tribute to a man who stood at the crossroads of philosophi-
cal and theological controversies surrounding mysticism and 
who, despite strong opposition, succeeded in resolving sever-
al major difficulties raised by the tension between mysticism 
and social concern. 
Hocking himself has passed from the world scene. But 
I hope and believe that his contributions to the study of 
religion will become more widely known. It is to that end 
that I dedicate this study to his memory. I wish to express 
my deep gratitude to my director, Dr. Robert Barry, and to 
my advisors, Dr. Francis Catania and Rev. Robert Harvanek, 
3.J., for their patient guidance and inspiration despite 
demands on them from several guarters. I would like to ac-
knowledge a special debt of gratitude to Sir Alister Hardy, 
founder and first director of the Religious Experience Re-
ii 
search Unit at Oxford, and to Mr. Edward Robinson, its pre-
sent director, for their interest and co-operation in my 
studies of religious experience. Finally, I wish to express 
profound thanks to my family and friends, who have so long 
borne with my projects and without whose support I would 
have long since wearied of the task: Rev. Jerome O'Leary, 
O.P., Rev. Daniel McGuire, O.P., Sr. Laurian Pieterek, F.S. 
P.A., Mr. Daniel O'Meara, Bro. Denny Broussard, O.F.M., Miss 
Melissa Siebert, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Hutt, and especially 
my parents, Mr. and Mrs. James Woods, and my brother, Dr. 
James Woods, Jr. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I. HOCKING AND Tr-J:B PROBLEH OF :•IYSTIC."-L EXPERIEHCE 
If few philosophers have so continuously and thor-
oughly addressed themselves to the meaning and structure of 
mysticism as did William Ernest Hocking, philosophical con-
cern with mysticism is nevertheless common and even tradi-
tional. The mere volume of literature on the subject testi-
fies adequately to its availability for philosophical inves-
tigation.1 This should not be surprising if philosophy can 
1A representative but.hardly exhaustive sample of 
modern and contemporary writings on mysticism would include 
works such as David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Re-
lioion and An Enguiry Concerning Human Understanding in 
7he English Philosophers from Bacon to Hill, E.A. Burtt, 
ed. (New York: The Hod ern Library, 19 39T;"G. ·~,i. F. Hegel, 
Qn Art, Religion and Philosophy, J. Glenn Gray, ed. {New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970}; Josiah Royce, The Porld and 
the Individual, 2 vols. (New York: The Hacmillan Co., 1904); 
William James, The Varieties of ReliTious Exnerience (~ew 
York: New American Library, 1958 ed. ; Bertrand Russell, 
Hysticism and Logic (London: Unwin Books, 1963 ed.); Henry 
Nelson ~deman, Religious Experience and Scientific Method 
(Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971 
ed.); Joseph Narechal, s.J., Studies in the Psychology of 
~ Hvstics (London: Burnes, Oates and 'i~'ashbourne, Ltd., 
1927); Henri Bergeon, The Two Sources of Horality and Reli-
gion (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, n.d.); Jacques 
Nari tain, The Degrees of Knowledge ( Ne~v York: Charles Scrib-
ner's Sons, 1959); John Dewey, A Common Faith (~ew Haven: 
~ale University Press, 1934); Etienne Gilson, The Hystical 
Iheology of St. Bernard (Hew York: Sheed and ~iard, 1940); 
Gabriel i-larcel, The f.!ystery of Being, 2 vols. (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Co., 1960); Wilbur Marshall Urbant Humanity 
~Deity (London: Allen and Unwin, 1951); Ninian Smart, 
Reasons and Faiths (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958); 
H.~. Lewis, Our ~xoerience of God (London: Collins, 1970); 
W •. T. Stace, Hvsticism and Philosonhy (London: Hacmillan Co., 
1 
2 
be described as the interpretation of the whole of human ex-
perience and once mysticism is granted a place in the full 
range of experience. 1 I·loreover, mysticism is an appropriate 
subject for philosophical exploration in so far as the mys-
tics themselves can be considered philosophers since they, 
too, as Hocking maintained, interpret the meaning of human 
2 
experience as a whole. 
Hocking's particular importance regarding the philo-
sophical study of mysticism lies first, I believe, in his 
articulation of the fundamental structure of all human ex-
perience as a triadic, theistically-grounded relation, "I-
It-Thou," which is brought to full awareness in mystical 
experience. Further, his perception of the necessary con-
1960); John E. Smith, Experience and God (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968); i>.rthur c. Danto, Nystici.sm and 
Horality (Harmondsworth, England: Pelican Books, 1976); J. 
N. Findlay, "The Rationality of Mysticism," Contemporary 
Studies in Philosophical Idealism, John Howie and Thomas 
Buford, eds. (cape Cod: Claude Stark and Co., 1975), pp. 
133 - 48; 'i'T •• Donald Hudson, Wi ttaenstein and Religious Be-
lief (London: Hacmillan Co., 1975). A recent volume of The 
Monist was also devoted to the subject of "The Philosophy 
of Hysticism" (Vol. 59, No.4 [Oct., 1976]). 
. 
1
cf. "Hhat Does Philosophy Say?" Anthology of Recent 
Ph1losophy, D. s. Robinson, ed. (New York: Thomas Crowell, 
1929), p. 34; hereafter referred to as "1·iDPS." Cf. also 
Types of Philosophy (third ed., revised in collaboration 
with Richard Hocking, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1959), p. 313; hereafter referred to as TP. 
2
cf. TP 255f. For a recent discussion, cf. Lawrence 
LeShan, The Hedium, the Hystic and the Physicist {New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1975) and Margaret Lewis Furze, Mysticism: 
\·iindmv on A ~'lorld View (Nashville: Abingdon, 1977). 
3 
nection between authentic mysticism and social action con-
stituted a distinctive and original contribution to the 
study of religion. For although noted by Underhill and oth-
ers as a function of heightened compassion, Hocking was 
first to account for the mystic's activity as a structurally 
integral phase completing a social process involving his 
withdrawal from the world, a systematic re-evaluation of the 
beliefs, goals and values of his society, and his return to 
the world better equipped to contribute significantly to so-
cial development. 
Like James, Underhill and others, Hocking described 
the mystic's motivation in terms of compassion, which re-
sulted from a deep realization of the unity of all human be-
ings. But by articulating the meaning and structure of mys-
tical experience in terms of both social process and indivi-
dual psychology as complementary aspects of a unified system 
of development,, Hocking went far beyond his contemporaries 
and even later commentators such as Harcel, Buber, Harts-
horne and more recent authors. 
Hocking's account, while largely an original achieve-
ment, also incorporated the major elements of classical mys-
tical theology -- particularly the interplay of action and 
contemplation and the progressive development of mystical 
experience through successive stages. Here, too, Hocking 
went beyond contemporary accounts first, by refusing to sub-
4 
ordinate either action or contemplation to each other and, 
second, by showing that progressive development was no less 
characteristic of the emergence of mysticism in historical 
religions than it is of its manifestation in individual in-
stances. 
In accomplishing this agenda, Hocking had to struggle 
against a conception of mysticism as a subjective cultiva-
tion of emotion and a form of social escapism which had 
gained it the opprobrium of Protestant orthodoxy for over a 
century. He also opposed the notion common to much Catholic 
opinion which divorced the mystical element of religion from 
the ordinary course of spiritual development. Against these 
views, Hocking argued that mysticism and social (i.e., pro-
phetic) action are not opposed in principle but are, rather, 
successive stages of a single process in time. He likewise 
maintained that the mystical experience of union with God 
completed the course of spiritual development as the full 
expression of religious experience. Hocking further upheld 
the metaphysical validity of accounts of mystical experience 
against psychologistic and other interpretations which at-
tempted to reduce such experience to "interior" mental or 
emotional events devoid of objective referential value. 
1. Fundamental Issues 
In this study I shall argue that despite recent ob-
jections, Hocking's account of the meaning and structure of 
5 
mystical experience was fundamentally cogent and correct. 
The principal elements of his case as I shall present it can 
be summarized as follows~ 
1. All experience is radically intersubjective as 
well as objective in origin. ~hat is, the fundamental struc-
ture of experience can be adequately described as a recipro-
cal triadic relationship of "I, It and Thou" -- the Self, 
the natural and social World, and Other Selves. Further, 
this "nuclear experience," as the basis of all further ex-
perience, is itself grounded in a unifying theistic field. 1 
2. Thus,. all experience is fundamentally and at 
least implicitly religious: reciprocally, all explicit reli-
gious experience is intrinsically social, a further develop-
ment of both the intersubjective and objective relations of 
nuclear experience as perceived in the context of the bond 
between the self and God. 2 This is to say that for Hocking 
1Hocking did not use the term"intersubjective" to 
describe the "I-Thou" dimension of nuc.iear or explicit ex-
perience before 1920. As used in this dissertation, inter-
subjective as opposed to social refers to the qualitatively 
distinct "I-Thou" relationship between human selves or be-
tween the human self and God in which the 11 other" is ad-
dressed directly, that is, vocatively. Intersubjectivity al-
so includes the "consubjective" we-consciousness of true 
communal experience, which may in fact embody the most pro-
found form of personal union and is certainly an essential 
moment in the experience of sharing a common world. Cf. 
"Harcel and the Ground Issues of Hetaphysics," Philosoohy 
and Phenomenological Research, 14 (June, 1954), pp. 58- 9; 
h~-reafter ref erred to as "HGIH." 
2By implicit I mean inherent or contained within the 
nature of something, to be involved in something but not in 
6 
religious experience is the explicit development of the the-
istic relationship grounding all human experience. 
3. Mysticism, as the practice of union with God in 
direct and immediate experience, represents the full devel-
opment of religious experience. As such it is the explicit 
manifestation of the "deep" theistic and social structure 
underpinning all experience, eventuating not only in a 
heightened awareness of God's presence, but also in more 
effective social action. Thus mystical experience, epito-
mizing all experience, is social in expression as well as 
in origin. 
These fundamental themes will be addressed in chap-
ters I through III below. In the concluding chapter, I shall 
compare Hocking's account of mystical experience with those 
of his contemporaries as well as those of more recent writ-
ers in order to evaluate his interpretation of the social 
dimension of mysticism. 
an open or manifest way. By explicit I mean precisely ex-
pressed, clear and evident. By explicitation I mean the pro-
cess by which that which is implicit is made explicit or 
manifest, i.e., clearly apparent, obvious. In terms of actu-
al process, development means approximately the same thing. 
The terms "latent" or "virtual" 'vill be used in approximate-
ly the same sense as implicit, i.e., to mean something pre-
sent as a potential but not manifest, and, with regard to 
virtual, something existing in essence or effect but not in 
actual fact or form. This usage is based on The Oxford Eng-
li!h Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1971, compacted.) 
and The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage-TNew York: Dell Pub. Co., 1970}. Hereafter the former 
will be referred to as OED. For instances of this usage, cf. 
Hocking, The .Heaning of God in Human Experience ( Ne\v Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1963 ed.), pp. 16, 303; hereafter re-
ferred to as MGHE. 
Recently, several objections have been brought a-
gainst Hocking•s conception of mysticism concerning its 
character both as an experience of the presence of God and 
7 
as the full development of the "nuclear experience" ground-
ing all actual experiences. To begin with, Hocking consis-
tently maintained that in religious experience and especial-
ly in its mystical expression God is not only directly but 
1 
also immediately apprehended. But it has been strenuously 
argued, for instance by John E. Smith, that all experience 
must be mediated, that is, interpreted, to be meaningful at 
all. This seemingly precludes immediacy, especially absolute 
immediacy, as a quality of an experience of God or anything 
else if it is to be meaningful. 2 Hocking•s understanding of 
mystical experience, immediacy, or both, is thereby called 
1In his magnum opus, Hocking wrote, for instance, 
"God has a presponsiveness of his own, and herein lies the 
immediate experience of the personality of God." (HGHE 336.) 
In an essay from his "middle period," he similarly contended 
that "Han has (or can have) an immediate a'<;vareness of God, 
from which fact he perceives that he is under obligation and 
must live his life in careful listening to the voice of du-
ty. n ("The Hystical Spirit, II Protestantism: 7-. Symposium, 
~iilliam K. Anderson, ed. [Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries 
Press, 1969], p. 190; hereafter referred to as "MS.") In one 
of his last works, he like\vise maintained that "If \ve ask 
him how he can be certain, the mystic refers us to that 
which is alt.vays better than proof, immediate experience." 
(The Meaning of Irnrnortalitv in Human Experience.[~!estport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973~ pp. 213 - 14; hereafter re-
ferred to as MIHE.} 
2
cf. John E. Smith, Exoerience and God (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1968). 
. 1 
into quest~on. 
I shall argue in this study that Hocking's claim 
8 
that mysticism involves an immediate as well as direct ex-
perience of God is not only intrinsic to his doctrine but 
is defensible in light of Smith's critique and fully conso-
nant with the traditional understanding of mystical experi-
ence. I shall attempt to show, moreover, how Hocking in 
fact not only anticipated but surpassed Smith's critique of 
absolute immediacy. 
It has also been claimed by Hocking's major commen-
tator, Leroy Rouner, that mystical experience is essential-
ly "extraordinary," an "esoteric, specialized vision," 2 and 
since "the whole point of Hocking's 'mysticism' is precise-
ly its ordinariness," 3 Hocking himself "remains an outsider 
to the mystic vision," 4 and mysticism "remains an illustra-
1In her dissertation on Hocking, Sr. ~ary E. Giegen-
gack thus maintains that "God can be experienced, not im-
mediately, but directly, in experiences of nature, of duty 
and of human love, and can be known to exist as the condi-
tion for the possibility of such experiences. 11 Oiary Eliza-
beth Giegengack, o.s.u., Can God~ Experienced? A Study in 
~ Philosophy of Religion of William Ernest Hocking [Dis-
sertation, Georgetown University, iiashington, D.C., 1971], 
"l1.bstract_, 11 p. 4. 
2 Leroy Rouner, Within Human Experience: The Philoso-
EhY of William Ernest Hocking (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1969), p. 242; hereafter referred to as WHE. Nuch of 
~ouner's book is based on his doctoral dissertation, Ideal-
~. Christianity and a World Faith: William Ernest Hock-
inq:s.~ of Christianity and its Relation to ~-ChriStian 
Rel~g~ons (Columbia University, 1961). 
3 Rouner, :\'HE 241. 
4 Rouner, WHE 242. 
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tion of Hocking's point, not the substance." 1 
Against this position, I shall argue that mystical 
experience, as Hocking himself expressly taught, is the na-
tural extension and fullest expression of orcinary experi-
ence, differing in degree rather than in kind, and is thus 
a common element in everyman's experience. Further, because 
of the common and ordinary character of mystical experience, 
Hocking himself can and should be considered a mystic, in-
asmuch as his religious experience as he reported it ade-
quately fulfills the requirements he established for authen-
tic mysticism. These requirements are, moreover, fully in 
accord with the classical Western tradition of Christian 
mysticism. Hocking, I contend, can also be shown to have 
admitted being a mystic, if somewhat indirectly. 
Hocking's status as a mystic is not peripheral to 
the present study. For, first, if Rouner's position is cor-
rect, then Hocking's understanding of mysticism as a common 
and ordinary aspect of experience must be in error, for the 
t\vO views are directly contradictory. Second,· if Eocking 
\vas not a mystic, then in so far as his understanding of 
mysticism was, as I shall show, based on his own experi-
1Rouner, WHE 243. A recent exponent of American mys-
ticism, Eal Bridges, similarly places Hocking outside the 
circle of mystics. Cf. American Nvsticism from \·Jilli am 
James to Zen (~ew York: Earper and Row, 19~ pp. 6 - 7. 
h as to that extent mistaken. Third, in so far as ence, e \v 
Hocking also based his case for the common and ordinary 
10 
character of mystical experience on the classical tradition 
of western and Eastern mysticism, either his reading of 
these traditions or Rouner's claims must be considered sus-
1 pect. 
Whether being a mystic is a necessary condition for 
philosophizing about mystical experience is a moot point. 
William James philosophized eloquently about mysticism but 
more or less denied that he was a mystic. 2 Similarly, in 
his study of mysticism, Bertrand Russell discouraged any 
. bl ' 1 1 . 3 TJ lt St conjecture as to possl. e myst1.ca ean1.ngs. ;, a er ace 
1Rouner's denial of Hocking's mystical status stems, 
I believe, from his tacit adoption of a revisionist concep-
tion of mysticism developed in the eighteenth century--
ironically, one which Hocking strenuously combatted. Conse-
quently, Rouner fails to realize that Hocking's reconception 
of mysticism constituted a recovery of the classical tradi-
tion developed between the fourth and sixteenth centuries, 
rather than being a departure from it. For an account of the 
separation of ascetical and mystical theology and the rele-
gation of mystical experience to the periphery of theologi-
cal concern following the controversies over Quietism at the 
end of the seventeenth century, see R. Garrigou-Lagrange, 
The Three Ages of the Interior Life (St. Louis: B. Herder 
Book Co., 1947), Vol. I, pp. 225 - 28. Cf. also his Chris-
tian Perfection and Contemolation (St. Louis: B. Herder Book 
Co., 1942), pp. 27ff. For an overvie\v of both Protestant and 
Catholic reactions against mysticism at this time, see Ron-
ald Knox, Enthusiasm {New York: Oxford University Press, 
196l.)Cf. also~ Protestant Mystics, Anne Frernantle, ed. 
(New York: Mentor, 1965) and F.C. Rappold, Mysticism (Balti-
more: Penguin Books, 1970). 
2 James, op. cit., p. 292. 
3 Russell, op. cit., p. 16. 
11 
also disclaims any nystical pretensions in his study. 1 
Fritz Staal, a recent comnentator on the philosophi-
cal study of mysticism, holds, conversely, that some mysti-
cal experience is probably necessary for a ~roper under-
standing of the Beaning of ~ysticism. 2 Ben-Ami Scharfstein 
makes a similar if softer case for understanding mysticism 
from within. 3 Asher Moore, writing in a recent issue of ~he 
Honist, like•.,.lise comments, "Hysticism is indeed ineffable 
to a degree that is not true of most philosophies. ~o an ex-
tent, it cannot be judged vlithout entering its vl0rld." 4 
In view of such conflicting opinions, my position is 
that any genuine understanding of a phenomenon requires 
some experience of it, that is, in James • terms, "knm.;ledge 
of," not merely "knowledge about." To understand mysticism 
fully, one would need to be a mystic. 7o understand mysti-
1
stace, op. cit., p. 6. 
2Fritz Staal, Exploring Mysticism {Harmondsworth, 
England: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 125. But seep. 126: " ••• 
one need not be a mystic in order to study mysticism; but 
one might have to become one •••. " 
3
•• ••• mystical experience, or something quite close 
to it, chaTacterizes every intense effort to create, includ-
ing that of the scientist who analyzes and theorizes anxi-
ously in order to solve an impersonal problem which has 
somehow become personal to him. By means of the solution, 
he arrives at a simultaneous outer and inner harmony. Per-
haps our very desire to understand mysticism in its breadth 
and depth is tinged with a mystical hope. 11 (Nystical Experi-
~ [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Herrill Co., 1973], p. 2.) 
4 l'.sher Hoore, 11 Hysticism and Philosophy," ed. cit., 
p. 499. 
cism adequately, one would need to have had at least some 
mystical experience. But with Hocking I believe that this 
experience is always at hand, in every waking of the mind 
1 to truth, beauty and goodness. But this is to say in ef-
12 
feet that mystical experience is indeed common and ordinary. 
Consequently, I would add, also with Hocking, that the meta-
physics of mysticism must be assessed according to the ordi-
f d . 2 Th . h nary canons o reason an exper~ence. e myst~c as no 
special claim on our assent to his vision of reality. 
1
cf. The Corning World Civilization (Ne,.; York: Harper 
and Row, 1956), pp. 101, 208; hereafter referred to as ewe. 
2
cf. MIHE 216. Cf. also "Illicit Naturalizing of 
Religion," The Journal of Religion, 3 ( 1923), p. 589; here-
after referred to as "INR." 
II. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERF-..TIOUS 
Hocking's Approach to Religious Experience and Mysticism 1. 
In treating religious and mystical experience, Hock-
ing's method was eclectic but highly distinctive, being vari-
ously empirical, phenomenological, pragmatic, dialectical 
and hermeneutical. With respect to his empiricism, first, 
Hocking was profoundly respectful of ordinary human experi-
ence and the ability of the common man to grasp the meaning 
of that experience. He was thus unwilling to concede to psy-
chologists in particular the last word in evaluating experi-
ence, especially inasmuch as there was a common tendency on 
the part of psychologists at the turn of the century (James 
almost exclusively excepted) to reduce religious experience 
to its psycho-physiological components. Hocking found Leuba's 
influential writings particularly objectionable in this re-
1 
spect. Nevertheless, he also felt free to draw on psycholo-
gical studies of the mystics by clinicians and physiologists 
such as De.Hontmorand, Delacroix, Murisier, James, Starbuck 
and even Leuba himself on occasion. 
Hocking's earliest writings on mysticism were them-
selves concerned with psychological aspects of experience, 
1 Cf. James H. Leuba, 11 The Immediate Apprehension of 
God according to Hilliam James and William Ernest Hocking u 
Journal of Philosophy, 21, 26 (Dec. 18, 1924}, pp. 701- i2. 
Cf. also his Psychology of Religious Hysticism (New York: 
Harcourt Brace and Co., 1926). 
13 
14 
but from the outset he app~ied to mystical experience a de-
scriptive analysis similar to those of later, more overtly 
phenomenological researchers. However, unlike his mentor, 
Husserl, Hocking did not employ the ontologically suspensive 
epoche. Epistemologically he was thus more a moderate realist 
than an idealist, maintaining throughout his career the real 
(extra-mental) existence of objects of experience. Hence his 
tendency to take the mystics seriously with respect to their 
reported experiences not only of God but also of the world. 
Here again, Hocking's rather radical empiricism was evident. 1 
The pragmatic element in Hocking's method exercized 
an almost exclusively negative function, looking to results 
in living to assess the reality as well as the worth of the 
2 
mystic's experience: .. That which does not work is not true." 
As he explained in his magnum oous, 
if a theory has no consequences, or bad ones; if it makes 
no difference to men, or else undesirable differences; if 
it lowers the capacity of men to meet the stress of ex-
istence, or diminishes the worth to them of what exist-
ence they have; such a theory is somehow false, and we 
have no peace until it is remedied. I will even go far-
ther, and say that a theory is false if it is not inter-
esting: a proposition that falls on the mind so dully as 
to excite no enthusiasm has not attained the level of 
truth •••• 3 
While rejecting pragmatic criteria as a positive in-
1
cf. MGHE xxvff., 215 - 16, 229. 
2HGHE xxiii. 
3
rbid. Cf. also TP 91. 
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dicator of truth, it seems not to have occurred to Hocking 
that even a 11 negative pragmatism" entailed a positive prag-
matism. Nevertheless, although he never repudiated his doc-
trine of negative pragmatism, it found fewer and fewer refer-
ences in his writings as time went on. Yet he continued to 
search for practical verification of mystical theor~es in 
the lived experience of individuals and societies. 
Although keenly analytical, Hocking considered a pri-
marily analytical method infertile, "preliminaries to preli-
minaries."1 As a reflection of his chief metaphysical themat-
ic, the tension between the universal and the particular (the 
whole and the part), his method stressed induction and syn-
thesis -- the logical movement from a grasp of the relations 
2 
among the parts to the meaning of the whole. Thus, Hocking's 
method was above all dialectical or "cumulatively inductive," 
loving from thesis to antithesis toward a new thesis synthe-
1cf. "MS" 188. 
2Hocking also maintained that meaning "descended~ from 
the whole to the parts. Hence deduction had a place in his 
methodology. Overall, the meaning of experience as well as the 
philosophical method by which experience is interpreted in-
volve both induction and deduction related as alternating 
phases, i.e., dialectically. Methodologically, deduction 
alone remains hypothetical, presupposing the meaning of the 
whole. Empirically, however, the meaning of the whole must 
be discovered and verified by inductive stages which lead to 
the formation of new hypotheses and require testing. Thus, de-
deduction represents the heart of scientific method but logi-
cally and metaphysically it is preceded and followed by in-
duction. The hypothetical-deductive element is thus only a 
part of the empirical method both in science and in any philo-
sophy which honors empirical experience. Cf. MGHE 408 - 09, 
475 - 77• TF 295ff. ,
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sizing both, much as life itself as he saw it was an on-going 
process involving cumulative stages which permitted advance-
ment according to a "law" of alternation. Grmvth and develop-
ment by means of positive and negative reciprocation became 
a leit-motif of Hocking's investigation of mysticism, being 
-
manifest especially in his "principle of alternation'' and in 
his original interpretation of the mystic's .. negative path." 
But his dialectical method was not slavishly hegelian despite 
the evident influence of Hegel upon his thought and method. 
Finally, Hocking's method was to a large extent her-
meneutical -- relying on the interpretation and evaluation 
of texts composed by mystics and their commentators in both 
Western and Oriental traditions. While less thorough than 
many later scholars of comparative religion and while not as 
inclined to examine critically his theory of interpretation 
as might be expected today, Hocking continued a tradition be-
gun in America perhaps by Emerson and carried on by Royce. 
He also anticipated the further development of religious her-
meneutics by scholars such as Wach, Eliade, Ricoeur, Kita-
gawa and others. 
2. Method in This Study 
Hocking's disdain for rigidly systematic approaches 
to philosophical problems, his skill in describing human 
phenomena and as a dialectician, no less than his fluent lit-
17 
erary style, still challenge the student eager to analyze 
and assess his thought. For it is first necessary to expose 
that thought in its barer outlines, shorn of fine statement 
and subtle detail. Accordingly, considerable attention is 
necessarily given in this study to textual exegesis -- the 
attempt to discover what Hocking in fact taught over his 
long career and whether, for example, there are thematic un-
dercurrents which occasionally surface but which nevertheless 
represent a dominant trend in his thinking. Second, a large 
part of the presentation involves hermeneutics -- the attempt 
to fathom what Hocking meant, especially given conflicting 
opinions about his teachings, and to determine whether his 
doctrine remained consistent and coherent despite the inter-
mittent character of his writings on mysticism. There is, 
third, an effort to analyze and evaluate the relevant ele-
ments of Hocking's teachings thus exposed in terms of co-
gency and validity. The expository sections of this study 
thus serve to provide material for argumentation, that is, 
for the purpose of demonstrating not only why but ~ Hock-
ing was correct (or incorrect) in his appraisal of mysticism. 
In many respects this approach resembles Hocking's 
own methodology, which is not wholly coincidental. Neverthe-
less, there are important differences, particularly the ef-
fort of this study to organize many scattered references 
thematically, to interpret earlier formulations in the light 
of later, more carefully articulated versions, and to con-
18 
an d compare relevant issues in Hocking's treatment with trast 
Of other standard authorities. Further, whereas Hock-those 
t to discover the meaning of God in human ex-ing was inten 
perience by a descriptive analysis of religion and mystical 
experience, I intend to explore and evaluate the implica-
tions of his teachings on mysticism with regard to the meta 
physical structures of experience itself. 1 overall, I con-
1That religious and especially mystical experience 
are subjects common to both the philosophy and theology of 
religion warrants explanation inasmuch as the present study, 
although philosophical, nevertheless relies on theological 
sources to some extent~ 
A philosophical approach to religion differs from 
that of theology. Fundamentally, the theologian considers 
other religions from the privileged viewpoint of faith in a 
specific religious belief-system. That is, despite a common 
object in the material sense and even formally, the view-
point of the theologian (objectum formale quo) is determined 
by an antecedent commitment to the truth of a particular un-
derstanding of revelation, whether this be Christian or some-
thing else and regardless of whether this perspective admits 
or rejects the possibility of religious truth in other tradi-
tions. Thus, for a Christian theologian, faith in Jesus 
Christ as the definitive revelation of God and the truth of 
the human situation predetermines any judgment about the con-
tent or validity of all religious experience and particular 
religions themselves, Christianity itself included. Catholic 
and Protestant viewpoints differ of course from one another 
and even among themselves. 
A Christian philosophy of religion differs essentially 
from theology mainly in that the pre-commitment to a particu-
larly Christian interpretation of experience is, in the Hus-
s~r~1an sense, "bracketed." The Christian philosopher of re-
11g1on, while no less commited than the theologian to faith 
in Jesus Christ and all which that entails, does not investi-
gate either Christianity itself or other religions under 
t~at precise formality but with regard to aspects intelli-
g~ble from a common human viewpoint including empirical ori-
~1n, me~ing, structure, coherence, consist~ncy, historical 
nfluence, effects, etc. Here the philosopher more closely 
resembles the social scientist who studies religion than he 
• 
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elude that Hocking's case for the intrinsic sociality and 
commonness of mysticism and mystical experience is based on 
and inevitably points to the intrinsic intersubjective open-
ness of human experience itself and its groundedness in an 
implicit dialogue with God as the personal Field of all ex-
perience. 
does the theologian as such. And like scientific material, 
theological statements can be incorporated into a philosophi-
cal treatment of an issue without thereby compromising the 
freedom of philosophical inquiry in so far as the philoso-
pher suspends or "bracketsu the faith commitment presupposed 
by the theologian qua believer. 
III. HOCKING'S PLACE IN THE ~~ERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION 
As a student of Peirce, Royce and James, and as the 
teacher of a generation of philosophers including Charles 
Hartshorne, Marvin Farber, Dorion Cairns, Henry Nelson 
Wieman and others, Hocking well represents the continuity 
of the American philosophical tradition. As a student for a 
brief time, then a life-long friend of Edmund Husserl, and 
as a major influence on his "disciple," Gabriel Marcel, 
Hocking also represents a vital link between American and 
European thought in this century. 1 His philosophical con-
cern can be seen in this light as an attempt to synthesize 
elements of idealism and pragmatism with those of phenomena-
logy and existentialism. Whether called 11 0bjective ideal-
ism,"2 "widened empiricism," 3 or .. realistic mysticism," 4 
Hocking's philosophy is a richly complex, dialectical meta-
1 On Husserl, cf. "From the Early Days of the 'Lo-
gische Untersuchungen,'" Edmund Huss-erl 1859- 1959 (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 1- 11; hereafter re-
ferred to as "FEDLU. '' Cf. also CliC 34. On Marcel, cf. 
"MGIM" and CHC 76 - 77. For Narcel on Hocking, cf. "W. E. 
Hocking et la dialectique de !'instinct," Revue Philoso-
phique, 88 (Juillet- Decembre, 1919), pp. 19- 54, and 
"Solips~s~ ~urmounted,u Philosophy, Religion and the Coming 
World C1v1l1zation, Leroy Rouner, ed. (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 23- 31; hereafter referred to as PRCWC. 
2TP 178 I 314. 
3
••FEDLU" 7. 
4Living ReliTions and a World Faith (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1940 , p. ~hereafter referred to as LRw7. 
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physic of experience, similar in many respects to that of 
1 his friend but frequent philosophical opponent, John Dewey. 
Hocking's philosophy is remembered especially with 
regard to its idealistic aspect, an element partly inheri-
ted from Royce, but which was ultimately Hocking's own cre-
ation. His interest in mysticism has often been identified 
with this strand of idealism, overlooking its prior and 
equal source in James' influence and personal experience. 
underlying all, however, was a personal sensitivity to the 
meaning of God in human experience which determined Hock-
ing's career as an exponent of mysticism. 
1. The context: Prophecy and Mysticism 
Hocking's attempt to formulate a theory of mysticism 
consonant with the American philosophical tradition in-
volved him in an effort to undercut a prevalent view in 
America and Europe which held mysticism to be opposed in 
principle to the socially-active, prophetic character of 
Christianity. 2 His thesis, and the occasion of his clashes 
1For Hocking on Dewey, see especially "The Transcen-
dence of Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy, 3 (Jan. 4, 1906), 
pp. 5 - 12, and "Action and Certainty,n Journal of Philoso-
E!!,y, 27 (April 24, 1930), pp. 225- 38. Cf. also Hocking's 
dedication to Dewey in The Lasting Elements of Individual-
!.!!!!. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937) and "Dewey's 
Concepts of Experience and Nature," Philosophical Review, 
49 (March, 1940), pp. 228- 44; hereafter referred to as 
"DCEN. •• 
2 Cf. Rouner, WHE 23 - 24. 
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with neo-orthodcx theologians, affirmed the dynamic identity 
of mysticism and prophecy, that is, that the meaning and 
structure of mystical experience were radically social. 1 For 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
idea of prophecy was identified by Protestant theologians 
with social activism and reform. This understanding was 
characteristic, for instance, of the HSocial Gospel" as set 
1Hocking's definition of meaning and structure are 
as elusive as those of any of his basic categories. Looking 
to his usage, he apparently took meaning to mean "intention" 
or "purpose," and sometimes "significance" or "idea." Thus, 
at least something of the nature of experience can be dis-
covered by attending to its function, for ''The most funda-
mental explanation of anything will be the function it 
serves." ("A World View," Preface to Philosoph)', William P. 
Tolley, ed. [New York: The ~acmillan Co., 1946 , p. 474; 
hereafter referred to as "WV.")The particular locus of mean-
ing is the relation between the part and the whole, how "it 
all hangs together." Meaning, Hocking was fond of saying, 
descends from the whole to the parts and ascends from the 
parts to the whole. Meaning moves and grows. (Cf. MIHE 110, 
142. On meaning and intending, cf. Human Nature and Its Re-
making [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923 ed:T, pp.~l, 
57; hereafter referred to as HNR. Cf. also Man and the State 
[New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926], p:-37~hereafter 
referred to as MS. Cf. also "WDPS" 35, MIHE 162. As a rela-
tion between the whole and the part, cf. "Religion of the 
Future," Religion~ Modern~, L. B. R. Briggs, ed. [New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927], p. 355; hereafter re-
ferred to as "RF. 11 Cf. also "DCEN" 230, MIHE 110 - 12, "Man's 
Cosmic Status,"~ Search for America, Huston Smith, ed. 
[Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959], p. 161; here-
after referred to as "MCS." For the movement of meaning, cf. 
''WDPS" 36 and "MCS" 161.) In general, structure means "The 
mutual relation of constituent parts or elements of a whole 
as determining its peculiar nature or character •••• " (OED, 
3104.) In the present context, structure can be taken to 
mean an integral, self-regulating system of transformations, 
here following the thought of Piaget. (Cf. Jean Piaget, 
Structuralism, Channinah Maschler, trans. [New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1970], pp. 5-7. 
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forth by walter Rauschenbusch, a disciple of Ritschl and 
Troeltsch, and refined by Reinhold and H. Richard Niebuhr. 1 
It was no less associated with the nee-orthodox movement 
inaugurated by Karl Barth and continued by Emil Brttnner and 
Hendrik Kraemer, the latter's Christian Faith in~ !£a-
Christian World (1938) being directed squarely against 
. t' 2 Hocking's pos~ ~on. 
The fundamental opposition between the prophetic 
character of Christianity and mysticism, according to the 
nee-orthodox point of view, entails an essential conflict 
between the historical, contingent, this-worldly but ulti-
mately trans-cultural nature of the Christian mission and 
the timeless, absolute, other-worldly and Hellenistic na-
ture attributed to mystical religion. 3 With regard to soci-
al reform, this opposition is experienced as a tension be-
tween involvement and escape. With regard to faith and sal-
vation, however, prophetic action was held to rely chiefly 
1c£. Herbert Schneider, Religion in the Twentieth 
Century (New York:. Atheneum, 1964), pp. 98f~ 
2For a discussion of the Hocking-Kraemer dispute, cf. 
Rouner, WHE 235 - 38, 280 - 82. Cf. also Hendrik Kraemer, 
"The Role and Responsibility of the Christian Mission," 
PRCWC 235 - 49. 
3c£. A. Leonard, "Studies in the Phenomena of Mysti-
cal Experience," Mystery and I-1ysticism (London: Blackfriars 
Publications, 1956), p. 72: "The mystic and the prophet are 
not only two irreconcilable religious types, but are repre-
sentatives of two human tendencies that it is impossible to 
harmonize: philosophy and religion." 
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on God's grace and initiative, whereas mystical quietism re-
presented a subtle dependence on "works,'' being a merely hu-
man endeavor to reach God. 
Hocking's contention that mysticism and prophetic 
action can be reconciled, being in effect complementary 
stages within a unified process, thus involved him in a head-
on collision with some of the most influential theologians 
of his time. While in many respects Hocking's view in fact 
carne to prevail, some contemporary scholars such as Ninian 
. h t t' . 1 Smart cont1nue to oppose prop ecy o mys 1c1sm. 
2. The Historical Background 
Despite the long-standing liberal bias against mysti-
cism in Protestant thought and its general neglect or even 
suspect character in Catholic theology following the Quiet-
ism controversies at the end of the seventeenth century, 
interest in mysticism was undergoing a renaissance in Europe 
at the turn of the nineteenth century, just as Hocking was 
entering Harvard. This renewed interest and the subsequent 
reaction against it both had their antecedents in the Roman-
tic movement, particularly in Germany and England in the 
earlier part of the nineteenth century. The names most close-
ly identified with the antithetical positions regarding mys-
ticism at this time are those of Schleierrnacher and Troeltsch. 
1 See below, pp. 360 - 64. 
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Friedrich Schleiermacher perhaps gave first voice 
philosophically to the Romantic interest in mystical aspects 
of religion in his revolutionary Reden ~ die Religion 
(l 799). Sensitive to Kant's anti-rationalistic rejection of 
any speculative 1<nmvledge of God, Schleiermacher developed a 
theory of religious experience based on the priority of feel-
ing: if God could not be known, he could at least be felt. 
Thus, human a>;vareness of God was conceived of as a fundamen-
tally aesthetic response, a feeling of total dependence. Re-
fined by generations of disciples, particularly by Rudolf 
Otto, this pietistic conception of religious experience has 
survived to the present. 
Positions antithetical to Schleiermacher's were not 
long in forthcoming, especially in Germany. A particularly 
sharp rejoinder was delivered by Albert Ritschl, whose Die 
Christliche Lehre ~ der Rechtfertigung und Verstihnung 
(1870 - 1874) postulated a strong dichotomy between biblical 
faith and any form of "natural religion" or mysticism, which 
he claimed were Hellenistic incursions into pristine Christi-
anity. 
This view of mysticism, which set it over against the 
prophetic elements of the Christian faith, was shared by 
Ritschl's great disciples, Nilhelm Herrmann, Adolf Harnack 
and Ern·st Troel tsch. The latter was especially influential 
in the theological schools of turn-of-the-century America. 
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Nevertheless a case for mysticism won a limited hearing in 
America mainly be.cause of the prestige of its students and 
defenders, notably Hilliam James, James Leuba, Rufus Jones, 
Hocking and his friend Charles Bennett. 1 But overall, th~ 
climate of scho~arly opinion in the United States remained 
less congenial to mysticism than was that of Europe. Royce's 
ultimate, if regretful, rejection of mysticism was indeed 
more characteristic of the Harvard of Palmer, MUnsterberg 
and Santayana than were James• and Hocking's defenses of it. 2 
This may account for some of the subsequent neglect of 
3 Hocking's work, as noted, for instance, by !·1arcel, as well 
as for the failure of James' research to inspire a continu-
ing investigation of religious experience. 
Hocking's writings on mysticism thus did not appear 
in a neutral setting, but rather one charged with deeply 
felt issues and lively debate. How Hocking responded to 
this situation, coming to it already convinced of the funda-
mental rightness of the mystic's vision, can best be seen 
1
cf. Charles Bennett, A Philosophical Study of :t-1ysti-
~ {New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923). -
2
c£. -r·Jarren E. Steinkraus, "A Furtber Note on Hilliam 
Ernest Hocking,~~ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
28 (March, 1968), p. 443. 
3
cf. Santayana's remark, "mysticism is the most pri-
mative of feelings and only visits formed minds in moments 
of intellectual arrest and dissolution ... (The Life of Rea-
son, Vol. III: Reason in Religion [Ne\v York: Charles -
Scribner's Sons~ 1905], p. 277. C£. Schneider, op. cit., 205. 
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in terms of his own development as a philosopher of reli-
gion and, in fact, a mystic. For it was in the light of his 
own experience that Hocking discovered the importance of 
the classical mystical tradition, obscured by t't·Io centuries 
of reaction. But his own experience was reciprocally illu-
minated by the writings of the world's great mystics. Signi-
ficantly, hov.rever, Hocking appealed for support not only to 
his own experience and to that of the great mystics, but 
also to the experience of "everyman," which he believed to 
be the foundation of both. 
IV. HOCKING'S DIALECTIC~L DEVELOPMENT 
From the relatively scant information available con-
cerning Hocking's childhood, it seems clear that his reli-
b t 1 1 H' gious experience egan a a very ear y age. 1s parents 
were devout Methodists, and young Ernest grew up in a house-
2 bold permeated by a strong sense of faith and duty. Rouner 
recounts a crucial ,.conversion experience" at a prayer meet-
ing when Hocking was twelve, quoting Hocking's remembrance 
of the event seventy-three years later: 
Hocking did not long remember what the evangelist said 
in his sermon, nor was he very much aware at the time. 
But there was, he said, "a presence felt, a reality per-
ceived" which was beyond the details of the service and 
including them. When the call came to "come down and be 
saved," this boy 'of twelve -- tears streaming down his 
face-- suddenly saw things"in a new light." He saw 
"the real," in a way which "combined a new resolve with 
a new insight. 11 He saw himself as part of a "great pro-
cession of humanity in which each man had an immortal 
soul." He had a vision, as he puts it, of "men like 
souls walking."3 
1
on Hocking's early life, cf. "Some Second Princi-
ples," Contemporary American Philosophy, George Jl.dams and 
William P. Montague, eds. (New York: Russell and Russell, 
1930), pp. 385- 93; hereafter referred to as 11 SSP." Cf. 
also Rouner, WHE 1 - 12 and PRCWC 5 - 22. 
2 Rouner, PRCWC 10. 
3 Rouner, WHE 2. Rouner adds, "The effects of this ex-
perience -- probably his most important 'mystical' experi-
ence-- lasted two or three days. He reports no great excite-
ment, but a tremendous sense of relief and the assurance 
that he had broken through to a significant new perception. 
It led to his joining the Methodist Church." Cf. also PRCWC 
10 - 11. 
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Whether or not this event conform~ to the accepted 
pattern of ~mystical" experiences, Hocking was nevertheless 
possessed thereafter of what he later called "the mystic's 
sense of the universe. •• 1 This view was severely shaken, how-
ever, when Hocking came into contact with the writings of 
Herbert Spencer a year later. 2 Several years of disillusion-
ment followed, during which, however, he experienced anoth-
er "mystical 11 insight into immortality. Hocking's powerful 
description of this episode, while long, not only illus-
trates his own experience, but also represents the almost 
prosaic kind of ordinary life-events that occasion mystical 
experience: 
The time is 1892, more or less. The scene is the right-
of-way of a single track railroad, between Aurora, Illi-
nois, and Waukegan ••.• It is a summer day. A lone fig-
ure carrying a pot of white paint and a brush, stoops 
every 100 feet to cover a chalk mark on the inside of 
the rail with a vertical line of paint, and every 500 
feet to paint a number. The crew of the civil engineer-
ing department are measuring the track of the railway 
for inventory purposes. The chalk markers, with the 
steel tape, have moved ahead of the painter, who doesn't 
mind being alone. He has become interested in the num-
bers. 
He is, at this moment, in a cut. The banks rise 
on either side of him above his eye level; the breeze 




"SSP" 387. Cf. 
ilization," This Is~ 
Allen and Unwin Ltd. 
as TIMP. ' ' 
also "A Philosopher of a Single Civ-
Philosophy, Whit Burnett, ed. {London: 
1958), p. 287; hereafter referred to 
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are the humming of insects and the occasional nervous 
flutter of a disturbed grasshopper 1 s wings. The paint-
er is painting the number 1800. He is amused to note 
the possibility of putting this number series into one-
to-one correspondence with the years of the century. He 
begins to supply the numbers with events, at first bits 
of history -- Civil i·lar and family background. This 
imaginary living-through-past-time becomes as real an 
experience as the rail-painting, and far more exciting! 
~~~~in~8{~ ~;r:~~d~~!~y1!~:k,m~r~!r~~wy~~:=n::~;;~~ or 
~~;2,i~h=n~~:~!:~:w~~~ ~:~~~~~7sh!~;~~y~n~u~h:e~~t~~~n, 
story coincide: I paint the Now! Prom this point, memo-
ry is dismissed; it gives place to anticipation, dream, 
conjecture -- there is something relentless in the on-
moving of these numbers, to be filled with something --
but with what? 1893 -- will it be the new Chicago Uni-
versity? 1900 -- where shall I be? 1950, fairly old, 
very likely gone. 1973, a hundred years from my birth --
surely gone: "Good-by, Hocking!" I see myself as dead, 
the nothingness of non-being sweeps over me. I have been 
for four years an ardent disciple of Herbert Spencer, 
unhappily but helplessly convinced that man is as the 
animals; the race moves on, the individual perishes, 
the living something has become -- nothing; "And not 
the pillow at your cheek So Slumbereth." For the first 
time I realize, beyond the mere clack of words, the 
blankness of annihilation. And no doubt, just because 
of this swift sense of no-sense, the shock was intense 
as I realized, with the same swiftness, that it ~ f, 
~ surviving, who looked upon myself as dead, that it 
had to be so, and that because of this, annihilation 
can be spoken of, but never truly imagined. This was not 
enough to free me from the spell of Spencer, but it 
cracked that spell: the rest of the day was spent in a 
new lightness of heart, as I had come upon a truth that 
was not to leave me. I was glad to be alone.l 
This "crack" in Spencer's spell was subsequently wi-
dened and Hocking's youthful confidence in the mystical vi-
sion of the world restored by his reading James' Principles 
2! Psychology while an engineering student at Iowa State 
1MIHE 213 - 14. 
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College in 1894, when he was twenty-one. Hocking later re-
lated that 
I cannot say what its argumentative value was at the 
time· it proved nothing, so far as I recall-- it was 
mereiy a release: it left all the systematic work to do. 
But it irrigated certain tracts that had become desert. 
I began to regain confidence that the mystic's sense of 
the universe is in substance a true sense, quite apart 
from his theological symbols. I was sure that the real 
world is more like the world of James• imagination than 
like that of Spencer's, and from that time it became my 
first business to define the difference and to capture 
some rational account of it.l 
Hocking was so impressed by James that he resolved 
to go to Harvard. 2 Once there, however, he found not James, 
who was in Scotland for his Gifford Lectures, but rather 
Josiah Royce, whose critical-skeptical interest in mysti-
cism stimulated the young Hocking's imagination further. 
But James' return to Harvard in 1903, the manuscript of The 
Varieties of Religious Experience in hand, provided the oc-
casion for Hocking to pass beyond the critique of theoreti-
cal mysticism inspired by Royce. 3 Having begun to realize 
that the active non-ego of our experience must also be a 
self, he recognized in it 
1
"SSP" 388. 
2 Cf. Rouner, WHE 7f., PRCWC 14£. 
3 Cf. "Lectures on Recent Trends in American Philoso-
phy," Scripps College Bulletin, 16 (1941), p. 11: hereafter 
referred to as "LRT." 
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the Absolute of Royce's teaching. But I also recognized 
it as the object of that mystic experience whose signi-
ficance James had begun to do justice to. With this 
identification, a great strand of speculative and reli-
gious tradition could be interpreted and saved for hu-
man as well as philosophic uses. Royce's dominantly ne-
gative attitude towards mysticism, which he so profound-
ly interpreted, becomes unnecessary.! 
It was thus in reconceiving mysticism that Hocking 
began to reconcile elements of James' and Royce's antipodal 
philosophies, creating in the process an original interpre-
tation, indeed a mystical philospphy of human experience. 
Hocking's overall interpretation of mysticism, the 
outcome of a life-long reworking of positions first articu-
lated in 1912, can be divided roughly into three periods, 
following Rouner's suggestion regarding important shifts in 
his thinking. 2 The first period extends from 1904, the year 
of his dissertation, to 1918, when Hocking published his 
second major work, Human Nature and .!..:!:1! Remaking. The "mid-
dle11 period will be taken to span the years between 1920 
and the publication of Living Religions and ~ World Faith 
in 1940. The final period falls between 1940 and 1966, the 
year of his death. 
1. Hocking's Early Period: 1904 - 1918 
The most influential event of Hocking's early career 
was his marriage to Agnes Boyle O'Reilly in 1905. Not only 
1
"sspu 392 - 93. 
2
c£. Rouner, WHE 188, 239 - 40. 
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did Hocking dedicate his magnum opus to her, "an unfailing 
source of insight," she was in no small way responsible for 
t t and eventual 11 Shape." 1 Even more funda-much of its con en 
mentally, in their love Hocking realized the truth of his 
most important insight -- that the isolation of individuals 
is a metaphysical illusion. All experience is, rather, radi-
cally intersubjective or, as Hocking described it in 1912, 
"social": 2 
I have sometimes sat looking at a comrade, speculating 
on this mysterious isolation of self from self. ~vhy are 
we so made that I gaze and see of thee only thy Wall, 
and never Thee? This Wall of thee is but a movable part 
of the wall of my world: and I also am a Wall to thee: 
we look out at one another from behind masks. How would 
it seem if my mind could but once be within thine; and 
we could meet and without barrier be with each other? 
And then it has fallen upon me like a shock -- as when 
one thinking himself alone has felt a presence -- but I 
am in thy soul. These things around me are in thy ex-
perience. They are thy own; when I touch them and move 
them I change thee. When I look on them I see what thou 
seest; when I liSten, I hear what thou hearest. I am in 
the great Room of thy soul; and I experience thy very 
experience. For where ~ thou? Not there, behind those 
eyes, within that head, in darkness, fraternizing with 
chemical processes. Of these, in my own case, I know 
nothing, and will know nothing; for my existence is 
spent not behind my Wall, but in front of it. I am 
there, where I have treasures. And there art thou, also. 
This world in which I live, is the world of thy soul: 
1ci. Rouner, PRCWC 21. Cf. also TIMP 288. 
2
social here means simply being united to or associ-
ated with other persons. (Cf. OED 2902.) Intersubjective, 
as Hocking came to employ the term, refers to interpersonal 
or social experiences which are characterized as "I-Thou" --
a direct encounter with another person as a self in a mutu-
al, intimate, non-objective manner. It is expressed in the 
vocative rather than the indicative case. Social is the 
Wider term. 
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d being within that, I am within thee. I can imagine a~ contact more real and thrilling that this: that we 
~hould meet and share identity, not through ineffable 
inner depths (alone), but here through the foregrounds 
of common experience; and that thou shouldst be -- not 
behind that mask -- but here, pressing with all thy 
consciousness upon me, containing me, and these things 
of mine. This is reality: and having seen it thus, I 
can never again be frightened into monadism by reflec-
tions which have strayed from their guiding insight.l 
As Rouner relates, the "comrade" whom Hocking was ad-
dressing was Agnes herself. 2 In regard to his love for her 
and its impact upon his philosophy, ~.;e find here perhaps the 
finest illustration of Hocking's reliance on his own experi-
ence with its assumed resonances in the common experience 
of "everyman." As we shall see, such love is pre-eminently 
a paradigm as well as a source of ordinary mystical experi-
ence. 
When his magnum opus was published in 1912, Hocking 
was an assistant professor of philosophy at Yale, having 
moved there in 1908 from the University of California at 
Berkeley where he had taken a position two years before. In 
1914, he was called back to Harvard. During the First World 
War, he saw active duty as a military engineer. Four years 
' 
later, he was appointed supervisor for Army educational 
training programs in the northeastern United States, which 
. 
1MGHE 265 - 66. This, perhaps the most famous and 
W1dely cited passage from his major wor~ contains the nu-
cleus of Hocking's personalistic refutation of solipsism. 
2 Rouner, WHE 44. 
small book, Horale and Its Enemies. 1 Human Na-led to his 
ture !P2 ~ Remaking was published the same year. 
-----
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In 1920, Hocking was appointed Alford Professor of 
lil'atural Religion, Horal Philosophy and Civil Polity at Har-
vard. Between then and 1940, he produced eight major books 
and over sixty articles and reviews. In 1930, he and his 
wife were appointed to the Laymen's Foreign Mission Inquiry, 
an investigating committee representing seven Protestant de-
nominations concerned about the state of their foreign mis-
sions. Appointed chairman of the group, Hocking was enabled 
thereby to travel widely in the Orient, broadening his un-
derstanding of Eastern religions and the possibilities of 
ecumenical relations. The report which resulted from this 
investigation, ~-Thinking Missions, involved Hocking and 
other members of the group in long and bitter controversies 
with neo-orthodox theologians. Not the least factor in the 
conflict was Hocking's manifest influence on the final re-
port.2 One of the less controversial recommendations en-
1 Cf. Rouner, PRCWC xiii, xiv. 
2The eminent Church historian, Bishop Stephen Neill, 
thus evaluates the report: "The controversial elements are 
concentrated in the summary ••• which was in the main the 
ha~diw~rk of the eminent philosopher W. E. Hocking. The 
P01nt of view here expressed was as different as could be 
imagined from that of the earlier missionaries. The report 
distinguishes between temporary and permanent elements in 
the function of a missionary. The task of the missionary to-
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. 1 d "a serious inquiry into the religious value of medi-·ta1 e 
d a study of the ways in which a further place for tation, an 
function can be brought into the Christian Church •••• "
1 
thiS 
At the beginning of this period, Hocking's attention 
began to shift from a preoccupation with religion toward so-
cial, legal and political issues. 2 But his involvement with 
the mission controversy awakened him further to the promise 
of ecumenism among Christian denominations as well as among 
different faiths. This in turn enabled him to reconceive the 
role of the mystic as a harbinger of religious unity on a 
world scale, a theme that would become dominant in the works 
of his rast period, especially The Coming World Civilization. 
In 1936, Hocking was honored with appointments to sev-
day, it was maintained, is to see the best in other reli-
gions, to help the adherents of those religions to discover, 
or to rediscover, all that is best in their own traditions, 
to cooperate with the most active and vigorous elements in 
the other traditions in social reform and in the purifica-
tion of religious expression. The aim should not be conver-
sion -- the drawing of members of one religious faith over 
into another or an attempt to establish a Christian monopo-
ly. Cooperation is to replace aggression. The ultimate aim, 
in so far as any can be described, is the emergence of the 
various religions out of their isolation into a world fel-
lowship in which each will find its appropriate place." 
(~History of Christian Missions (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1965J, pp. 445- 56. For an account 
of the reaction against this position and its ultimate col-
lapse, seep. 456.) 
1Re-Thinking Missions: A Laymen's Inquiry after~ 
Hundred Years (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932), pp. 45f. 
2 Cf. Rouner, WHE 188. 
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1 lectureships which in effect crowned his academic ca-era 
The first of these was the Hibbert Lectures at Oxford 
reer. 
and cambridge, later published as Living Religions ~ ~ 
world Faith. In the same year, he also delivered the Inger-
soll Lectures at Harvard and the Thomas Lectures at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, published together in 1937 as Thoughts 
on Life ~ Death and revised and augmented in 1957 as ~ 
-
Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience. In 1938, Hocking 
was invited to present the prestigious Gifford Lectures at 
the University of Glasgow, perhaps his greatest accomplish-
ment in the field of religious studies. >·Jhile never pub-
lished in book form, these lectures, "Fact and Destiny," 
provided material for reflection which occupied Hocking un-
til his death -- including his first insights into the self 
as a "field of fields, .. the central concern of his mature 
metaphysics. 1 
1In Scotland, I discovered that the accounts of the 
Gifford Lectures published in summary form in the Glasgow 
Herald are still accessible through back issues found at 
the Glasgow Public Library. These summaries were submitted 
by Hocking himself each day and only slightly edited; here-
after the Scottish version will be referred to as GL. Hock-
ing later revised his notes and published them provisionally 
as "Fact and Destiny," The Review of Hetaphysics, 4 (Sept., 
1950), pp. 1- 12 --being the introduction to the whole 
series, and "Fact and Destiny (II)," Ibid., 4 (March, 1951), 
pp. 319 - 42 -- being an account of the first five lectures; 
hereafter referred to as "FD I" and "FD II." The second 
half of the.first series was not published until 1958 in a 
97eatly revised form as 11 Fact, Field and Destiny," TheRe-
V1ew .2! Metaphysics, 11 (June, 1958), pp. 525- 49; hereaf-
ter referred to as "FFD." The second series of lectures ;~i~tory and the Absolute," was revised and published i~ 
Ct'iC, pp. 423 - 63; hereafter referred to as "HA." 
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\ihen Hocking returned from Scotland, he was then six-
ty-five and due to retire from harvard. He was, however, in-
vited by President Conant to continue teaching for an addi-
tional five years. After his actual retirement in 1943, 
Hocking enjoyed several guest professorships and an occa-
sional lecture. His writing continued unabated; of the 294 
items in Gilman's standard bibliography, fully 125 were 
written after 1943! 1 
World War II created a crisis period in Hocking's 
life. Not only did the outbreak of war in 1939 disrupt his 
plans to publish 1'Fact and Destiny," it significantly al-
tered his outlook on world problems, deepening his under-
standing of the creative potential of suffering in the emer-
gence of any future world community united in its shared ex-
perience of God's silent presence. 2 The war also provided 
the occasion for his third major mystical experience, which 
he related years later in the preface to The Meaning of Im-
mortalitv"in Human Experience. 
He had been lecturing on metaphysics at Harvard dur-
ing the autumn of 1941. The war was much on his mind. One 
evening as he walked along the Charles River, "It was though 
1PRCWC 469 - 504. 
2
c£. especially his Experiment in Education (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Co., 1954), pp. 140- 50:-160- 63. 
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tor a moment Nature were holding still -- caught in a spell 
of quiet and tense glory, unwilling to fade." 1 In the fol-
lowing passage, he described his sudden insight into "a 
t he world, as well as about [the] self, u 2 again truth about 
providing a paradigm of mystical experience, now mediated 
by space as before it had been occasioned by a perception 
of time: 
Here was _quiescence -- no seminar, no discussion, no la-
bor of categories, also no war. Time had stopped, and 
the world was now drenched in unmoving space. Space was 
endless; it was ~ space, running out far beyond the 
solitary evening star; running also through the earth, 
and out the other side. There were armies at night, 
minds full of battle-plans for tomorrow's action. Was 
it truly the same space?. Could that space, crowded with 
fighters' strategies, be the same as my space, spell-
bound in peace? 
Yes, it must be the identical space; it is the 
same world for all of us. Yet it cannot be the same. For 
no one else saw the world I saw; if I had not happened 
along, that marvel of a sky-moment might have passed un-
known. It was certainly not known to itself, was it? 
Those colors, lights, shadows, shapes, could exist only 
for a creature with eyes, stationed at or near where I 
was standing.3 
Falling back on a theme of plural spaces about which 
he had theorized as early as 1912, Hocking was able to or-
ganize the elements of an actual awareness of plural spaces. 
He passed by reflection from that recognition to a new in-
1M IHE xiv - xv. 
2MGHE: 362. Cf. 450. 
3M IHE xv. 
l.·nto the concept of interacting fields, inklings of sight 
whiCh had also appeared in previous works. He continued, 
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our various spaces, all infinite, must be and cannot be 
identical. The answer7 Space is ~ single, but plural. 
There is a world-space, identical for all included per-
sons. But for each one, there is also a private space, 
perhaps spaces, holding private responses to qualities, 
holding also futurities, not yet existent -- plans, bat-
tle plans perhaps, plans that can be detained, modified, 
canceled, as events in the identical world-space cannot 
be. 
Space must have a plural -- this we were saying 
in the seminar. And more than this, each person envis-
ages plural spaces. Then, ~ position of the person, 
the self, toward this his plurality, how shall we de-
scribe it? Each space can be called a "field," a con-
tinuum on which infinite positions, potentials, etc., 
can be distinguished and held-together. Could the self, 
as envisaging plural fields, be a field 21 fields?l 
What he had merely thought before, he was ncwexperi-
encing.2 Out of that experience came a new assurance in the 
reality of human freedom, immortality -- which had figured 
prominently in both his 11 Conversion" experience and his en-
counter with time and death, and God, an assurance not the 




cf. "Theses Establishing an Idealistic Metaphysics 
by a New Route," Journal of Philosophy, 38, 25 (Dec. 4, 
1941), pp. 688- 91. Hocking had explored the concept of 
space-fields as recently as hi~ article "Outline-Sketch of 
a System of Metaphysics," Philosophical Essays in Honor of 
Edmund Husser!, Marvin Farber, ed. (cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1940), pp. 251- 61; hereafter referred to 
as "OSSM. n 
3 MIHE xvi. 
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Commenting much later on the philosophical signifi-
of this and similar episodes in so far as they are in 
cance 
S ense extraordinary, Hocking noted that some 
The function of unusual experiences is, as a rule, not 
so much to answer questions as to open them. They stir 
us out of our habitual assumptions. They may illuminate; 
but the final answers must be in the common experiences 
of mankind -- this has become my firm conviction. If 
there is any truth is "mystic experience," it is what 
every man subconsciously knows, and what thought can 
eventually validate.l 
The specific significance of these events and Hock-
ing's more ordinary experiences of love and duty will occu-
PY us later, when we return to the mystical status of the 
man and his philosophy. It is important here to note his 
own estimation of the criteriological function of ordinary 
experience, but also his intimation that the roots of mysti-
cal experience lie in the depths of common knowledge. And 
thus, what may be unusual or extraordinary with respect to 
incidence or intensity need not be so with regard to either 
capacity or extent. "Everyman 11 is fundamentally a mystic. 
Having set out the basic problematic of this investi-
gation in terms of its historical and thematic context as 
well as Hocking's own development, we turn now to consider 
his basic concept of experience as rooted in the triadic, 
intersubjective relationship of the Self, the World and 
Other Selves, grounded in God as the Field of all Experience. 
1MIHE 216. 
CHAPTER I 
THE DIALECTIC OF EXPERIENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Hocking's concept of experience was developmental and 
fluid; he proposed various formulations throughout his long 
career, altering emphases and recasting the elements of his 
definitions. One such formulation from his middle and late 
periods, "The self meeting the world more or less well," 
1 has been taken as definitive by several commentators. But 
while perhaps adequately reflecting Hocking's basic concept 
of experience, this was neither his clearest nor his final 
formulation. 
In this chapter, I shall argue that Hocking's concept 
of experience involved a progressive clarification of early 
formulations elaborated in conscious opposition to the clas-
sical, empirical concept. Inasmuch as this classical concept 
consisted of the relation, usually specified as conscious-
ness or knowledge, between an object and a subject, it can 
be called dyadic. Hocking's formulations, building on rather 
than rejecting the dyadic concept, were typically triadic, 
involving three elements-- the subjective, the objective and 
1
cf. A. R. Luther, Existence as Dialectical Tension: 
! St~dy of ~ First Philosophy of ~ E. Hocking (The Hague: 
Mart1nus Nijhoff, 1968}, p. 31. Cf. also Giegengack, op. 
cit., p. 60. 
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·ntersubjective (or social), related to each other in 
the l. 
distinctively different modes of consciousness, including 
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knowledge, volition and feeling. 1 I also contend that in 
articulating this triadic notion of experience, Hocking not 
only overcame some perplexing problems raised by the classi-
cal concept, but was thereby enabled to develop his doctrine 
of "relative immediacy" by which he could in turn account 
for the possibility of mystical experience as the full ma-
nifestation of the implicit theistic dialogue grounding all 
experience, that is, as an immediate as well as a direct ex-
perience of God. 
Hocking may never have achieved what to him was a 
finally satisfying definition of experience. Nevertheless, 
an analysis of the three principal formulations of his tri-
adic concept, "!-It-Thou" (nuclear experience), "The Self 
Meeting the World More or Less Well," and "Fact, Field and 
Destiny," indicates that each incorporated the same elements 
expressed differently according to differing priorities in 
Hocking's philosophical concerns at the time. Further, I be-
lieve that these formulations were not in fact successive 
attempts to formulate a single, all-encompassing definition, 
but varying ways of expressing the same insight into the 
fundamental structure of experience and refer as well to 
1




sense. different aspects of experience taken in a general 
builds upon and clarifies the others. Consequently, I EaCh 
hold that the primary value of Hocking's descriptive analy-
sis of experience lies not in the progressive articulation 
of a comprehensive, fully adequate definition, but in his 
illumination of manifold dimensions of experience in regard 
to its three-fold constitution expressed in terms of the 
structure of the human psyche, the nature of social inter-
actions, and their metaphysical ground. 
Summarily, Hocking's elaboration of experience as a 
system of relations between the Self, Nature and Society 
(including intersubjective relations) grounded in a divine 
"field of reference .. can best be viewed as a dialectical 
process having three distinct phases -- the early, psycho-
logical formulations, their reconception in terms of social 
transactions and, finally, their reinterpretation in meta-
physical terms characteristic of Hocking's mature thought. 
1Among contemporary commentators, Andrew Reck has re-
cognized a connection between "the Self, the Other and God" 
and Fact, Field and Destiny, but relates neither to "Th& 
Self Meeting the World More or Less Well." (Cf. "Hocking's 
Place in American Metaphysics," PRCWC 47.) Further, his 
first "triad" is not exactly equivalent to the "I-It-Thou" 
of nuclear experience. Nor is God to be identified with the 
"Thou" of nuclear experience too closely. For God is ex-
perienced as different from other (finite) selves, being 
in fact not an element of nuclear experience so much as its 
field or ground establishing the possibility of structural 
relations between "I-It-Thou{s)." Cf. MGHE 298. 
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Hocking faced two major problems in formulating each 
of these concepts: first, to account for human intersubjec-
tivity and, second, to account for the awareness of God 
within human experience. 1 Hocking's enterprise can be inter-
preted, therefore, as an attempt to articulate a radical 
concept of experience adequate to the psychological and so-
ciological dynamics of human existence and to establish a 
metaphysical foundation for what might still be called a 
"natural theology," especially with respect to its experi-
entia! manifestation in mysticism. I shall attempt to show 
that while perhaps not wholly successful, Hocking's recon-
ceptualization of the classical concept of experience accom-
plished these objectives. I shall argue, moreover, that his 
doctrine of relative immediacy still provides a penetrating 
solution to the problem of how God can be immediately and 
directly experienced. 
1For an explicit statement of this enduring two-fold 
agendum, see the 1962 preface to MGHE, pp. xff. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF A CONCEPT 
As Hocking began his study of experience, he found 
it, as he later remarked, conceptually "tired" and ambigu-
ous, having been exhausted, as it were, and bifurcated by 
the analyses of Descartes, the English empiricists, Kant 
and the German idealists. 1 The previous three centuries of 
investigation had, moreover, fostered several fundamental 
misconceptions about the character of experience: subjectiv-
ity, passivity, shreddibility and indifference, 2 coupled 
with invariance and an overriding cognitive bias. 3 Underly-
ing these misconceptions was the classical concept of ex-
4 perience as sense-data interpreted by reason or thought, 
that is, the empirical concept which had attained the sta-
tus of an axiom in Western philosophy. 5 
The inadequacy of the dyadic concept of experience 
as facts plus consciousness was revealed to Hocking in the 
1
cf. "LRT 11 16, "FD Iu 320. 
2
cf. 'tLRT" 16 - 17. 
3
cf. "FD I" 320. 
4Cf. MIHE 51. 
5
cf. MGHE 43: "Philosophers wonderfully agree in ac-
cepting the term 'experience' as a comprehensive name for 
whatever is either real or significant. Facts and events 
ma~ have their independent external existence; but they 
ga~n living certainty and importance only as they impinge 
u~o~ consciousness. Unless a fact is caught up in the sen-




major distortions which sprang from it. The first was sub-
jective idealism, the "retreat into subjectivity," by which 
experience was riven into separate realms, one or both poles 
of which were removed from actual awareness. Important in-
stances of subjectivism include Berkeley's reduction of the 
objective world to a mental construct of the experiencing 
subject and Kant's postulation of noumena and the transcen-
dental ego. 1 A second major distortion was promoted by real-
istic naturalism, whether the atomistic phenomenalism of 
aume, classical realism, or modern behavioralism, which con-
versely absorbed the experiencing subject into the fact-
world -- with the consequent denial of the reality of the 
2 
self. As a result, 
When \ve speak of experience, what is called to mind is 
usually experience with the experiencers left out; ex-
perience just in so far as it can easily be common ob-
ject and no farther. Hume, in his examination of experi-
ence found no self; he had gone out of his house, as 
one noted rejoinder had it, and looking in at the window 
was unable to find himself at home.3 
In addition to either overdeveloping the subjective 
or objective aspects of experience, or sundering them com-
pletely, subjective idealism and naturalism were incapable 
of accounting for the experience of other selves, that is, 
1
cf. MGHE 192 - 93. 
2
cf. MGHE 194 - 95. 
3MGHE 280 - 81. Cf. 277ff., 282. 
trulY interpersonal relations .• Further, 
as a possible object of experience. 
God was ruled out 
48 
For Hocking, an adequate concept of experience would 
to do justice to actual experience itself. It would have 
have to preserve the irreducible, felt reality of both the 
thinking-feeling Self and the world of fact as met in lived 
events of Nature and Society. It would neither radically di-
chotomize the subjective and objective elements, thereby 
rendering their relatedness wholly adventitious or illusory, 
nor collapse one element into another, thus no less effect-
ively suppressing real relations. 1 Horeover, an adequate 
conception of experience would be able to provide some un-
derstanding of our direct experience of persons as distinct 
from non-personal objects of experience as well as the fact 
that God continued to be reported as ingredient in experi-
ence, Kant to the contrary notwithstanding. 
In order to preserve conceptually both the unity and 
duality of experience "as an interplay between an active 
Self and an active External Reali tyn·2 \-lhile accounting for 
interpersonal relations and the experience of God, Hocking 
proposed a third element in the structure of experience, 
the social (or, later, intersubjective} dimension. In refer-
ring to Hume's failure to find himself "at home, 11 Hocking 
. 
1
cf. HGHE 204: "Briefly, Sein and Bewusstsein togeth-
er g1.ve Werden ... 
2MGHE 285. 
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had noted that 
In truth, it is not I alone, but ~ who go out, and can-
not be discovered by ourselves in that house. And that 
same reflexive turn of consciousness which takes notice 
of Self, as of something always present, must, if we 
are right, discover the Other also, my other I, perpet-
ual sustainer of universality in my judgments of ex-
perience.! 
In short, "Experience is always and necessarily social, or 
never, -- these are our alternatives." 2 Hume's mistake, as 
well as that of Descartes, Berkeley and Kant, lay in fail-
ing to recognize experience as intersubjective from the out-
set, indeed as "consubjective." 3 Without a third element, 
the social dimension, in the very structure of experience 
to balance the objective-subjective tension of opposition, 
one aspect tended to become a prison, the other an illusion. 
Hocking's argument was two-fold; first, our experi-
ence, even of Nature, is in fact social, that is, shared 
4 
with others and known to be so. Second, the fact of pre-
sent social experience implies not an emergence out of pri-
vate experience, but the actualizing of a potential already 
1MGHE 281. ef. ewe 39, quoted below, p. 
2MGHE 282. Cf. also 273, 275 - 76. 
3
ef. MGHE 242, 262. eonsubjectivity, a term appear-
ing in Hocking's writings even later than intersubjectivity, 
refers to this "we-consciousness" of the world and as an , 
expression of the social dimension of experience, consti-
tutes a distinctive type of relation which might be termed 
"We-It" and conceivably even "We-Thou," although Hocking, 
so far as I know, never did so. ef. n:HGIM" 458 - 59. 
4e£. MGHE 284: "~e look at Nature through the eyes 
of a social world." Cf. 273 n. and 278. 
• 
1 
present from the beginning because an element in the very 
nature of experience itself. 
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With regard to the first part of his thesis, Hocking 
devoted many pages of his magnum opus to the description of 
our actual social experience of the world, summarizing it 
in terms both of a shared experience of I-thou relations 
and also of a sense of universality as the extension of our 
intersubjective awareness of a common world: 
we see objects and truths in general through two pairs 
of eyes; through indefinite multitudes of eyes, and 
thereby acquire that deepest solidity of judgment which 
we call "universality. 11 Universality is a social habit; 
the necessary habit of looking at any truth as if not 
I alone but the whole conscious universe were looking 
at it with me.l 
That is to say, natural and social objects exist in a realm 
of common or shared experience which has unlimited scope. 
As we shall see, that is what Hocking meant by the term 
"world." 
The second part of his thesis affirmed that the fact 
of social experience rests not on a breakthrough into 
shared experience from the isolation of privacy, which as 
the classical empiricists realized, cannot be substantiated 
in experience. It depends, rather, on the more or less pro-
gressive realization of a potential already there in the na-
ture of experience itself: "If, then, experience even be-
comes actually social, it has, in more rarefied condition, 
1MGHE 282. 
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S been so·, and hence is, in the same fundamental sense, alway 
. ..1 
continuously so. 
For Hocking, solipsism could only be the result of a 
failure to realize one's deepest potential as a social be-
ing and therefore constituted either a moral lapse or, pre-
sumably, a psychological disorder. ~·le shall return to this 
point again. Here I wish only to note that this process of 
actualizing the potential or implicit structure of all ex-
perience was the immediate basis of Hocking's controversial 
contention that "In any sense in which I can imagine, or 
think, or conceive an experience of Other [M]ind, in that 
same sense I have an experience of Other 1·1ind, apart from 
which I should have no such idea. 112 In other words, "the 
Idea of a social experience would not be possible, unless 
such an experience were actual." 3 This proposition itself 
rests on a principle taken from communications theory and 
its metaphysical correlate. The principle which Hocking 
adopted from "the logic of communications" states simply 
that "In order that any two beings should establish communi-
cation, they must already have something in common." 4 Today 
1 I-1GHE 2 7 3 • 
2MGHE 274. 
3Ibid., original emphasized. 
4MGHE 272, original emphasized. The importance of 
communications theory in Hocking's early philosophy is re-
flected significantly in the subtitle proposed for his dis-
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thiS shared ground required as the condition for the possi-
bilitY of communication is generally described as "the 
field of reference" or "field of experience." 1 In similarly 
describing this common field, Hocking anticipated much lat-
er developments in theory. He also thereby introduced the 
theme which he would develop into a major metaphysical 
statement and even at this date provided the basis for his 
effort to ,.surmount" solipsism: 
For when I consider the two beings, prior to their com-
munication, as apart from one another, I must consider 
at the same time the field through which they must pass 
to approach each other: and this field is already a com-
mon field.2 
The fact of communication thus entails an underlying 
region of mutuality between communicators: "All actual ap-
proach implies a deeper-going presence as an accomplished 
fact." 3 Here we find in different language the metaphysical 
principle on which Hocking 1 s argument ultimately rests: all 
possibility depends on a prior actuality. 4 Experience can 
sertation: "Philosophy of Communication, Part I," which, 
Gilman notes in the standard bibliography, "announc[es] its 
central theme and indicat[es] the author's further plans 
for research and publication on that topic." ( PRCW'C 469. Cf. 
also Rouner, WHE 86f£. 
1 
. Cf. Wilbur Schramm, 11 How Communication Works,"~ ~ed7a ~ Society, Alan Wells, ed. (Palo Alto, California: Nat~onal Press Books, 1972), p. 184. 
2MGHE 272. 
3MGHE 273. 
4This classical principle, actus prior ~ potentia, 
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become explicitly social because it was antecedently so-
. 1 that is, implicitly so by nature of the metaphysical c1a , · 
structure of experience as a triadic relationship of I, It 
and Thou(s). In a later article, Hocking would refer to 
this in terms of a process of explicitation or specifica-
tion of "that latent or unfulfilled intersubjectivity under-
lying the entire social life of mankind in which the indivi-
dual Thou's of the •we• are a mere algebraic •x.'"l As a 
universal capacity for social experience, this latent inter-
subjectivity needs only the appropriate occasion for its 
actualization: "This • x• is always capable of specification, 
and always finding it as individual persons enter the scene 
and constitute a wholly concrete group, with its own identi-
2 ty and very likely its own proper name... Thus, Hocking 
concluded, "if there were no [prior] experience of 'we' 
there could be no [subsequent] idea of •we.• In some degree, 
intersubjectivity is either everywhere or nowhere." 3 
was first formulated by Aristotle {Cf. Metaphysics 1049b4 -
10Sla3) and, as refined by Thomas Aquinas, became a corner-
stone of scholastic philosophy for centuries (cf. Summa 
Theologiae, I, Q. 3, a. 1; Q. 77, a. 1; Summa Contra Gen-
tiles, I, 16, 3 and elsewhere.) Hocking clearly appears-to 
this principle in related contexts as well: ..... the in-
herent publicity of Nature, the fitness of all its objects 
to be communally experienced, is no empty potentiality, but 
a potentiality founded (like other potentialities) on some 





Hocking pursued this line of investigation beyond 
the relationship of possibility to actuality. Already sensi-
tized to the need for a field to ground the possibility of 
communication, he realized. that the condition for the possi-
bility of all intersubjective experience had to be a prior 
agency possessing a social character which could constitute 
a field of experience in which all further communication 
could be grounded. For Hocking, only Gad could be such an 
agency. For God alone could call the Self into existence 
through the natural and social media of the World by first 
establishing the Self in its fundamental intersubjectivity, 
1 that is, as a Thou. Moreover, all specific fields of ex-
perience are limited and relative with regard to space and 
time. But if intersubjectivity is primordially universal, 
as it has to be to account for the fact of universal social 
experience, then there had to be an unlimited, absolute 
field of reference to ground the possibility of all such ex-
perience. As the Field of all fields, God was for Hocking 
the ultimate ground of experience. But by Hocking's logic, 
such an idea of God implied an experience of God, and thus 
arose his second problematic: does God ever enter human ex-
perience in any way recognizable as the ground of all experi-
ence? Turning to actual human experience, Hocking found just 
such a claim in the writings of the mystics, who not only 
1 Cf. MGHE 295 - 97. 
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described their own direct and immediate experiences of God, 
but also declared ·that such experiences were within the ca-
pacitY of everyone. 
Thus, for Hocking the solution to the two-fold pro-
blem of modern philosophy came to hand early in his career 
if, indeed, he would spend a lifetime elaborating its full 
significance. Intersubjectivity is not merely an achievement 
but in a more radical sense, the pre-condition for the pos-
' . 
sibility of all experience. God, as the ground of experience, 
is not simply encountered as an object among other objects, 
but recognized or 11 discovered" as the Field of our experi-
ence of Self, Nature and Society. 1 Furthermore, God is so 
discovered not merely as an impersonal background or fringe 
of consciousness, but as "Thou" -- a distinctively unique 
Presence addressing the Self in the depths of experience and 
dimly perceived by all as an intimate, infallible associate. 2 
The transition in experience from other minds to the 
Other Mind (that is, God) as the "Thou of the ~·lorld" and 
"the heart of Fact, 113 constituted a problem which perhaps 
most vexed both Hocking and his critics. He may well have 
never satisfactorily resolved it, but I believe that he 
1
c£. MGHE 321, 323, 332. Cf. also "The Meaning of God 
and Human Experience," Experience (Evanston, Ill.: The Annu-
al College of Preachers, January 1- 4, 1935), p. 62; here-
after referred to as "HGHE." 
2c£. MGHE 224. 
3cwc 198. 
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successfully articulated the principal factors in this tran-
sition by his analysis of mystical experience. And in doing 
Hocking developed a general concept of experience which 
so, 
overcame the misconceptions of previous interpretations of 
it as atomistic, phenomenalistic, rationalistic, passive, 
invariant, subjectivistic and devoid of divine influence. 
For Hocking, experience was holistic, metaphysically inten-
tional, aesthetic, active, dynamic., social and theistic. 
That is to say, Hocking conceived of experience as a unified, 
dialectical system of interactions between a changing Self 
and a real but variable environment in which feeling en-
tered as an intrinsic element and which was rooted in an 
openness to other persons as well as the all-pervasive pre-
sence of the Thou sustaining all reality. 
1. Initial Concepts of Experience: "I-It-Thou 11 
Out of the wealth of denotations funded by centuries 
of reflection, 1 Hocking incorporated three elements in his 
1In ordinary use, the English word "experience," de-
rived from the Latin verb experiri, meaning "to put to the 
test," acquired a variety of meanings: "The action of put-
ting to the test; trial •••• Proof by actual trial, practical 
demonstration •••• The actual observation of facts or events, 
considered as a source of knowledge •••• The fact of being 
~onsciously the subject of a state or condition, or of be-
~ng consciously affected by an event •••• ~lhat has been ex-
perienced; the events that have taken place within the know-
led~e of an individual, community, mankind at large, either 
dur~ng a particular period or generally •••• Knowledge re-
sulting from actual observation or from what one has under-
gone •••• A piece of experimental knowledge ••• The state of 
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reconception of experience: subjectivity -- a knowing self; 
objectivity -- a fact-world existing independently of the 
human mind; and intersubjectivity -- social interaction of 
a direct and immediate nature; all united in a common field 
of reference. As the manifold of structural relations be-
tween these factors, experience would find expression in 
three somewhat differing formulations, the first of these 
being an articulation of the radical psychological charac-
ter of consciousness, or "nuclear experience," the "I-It-
Thou" triad. 'iihile he did not mention the term "nuclear ex-
perience" or the "I-It-Thou" triad in his magnum opus, Hock-
ing later identified these as the fundamental experiential 
thematic of that study. 1 
Hocking's initial triadic conception was already 
clearly operative in his 1904 dissertation, which was de-
liberately intended to overcome the idealistic view found 
even in Royce, that individuals can know only their own 
mental states, being forever barred from directly experi-
encing the personality of another Self. Hocking wrote in 
his preface, "Idealism has been exercised to rediscover the 
outer world which the individual self has absorbed: I wish 
to restore the stinging reality of contact with the human 
~aving been occupied in any department of study or practice, 
ln affairs generally, or in the intercourse of life •••• " 
(OED 930.) 
1 Cf. the 1962 preface, HGHE xii - xiii. Cf. also 315f. 
which this same idealism obscures. 111 
co111rade 
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From the beginning, Hocking identified the elements 
of human experience in terms of a three-fold focus of atten-
tion: physical objects, ourselves (that is, our inner 
states) and other minds. 2 Further, he claimed, we cannot 
make physical objects the pattern of our experience of oth-
3 
er persons, nor can we make ourselves such a pattern. The 
experience of another person as "thou" possesses a 11 primor-
4 dial nature. 11 In his magnum opus he wrote, 
All the (substantive) objects of human attention 
and experience may be put into three fundamental classes: 
the physical objects, which with their relations we sum 
up as Nature; the psychical objects, which with their 
relations we sum up as Self; and the social objects, or 
other minds, which with their relations we sum up as So-
ciety, or still more comprehensively, as our Spiritual 
World, ourselves being included. These classes of ob-
jects seem clearly distinguishable; not mixing or blend-
ing at their borders -- when I mean another mind I dis-
tinctly do not mean either my own mind or a physical 
thing.s 
1~ Elementary Experience of Other Conscious Being 
in ~ Relations !£ the Elementary Experience of Physical 
!n2 Reflexive Objects-TDissertation, Harvard University, 




5MGHE 241 - 42. Here it is important to note that for 
Hocking the social dimension of experience has a dual char-
acter, the intersubjective, in which the other is referred 
~0 vosatively as "thou" or "you'' (plural), and objective, 
1n Wh1ch others are referred to indicatively as "he .. "she " 
and "they." The intersubjective aspect includes the'con- ' 
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The triadic character of these and subsequent formu-
lations resulted not from some dialectical penchant for tri-
nitarian conceptual play, but from the exigencies of widen-
ing the dyadic concept of experience sufficiently to in-
clude a neglected but irreducibly necessary factor in actual 
human experience-- the social dimension, especially its in-
1 tersubjective aspect. 
Objectivity and intersubjectivity are both distinct 
functions of social experience: "I do not know my physical 
world as a world of objects and then as a world of shared 
objects: it is through a prior recognition of Other Mind 
that my physical experience acquires objectivity at all." 2 
• 
Reality was for Hocking clearly a social construction, a 
view he called uthe realism of social experience. 113 
The objectivity of the world as a whole is a func-
tion of its experientiability by all selves in space and 
time Other Mind as the collectivity of knowing subjects. 4 
subjective 11 We 11 dimension also. In his earlier writings, 
Hocking covered all three dimensions by the term 11 Social," 
making some ambiguity inevitable. 
1
cf. MGHE 252, n. 1. Elsewhere, Hocking even went be-
yond a triadic formulation of the structure of experience, 
including a fourth 11 field 11 alongside Nature, Society and 
the Self: Ideals. (Cf. "MGHE" 65.) This, however, was in 
~erms of a controversy concerning Dewey and was not retained 
1n subsequent formulations. What this departure reveals, I 
think, is that Hocking was by no means captured by the lure 
of three's. 
2MGHE 288. Cf. 284. 3MGHE 290. Cf. 298£. 
4Hocking seems to claim in such contexts that by a 
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subjectivity in the sense of individual consciousness of 
self and other natural and social objects is likewise depen-
upon a more primordial sociality: for Hocking, "we do dent 
not begin as solitary beings and then acquire the arts of 
solitude •••• " 1 His philosophy of self, which runs through 
all his formulations of the concept of experience, consis-
tently maintained that all experience is thus fundamentally 
social, including our experience of Nature. 
process of extension, the totality of possible (finite) oth-
er knowers of my world must have its own other Knower, for 
otherwise it would be inconceivable. But unlike a "class of 
all possible classes," the class of all possible knowers is 
not unthinkable, for it is not self-encompassing and has a 
finite basis. Thus anchoring his argument in the logical 
priority of actuality over possibility, Hocking moved to 
the conclusion that an actual Knower of all possible know-
ers exists if any actual knowers exist. Consequently, the 
realization that my present act of knowing something as a 
shared object entails other knowers can be an occasion for 
an awareness of the presence of God as the active ground of 
such knowledge, now knowing me. Thus the term "Other t-1ind" 
primarily refers to God as the ultimate, t~holly active and 
therefore creative knower of myself, other selves and the 
world of Nature and Society. Hocking's distinction of two 
aspects of Other Mind which are not reducible to each oth-
er, and his transition from other mind(s) to Other Mind is 
a very difficult one to follow. But in both respects, the 
point regarding objectivity remains the same: objectivity 
implies a prior subjectivity. ( Cf. MGHE 294f., 332.) 
Important here, too, is the implication that it is 
impossible to encompass the totality of all knowers con-
ceptually; an infinite abyss separates the finite knowers, 
possible and actual, from the Infinite Knower. (Compare here 
the treatment of the same issue by Emmanuel Levinas, Totali-
~ ~ Infinity [Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1969j.) Significantly, Hocking's notion of God as the All-
~nower was conditioned by time. As he was fond of saying, 
(God does not know what I am going to do this afternoon. •• Cf. Rouner, WHE 107.) 
1MGHE 299. 
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A Self for Hocking was a system of systems -- a sys-
tero of behavior and meanings (mind) interrelated with a 
system of facts (body) which is the interface between the 
mind and the "exosystems" of Nature and Society. Mind is 
balf of Nature and the body is part of Nature as well as an 
instrument of mind. 1 The "whole" of reality is thus on one 
level the community of selves and on another the Self to-
qether with its natural environment. But in so far as the 
objects of Nature are common to many selves, the physical 
environment is the overall context and yet also part of the 
community of selves: 
A self, we have said, is a process of intercourse with 
reality: cut away the objects and there is no process, 
the mind becomes a seeing without light. The empty mind 
is equivalent to no mind; hence we speak of the out-
world as its 'contents,• and draw the mind's boundary 
not at the eyes but far and away in front of them. The 
self must include something of its objects.2 
But if the world of natural objects is part of the 
mind, so also are its social objects: ..... among its ob-
jects are its fellow selves, its society; the boundary of 
the self must be drawn as to include something of them al-
so."3 Ul · t~mately, the Whole thus includes the community of 
1 
. Cf. ~ Self Its Body and Freedom (New Haven: Yale Un~versity Press, 1928), pp. 23£.; hereafter referred to as 
SBF. 
2Ms 232. Cf. also the famous passage in MGHE 265 - 66. 
3Ms 343. Cf. HNR 173: " ••• social experience is an int~gral part of individual experience, since individual ex-
Per1ence has neither its complete data nor its working tools 
apart from social interaction." 
the World of fact, and the Self conscious of both 
selves, 
as well as of itself. 
Ingredient in each conscious Self are sensations, 
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emotions and will; ideas and feelings; and subconscious 
elements: instincts, memories, habits and repressed factors. 
These latter are a non-thinking aspect of Self, more akin 
to feeling than to thought. 1 By the subconscious, Hocking 
did not mean some special faculty or a "superhuman resource," 
but a marginal area of ordinary consciousness voluntarily 
"condemned to death" to enable the Self to "gain firmness 
in the saddle of practical self-possession," that is, to 
2 become the "artificial self." 
1ch. MGHE lOS. 
2KGHE 371, 414. For Hocking the subconscious has two 
aspects, the allied and the critical. The former is subcon-
scious in so far as "it is not being thought of, though it 
is being thought with." (MGHE 527.) Its contents are, rough-
ly, "the instincts that we inherit and the habits we form; 
also the memories we store, and all the system of ideas with 
which we do our perceiving. It contains the habits of ap-
preciation we build up and the habits of decision -- in 
short, our 'character.'., (Ibid.} Active in all experience, 
the elements of the allied subconscious are always suscepti-
ble of becoming objects of reflective scrutiny. By contrast, 
the critical subconscious is 'a consciousness of objects 
wh~ch ~, the artificial person, have chosen not to be con-
SC1ous of. It is the unchosen or repressed, marginal life 
Of the mind, maintaining an existence of protest, like a 
sort of bad conscience." (MGHE 528.} This aspect of con-
sciousness is also influential in everyday life, but not 
susceptible to deliberate scrutiny as is the allied sub-
consciousness. With James, Hocking insisted that there are 
no real divisions in consciousness; both aspects of the sub-
;onscious Self are within consciousness, so that the only 
f proper contrast is between the subconscious and the arti-icial self." (MGHE 528, n. 1; cf. 537.} 
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The artificial self is that "made" (or "remade") 
Self consequent on the practical necessity of directing at-
tention to partial aspects as opposed to the whole of ex-
perentiable reality. Conversely, the "natural self" is the 
whole Self --"the stark and original self," 1 the conscious 
and the subconscious self, the full integrity of which seems 
-
to be felt only in childhood and in rare moments of mystical 
revelation. 2 The artificial self is the socially-constructed 
self in its relations with others, especially as these rela-
tions are the result of the exigencies of social life it-
self: strenuousness, resistance to criticism and organic 
qrowth. 3 (One function of mystical experience is rejoining 
the artificial and subconscious selves by countering the 
force of social demands, as we shall see.) 
In both his earlier and later periods, Hocking thus 
stressed the wholeness of the Self against any effort to 
1MGHE 438. 
2
cf. MGHE 527; cf. 430. 
3
cf. MGHE 531 - 33. Revising the concepts of the Self 
and the subconscious some forty years later, Hocking re-
placed the term "artificial" with "excursive" and contrasted 
the excursive self with the 11 reflective" self, the equiva-
lent of the "natural self'' of his early works. The fundamen-
tal thrust of his argument was the same. However, rather 
than finding the subconscious self peripheral to the excur-
sive self, he now located it "at the center of selfhood, and 
~he invidious term 'subconsciousness.'" he declared, "is an 
~nept recognition of the fact that the primary springs of 
~elfhood are not habitually at the focus of its outgoing 
lnterests." (MIHE 50.) 
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fragment it. The Self is individual. But it is also inte-
grated -- composed of differentiated functions and aspects. 
The division between consciousness and subconsciousness is 
a tension of opposition within a single conscious Self. Fur-
ther, if the Self can only be truly grasped in its whole-
ness because it is primarily a whole, it must also be 
grasped in its relatedness. The Self cannot be understood 
in isolation because it does not exist in isolation. It is 
structurally related to other selves by direct interactions 
such as lov~ as well as by the media of natural and social 
objects. 
The "I" of nuclear experience, the constant if often 
"invisible" (i.e., pre-reflexive) "!-think" which can be 
added to every fact of which we are conscious, is therefore 
found in the specific, concrete events of Nature and Society 
as a social Self. The "invisibility" of the Self is in large 
measure the consequence of the social character of experi-
ence itself, for, as Hocking observed, 11 it is not I alone, 
but~ who go out ...... l The we-consciousness of consubjec-
tive experience is prior to the !-consciousness of Cartesian 
individualism and Kant' S· transcendental ego. As modern de-
velopmental psychology as shown, every "I" is a partial "We" 
discovered by a gradual process of disengagement. The I-Thou 
<-It) consciousness of intersubjectivity is already a step 
1MGHE 281. 
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away from (or perhaps back toward} the primordial a~vareness 
of We{-It) • 
In Types 2f Philosophy, Hocking acknowledged this di-
mension of primordial awareness in social experience to be 
a psychological fact: 
At the beginning of experience, whatever is other-than-
self, acting on self, is other self; the infant's social 
awareness is contemporary with his recognition of sensa-
tion as the inner aspect of an outer action, addressed 
to him: his sense experience is a direct social experi-
ence.! 
The newborn infant has no explicit awareness of the .. It" 
world as different from its own being, nor does it have a 
distinct concept of itself as separate from the environmen-
2 tal activity to which it reacts. In particular, the infant 
fails to perceive itself as distinct from ita mother or oth-
er social "objects ... 3 Only gradually does the infant begin 
to distinguish itself from other selves and from the fact-
world. For some years afterward, the child continues to per-
sonify inanimate objects. 
The sociality of experience is not merely an adventi-
tious psychological fact, however; it is rooted in the very 
1TP 192. 
2The "it 11 of Hocking's first triad is the World or 
Fact of his later formulations. As the manifold collectivity 
of natural and social objects and relations, "It'~ refers to 
everything which is not 11 We," "I," or "Thou." For World as 
Nature and Society, cf. MGHE 157, 230f., 236, etc. 
3 Cf. Jean Piaget, The Construction of Reality in the 
£hild (New York: Ballantine Books ed., 1954T, chapters 1 - 2. 
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structure of experience. The infant's a\'v'areness of being a 
kind of all-inclusive selfhood is a nascent reflection cf 
~etaphysical fact. Thus, taking an ordinary adult experi-
ence as his point of departure, Hocking could also observe 
that 
Love, an admission into identity with Being-other-than-
self, the human-other in the foreground, includes the 
world-other in its natural sweep: it is our most direct 
partnership with the life~within-nature, our most im-
mediate awareness of the Real. Its most familiar form,· 
that of ordinary human communication, is an experience 
of receiving-and-invading in which the solitary I-think 
of Descartes becomes spontaneously a We-think -- so sim-
ply that we fail to note the momeritous transition. In 
it, we directly share the object world. It is "our" 
world; it is universal. "Here we are," its most sponta-
neous language, contains the rejection of solipsism, 
that spectre which modern philosophy, held by Descartes• 
I-think,· has been unable to shake off. In this, our nor-
man "intersubjectivity," we recognize, without analysis, 
that the "objectivity" of this object-world is something 
more and other than alien stuff. The silent, impersonal 
"It" retains its abstraction for ~ purpose: the "It" dis-
closes itself as a "Thou."l 
All experience is thus radically social, from that of 
the infant to the adult, being both a primordial and ulti-
mate involvement with Other Mind actively addressing the 
Self. But neither consubjectivity nor intersubjectivity nor 
any other form of social experience exists without the con-
textual mediation of the world, whether adverted to or not. 
If we experience other mind(s} in our awareness of natural 
and social objects, so also we experience the World in our 
awareness of other mind(s), for no mind can be truly empty 
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and be known. Each functions as a "third .. for the other, 
thus permitting the ego to escape its predicament of self-
enclosure. The world, as shared, alone can bring human 
selves knowingly into each other's experience. There is no 
direct vision of another by some kind of psychic intuition: 
Human beings can only approach each other by \vay of 
third objects. We do not see each other: we see only 
the outer shell -- the body, and the objects which we 
have in common -- things and events in space. We are 
like persons on opposite sides of a mountain, invisible 
to one another; they cannot meet by direct approach, 
they have nothing to aim at, but each can see along his 
own path the point of junction, the rendezvous: by way 
of this third object they meet. Likewise with all men-
tal approach. There is no direct way of comparing ideas 
and sentiments: agreement means a common attitude to a 
common object: ultimate agreement means caring for and 
serving the same causes -- worshipping the same gods. 1 All human approach of minds and wills is thus indirect. 
Hocking is not denying here that we can have a di-
rect experience of other selves -- a thesis which' had occu-
pied so many crucial pages of his magnum ~.2 Rather, he 
is denying that there can be directness without mediation 
exactly the point he had made before. The world is the 
necessary medium of both our intersubjectivity and our con-
subjectivity. It is by restoring the objectivity of the 
world without diminishing the independent reality of the 
Self that 11 the stinging reality of contact with the comrade .. 
1LRWF 33 - 34. Cf. MGHE 256 - 57 and Marcel's com-
mentary on this passage, art. cit., PRCWC 29. 
u 
2This passage should be compared with the famous 
comrade 11 passage in MGHE 265 - 66, cited above, p. 33 - 34. 
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can be restored. Experience is always a relationship of 
thirds-- I, It and Thou(s), and hence the necessity of 
passing beyond the traditional dyadic conception of experi-
ence in order to describe it adequately. 
Hocking did not close his accounts with experience 
' 
by exposing its necessary triadic structure, however. The 
second part of his program concerned discovering how God 
could be ingredient in experience both immediately and di-
rectly. As social, that is, shared, experience was for him 
capable of revealing its ground, the condition for the pos-
sibility of all social intercourse. That ground is first 
disclosed as the underlying unity that constitutes the pos-
sibility of relations between I, It and Thou(s): 
this everyday process of 'finding themselves sharing 
the planet,' together with every mutual understanding 
growing out of this discovery, implies that these 
selves have always had some region of unity, or identi-
cal experience, known to be such. This aboriginal core 
of unity cannot be the result of historical achieve-
ments: it cannot be the state. It is an object not of 
social but of metaphysical reflection: our practical 
dealings with it are matters not of politics but of re-
ligion.! 
Similarly, in his magnum opus, Hocking unmistakably 
identified the Other Mind perceived in our natural and so-
cial experiences as God: 
The idea of God is not an attribute which in the course 
of experience I come to attach to my original whole -
1 MS 377. Cf. also MGHE 315, and "FFD" 545 - 46. 
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idea: the unity of my world which makes it from the be-
ginning a whole, knowable in simplicity, as the unity 
of other selfhood. 
God then is immediately known, and permanently 
kno\vn, as the Other Mind which in creating Nature is 
also creating me. Of this knowledge nothing can despoil 
us· this knowledge has never been wanting to the self-
kn~wing mind of man.l 
our fundamental social experience is, therefore, an 
experience of God, whether or not it is recognized as such. 
Further, such experience "is not an inference, but an im-
mediate experience. As simply as Nature presents itself as 
objective, just so simply and directly is the Other Mind 
present to me in that objectivity, as its actual meaning." 2 
Society, too, composed at first glance of the multiple 
selves to whom we are variously related, whether expressed 
indicatively or vocatively, discloses the presence of a 
t 
1MGHE 296 - 97. In a letter to an unnamed friend 
(1920), Hocking identified God as the ultimate medium of in-
terpersonal communication: "If we could understand the mys-
tery of our human communication, we might get some light on 
the Divine Mystery at the same time. Now it seems to me that 
we perceive each other by the aid of objects which we have 
in common, meeting in a common place and time, under a com-
mon sky, having some common interests and ideas, and most 
fundamentally, common love of truth. And before we met each 
other, or anybody else £or that matter, we knew that these 
objects and interests were not our private property, but 
were sharable -- yes, already shared with a companion who 
does not come and go. In short, it is God who from the be-
g~nning shares all our objects, and so God is the real me-
~~urn of communication between one person and another. That 
~s all." (Quoted by Rouner, WHE 41.) 
2MGHE 288; cf. 230ff. Importantly, Hocking insisted 
t~at although objective in experience, just as God is not 
d~scovered as "an object among other objects" ("MGHE" 62), 
s(o also God is not found as an other mind among other minds. 
Cf. MGHE 332.) --
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ThOU calling to the Self through the exigencies of love and 
1 
dutY• 
Precisely here arises the chief difficulty in Hock-
ing's elaboration of social experience. If our knowledge of 
God is not only inferential but also immediate, and God is 
the ground of our experience, the very condition for its 
2 possibility and its wholly active source, how and when 
does the identification of this ultimate "field of refer-
ence" _!! God occur within human experience, that is, con-
sciously? 
In his magnum opus, Hocking held that our initial 
knowledge of God as the wholly active Self communicating 
to me through the events of Nature and Society is neither 
conspicuous nor adequate. 3 But it is recognizable: 
It will be present for the most part in no other.form 
than as the abiding sense of what stability and certain-
ty we have, as we move about among men and things; it 
will be present for the most part just as our own force 
of self-assertion and self-confidence is present, that 
force by which we individually will "to maintain our-
selves in being" in a world known, by what assurance \ve 
do not ordinarily inquire, to be no hostile, nor ulti-
mately alien, thing. It will be present chiefly in my 
persistent sense of reality in that with which I am deal-
ing, and in those fellow minds with whom I converse.4 
1
cf. l-1IHE 89 - 92, 247ff., and MGHE 23lff. 
2
cf. MGHE 295. 
3




AlSO present in "objectivity of mind," an empirical open-
ness to experience, as well as in the sense of responsibili-
ty and dependence, this sense of an Absolute Other is in-
separable overall from self-consciousness "and discernible 
in all the dimensions and assertions of self-consciousness."! 
Similarly, in his 1935 address entitled significant-
ly "The Heaning of God and Human Experience," Hocking reiter-
ated his position that experience was metaphysically inten-
tional: "Experience is always 'of' something." 2 Ultimately, 
what it is "of" is reality, the Real. Thus, "Whether experi-
ence reveals God at any point, then, depends simply on wheth-
er the real is God, or whether God is the real." 3 
The two primary regions of reality, Nature and Socie-
ty, are manifestly not God. But ~ experiences of Nature and 
Society, especially in the latter respect of friendship, 
there opens another region: "Where two or three are gathered 
together in friendship there is always a third." 4 Ultimately 
this third is not merely the common world, but another pre-
sence, found not as an object among other objects, but as 
1MGHE 296. 
2
"MGHE" 61. In a brief article, "On Royce's Empiri-
cism," Hocking again stated that being "is always a factor 
in experience: ••• experience is always ontological, and •.• 
ontology is always empirical. The real is not behind the 
surface of experience but in it: a valid empiricism will in-
clude the 'what' as well as the 'that' of our perceptions." 
h(The Journal of Philosophy, 53, 3 [Feb. 2, 1956], p. 59; ereaf:ter referred to as "ORE.") 
3
"MGHE" 61. 4 "MGHE" 65. 
the Thou always there, once more, "the point of certainty 
implied in all [human] experimental outreachings into the 
world of flux, conf.usion and uncertainty. n 1 
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Here, Hocking is restating a position first proposed 
in his magnum onus. God is ultimately disclosed not as an 
impersonal item (It) in the constellation of environmental 
factors we recognize in our dealings with natural events and 
society, but as a personal dimension, an Other Mind of im-
mense presence, unlike all finite objects and other minds. 
This personal Presence is not encountered in a delimited 
fashion as a "he" {or conceivably "she" or 11 they"), but as 
a supportive, sometimes demanding Thou. But God as the 11 Thou 
of the World" 2 is not circumscribed in experience, that is, 
objectified among other objects of consciousness, even as a 
vocative presence. He is a Thou of a wholly different char-
acter from all the other thou's, grounding, circumscribing 
and non-finite. 
The reality of natural and social experiences thus 
depends on a more primordial reality, and it is in this 
sense that God is the real. The limited, contingent reality 
of our experiences of the world bespeak a source in which 
all our lesser realities are gounded. In his magnum ORus, 





ment of the ontological argument for God's existence. 1 At 
a later date, he pressed on to characterize this Reality as 
the field of experience, or, as it put it then, "the frame 
of the universal": 
There are those who doubt whether God can be given in 
experience because, as they say, experience gives only 
the immediate, whereas God is all. The answer lies in 
the structure of experience. Experience is here and now. 
But it is always more than immediate; for it is experi-
ence of an object. Now the objects which experience 
deals with change; but the changing objects are always 
placed; they stand in a context which is beyond change. 
This context we have been calling "reality"; and we have 
been implying that whatever else we are dealing with, we 
are dealing with reality, and reality is one and whole. 
It is this character, always dimly present, which reli-
gious experience makes salient. Experience gives us 
change, yes, but change in the frame of the not-self; 
it gives the particular, but in the frame of the univer-
sal; it gives the evil and the defeating, but in the 
frame of the absolute assurance of substantial good.2 
The structure of experience thus includes the "frame" 
dimension, without which the fragmentary aspects of life 
would not even have their relative coherence. There is a 
reality beyond and upholding the three-fold elements of ex-
perience, a reality capable of being consciously if .. dimly" 
perceived. Hocking elsewhere concludes, 
1
"The ontological argument reasons that because the 
world is not, God is. It is not from the world as a stable 
premise that we-can-proceed to God as a conclusion: it is 
rather when the world ceases to satisfy us as a premise 
and appears as a conclusion from something more substantial 
that we find God -- proceeding then from the world as a con-
clusion to God as a premise." (MGHE 312.) 
211 MGHE" 65. 
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Religion thus contains in itself the ultimate truth of 
human psychology (not as a rule discovered by the psy-
chologists), that the mental life of man is conversation 
with an absolute object, apart from which the whole 
sail-expanse of his several desires flaps loosely in 
divergent winds.! 
Nowhere is it clear in these passages, however, just 
how the transition is made in conscious experience from the 
immediate awareness of Presence in our experience as the 
source of our fundamental certitude, objectivity of mind, 
sense of reality and personal destiny, to the recognition 
of God. It is conceivable that without a concept with which 
-
to thematize the perception, the grounding Other Mind would 
E2l be recognized as God. Conversely, it would seem that by 
"religious experience," Hocking understood just such a non-
inferential realization: that it is God who is here and now 
present as the ultimate ground of experience. And thus the 
problem of the transition must be deferred at this point to 
an inquiry into the religious dimension of experience. 
In summary, the following elements can be discerned 
as constituting the structure of experience according to 
Hocking's fundamental conception. First, the Self or "I;' 
including the plural ego or "We," being a unified composite 
of body, ideas, feelings, will, instincts, memory -- both 
conscious and unconscious, realizing itself excursively 
(the artificial self) and reflectively (the natural self). 
1LRWF 34 - 35. 
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second, a common world of fact -- Nature as physical and 
animate environment and Society as the realm of persons and 
relations experienced objectively or "indicatively" -- "he, .. 
"she," or "they." Third, the world of other persons per-
ceived intersubjectively as "thou 11 and "you" (plural) and 
relating in turn to the "I" as "thou." Each of these three 
dimensions of human experience is reciprocally related to 
the others, functioning as a medium of disclosure. That is, 
the World is the indirect object and medium of every I-
Thou encounter and vice versa. Finally, these elements and 
their relations are grounded in an encompassing field of ex-
perience providing the possibility of interaction and the 
assurance of reality. This field, as the ground of experi-
ence, shares in its qualities in a transcendent manner 
it manifests selfhood, objectivity and intersubjective pre-
sence as Thou. It is, in short, divine. 
2. Reconceptions of Experience: The Self Meeting the World 
More or Less Well 
Hocking's second and third formulations of the con-
cept of experience can be shown to have been modifications 
of his fundamental concept rather than departures from it. 
The first presages of the second formulation appeared in 
his 1938 Gifford Lectures, fully three years before "Lec-
tures on Recent Trends in American Philosophy" was pub-
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lished. There, he observed that 
the term [experience is] full of false suggestions when 
taken as a non-committal or peculiarly secure point of 
beginning. It [is] not a primitive or unanalysable term. 
We must take the risk of dissecting it, and of describ-
ing experience as a 'meeting between a self and a world.' 
This indicate[s] that experiencing [is] active, 
not merely receptive, and that it [is] done more or less 
well.l 
Experience is a doing, not merely a passive undergoing of 
outer activity. Further, it is done more or less well be-
cause the "equipment," the experiential means by which we 
meet the world, is ideas, which are always more or less ade-
quate to the task of relating the world to consciousness. 2 
The watershed into which Hocking's initial and later 
conceptions of experience were gathered was, as indicated 
earlier, the essay "Lectures on Recent Trends in American 
Philosophy" published in 1941. In it he identified certain 
misconceptions which had rendered even the word "experi-
ence 11 tired: subjectivity, passivity, shreddibility and 
indifference. 3 Against these misconceptions were being 
1 GL Jan. 18, 1938. Past tenses have been rendered 
present for the sake of uniformity with other writings. 
2Ibid. Hocking can thus be considered only a tenta-
~ive rationalist. However, he explicitly rejected the opin-
~on that our ideas of reality are ever completely inade-
quate, with the possible exception of our ideas of God. (Cf. 
"LRT" 18.) 
311 LRT" 16 - 17. 
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lodged the complaints of Dewey, Whitehead and Wild, who had 
prepared for "a new beginning which shall unite the elements 
various protests." 1 To this end, Hocking proposed of these 
the three components of his definition: (1) The Self, (2) 
Meeting the ~orld, (3) More or Less Well. This conception, 
he argued, "evades subjectivity because it brings the Self 
2 and the World together... Thus the misconceptions of sub-
jectivism and naturalism were corrected. 
Further, atomicity is corrected, for whatever else I 
think of, I am thinking of the world as a scene for the 
detail. Further, there is always an agendum and there-
tom solicitude. Whenever an individual has anything to 
d~ he realizes it as part of a total unmastered task; 
therefore there is concern; and where there is concern, 
nothing is blank, neutral fact.3 
Experience, from this perspective, is revealed to be objec-
tive, that is, metaphysically intentional; contextual, thus 
implying a field of reference; active; and, finally, pas-
sionate. 
As in his Gifford Lectures, for Hocking "Ideas are 
the equipment with which we meet the world." 4 But ideas are 
always to some extent inadequate, if never totally so, and 
thus our meeting with the world is itself always "more or 







In his 1951 reworking of the first five Gifford Lee-
tures, "Fact and Destiny (II}," Hocking similarly argued 
for a widened conception of experience. "I propose," he 
wrote, "that \-re consider all experience as experience .£y 
a self, a 'subject,' and as experience of a non-self, an 
•object.•n 1 Once again, Hocking was starting from rather 
than rejecting the dyadic conception. 11 But," he continued, 
taking the second step with the first -- all experience 
is of a not-self -- we break out of the ego-centric en-
closure and escape the subjective bias without repudi-
ating the self-subject who seems to be always discover-
able. [ ••• ] For simplicity and without doctrinaire im-
plications, let us say that experience is of 'a world': 
it is a special sort of meeting between ~ self and ~ 
world.2 
Experience is thus metaphysically intentional or ob-
jective: it is of a world having its own "persistent char-
acter." Such an independent fact-world seems at this point 
to bear its own warrant, however. The objectifying social 
dimen~ion of experience does not arise, although it might 
well be presumed. In fact, I believe it was. 
The specific misconceptions of experience Hocking 
was concerned to correct at this time were passivity, a cog-
nitive bias, and invariance, against which he countered: "Ex-
perience includes experiencing: and experiencing is an acti-
vity detailed at its maximum quiescence, in acts of atten-
t . 3 ~on." Further, " ••• every item of experience is charged 
1
"FD II 11 320. 
3Ibid. 
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with feeling."l Horeover, not only is the "content of ex-
erience ••• subject to judgment at every point as better or p . 
"
2 but, once more, the "equipment of ideas" with worse, 
which we meet the world is more or less adequate. Thus ex-
periencing itself can be better or worse. Therefore, 
These observations enable us to enlarge our notion of 
experience to an extent likely (and intended) to bring 
consternation to any who regard it as a primitive term: 
in experience, we venture to say, a self is meeting its 
world always receptively, but also actively, passionate-
ly and more or less well.3 
What is perhaps most significant about all three ver-
sions of Hocking's second formulation is that the social 
and theistic dimensions of experience are at most implicit. 
The issue of intersubjective knowledge simply does not 
arise, nor does that of the field of experience. As we 
shall see, however, Hocking had not retracted his conten-
tions that all experience is radically social and divinely 
grounded. Even in these references, the implicit inclusion 
of ideas, the equipment for meeting the world, carries a 
social dimension in so far as all ideas are in some sense 
common. That is, we know the objects of natural and social 
experience as known by others. Further, World, as we have 
seen, contains the realm of both Nature and Society. But 
1Ibid. 
2
"FD II" 323. 
3Ibid. 
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despite such allusions, it is obvious that Hocking's con-
ceptualization of experience during the period between 1938 
and 1951 was less explicitly social in view of his overall 
philosophical project. This may be because Hocking had ear-
lier striven to bring the social dimension forward from a 
psychological perspective and in view of the problem of 
solipsism. In the following period, he was not only addres-
sing the topic from the perspective of his own active soci-
al involvement, but was considering another set of problems, 
including that of the intentionality of experience. But in 
this regard the second formulation was perhaps even more 
social than the previous conception in its presumed inter-
subjectivity. 
At this time, in fact, Hocking's views on intersub-
jectivity and the religious dimension of experience were 
being developed even further, but elsewhere. 1 With respect 
to the social dimension of experience, in 1954 Hocking ad-
dressed himself directly to the tension between the direct 
and imnediate experience of other selves versus the neces-
sity of mediation and interpretation in all experience. In 
a detailed analysis of some recent works by Gabriel Marcel, 
he noted that the "illusion of directness'' has its correla-
tive "illusion of indirectness," which obscures the con-
. 
1Hocking•s explicit writings on religion and reli-
g~ous experience at this time will be considered in chap-
ters II and III below. 
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5 tant reality of intersubjectivity.
1 That is to say, "in-
direct intersubjectivity," I-It relations mediated by Thou's 
not the direct focus of attention, 11 iS possible only if 
there is already a direct intersubjectivity somewhere." 2 
The latter case would comprise I-Thou relations mediated by 
"It's" no longer at the center of conscious attention. Hock-
ing was here returning to the principle of the priority of 
actuality over possibility. Similarly, he argued, the "ful-
filled" intersubjectivity of direct I-Thou encounter in ac-
tual experience has as its ground a latent or "unfulfilled" 
intersubjectivity which, below the threshold of full con-
sciousness, is nevertheless "our native air." 3 That is, as 
Hocking said elsewhere, we possess an actual capacity for 
intersubjective experience of which we are ordinarily only 
11 dimly" aware, if only because it, like the air we breathe, 
is so utterly familiar as to escape notice until some strik-
ing alteration brings it to mind. This latent intersubjec-
tivity, we are told, is our nuclear experience, in which 
individual Thou's, as we have seen, remain "a mere algebra-
ic 'x'" until in the intercourse of actual experience our 
general intersubjective potential is uspecified," finding 




"MGIM" 453 - 54. 
2Ibid. 
4
"MGIM 11 458. 
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The experiences by which intersubjective latency 
finds manifest fulfillment are those, generally, of love 
and obligation, including a sense of destiny. 1 Thus, for 
Hocking the .. relatively unmixed experiences of intersubjec-
tivity must belong either to the inaccessible beginnings of 
mental life or to the mature revulsions from solitude." 2 
Intersubjectivity thus exists in two forms: as a radical 
but potential openness to others in nuclear experience and 
also in actual encounters with particular persons in which 
the acquired arts of solitude are surmounted. Hence, 
our most primitive human illumination is a breaking out 
of solitude into a possessed intersubjectivity, which 
is also consubjectivity. Through the love born in it as 
a response, the discovering and realizing self is under 
pressure to spread its light.3 
Hocking is here claiming that once the acquired sol-
ipsism of individual isolation is overcome, especially in 
acts of compassion and love, there is a natural inclination 
to expand the intersubjective-consubjective horizon, to re-
late to more and more persons as "Thou" and uwe." His argu-
ment is founded on a familiar principle. Indirect !-Thou re-
lations imply direct I-Thou relations, inasmuch as conscious-
ness of the world as mediated by other minds is epistemolo-
gically posterior to an awareness of other minds as mediated 
l"MGIMu 457, 460. 2 "MGIM" 458. 
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the world. Objectivity is, like solitude, an acquisition, bY 
a property discovered by a shift of attention from " (I-) 
Thou" to "(I-)It." In turn, direct and explicit intersubjec-
tive experiences are possible only because there is a pri-
mordial capacity for them which has been specified in the 
concrete event. In both cases, the logic is the same: pos-
sibility implies prior actuality. Experience is always so-
cial or never. It is primordially social because the very 
structure of experience itself is a dialogue with the Other 
Mind mediated by the natural and social World as a whole 
and in detail. 
"Developed" or explicit experience as an articulation 
of the nuclear I-Thou-It relation is a progressive disengage-
ment of the three elements at one level of psychological rna-
turity and a re-engagement of them later on in the following 
order: objectivity, subjectivity and, finally, intersubjec-
tivity and consubjectivity. Epistemologically, however, both 
objectivity and subjectivity depend upon a latent or impli-
cit intersubjectivity, which finds explicitation in a two-
fold psychological movement. First, the disengagement of 
subject from object, followed by the full realization of 
intersubjectivity, the discovery of other selves by a de-
tachment of the "Thou" from the 11 It." That is to say, the 
Psychological order of development reverses the epistemolo-
gical order of priority. 
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The field of experience remains a latent factor in 
consciousness as the elements of experience are gradually 
distinguished. But it is capable of being brought to aware-
ness by a shift of attention from any of the three elements 
of experience to the context which grounds them. In his 
next major work, The Coming World Civilization, Hocking con-
tinued to insist that the intersubjective character of all 
experience thus leads directly to an awareness of God by a 
contextual reflection: 
~ ~ ~ that brings the I-think into the picture 
~ brings the sharableness: the simple thereness is 
already common experience, common receptivity toward an 
intersubjective action. Yet as action it is wholly dif-
ferent from any activity I might perceive in the field 
of thereness: it is silent, unrelenting, with no insis-
tence on change, more like a firm pressure-of-being 
from the unnamed, unvocal, nonintrusive Other.l 
In a shift of attention from the part, the self-conscious 
ego, to the whole, the field of consciousness, the Other is 
brought to explicit awareness in what can only be described 
as a mystical experience: "I recognize it as the will of 
another self, a purposive selfhood, purposing among other 
things the being of this I-think. It is the Thou-art, im-
2 
mediately experienced as such." 
On the basis of this discussion, to describe the pro-
cess by which the structure of experience is explicitated 
1
c1·iC 39. 
2Ibid. Cf. 40. The field of experience can also be ~rought to conscious awareness by reflex acts of attention 
1 D dealing with other Thou's and the World itself. 
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in the concrete events of life becomes possible in terms of 
the creation of a Self by another s.elf in a process of self-
communication mediated through the natural and social World. 
ThiS process succeeds "more or less well" inasmuch as the 
conceptual presentation of reality by ideas is more or less 
adequate. (It is important to remember that for Hocking 
ideas never exist in isolation from feelings.) The Self so 
created is thus always a social Self. 
3. Final Conceptions of Experience: Fact, Field and Destiny 
Hocking's third formulation of the concept of experi-
ence was both more overtly metaphysical than the previous 
two and also emphasized the contextual field of experience 
more than they did. The continuity between the concept of 
experience as the interrelationship of Fact, Field and Des-
tiny is perhaps not immediately apparent in Hocking's arti-
culation of his final metaphysic, but I believe that a clear 
line of convergence can be discerned. For in Hocking's view, 
Fact came to signify the ultimate category of the World's 
reality, the bald .. It" of nuclear experience. Field similar-
ly assumed functions of the "I" and the "Self" of the for-
mer concepts. Field also united the World of Fact with the 
Self, for facts do not exist in isolation, but as elements 
in a field. Further, the Self is also a field in which Fact-
fields intersect· the Self is a "Field of Fields." The ulti-,
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~ate intersubjective or social dimension of experience came 
to be embodied for Hocking in the notion of Destiny, the I-
fhOU relationship between God as the ground of experience 
and the Self, expressed in terms of creativity and purpose. 
fhe context of human destiny is the field of social inter-
action, particularly as manifest in science, love and jus-
tice. God is the Infinite Field ultimately binding Facts, 
finite Fields and their Destiny together. And thus the con-
cept of experience debouches, as Hocking might say, into 
1 . . 1 that of re 1g1on. 
i. Fact 
The importance of Fact as an element in experience 
was clearly stated in Hocking's 1951 version of "Fact and 
Destiny," in which he related it to his second formulation 
of the concept of experience. In so far as experience can 
be described as "a meeting of a world by a self in succes-
sive acts of attention," 2 then the "existent object of a 
single act of attention is, in general, a 'fact.'" 3 
1The categories of Fact, Field and Destiny were not 
n~vel to Hocking's final period of development, but had 
f1gured more or less prominently from his earliest period. 
Their convergence toward the end of his life as the major 
metaphysical category-system must be seen as the culmina-
tion of a process of gradual, even dialectical development 
in which the radically theistic character of experience be-
came more pronounced. 
2
"FD II 11 322. 
3Ibid. 
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Hocking had already introduced Fact in the preceding 
article as a datum, something given in the course of ex-
perience as "simply there, without apology or permission, 
with silent finality."! Its salient feature is its .. hard-
ness" -- the quality or "whatness" by which "it irresistibly 
2 displaces whatever we might imagine there in its place. 11 
Fact is also characterized by existence, its "thereness" or 
"presence in the realm of being!'" 3 A third characteristic 
of Fact is its impenetrability: "it lends no encouragement 
to understanding. u 4 
Fact, Hocking later claimed, is always accompanied 
in its singular particularity by its "shadow" -- the vague 
presence of the whole. 5 Facts occur in context, ultimately 
that of the World as a whole. The particular bespeaks the 
universal. Whether in terms of existence or of meaning, 
facts are elements in a field potentially infinite. 6 
ii. Field 
Field was also a category of Hocking's thought from 
l"FD I" 2· I cf. MGHE 485, 106, 137. 
2
"FD I" 4. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
S"FD. II" 325 
-
26. 




hiS earliest writings. 1 His concept of the Self as a "Field 
of Fields" was foreshadowed as early as 1926, when he de-
scribed the unity of the Self as one in which Nature, Soci-
etY and God interact: "The self stands as the vinculum be-
tween a plurality of space-time orders: it is not complete-
ly absorbed in any one of them, and no one of them is for it 
2 
exclusively real." 
Hocking's awareness of the metaphysical importance 
of the concept of Field with regard to the triadic nature 
of experience was noted in 1940: "The content of experience 
consists of (a) particulars exemplifying or embodying (b) 
universals, and {c) the fields in which these particulars 
lie." 3 In a note, he added, "Since these fields (such as 
space, time) are particular fields, namely the fields of 
these particular events, they may be dealt with for the pre-
sent discussion as particulars." 4 
iii. Destiny 
The concept of Destiny had figured unobtrusively in 
1
cf. MGHE 118 - 19, where Hocking refers to "object-
f~elds and field-contents ••• space-fields, cosmic force-
f1eld and one ultimate background-field of infinite time." 
Cf. also 212, 298. 
2SBF 94; cf. also 177f., "WM" 426, "MGHE" 65. 
3
"0SSM" 257. It is hard to dismiss the possibility 
t~at Hocking has here replaced the "form" mentioned in his 
d1ssertation with its metaphysical equivalent. See below, p. 
108. 
4Ibid. For an analysis of Hocking's use of the field-
concept, cf. Frederick Werner, "Integrity," PRCWC 95 - 120. 
socking's magnum~, especially in its two concluding 
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unless the original sources of history, the ultimate ar-
rangements of natural facts, the configurations of phys-
ical things which set the last limits to the hopes of 
all living beings, are already subject to some other 
control than our own, there is no such thing as absolute 
certainty of historic action.l 
While appearing in subsequent works, Destiny was not devel-
oped as a major category, however, until Hocking's last pe-
riod of metaphysical reflection. 
In Science and the Idea of God, Hocking referred to 
nuclear experience, stressing the ethical element of call 
and response which would eventually become the sense of Des-
tiny. He began, however, by exposing in the concept of Fact, 
the "datum" of sense experience, the implicit give-and-take 
which gives rise to call and response and thereby to duty. 
As a personal transaction, call and response implies a di-
mension of experience beyond the simple dyad of mind-meet-
ing-object. The first stage in making manifest the intersub-
jective character of scientific experience is the rejection, 
accordingly, of pure subjectivism: "As a 'datum,' it [i.e., 
fact] is something 'given,' and that means given to are-
ceiving self by an outer activity~ it is a surface of con-
tact between a living mind and a living world." 2 Such ada-
1MGHE 516. Cf. also 488, 503, 5llf., 515ff. 
2
science and the Idea of God (Chapel Hill: University 
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tum of experience presents me with a moral alternative: do 
1 take it as solipsistic, mere fodder for subjective self-
enjoyment, or as a summons to think, a phase of an object, 
the sign of an objective world? Hocking replied, 
The life of the man and the life of science itself de-
pend on rejecting the first alternative, and going in 
for the second; it is the rejection of solipsism, and 
therewith of solipsistic enjoyment; it is the beginning 
of conversation.! 
Here, Hocking clearly implies that experientially, 
the rejection of solipsism is a matter of moral choice. This 
l.• s I believe,· a manifes,t reference to his notion of destiny , 
perceived as a call of duty to address and deal with the na-
tural and social World as a dual realm of personal responsi-
bility. 2 A "natural'• failure to do so would amount to some-
thing like deliberate autism; the moral refusal to come out 
of one's solitary self-preoccupation and undertake the duties 
of social life would be an act of fundamental selfishness. 
Further, the fact of scientific enterprise itself as-
serts by implication that the outer agency is not only a 
source of obligation but a "Thou." For 
of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 113; hereafter referred 
to as SIG. Cf. also "ORE" 61: "There are data in experience, 
and the word datum refers not only to material accepted but 
to a need to accept, an incapacity of our knowing processes 
to operate without a raw material actually presented as gift." 
1
siG 113. 
2c£ ewe 198: "God is the heart of Fact; and with this 
Primary Fact appears my first duty, to come out of my self 
and converse with him." 
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only a living self can be such a source. This is not ar-
gued out by the incipient consciousness of the infant; 
its attitude is far more substantial and direct. It 
does the primary ethical deed of living outward rather 
than inward, as no proof could either require or reach, 
because it already perceives that which is not itself 
as a Thou, an Other, and accepts its destiny as a life 
of conversation with that Other. This is the immediate 
presence of purpose in the nucleus of the world, pre-
cisely there where science begins and also the mystic.l 
Perhaps this view is not an extreme extrapolation of 
the view of Eddington that ~the stuff of the universe is 
mind stuff." 2 Hocking is claiming that both the mystic and 
the scientist, even the infant, are responding to what is 
perceived as the call of a living self, not the bare facti-
city of a dead universe. Only a living mind has such a 
••pull." The mystic and the scientist differ from the infant 
in reaching out deliberately, fulfilling with the fullness 
of conscious decision what the infant normally does instinc-
tively and effortlessly. 
Similarly, in~ Coming World Civilization Hocking, 
moving closer to his explicit concept of Destiny, maintained 
that 
In the presence of the universal Thou-art, there is an 
immediate summons to live by objective thought (includ-
ing science) and by creative action: and in so far as 
the individual resp~nds, partially or completely to 
1
siG 114. Cf. "WV 11 473ff. 
2Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931), p. 414. 
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this imperative, God is literally, through him, at work 
in history.l 
The reworking of Thoughts 2n Life and Death (1937) as 
The Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience in 1957 gave 
----Hocking the opportunity to bring Destiny explicitly forward 
as an experiential fact. The sense of destiny, he observed, 
is fundamentally an experience or feeling that one 
is in the hands of an overnecessity which in the course 
of his world line he could not evade except at the cost 
of complete futility. The sense of power is to such per-
sons a sense of obligation, and the quest not of inner 
dimensionality, but of specific agenda, as of the thing 
or things one was meant to do.2 
In so far as this "overnecessityn is an experience, 
more precisely a feeling, it is not exactly to the point to 
account for it in terms of social demands, family expecta-
tions, education, etc. And this for two reasons. First, as 
an "overnecessity," there is apparently some awareness that 
Destiny is not of the same kind as the common necessities of 
life, although perhaps implicated in them, but something 
over and beyond them, something possibly on the order of 
Kant's categorical imperative. Second, even if the immediate 
occasion of the specific feeling of destiny were the ordi-
1cwc 83. Cf. !>1GHE 5llff., HNR, Chapter 14 and 11 HA" 435. 
2MIHE. 95. Cf. also "A Brief Note on Individuality in 
East and ~'lest," The Status of the Individual in East and 
fest, Charles Moore, ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
ress, 1968), pp. 94- 95; hereafter referred to as "ABN. 11 
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narY necessities imposed upon us by the demands of social 
life, these might well be perceived as the media of some 
higher call addressing us through them, a possibility which, 
given Hocking's respect for ordinary experience and media-
tion, provides an attractive theoretical account. At any 
rate, it is the force of conviction, not the specific occa-
sion that Hocking has here singled out for consideration. 
Further, those who express such a conviction are themselves 
d 'b ;t t 1 1 at a loss to escr~ e • accura e y. 
Hocking's last metaphysical testament brought great-
er, perhaps final sharpness to the relations between the 
fundamental elements of experience: the given aspect of 
Fact, the Field which grounds Fact both as background and 
as consciousness or Self, and the call of an Other, which 
demands a response in the purposeful activities of the Self 
in the fact-world of Nature and Society and ultimately 
stands revealed as the Field of all experience. 
Much of Hocking's treatment of Fact in "Fact, Field 
and Destiny" is endebted to "Fact and Destiny (II)." He 
added, importantly, however, that Fact 11 has the wide gener-
ality of both 'thing' and 'event• •••• 112 And here, even more 
1c£. MIHE 95: "Let us designate such persons as the 
~ystics. They are led on by something they know not what. 




importantly, Fact is no longer synonymous with datum: "The 
Enqlish word 'Fact• ••• suggests an independent entity 
standing pat toward our encounter -- offering itself, if at 
all, only to our awareness. The self-giving of the particu-
lar pact is a piece of the self-standing of the world." 1 
Fact is the fundamentally irreducible but non-deducible ele-
ment of extramental reality in our experience. 2 But Fact is 
problematic. While it is necessary that if anything is to 
exist that there be a factual world, still, any singular 
Fact is unnecessary and therefore contingent. 3 Facts may 
well be prosaic, but they also have indisputable authority 
when established. 4 In sum, -It belongs to the concept of a 
Fact that a fact is identifiable -- and this trait implies 
finitude, boundary, and presumably plurality. And if Fact 
imp~ies facts, there must also be relations among facts, 
distinguishable from the facts themselves." 5 Such relations 
are often considered "facts of a second order." But rela-
tions presuppose a background which is the context and 
ground, not of themselves alone, but of their relata, Facts. 
Therefore, Hocking brought forth the concept of Field for 
consideration as a fundamental metaphysical category. 
1 Ibid. Cf. 525: " ••• the business of Metaphysics is 
to understand the world, that is to say, the given world 
Which, as given, is one stupendous Fact." 
2Ibid. 3c£. "FFD" 528 - 29. 
S"FFD" 531. 
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Field is no mere mental construct; it is real and 
factual: "Having no specific sense-properties of its own, 
it is (in a sense) indistinguishable from Nothing, and has 
often been referred to as 'The Void.' But unlike a Nothing, 
it has properties such as continuity and measurability." 1 
space and time are such fields. Hocking, however, congru-
ently with his 1941 insight, found in Field a more ordinary 
meaning: "the term Field is not originally technical but a 
term of common speech, to which I now propose to return it, 
but with an ideal emptiness!" 2 He advanced his case for the 
metaphysical significance of field-theory by addressing the 
knotty problem of necessity and freedom, especially as then 
embodied in controversies over biological determinism. Hock-
ing, ever-certain of the irrefragible reality of freedom, 
utilized the concept of Field and the creativity it grounds 
in order to overcome the philosophical impasse. The solu-
tion lay, he advanced, 
in the circumstance that Fields, infinite Fields, may 
~ plurals. Kant to the contrary notwithstanding, 
there may be more than one total space, more than one 
total time, more than one world-order. Because of this 
valid pluralism, the apparent alternatives before us, 
as we deliberate courses of action, are genuine alter-
natives -- not pantomime: the term "possibility" has a 








Further,"since fields do not exist in their own 
right, but are derivative from events, as Relativity theory 
implies, if there can be independent events, there can be 
independent fields." 1 But a plurality of independent fields 
indicates an absolute ontological pluralism and its conse-
quence, an ultimate lack of coherence, unless such a plural-
ity can be contained by another kind of field. As Hocking 
had realized on his lonely walk by the Charles River, the 
self is such a field. Thus, even though there is "no physi-
cal transition from one field to another ••• there is transi-
tion11 and therefore the possibility of novelty, 
-
namely by a movement of attention: the Self is, we may 
say, the vinculum between one field and the other. On 
the view of the general thesis that wherever there is 
a homogeneous plurality there is a Field expressive of 
the relationships between individual entities, the Self 
here functions as a Field of Fields.2 
The implications of this insight are important and 
relevant to Hocking's final conceptualization of experience. 
First, the Self is a metaphysical category of first priori-
ty, transcending the limitations of subordinate fields and 
the closed cosmos of the conservative system: 
the phenomenal world -- that of the conservative order 
will maintain its rules; but ••• the rules are at every 
point subject to alteration of field-reckoning through 
the creative decisions of Selves. This implies that 
1Ibid. 
2
"FFD" 541 - 42. 
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while the phenomenal world is a closed system, the real 
universe is to some extent "open toward the future."l 
second, by means of the emergence of creativity and purpose, 
Hocking prepared the way for a consideration of Destiny. He 
pointed out that our creativity is radically limited and 
actually nascent: 
we human beings never create-in-toto: we bring into ex-
istence states of fact not otherwise involved in the 
conservative system; we have indeed introduced novelty 
into the world, but novelty of familiar kinds -- a nov-
elty of rearrangement rather than of production ~ ni-
hilo. Our creativity is fractional. The truth is, we 
hiVe to learn how to create; and the value of the pro-
dUCt is in proportion to the prior docility -- let me 
say to the depth of the generating empirical plunge.2 
We are, as he said elsewhere, "apprentices in creativity." 3 
Human creativity is thus derivative. It is, further, 
often spontaneous and unpredictable: "Not only is our ere-
ativity dependent on a prior realism, the new idea we call 
4 
our own often arrives without intent or plan." It is also 
sometimes the response to excitations not entirely within 
the scope of our voluntary origination and therefore implies 
community: creativity occurs within a trans-personal field 
of interacting agents. Art is a form of communication: 
It is of the essence of human creation that its product, 
like its gestation, belongs not alone to the author's 
world but to our world. For as the lesser creativity of 
l"FFD" 542. 2 "FFD" 543. 






free action implies a passage of telos from a private 
~orld to a factual world field, so the greater creati-
vitY means a passage from the world of private concep-
tion into the world of every man. Each such decision, 
and each such output of idea, is attended by the simple 
certitude that one's private thought is in its nature 
universal -- the natural, unquestioned intersubjectivity 
of experience.! 
-
Here, intersubjectivity refers not merely to I-Thou 
or even social relationships in general, but to the inter-
course between the finite mind and the infinite Other Mind 
in the act of objective thinking. Creative thought is con-
sequently a participation in the creative activity of God. 
And with such creativity enters Destiny: 11 the creative self 
perceives his product as having a destiny beyond himself. 
This, its destiny, is part of its being; and also part of 
his. The idea of destiny becomes part of our empirical out-
2 look.'' 
The field-concept thus joins the concepts of Fact and 
Destiny in a synthesis that includes the field of reference 
as well as the Self, now clearly associated with the origi-
nal notion of nuclear experience: 
••• the Field-concept •••• underlies all discontinuities, 
and, ••• once recognized, accounts for the simply felt 
u~ity of the world. Within this felt unity, there is a 
r~chness of experience which is at a disadvantage for 
recognition, partly because it is too near us, beneath 
the level of specific language, and partly because its 
aspects are mutually involved. To refer to it, we must 
use speech; and every translation does it some injustice. 
l"FFD 11 544 - 45. 
2
"FFD 11 545. 
\ 
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Let me refer to this region as our nuclear awareness of 
the world. ~d thin it there is, for example, a nuclear 
awarenesa of our Self, so central, and so engaged, that 
Hume and many after him, interested in separate impres-
sions, not only fail to find it, but deny its existence. 
There is a nuclear awareness of the intersubjective Thou-
art. There is also a nuclear awareness of bodily well-or-
ill being, of certain instinctive powers, of a general 
direction of process in time, involving what is now per-
tinent to us, a sense of destiny.l 
Fact, Field and Destiny thus incorporate the elements 
of nuclear experience, providing the bare "l-It-Thou" with 
relational content. The psychological triad has become a 
metaphysical one. Two items remained to be specified in 
this metaphysic of experience, however; the content of the 
category of Destiny and the relation between Destiny and 
God as the Ground of experience. 
Recalling his original, more descriptive analysis of 
prophetic consciousness in his magnum opus, his characteri-
zation of objective thought in Science and the Idea of God 
as well as of Destiny itself in .!:.!!.!!!. Heaning of Immortality 
!a Human Experience, Hocking found in Destiny at this point 
a reconciliation of present quest and future attainment: 
There is here something like an incipient sense of 11 duty" 
(from which will come, in due time, science); but not of 
duty alone: it is at the same time the way to fulfill-
ment. Destiny, as the elemental End, is the natural syn-
thesis of "duty" and "happiness." Into it, there comes 
by degrees a specification, that of having an individual 
1
"FFD" 545 - 46. Significantly, Hocking added, "Its 
~ost tangible elements are the elements vaguely called feel-
7ng, at once cognitive and emotional, endlessly variable and 
lntertwined." 
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"calling," in which concept one detects (i) an undefined 
something for me to do, an obligation, and {ii) an unde-
fined promise, an assurance of possible success, authori-
tative!! 
such purpose and fulfillment cannot escape our conscious 
awareness if it is at all real within human experience, nor, 
as Hocking argues, can we be ignorant of its source in a 
''creative real, somehow akin." 2 Destiny involves us in are-
lation, both latent in the deepest structure of experience 
and manifest in the imperative of scientist and mystic, Y.li th 
an all-embracing Field of Fields. And our life thus finds 
meaning as a response to a call: "It is a call to the finite 
creator ••• to fill a need which is a world need, that mean-
ing be realized in his unique and factual situation, a con-
tribution to the life of God, as the hidden meaning of cre-
ation~ nihilo." 3 
As Hocking's triadic concept of experience evolved, 
the social character of experience was articulated in dif-
ferent modes, but was present in all three major formula-
tions. As the concept of intersubjectivity became clearer 
in his exposition, curiously, explicit reference to the 
"thou-dimension" of experience diminished. It is only by 
analyzing the concepts of Horld, Idea and Field that the 
social dimension is in fact made manifest. In each instance, 
l 11 FFD" 546 - 47. 
2
"FFD" 54 7. 
3Ibid. 
101 
Social aspect is specified by the function of mediation: the 
fJorld-obje_cts, both inanimate and personal, ideas (by the ~"~ 
whiCh the Horld is met) and fields of all kinds (and the 
creativity they permit) are all common media they unite 
selves in shared experience. The possibility of such unity 
is conditioned by the presence of a total Field which not 
onlY grounds the elements of experience, but also enters in-
to active relationship with those consciously aware of them-
selves, others and the Fact-world. 
God thus enters the scene, not as Ralph Barton Perry 
remarked, "at the point at which Other Mind is capitalized," 1 
but in moments of feeling-charged insight that this, my ex-
perience of whatever aspect of Nature or Society, is situ-
ated within a context which is not only itself social, that 
is, related to other selves and known to be so, but laden 
with a personal meaning for my own future happiness. I am 
being addressed, called to become responsibly creative of 
the coming world civilization by a Presence operating in 
history and through me. 
The specific manifestations of God in human experi-
ence are matters for treatment under the religious dimen-
sion of experience: the point Hocking has established in 
his articulation of the structure of experience as such is 
.. 
1Ralph Barton Perry, "Contemporary Philosophies of 
Rel1g1on," Harvard Theological Review, 7 (1914), pp. 385 - 86. 
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that it is grounded in a divine Field which can become sa-
lient in human experience by a direction of attention either 
inwards or outwards. In both cases, the sense of God's pre-
sence has an infallibly social character. 
Religious experience thus becomes a mode of experi-
ence in general, the conscious manifestation of the theistic 
ground mediated in whatever fashion. Mystical experience, 
in turn, can be seen to represent the fullest realization 
of that divine presence. Mediation remains the function of 
experience which conditions the possibility of an awareness 
of God in either case, if such awareness is to exist at all. 
For all experience, as triadic, is mediated, whether direct 
or indirect. There is no I-It relation outside the sphere 
of other knowers. And the field of experience can become ma-
nifest only in relation to the figures for which it is the 
ground. And thus we return to the problem of immediate ex-
perience~ how is it possible for any relation, not only with 
God, but with anything or anyone, to be immediate, direct 
and yet mediated? Did Hocking, by espousing a triadic con-
cept of experience with its necessary implication of media-
tion, preclude the possibility of mystical experience? 
II. THE PROBLEM OF IMl-!EDIACY 
As noted before, John E. Smith's distinction between 
immediate experience, mediated (interpreted) experience and 
inference has direct bearing on the present discussion. 1 
According to this view, both interpretation and inference, 
as mediated, exclude immediacy in any absolute sense. There-
fore Smith denies that an immediate experience of God is 
possible, in so far as God can never be disclosed withou~ 
some intervening medium. Moreover, absolute immediacy, mean-
ing non-mediated experience, would negate the structure of 
experience itself: 
Absolute immediacy can never deliver what it promises 
because some form of r:lediation -- concepts, language, 
symbols -- always intervenes and makes it impossible to 
pass from the experience to the reality of God; infer-
ence does not su=fice because it always takes the form 
of necessity, which means not that God is experienced, 
but that something else is experienced and that there-
fore God "must" be rea1.2 
Thus Smith proposes an approach to experience be-
tween absolute immediacy and inference, "that of mediated 
or interpreted experience in which both experience and in-
terpretation are interwoven." 3 Smith does not consider, how-
1For a direct application of Smith's critique to 
Hocking, cf. Mary E. Giegengack, op. cit. 





whether in this interweaving some kind of immediacy 
ev , 
iS retained. 1 Hocking, on the other hand, as we have seen, 
clearly stated that God is not only directly but immediately 
experienced. Consequently, in attempting to discover the 
• -~ condition for the possibility of such an experience of God 1 
~e must inquire whether Hocking meant something other than 
"absolute immediacy" when referring to an immediate experi-
ence of God. 
It should be observed here that Smith's criticism of 
an immediate experience of God extends to immediate experi-
ence in general. Hocking himself held, as we shall see, that 
immediacy was to the contrary a property of all experience 
and that therefore, taken as a criterion, insufficiently 
distinguished mystical experience from other types of ex-
perience.2 But Hocking also held that all experience, in-
eluding the direct experience of God, was mediated, as Smith 
cogently argues. Consequently, if Hocking could show how an 
experience of God could be both immediate and mediated, a 
possible case would be established for all experience. (The 
reciprocal claim would not necessarily follow unless it were 
shown that the experience of God is not exceptional, that is, 
essentially extraordinary. This was, of course, one of Hock-
. 
1Following Smith, Giegengack clearly rules out any 
7mmediate experience of God along with all other absolutely 
1~mediate experience, thus contending that Hocking's posi-
t1on is untenable. Cf. Giegengack, op. cit., pp. 68, 78. 
2
see below, pp. 113 and 223. 
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ing's major contentions.) 
In the following section, I shall attempt to show 
that Hocking anticipated Smith 1 s objections by developing 
hiS concept of "relative immediacy," which not only covers 
smith's "third alternative," but also developed it further 
and more carefully. This, I believe, established the logical 
basis for Hocking's argument that religious and mystical ex-
perience are more developed forms of experience in general 
in which the theistic element, the divine "field of refer-
ence," becomes progressively more salient. That is to say, 
religious and mystical experience represent the explicita-
tion of the religious dimension of all experience. 
1. Hocking's Concept of Immediacy 
Hocking nowhere offered a specific definition of im-
mediacy. He was aware, I believe, that in general usage, 
"immediate" means not only "unmediated," but also "present 11 
-- in the sense of both spatial and temporal "proximity" or 
intimacy -- "here and now." 1 It was to this latter, positive 
1According to the OED, uimrnediate" is "Said of a per-
son or thing in its relation to another: That has no inter-
mediary or intervening member, medium or agent; that is in 
actual contact or direct personal relation." As such, it is 
opposed both to mediate and remote. Immediate also denotes 
"Having no person, thing, or space intervening, in place, 
orde~ or succession; standing or coming next; proximate, 
n~a~est, next; close, near •••• " With respect to time, it sig-
n1f1es "Present or n~xt ~djacent •••• Uccurring, accomplished, 
or taking effect without delay or lapse of time; done at 
once, instant." (OED1379.) Similarly, the American Heritage 
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aspect of direct and objective presence that Hocking's gen-
eral use of t.he term primarily referred rather than to "un-
mediated" -- its negative meaning. In one instance, he no-
ted tersely that "Experience is here and now." 1 He also 
called this quality of experience "simple thereness," sug-
gesting a mode of spatial presence or "place." In making 
"An Appeal to Immediate Experience," he wrote, again, "We 
do not ordinarily consider the world we perceive as an acti-
vity upon ourselves. We perceive it as a simple thereness 
2 
of ·the sense-presented expanse. 11 In a late work, Hocking 
similarly invoked the temporal dimension of our assurance 
of reality, simultaneous with our awareness of the presence 
of God: urn my view, the assurance of reality is immediate; 
because the experience of an actual world is at the same 
time an experience of its active source, the self-authenti-
cating Thou-art." 3 Thus Hocking opposed immediate experi-
Dictionary of the English Language gives the following mean-
ings of immediate: "1. Being without mediation or interposi-
tion; direct. 2. Intuitive. 3. Next in line or relation. 4. 
Occurring or accomplished without delay; instant. 5. Near 
to the present. 6. Near at hand.a (Op. cit., p. 352.) 
l"MGHE" 65. Cf. also MGHE 203. 
2 c~·iC 38. Cf. also 191 - 92, where, utilizing both 
senses of immediate, Hocking further describes the "there-
ness" of God's immediate presence in terms of William James' 
"quiet music playing in the back of the mind": " ••• the mu-
sic is addressed to the mind it inhabits, and to many this 
~resence takes companionly form, without any of the palpable 
7ntrusions of human companionship. It means, at least, 1 He 
ls there'; and because of this, my solitude can never be de-
serted and insignificant." Cf. also "RF" 360. 
3MIHE. 241. 
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ence to inference or indirect or vicarious experience, in 
'l¥hich an object of experience was not "here and now," but 
separated by time or distance. 
The earliest instances of the space-time proximity 
connotated by immediate in Hocking's writings appear in his 
unpublished 1904 dissertation. In developing the concept of 
the "judgment of experience, 11 he raised the subject in the 
following manner: 
A rough description of the current judgment of experi-
ence ••• is this: It is charging immediacy with univer-
sals. The more we know and the wider awake we are, the 
more we see in what is before ~, the more it means to 
us.l 
The simplest example of the judgment of experience 
would be a predication such as "This is ice," about which 
Hocking commented, "The subject is the 'this-now,• and the 
predicate undertakes to characterize it by a general mean-
ing found perhaps in some previous experience •••• " 2 Thus 
judgment was for Hocking ua universalizing of the given" in 
which he distinguished three elements: 
1EEOCB 37. Hocking first mentions "immediate experi-
ence" on p. 39. Roland Rice, in his dissertation on Hocking's 
mysticism, claims in this respect that "Immediacy refers to 
content already there and available for any future know-
~edge." (Mysticism in the Philosophy of William Ernest Hock-
~ng, Dissertation, Boston University, 1954, p. 22.) Rice is 
definite in maintaining that even in his earliest writings, 
Hocking was not referring primarily to simple or pure immedi-
acy, but to immediacy as a result of interpretation. Cf. pp. 
2, 24, 27, 50 and 153 - 54. 
2Ibid. 
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(1) The immediate, "this-now" character; 
(2) The universal character, which has various offices, 
as classing, characterizing, signifying, associat-
ing; 
(3) The form.l 
In developing the positive concept of immediacy throughout 
his career, Hocking never deviated far from this initial 
position. The distinction between the positive and negative 
sensesof immediate is, further, important, given the per-
haps subtle but nevertheless significant difference between 
their references. 
In actual practice, Hocking used immediate to qualify 
many aspects of experience, generally in the sense of "this-
now" or "here and now" proximity rather than of "non-medi-
ated. " 2 ~ihile it would be inaccurate to say that Hocking 
was uncritical in his employment of the term, immediate has 
somewhat different connotations in different contexts, al-
though within the general ambience of "presence." Thus, for 
1EEOCB 59. 
2At least the major instances of this usage fall un-
der the following nine categories: immediate assurance ("How 
Can Christianity Be the Final Religion?" Yale Divinity Quar-
terly, 5 [Mar. 1909], p. 287; hereafter referred to as----
"HCCBFR .. • TP 317 · "LRT" 43 · "DCEN" 242 · "HA" 435) • immediate I I I I I " 
awareness (NGHE 390 • MS 441 - 42 330 • "MS" 190 194 • LRvlF I I I I I 
87); immediate certainty (MGHE 449- 50 n. 1; MIHE 159); im-
mediate experience (MGHE xxix, 410, 474; "RF" 365; TP 262 -
63, 316; RM 45; ewe 39; MIHE 3 7, 246; "FFD" 548; "HA" 460, 
etc •); immediately felt meaning (MIHE 98, 159; "FFD" 545) ; 
immediate knowledge (MGHE 297: "INR" 582, 588); immediate 
perception (CWC 97 - 98; cf. also for "immediate insight" 
MGHE 361) · immediate presence (CWC 198· SIG 112 114· "FFD" 
54 I I I I 8); and the immediate sense of God (CWC 198). 
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instance in his magnum ~ he wrote, "The mystic finds his 
absolute in immediate experience. 111 Elsewhere he noted, "The 
ultimate evidence for the selfhood of the whole is not pri-
marily the evidence of argument, however, nor of analogy, 
but that of immediate experience, interpreted by the dia-
lectic."2 In what is likely his last arti~le, Hocking ob-
served, "The genius of the East has turned with even greater 
emphasis toward a type of knowledge in which the distinction 
between subject and object yields place to an experience of 
unity, and immediate awareness of its theme." 3 . 
2. The Problem of Pure Immediacy 
Although willing to regard pure or absolute imrnedi-
acy as a possible dimension of human experience, Hocking did 
not find in it the satisfaction of the desire to know, to 
love or to create. For pure immediacy lacks structure and 
meaningful content. Here, Hocking clearly anticipated Smith: 
A purely immediate experience would be empty of meaning: 
our most nearly immediate experience,self-awareness, is 
mediated by the current rill of sensation and the con-
tents of memory and purpose. To find God in immediate 
experience, which is indeed the substance of religion as 




4cwc 99. Earlier, Hocking had played upon the para-
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God may well be present to us in the pure immediacy 
of pre-reflexive, subconscious experience, but such absolute 
and primordial communion is not available for understanding 
without the intervention of some mental process. To be mean-
ingful, immediate experience was for Hocking first of all 
intentional and therefore relative: "Experience is always 
here and now. But it is always more than immediate; for it 
is experience of an object." 1 Such objects of experience 
possess real and external relations to the perceiving Self 
(and to each other), relations which are not only experi-
enced but also charge all meaningful immediacy with rela-
tivity both in time and "place. 11 Thus, "The immediacy of 
any experience must submit to interpretation by what is out-
sideit and related to it." 2 Even if understood as the su-
preme instance of immediacy, mystical experience, there is 
no exception to this general rule: " ••• the immediacy of the 
mystic experience has its external relations." 3 Further, 
" ••• the immediacy of the [mystical] experience is never so 
great as to be wholly free from outer reference, ••• some 
dox implicit in the preceding quotation: 11 This present actu-
ality of experience, 'pure experience,' finds me in living 
~elation with that which is most utterly non-myself. Here, 
7n the immediate, is my absolute escape from immediacy. Here 
~n the given present is my escape from myself, my window 
upon infinity, my exit unto God. 11 (MGHE 316, emphasis added.) 
l"MGHE" 65. 
2MGHE 354. 
3MGHE 355. Here Hocking clearly departs from Smith. 
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ldl lf - f . . . .,1 consciousness of the wor y se - and o ~ts t~es rema~ns. 
Hocking also clearly indicated the limits of immedi-
acY with respect to other important aspects of experience, 
notably knowledge, meaning and certitude. First, as early 
as his dissertation, he asserted that experience does not 
come in self-containedumts, but has its beginnings in pre-
vious experience and leads to further experience: "The im-
mediate 'for itself' is not knowledge •••• Knowledge~ we 
know!! never begins out of immediacy; but always stands 
- 2 
upon a given piece of knowledge to reach out toward more ... 
Knowledge was thus "funded" for Hocking by past experience 
as part of a temporal system which entails the future inas-
much as our limited knowledge implies further experience --
more to be known and done. Hence cognitive experience cannot 
be immediate in the sense that it is devoid of connections 
beyond its "here and now" presence before the mind. By im-
plication, the objects of knowledge are intermediaries be-
tween this experience and further experience as well as be-
tween knowers. 
Second, with regard to several paradoxes of meaning, 
Hocking again both affirmed (relative) and denied (absolute) 
immediacy: "There can be no meaning in life unless there is 
1I-1GHE 390. Cf. 11 The Meaning of Mysticism as Seen 
through Its Psychology, .. Mind, 21 (1912), p. 46; hereafter 
referred to as 11 Ml4. 11 
2EEOCB 40. 
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J.·mmediate meaning," he declared, explaining that "Meaning an 
cannot lie in postponed satisfaction in some future attain-
ment. However we try to refer meaning to an 'end' or 'goal,' 
it is the nature of experience to lure it back and weave it 
in with the quality of the on-going present." 1 On the other 
hand, he was no less explicit in stating that 
There can be no sufficient meaning in life in immediacy • 
••• Meaning is not a taste, nor any sort of purely ani-
mal sensitivity; for a human being can take no self-en-
joyment in a sub-human form of consciousness. And the 
human form is actively referring to its present some 
sort of a beyond which the taster fails to get.2 
For Hocking, then, the immediately felt meaning that 
endows life with hope is always limited and thus relative, 
both with reference to time and in terms of its own adequacy, 
which is always partial. Meaning is always provisional, and 
because of that, third, the immediate certitude of the mystic 
<and everyman) is likewise limited and provisional although 
persistently aimed at fuller satisfaction and completion. 3 
Clearly, Hocking envisioned not only the possibility 
of an interpretative (or mediated) dimension of experience 
as called for by Smith's critique, but in fact went on to 
propose a model which did not jettison the dimension of im-




on immediate certitude or assurance, cf. also MGHE 
296, 453 - 54; MIHE 241, 200; and "ABN" 95. 
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subordinate immediate experience to interpretation, a strat-
egem of Royce which he had expressly rejected. For Royce had 
held that God, as well as the Self and other selves were not 
known in immediate experience but solely by interpretation. 1 
Hocking held to the contrary that ~ meaningful experience, 
including the immediate experience of God, the Self and oth-
er selves, was mediated. 2 
3. Relative Immediacy 
Relative immediacy was thus characterized for Hock-
ing by a non-exclusive relation with mediation. 3 "Third'' ob-
1For Hocking's criticism of Royce's doctrine, cf. 
"ORE" 6lff. and "INR" 588. For Hocking on interpretation, 
see below, pp. 282 - 91. 
2
cf. LRWF: "The perception of God for us mortals is 
always by way of something or through something: it is 'me-
diated.'" He added, significantly, "Through such mediation, 
God becomes for our perception as real as the human world, 
as real as things, as real as ourselves!" 
3Hocking expressly mentioned "relative immediacy" in 
a discussion with John Dewey in which he described how by 
reflection subsequent to an experience, immediacy is "lost": 
"Accepting the maxim that the ingredients of experience are 
first h!2 then thought about, this subsequent thinking deals 
in general with the enquiries 'What is this object?' 'On 
what does it depend?' In the course of these enquiries, 
which are always pertinent, the relative immediacy of the ex-
perience of 'having' is lost; the immediate becomes charged 
with 'mediation.'" ("DCEN" 236.} If, however, the ingredi-
ents of experience are not first had and subsequently 
thought about, but simultaneously had and thought about, 
e.g., recognized or conceptualized --an event definitely con-
sonant with Hocking's epistemology-- then, presumably, the 
mediation would not rob the experience of its immediacy, 
that is, the felt presence of its objective ingredient. 
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jects as possibly '*transparen-t" intermediaries between 
selves, have a double significance. As he had observed in 
his magnum opus, 
Any connecting medium is apt to appear as an obstacle to 
direct relationship; on the other hand, any obstacle may 
discover itself to be a mediator, sign of unbroken con-
tinuity. The sea separates, -- or the sea connects; it 
cannot do one without doing the other also. So Nature 
may be interpreted in its relation to social conscious-
ness as the visible pledge and immediate evidence of 
our living contact with God.l 
But, as Hocking also insisted, " ••• let us be clear that 
whenever mediated and indirect relations are possible and 
valuable, there presumably immediate relations are possible 
and valuable as well." 2 Here again Hocking is building on 
the axiom that actuality precedes possibility; immediacy is 
prior to mediation as subjec.tivity is prior to objectivity. 
In terms of God, this means that " ••• the assurance of real-
ity is immediate; because the experience of an actual world 
is at the same time an experience of its actual source, the 
self-authenticating Thou-art." 3 
God, therefore, can be encountered in immediate ex-
perience but meaningfully only if mediated by real "third" 
entities which permit and indeed demand interpretation. In-
1MGHE 266. Compare Hocking•s notion of concepts with 
a "double boundary": GL Mar. 18, 1938; "l·lDPS" 37; "Response 
to Prof. Krikorian•s Discussion," Journal of Philosophy, 55, 
7 (Mar. 27, 1958), p. 276; hereafter referred to as "R.PK." 
Cf. also Rouner, NHE 122, and "MS" 190. 
2MGHE 357. 3MIHE 241. 
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terpretation in this sense can be taken as the ability to 
explicitate the implicit meaning (or "content") of an ex-
perience by rendering intermediaries transparent, that is, 
bY recognizing them as "third" objects uniting knowing and 
feeling selves. "Objects" are media of communication. In-
terpretation is the conscious, subjective aspect of media-
tion; both are essential parts of experience. 1 The recog-
notion of the mediating and thus relative function of 
"thirds'• becomes the means to known immediacy, which is 
alone meaningful, being the more or less structured and "lo-
cated" elevation of pure (absolute) immediacy to conscious-
ness: " ••• reaching the non-mediated is a passage beyond me-
diation, !2,y aid of that mediation." 2 For the mystic and po-
tentially for everyman, therefore, anything -- indeed, every-
thing -- can become such a mediator: 
The mystic finds the absolute in immediate experience. 
Whatever is mediated is for him not yet the real which 
he seeks. This means to some that the mystic rejects all 
mediators: the impli·cation is mistaken. To say that a 
mediator is not the finality is not to say that a medi-
ator is nothing. The self-knowing mystic, so far from 
rejecting mediators, makes all things mediators in their 
own measure. To all particulars he denies the name God, 
-- to endow them with the title of mediator between him-
self and God.3 
1 See below, pp. 182ff., 282- 91. 
2cwc 99. Regarding "location," Hocking observed that 
"~nowing, as process, is essentially the work of placing a 
g1ven experience within the entire system of experience." 
("The Transcendence of Knowledge," art. cit., p. 22.) 
3MGHE xxix. Here and in the previous quotation, Hock-
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The triadic str~cture of experience entails that all 
experience is mediated. It also enables the ~ystic (and 
Hocking) to avoid pantheism, for even the Hhole of experi-
ence, when taken as an "object" of conscious reflection, is 
not thereby identified with God, but mediates God. Every 
"part" of the Whole is likewise a possible intermediary be-
cause of the actual mediation of the Whole. 1 
4. Conclusion 
In summary, Hocking's doctrine of immediacy can be 
expressed in the following propositions. Pure or absolute 
immediacy lies below (or above) the threshold of conscious 
meaning and can be termed "experience" only in a limited 
sense. All consciously meaningful experience is, conversely, 
always mediated to some degree. Such interpreted experience 
can either be 11 relatively 11 immediate or inferential, that is, 
deductive or inductive. And thus, mediation is not an obsta-
cle to immediate experience in the sense of direct presence 
11 here and now," but a means to it, i.e., to known immediacy. 
Hence Hocking could claim without inconsistency or 
ing may have alluded to a third level of immediacy, a "pure .. 
experience of God which transcends all consciousness of the 
media which ''trigger" it. :·ihether such an experience could 
be meaningful in its moment is doubtful by Hocking's criter-
ia as well as Smith • s. The raptures of the mystics, 'tvhich 
are subsequently identified as a pure awareness of God, 
could readily fit such a description. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologiae, II-II, Q. 180, a. s. 
1 See below for discussion, pp. 147f., 193ff., 197, 
202ff. 
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tradiction that God can be experienced first, in a direct con 
out restricted, pre-reflexive manner (i.e., in absolute im-
mediacy) as a presence of which we are at most only "dimly" 
aware. second, God can also be experienced in a direct but 
mediated manner (i.e., relative immediacy), in which the dim 
awareness of his presence is raised to fuller consciousness 
by the interpretation of the media of s:elf, Nature and Soci-
ety. Third, God can be indirectly experienced in the events 
of everyday life as well as in rapturous experiences of ab-
solute immediacy in so far as both are subject. to later in-
terpretation or inference. 
Consequently, it seems evident that it is not useful 
to categorize experience as "immediate," "interpretedw and 
"inferred" with Smith (and Giegengack) in so far as for 
Hocking all meaningful experience, including (relatively) 
immediate experience, is both mediated and interpreted. Even 
absolute immediacy remains open to later interpretation. 
Two alternatives are possible: experience can be dis-
tinguished either (1) as absolutely (purely) immediate, re-
latively immediate and inferential; or, (2) as direct, com-
posed of both absolute and relative immediacy, and indirect, 
that is, inference. In either case, absolute immediacy must 
be sharply distinguished from relative immediacy. A diffi-
culty lies in Hocking's reticence to refer to absolute im-
mediacy as experience in any but a marginal sense since, 
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being without known external relations, it is (in its mo-
ment} un-mediated, un-interpretable and therefore devoid of 
meaning. Subject to later or even simultaneous interpreta-
tion, however, even absolute immediacy remains in some sense 
related to both conscious, relative immediacy and infer-
ential or reflexive experience. 
If Hocking had used another term for either "'immedi-
ate" or "mediation," or if he had more systematically de-
veloped his concept of "relative immediacy," a good deal of 
ambiguity could have been avoided. His occasional failure 
to qualify immediate, allowing the context to provide the 
appropriate connotation, is particularly liable to produce 
misunderstanding, especially if one has a univocal concept 
of immediacy. 
Nevertheless, I believe that, overall, Hocking es-
caped the dilemma posed by Smith. Further, I believe that 
the articulation of his doctrine of relative immediacy pro-
posed above avoids the difficulty of how God can be experi-
enced within human experience short of becoming an object 
among other objects. In fact, Smith's rejection of the al-
leged immediacy of mystical experience, far from weakening 
Hocking's position, virtually reiterates it: 
A pure empiricism of immediacy such as can be found in 
~ysticism, where God is disclosed without a medium, as 
~t were, would seem to demand that the reality or exist-
ence of God be given along with the immediate experi-
ence itself. If, however, we deny that there can be an 
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absolutely immediate experience that is also meaning-
ful it follows that any supposed experience of God 
wouid have to be mediated in some way.l 
Hocking, of course, would simply deny that in mysti-
cal experience, God is ever disclosed without a medium. For 
him, if God is to be meaningfully disclosed, it must be 
!Prough some medium. In this, Hocking is in full agreement 
with the classical Western mystical tradition, as we shall 
2 have occasion to recall. Further, by elaborating the im-
plications of his triadic conception of experience, Hocking 
also established the logical basis for his investigation of 
religious and mystical experience as well as his argument 
that these forms of experience are not different in kind 
from other experience, but represent the fuller develop-
ment of the triadic character of all experience. As such, 
they are at least potentially the common inheritance of 
all human persons. 
1
smith, op. cit., p. 52. Elsewhere Smith argues 
against mysticism in even stronger terms but along the same 
lines as above. ( Cf. 11 In ltfhat Sense Can We Speak of Experi-
encing God'?" Journal of Religion, 50 [1970], pp. 229- 44.) 
However, as with the objections brought forward in his 
book, the latter do not hold against Hocking's concept of 
relative immediacy but only against claims that God is ex-
perienced in absolute immediacy. For a recent discussion 
provoked by Smith's approach, cf. Robert A. Oakes, "Sensi-
ble Experience of God, 11 The New Scholasticism, 48, 2 
(Spring, 1974), pp. 171- 84; Edward Walter, "Can There Be 
Sensible Experience of God'?" Ibid., 48, 4 (Autumn, 1974), 
pp. 519 - 26; and Robert A. Oakes, 11 Sensible Experience of 
God-- Once Again," Ibid., 49, 3 (Summer, 1975), pp. 341 -43. 
2For Hocking and immediacy, cf. Reck, art. cit.; for 
rn¥sticism as "the recovery of immediacy," cf. Furse, op. 
C~t., pp. 14 - 17, 45, SOf., 186 - 201. 
!II. l'HE t1ZriNING AND S·l'RUCTURE OF riU:1AH EXPERIENCE: 
CONCLUSION 
Following the line of argumentation so far exposed, 
the meaning of experience in general, that is, the purpose 
it serves and therefore the value it has, could only lie for 
Hocking in the progressive realization of the intersubjective 
unity of persons,· Nature and Society in God. The meaning of 
experience is community, community which involves communion 
with God or, rather, rests upon communion with God. In both 
individual and social experience, this unification occurs 
'11 } . h. l I h h . f . (or w1 occur 1n 1story. nasmuc as t e un1 y1ng pre-
sence of God in individual and social history occurs in a 
movement of progressive explicitation, it is likely that the 
meaning of human experience will be most keenly felt in the 
individual and social dimensions of that realm of experience 
called religious. For religion and religious experience 
mark the frontier for Hocking between the latent and mani-
fest awareness of God as Thou. In other words, in religious 
experience we should expect to find the more explicit mean-
ing of all human experience, its essence as well as its ma-
nifestation; For the structure of experience itself, as a 
triadic interrelationship of the Self, the World and other 
selves, is grounded in a field of reference which not only 
1
see MGHE Chapter 33, "The unifying of History, .. pp. 
515 - 24; GL Jan. 21, 1939; ,.HA 11 Lecture X, pp. 456 - 63. 
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b les the act of community, that is, communication, to ena . 
Ur but itself enters into communication and communion occ , 
as a personal agency. 
Each of the three concepts of experience developed 
bY Hocking to illuminate different aspects of human exist-
ence-- its psychological 1'interior," its sociological "ex-
terior," and its metaphysical significance-- are also re-
lated to each other as moments of a dynamic, i.e., temporal, 
process of development. That is to say, these aspects of 
human existence succeed each other in the life history of 
the individual as it unfolds in a progressive explicitation 
of the meaning of. experience. The agency of explicitation 
is the course of experience itself, the more or less ade-
quate interplay in which the universal capacities of the 
Self are particularized in actual encounters with individual 
persons and the facts of the natural and social World. Ex-
perience is thus structured both as a state and a process. 
As structural elements, Nature, Self and Society are 
progressively related by antitheses of predominantly objec-
tive and subjective moments culminating in a unified subjec-
tive-objective synthesis of intersubjective or consubjec-
tive awareness. While vulnerable to criticism as an abstract 
and somewhat forced conceptualization of the dynamic and 
concrete process described at some length by Hocking, the 
following sketch is intended to indicate the movement of 
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con~cious development from the objective to the intersub-
jective aspects of experience, beginning from the experi-
ence of Nature. 
Taken as a whole, which is apparently how children 
and "primitives" take Nature in large measure, the objec-
tive World manifests a character of power and sometimes of 
threat. 1 The subjective response is one of a sense of help-
lessness, fear, often of reverence or fascination, but just 
as likely of horror -- leading withal to a demand for jus-
tice addressed to the World of Nature as a primordial Thou: 
the intersubjective moment. 2 
As mysterious, further, Nature in its objective power 
is revealed as somehow already known, for it is discovered 
to be knowable, perhaps endlessly knowable. But it is never 
discovered as knowable only by me; it is at least potential-
ly known by others, even by all others. Such possible know-
ledge rests on some actual knowledge of the Whole. Accord-
ingly, the change of person and voice grammatically from 
"it is known" to "he knows it" has an apparently universal 
range in actual occurrence. 3 The subjective correlate is 
the conscious response to mystery-- the awareness of one's 
own ignorance of what can be but is not yet known, although 
1For the "dialectic of Nature," cf. HGHE 6, 229ff., 
and TP 265. 
2MGHE 146. 
3
cf. MGHE 334ff.; cf. also 308ff. 
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"he knov;s it." 1 The intersubjective moment is the discovery 
that the World is shared and belongs to us. In knowing the 
2 
common world, one knows the Other. 
A third dialectical moment in Nature springs from 
the discovery of the common world. Nature as knowable calls 
forth the subjective sense of obligation actually to know, 
the imperative of science. 3 The intersubjective or consub-
jective aspect of knowing the world as shared in terms of a 
call to know it further is the emergence of "con-science" 
a community of knowers morally interrelated as if knowing 
were done in the presence of a universal onlooker. 4 
Experiences of one's own self and of society are si-
milarly structured by moments of objectivity and subjecti-
vity, culminating (ideally) in an intersubjective or consub-
jective synthesis. First, one's inner life has its moments 
of objectivity which include the contents of the mind, con-
scious as well as subconscious, such as ideas of things, in-
stincts, memories, internalized criteria, etc. 5 The subjec-
1MGHE 237. On mystery, cf. MGHE 234, 398; TP 315; 
"SSP" 397; '~MGIM" 448 - 49, n. 11; npn II 11 339. 
2




c£. HGHE 409, n. 1. 
4
c£. "Science in its Relation to Value and Religion," 
The~ Institute Pamphlet, 29 (1942), pp. 182- 191, 220. 
Cf. also SIG 113ff. In Hocking's thought, science as are-
spo~se to Nature also represents a response to Society and 
Ult~mately to God and has important parallels with religion 
and art. 
5c£. MGHE 527 - 38; cf. also HNR 430, ewe 73. 
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tive response to tha recognition of such psychic objects is 
the mental or emotional aspect of •• interior" experience, 
especially the sense of "I" achieved in peak. moments of re-
flexive awareness. The intersubjective moment is the percep-
tion (or apperception) of the essentially shared elements 
of the World as the contents of one's own mind: each "I" is 
also a uwe." There is no wholly private world, short of mad-
ness; nor is there a wholly public one. 
Second, the major sectors of social experience fell 
for Hocking under the general categories of love (or friend-
ship) and duty (or justice), in which the objective pre-
sence of the Other(s) occasions a response which itself 
leads to genuine, manifest intersubjectivity and the consub-
jective "We-consciousness" of true communi ty.1 Examples of 
social experience -- death, birth, war and wedlock, dream, 
disease, apparitions, etc. -- are as numerous as those of 
2 Nature and follow a similar dialectic of development. The 
movement from the universal to the particular, from the im-
personal to the personal, from objectivity to intersubjec-
tivity, from latent to manifest -- clearly pertains here. 
(It should perhaps be observed here that as a dynamic struc-
ture, the dialectical process is not itself the experience, 
1c£. MGHE 231, 295, 317- 18, 431. 
2
cf. MGHE 6, 230- 31. On love, cf. MGHE l97f., 431; 
HNR 311; MIHE 88 - 92, 247ff. 
t its general form in temporal perspective.) bU. 
The natural and social elements of experience are 
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also structured as media of God's self-revelation (communi-
cation) to human selves, the dialectic here being the tran-
sition from the opacity to the transparency of intermedi-
aries by means of a shift of attention from the partial as-
pects of experience to the Whole. Here, the perception of 
and response to God again moves from "It" to "He" to "Thou." 
The underlying ground or field of all these types of 
experience is the intersubjective field itself, existing 
and perceptible as an infinitely expansive and progressive 
matrix of creativity: God himself as the constant Thou pre-
sent to and addressing us in all our experiences of Nature 
and Society as well as of the Self. The two-fold (i.e., 
static and dynamic) structure of experience is thus not only 
personal, it is dialogical -- an on-going communication in 
which mutual self-disclosure reciprocates with mutual ac-
ceptance (or, conceivably, inadvertance or even rejection: 
Hocking was not blind to the reality of sin and even the 
possibility of ultimate loss1 ). The structure of experience 
is a pattern of communication, a dialogue. 
Here we are already beyond the threshold of religion; 
for the manifestation of the Thou of the World as God con-
stitutes religious experience. And it is in examining reli-
350. 
1cf. "HCCBFR" 280; MGHE 515, 523; HNR 125 - 68; "RF 11 
gious experience that the meaning and structure of human 
experience must find its further scope and depth. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF EXPERIENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
All human experience, as we have seen thus far, had 
for Hocking an intrinsic religious dimension -- here taking 
religion as "man's relation with God." 1 God is ingredient 
in experience not as an object among other objects, but as 
the "field of reference" grounding all relationships among 
selves and the natural and social World as the actual con-
dition of their possibility. Given the structure of experi-
ence as thus articulated by Hocking, the relationship be-
tween man (or, better, men) and God can be expected to be 
manifold rather than simple, both objective (i.e., inten-
tional) and intersubjective {social) rather than merely sub-
jective or "private, 11 aesthetic rather than merely cogni-
tive, active rather than merely receptive, and variable 
rather than invariant. It is also latent as well as mani-
fest in so far as the divine field of reference, as context, 
1The origin of the word is obscure. Modern scholars 
generally associate it with religare, "to bind." (Cf. OED 
2481.) Religion can bedescribed therefore as the "bond" 
between man and God or, as Paul Ricoeur suggests, "The bond 
bet";Yeen man and what he considers to be sacred." (The~­
bol1sm of Evil, Emerson Buchanan, trans. [Boston: Beacon 
Press, 196~p. 5.) Hocking's use of the word indicates a 
general agreement with this traditional meaning. See below, 
pp. 130, 13 7ff". 
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not enter our conscious awareness when we are preoccu-does 
pied with the ordinary objects of experience. However, the 
latency of the relation can give way to manifestness through 
a process of explicitation in which, by a shift of atten-
tion, the context or ground of experience becomes focal. And 
this religious experience, the awareness of our relation 
with God, is a development of ordinary experience as a 
heightened consciousness of the most fundamental element in 
the structure of experience, its ground. This is not to say 
that the perception of the ground may not be surprising and 
in that sense extraordinary. It is to say that the religious 
dimension thus revealed is not added to ordinary experience, 
but discovered within it. 
It is this dimension of experience and its explicita-
tion which we have before us now for consideration. The bur-
den of the argument of this chapter will be to show that 
Hocking adequately demonstrated that religious experience 
is a development of ordinary experience as the explicita-
tion of the relations between the elements of experience 
and their ground or field of reference. Further, I shall 
argue that he proved religion to be intrinsically social, 
that is, originating in an intersubjective dialogue and ma-
nifesting itself in both corporate worship and public acti-
Vity. Hocking also held that religion, as "the redemption 
Of solitude,'' fostered individual human development. I 
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shall also argue that Hocking's progressive explicitation 
of the concept of religion was positively related to his 
development of the concept of experience. But ultimately, 
religion in its ordinary manifestations fell short for Hock-
ing of fully satisfying the desire for union with God. It 
does not represent the fullest expression of the theistic 
relation within experience. A further dimension of human ex-
perience is opened, however, by reaching the limits of ordi-
nary religious experience --that in which it is claimed 
that the quest for final satisfaction is fully met: mysti-
cal experience. 
At the outset of this inquiry into the further di-
mensions of human experience, it will be important to note 
the distinction in Hocking's thought between religion and 
religious experience on one hand, and that between reliaion 
and religions on the other. In turn, this will require at-
tending to the social and individual aspects of religious 
experience and the reciprocal relations between them. In 
thus exploring the meaning and structure of religious ex-
perience, we are no longer asking whether but how God is 
directly and immediately met in human experience and what 
the effects of that meeting are on Self and Society. 
I. RELIGION, RELIGIOt:S EXI'ERIENCE AND RELIGIONS 
1 Religion and Religious Experience . 
Religion as a whole, that is, in its universal as-
pect, was evidently not simply identical for Hocking with 
religious experience (a phrase he rarely used, as we shall 
have occasion to note again). Fundamentally, religion is the 
relation or bond, both latent and manifest, between the Self 
and God as "the 'Thou' of the world."l Particular religions 
are concrete instances of this universal dimension of human 
experience, localized in time and space and necessarily con-
ditioned by culture and history. As particular, religions 
are institutions, being established ways of realizing the 
human involvement with the totality of experience (the Whole 
as the Holy) -- in codes, creeds, liturgical cult, buildings, 
2 books, ministries, etc. Nevertheless, each religion can 
also be characterized as more or less universal in its scope 
and outreach. 3 In this characterization, Hocking remained 
well within the orthodox Western tradition. 
l"RF" 365. 
2
cf. LRi1F 63f. An institution for Hocking is 11 a more 
or less settled way in which the members of a society have 
come to satisfy their main interests, including property and 
the family, education and religion, science and the arts, 
the traditional ways of amusement and recreation." ( "vN" 3 7.) 
For a discussion of religion and religions, see below. 
3 See below, p. 134ff. 
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Religious experience, on the other hand, signifies 
the explicit awareness of the Self's relation to God, wheth-
er as a dimension of all experience or as realized in speci-
fic instances as religious experiences. Religious experi-
ence in either sense is, however, a phrase Hocking rarely 
- 1 
employed. The reason for this is, I believe, that as we 
have seen, for Hocking all experience has a fundamental, at 
least implicit, religious dimension and, further, the in-
stances in which God becomes most manifest in consciousness 
were, for him, better described as mystical. At any rate, it 
is clear that Hocking did not take religious experience to 
signify a kind of experience different from ordinary experi-
ence: 
Religious experience is not as a rule the object of a 
special faculty; it is a development of ordinary experi-
ence, and religion invites men to take this ordinary ex-
perience not less but ~ realistically than those who 
are content with its surfaces.2 
The importance of this passage is difficult to over-
estimate. Its significance lies not only in the connection 
between religious and ordinary experience, but in the im-
plication that if mysticism is a fuller development of reli-
gion, then it, too, is rooted in ordinary experience. 
As a development of ordinary experience, religious 
l.,MGHE 11 62, 65 and ewe 73 being among the few in-_ 
stances. 
211 MGHE 11 62 C 49 • f. MGHE - 50. 
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oerience refers then to the explicit manifestation of the 
ex, 
-
theistic dimension of experience, the divine "field of re-
ference" which grounds the interrelations among the Self, 
the world and other selves but also enters the process of 
experiencing actively. For, as was shown in the first chap-
ter, this field and the relationship of the elements which 
it grounds constitute the primary locus of the divine pre-
sence active in the structure of experience itself. Reli-
gion can be described, consequently, as the relation (i.e., 
"bond") between human persons, both individually and collec-
tively, and God as the Field of experience. To understand 
religion entails understanding the nature of that relation. 
At this point, the question remains whether in fact the hu-
man experience of God reveals a presence which is both the 
ground of Self, the World and Other Self, that is to say, 
the ground of the Whole, and yet reveals itself as a Thou 
(or, more accurately, an "I") calling persons to union 
through the particular events of life. 1 
1It should be noted here that another, perhaps subtle 
but nevertheless important distinction should be drawn be-
tween religion as the manifold relation between human per-
sons and God, and religious experience in the form of a 
heightened perception of God's presence. Presumably one can 
be aware primarily of the relation, e.g., dependence, pro-
tection, favor, estrangement, etc., without thereby having 
a direct awareness of God as "Thou ... I believe that this dis-
t~nction constitutes a major difference between ordinary re-
11gion and mysticism. For religion as a bond among men, cf. 
"INR" 576, HGHE 522, "HCCBFR" 270 and "Does Civilization 
Still Need Religion'?" Christendom, 1 (1935}, p. 35; hereaf-
ter referred to as "DCSNR." Also see below, pp. 171- 75. 
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On the basis_ of the preceding remarks, in this study 
I shall take the terms" religion," "religious experience" 
and "the religious dimension of (all) experience" to be 
onlY roughly equivalent. Exceptions will be indicated, as 
<= ence to "a" rel ;gJ.· on in re ..... er ... or "a'' religious experience as 
a particular instance of the explicit consciousness of God 
as present. But the distinction between religion and reli-
gious experience as the tension between the latent and mani-
fest dimension of all experience remains relevant. It is 
based on the distinction already alluded to between the uni-
versal and the particular aspects of religion, the whole 
and the part. For each individual exists in the particulari-
ty of culture and history, which constitute the finite con-
text for the realization of all human potential. 
2. Religion and Religions 
The tension between the universal element in all re-
ligions and the particularity of each religion was present 
in Hocking's thought from the beginning of his career. In 
1909 he wrote, 
The universality of truth seems the best and most natu-
ral security for the universality of religion. [ ••• ] But 
the trouble is that the universal religion, when defined 
on the basis of truth, is not identifiable with any par-
ticular religion, and hence not with Christianity except 
by that courtesy which we by our birth are inclined to 
concede.l 
l"HCCBFR" 269 - 70. 
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Oaradox of all religions, but especially those with a the ... 
claim to universality, is that of representing both the uni-
versal and particular aspects of human experience including 
pre-eminently the theistic relation. 
Hocking's insistence on the universal aspect of reli-
was most forcefully presented in his study of compara-c;Jion 
tive religion, Living Religions and ~ World Faith, in which 
he articulated two "postulates." The first was that "Reli-
gion must be universal": 
It arises in a universal human craving directed to an 
equally universal object. [Religion] is not a capacity 
of special men or races. It belongs to the psychology of 
man; that is, it is the response of human nature every-
where as it faces its finite situation in the great 
world.l 
Thus, even though religious expression is not equally dis-
tributed among human persons, "there are no natively unreli-
gious peoples or individuals." 2 
Universal here connotes, first, a capacity of human 
nature as such. Religion in this sense exists within the 
very structure of human experience. As a psychological fact, 
accordingly, religion concerns both consciousness and behav-
ior and, as such, it is related thematically to Hocking's 
first, psychological formulation of the concept of experi-
ence. But it should be noted that Hocking also employs uni-
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in the secondary sense of pervasive distribution. Re-
ligion as a concrete manifestation of a funda.mental element 
of human experience is found everywhere. Religion in this 
sense is an obviously social phenomenon. The truly irreli-
man is, by that token, in the same predicament as the gious 
solipsist who refuses to acknowledge his native social re-
latedness, refusing to coma out of his acquired solitude to 
converse with God. 
Hocking's second postulate was that "Religion must be 
particular." 1 In fact, it is because religion is universal 
(in the first sense) that it must become particular. 2 For 
Hocking the "abstract universal" belongs to the realm of pos-
sibility, whereas particularity is actual. Here he is en-
debted to Hegel: 
everything in the realm of "spirit 11 -- thought, fancy, 
feeling -- tries to take on bodily form: we can hardly 
think at all unless our ideas wrap themselves in float-
ing imagery, then attach themselves to words, then work 
themselves into action.3 
Religion thus tends to actualize itself as a universal capa-
city of human nature by taking on concrete form, in short, 
by appearing in history, by becoming explicit. In so doing, 





in the human realm, if actually diversified in particular. 
For Hocking, a sense of obligation, a moral impera-
tive, constitutes the human aspect c:: the diffusion of re-
ligion: 11 There is an element of duty in the situation which 
1 
coincides with the natural irnpulse of joy to overflow ... 
Part of this motive is compassion for those who have not 
yet perceived the truth of religious insight, part is con-
tingent upon the inherent social relatedness among men 
which demands communication. For 11 Unless the discoverer 
speaks, he is separated from his fellows by his insight, 
rather than united to them. His enlightenment is socially 
2 dangerous... Dangerous because private, that is, sharable 
but not yet shared. Hence the universal capacity for reli-
gion appears in particular historical form because men are 
1LRWF 39. Cf. 36: "In so far as [religion as] the 
passion for righteousness reaches satisfaction, it becomes 
a passion for the spread of righteousness. And this acti-
vity of spreading, as well as the search for and the prac-
tice of the right \vay, is conceived as a cosmic demand." 
Cf. also p. 37: "The impulse [to spread religion] lies at 
the root of much unique religious behavior whose meaning 
tends to escape the polite academic mind, for example, the 
strange activity of preaching, which naturally expands into 
the founding of a religious community with its special or-
ganization, and into the mission." 
2 -
LRWF 39 - 40. He continued, "His truth is potential-
ly the deepest bond of himself with his fellows; but unless 
thex ~· ~ truth, it alienates them from him. It is not 
a bond unless it .. is made a. bond: he must become a teacher, 
or else a hermit or ari""Outcast:''' Thus religion as an insti-
tution is a social constr~ction. r6r religion as a bond 





bY nature social beings: 
in so far as one's moral destiny becomes ••• identi-
fied with the moral destiny of the group within which 
one acts, the religion of the preacher will be im-
mersed in regional character and regional history: it 
will be religion in particular.! 
Not even religious experience can remain private, despite 
its rootedness in the depths of each person's consciousness. 
Thus for Hocking religion tiberhaupt is a unity of 
universal and particular elements as they appear in indivi-
dual consciousness and history: 
Our religion must be a particular religion as well as 
a universal one. This is the real source of the casu-
istry of apologetic; -- for religion, like every other 
live thing, is growing under the pressure of antagonis-
tic requirements: it must be universal, and yet at the 
same time particular, authoritative, continuous, his-
torical.2 
Summarily, the religious dimension of all experience 
was of greater philosophical concern to Hocking than were 
1LRWF 43. 
2Hocking's insistence on the reality of the universal 
character of religion, both as a native capacity of man and 
as a cultural phenomenon, led to an express disagreement 
With John Dewey, against whose rejection of religion in view 
Of the ellegedly irreducible multitude of religions Hocking 
devoted the opening argument of LR~iF. (For De'tvey' s position, 
s~e A Common Faith, op. cit.) Contemporary studies of reli-
g1on, especially phenomenological and structuralist accounts, 
tend mainly to support Hocking's approach rather than Dewey's. 
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episodes of particular "religious experience," not least 
because the instances reveal an underlying and wider poten-
tial than is likely to be realized in any single episode. 
Both religions and religious experiences are thus to be un-
derstood as the ~anifest development, the explicitation, of 
the manifold relation between the three constituents of the 
field grounding the structure of experience. But common ele-
ments exist in both forms of manifestation which, while 
rooted in the universal relation at the found~tion of all 
experience, are truly universal in extension, that is, con-
cretely. 
Hocking's use of the categories of universality and 
particularity to structure his phenomenology of religion 
was not new; it is specifically endebted to Hegel, as noted 
above. Obviously, these categories are related to Hocking's 
reliance upon the whole-part relation, which he employed in 
a variety of contexts. 
As a relational scheme, this approach has its limi-
tations and, as a result, fell into disfavor early in the 
present century. It is somewhat forced and abstract, simple 
and radically limited -- as are dichotomous relations in 
general. nevertheless, it applies. So pre-eminent a schola:r.: 
Of religions as the late Joachim Wach singled out Hocking's 
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approach for qualified but definite endorsement, siding with 
Hocking in more than one disputed interpretation. 1 With 
reservations, therefore, I suggest that as employed by 
Hocking, the characterization of religion as universal and 
yet particular remains plausible. For the philosophy of re-
ligion deals both with the common and with the universal 
elements of all religions while recognizing the real dif-
ferences among religions based upon fundamental differences 
in human culture, history and even temperaments. The uni-
versal elements such as structures and functions are always 
incarnate in particular manifestations. As such they are 
accessible for consideration only by a process of abstrac-
tion. Nevertheless, as embodied such universals are always 
concrete. Thus, to be adequate, any philosophy of religion 
must deal with th.e idiosyncrasies and significant differ-
ences among various religions as well as their underlying 
commonalities. In this regard, Hocking was more attentive 
than Dewey to structural and functional similarities, but 
less.attentive to differences. 
1
cf. Joachim 'lilach, Types of Religious Experience 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 18ff. 
Wach devotes ten pages of his classic work to Hocking's 
later treatment of religion, specifically that. in LRW'E .. Cf. 
also Wach's final work, The Comparative Study of Religion 
( Ne"i·T York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 68 - 84. 
Cf. ~lso Claude Levi-Straus, The Savage Hind (Chicago: Uni-
vers~ty of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 161- 190. 
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Several preliminary conclusions can be drawn from 
this purview of Hocking's investigation of religion. First, 
the universal aspect of religion is consequent upon the 
structure of human experience itself as a triadic relation-
ship between the Self, the World and other selves, in which 
God is present as the unifying ground or field of experi-
ence. As a ?ersonal presence, this trQnscendent Other Self 
addresses the finite ego and calls it to its destiny 
through particular natural and social experiences. Recipro-
cally, all such experiences are at least implicitly reli-
gious, that is, related to the ground and ultimate meaning 
of one • s entire life, whether one is consciously a"tvare of 
it or not. 
Second, in so far as all experience is thus funda-
mentally religious, that is, entailing an implicit theistic 
ground, any actual experience is a potential occasion for 
11 a 11 religious experience, that is, the manifest awareness 
of one's relatedness to God as mediated by this experience. 
Further, these occasions of religious experience, given the 
manifold relations possible (and actual) among the various 
elements of experience (I, It, Thou[s]), can be expected to 
be numerous rather than few, depending upon a person's abil--
ity to attend to the context of relations by a shift of 
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awareness rendering transparent the opacity of intermedi-
aries. This occurs in a possibly subtle but profound change 
of consciousness in 'l',·lhich the holistic aspect of expe ri-
ence supercedes the particular. This ability can be greater 
or less in different persons; it can also be increased or 
"heightened" a~d, presumably, lost. 
Third, religion is thus a common or ordinary dimen-
sion of everyman's experience as the explicitation of its 
ground. Religious experience is extraordinary only in the 
sense of its possible infrequency, suddenness or intensity 
in particular instances. It is a different degree, not kind 
of experience. 
Fourth, as comQon, religious experience is thus in-
evitably social, in so far as all experience is both radical-
ly intersubjective and particularized by social activity, in-
cluding our transactions with Nature. As the fuller develop-
ment of experience in general, religious experience can be 
expected to manifest more fully -- if not simultaneously --
all the characteristic qualities of experience as such, not 
only its social character, but as holistic, intentional, 
cognitive, passionate, active, variable, dynamic and, of 
course, theistic. 
From these provisional conclusions, which may also 
be taken as hypotheses for further investigation, it i.vould 
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seem to folloH in addition that for Hocking the pa.rticular 
fu~ction of religion as a social phenomenon is realized in 
-
furnishing interpretative schemata which facilitate the ex-
plicitation of God's presence by showing how the intermedi-
aries can be made transparent. Further, religion provides 
particular occasions for .. religious experiences" in the 
form of prayer and worship. It also teaches persons how to 
satisfy whatever psychological and moral conditions might 
be required for "seeing" God. And, finally, religion pro-
vides opportunities for individual and social action as the 
outgro-v;th of the receptive aspects of religious experience. 
All this religion does by institutionalizing, that is, pre-
serving in time and space the structures and events that 
have successfully fulfilled these functions, for instance, 
liturgical expressions, sacred scriptures, creeds, commen-
taries, moral codes, ascetical practices, authority struc-
tures and concrete forms of behavior such as preaching, 
charitable works, social reform, etc. 
The crisis of religion arises when the institutional 
aspects cease to function properly, when modes of expression 
gro-v1 outdated, when liturgies ossify, when the spoken and 
written word rings hollow, when moral concern hardens into 
casuistry and the rule of law becomes supreme, authority 
overmasting service. In such a situation, religion can only 
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die or rene1v itself by incorporating the energy of a fresh 
vision of its deepest nature and recovering its original 
purpose. To this end, as we shall see, religion needs its 
mystics. 
Thus circumscribing the topic of religion in advance 
sets up certain parameters for a consideration of Hocking's 
treatment of religion as a concept, that is, in its formal 
aspects -- its characteristics, elements, structures and 
functions, the present study is not intended to suggest 
that he was insensitive to the specific content of reli-
, 
gious beliefs. 
1 see TP 16 - 17, LRWF 227, 27f., 219. 
II. HOCKING'S CONCEPT OF RELIGION 
Fundamental Concepts l. 
As already indicated, Hocking adhered to a basically 
traditional notion of religion as the relation or bond be-
t~een man and what he holds to be the divine element in the 
whole of reality, the totality of experience. The work of 
religion is to raise to consciousness that fundamental bond. 
This it does by calling to mind the holistic character of 
human life with respect to its experiential ground: "Every 
one begins with his whole-idea; but it is the function of 
religion to interpret this whole as divine; in brief, to 
make the transition from the whole-idea to the idea of God. 111 
The mediate character of all experience calls for interpre-
tation; the agency of interpretation in the present in-
stance is religion as in some sense institutionalized. The 
1I-1GHE 142. Cf. 95: "The religious idea will be as 
positive and primordial as any; will insist that it is pos-
sible to begin with the whole, as readily as with any frag-
ment ... Cf. also 129 - 133 for the whole-idea as Weltanschau-
ung. In SBF Hocking wrote, 11 Religion is man's intuition of 
his destiny to have commerce with the ultimate powers of 
the world, and the impulse which accompanies that intuition. 
It nerves him to the audacious effort to match his thought 
~gainst the whole of things, and to make that whole an ob-
Ject of contemplative enjoyment ... (SBF 5.) Cf. also 11 MGHE" 
~5 and "Christianity and Intercultural Contacts," Modern 
.:.rends in 'ivorld Religions, A Eustace Haydon, ed. (Freeport 
New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), p. 146; hereaf-
ter referred to as "CIC." Cf. also "DCSNR" 39. 
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categories of interpretation are not innate but embodied 
(as are all ~ oriori ideas) in the World. 
Religion is not merely a cognitive activity, a "mere" 
recognition of the ultimate meaning of the whole of the 
Horld. The religious attitude is practical and unitive: "It 
is a practical relation established between man and the to-
tality with which he is destined to deal." 1 Further, 
In religion the will of man seeks union with the simple 
centerof power which is "beyond" and "within" the 
world as the will of the world. The extravagant claim 
of religion has been that union with God is itself a 
good, and indeed, the supreme and sufficient satisfac-
tion of the will.2 
The function of religion in this regard will be "integrating 
the human will in view of the whole. 113 
Thus religion seeks a personal relationship of unity 
with the power representing the will of the world, the only 
kind of relationship which could satisfy the longing of the 
human spirit for ultimate fulfillment. For Hocking" ••• re-
ligion thinks of the universe not in terms of 'It, • but in 
terms of 'Thou.' It exists when man apprehends, beyond or 
within the dark reaches of his environment, a controlling 
power or powers in some measure akin to himself." 4 Thus re-





HNR. 352. For religion as the Self-Uhole relation, cf. 
TP 315 - 16, "WM 11 415, ewe: 26 and SMN 207. 
3 e~·lC 46; cf. 92 4 "WV" 33, emphasis added. 
146 
iS the 1 'I'hou 1 of the ~~orld ... l However, the perception of the 
personal character of the ground of the ';\'hole ( 11 Thou") would 
seem to be a distinct moment dialectically from the recog-
nition of this "Thou" as God, a recognition made possible by 
th~ availability of a suitable concept of God in the concep-
tual armory of any given culture. 
Summarily, the religious dimension of experience be-
comes salient for Hocking when the ground of experience be-
comes manifest not only as the infinite Thou of the World, 
but~ God. In Hocking 1 s thought, as I understand it, this 
occurs first when the whole-idea, the non-reflexive, working 
concept of the world as the total context of experience (The 
World} becomes focal in consciousness but, and most impor-
tantly, as a transparent medium of the known-felt presence 
of God. The first phase of this process involves a psycholo-
gical shift of attention from the part to the whole, an "in-
duction" in which consciousness· of the ground of experience 
replaces that of its elements: one 1 s own psychic objects, 
natural and social objects or other persons as thou(s). The 
second phase entails the recognition of the ground ~ God, 
which involves not merely the God-concept (which we think 
God with} but a concept of God -- an idea accessible to us 
-I -
by which the God-concept and the experience of the ground 
are recognized as coincident. It is in this sense that the 
function of religion as an i~stitution is to provide the 
l"RF" 365. 
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concepts ~ God which thematize our experiences of God, that 
iS, give them structure and definition, and thus to inter-
EFe~ the Whole as divine. But as culturally conditioned, as 
well as limited by their definiteness, all such concepts are 
inadequate to the God experienced -- a point typically 
stressed by the mystics, as we shall see. Such concepts re-
veal God to us in the immediacy of experience, but they like-
wise obscure the full transparency of the experience. The 
more concrete and definite the concepts, the more restric-
tive they are in operation. 1 
Conceivably, one's idea of God could be so limited, 
2 
so "small 11 as J. B. Phillips• would say, that the God ex-
perienced is all but missed in being conceptualized. The 
failure to recognize the presence intuited as God (i.e., as 
11 God" is conceived in different cultures) could also result 
from a deficient or simply different concept of God without 
thereby affecting the initial moment of personal recognition 
of the "Thou-character" of the presence felt. Hocking no-
where developed this line of thought, to my knowledge. But 
it has importance inasmuch as the failure to achieve a mani-
fest awareness of the presence of God as God could be attri-
1
compare St. Augustine's comment: "For God is more 
truly thought than expressed; and he exists more truly than 
he is thought." (De Trinitate, VII, iv, 7. Cited in ?;n 
~Ugustine Synthesis, Erich Przywara, S.J., ed. [New York: 
Sheed and Ward, 1945], p. 83.) 
2J.B. Phillips, Your God Is Too Small (New York: The 
Macmillan co., 1961). --------
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outable to influences largely beyond the individual's power 
to control and therefore outside the p~rimeter of culpabili-
The second way in which the religious dimension of 
experience becomes salient involves a movement opposite from 
that just described-- a~eductive" process in which atten-
tion shifts frcm the ~hole to the part, as it ~ere. That is, 
when the presence of God as the pervading Thou of the World 
is discovered through the transparency of particular media 
such as one's own psychic objects, some element of the 
world, or an experience of interpersonal sharing. Hocking 
was fully alert to the reality of such particular experiences, 
in which the love of a friend, the beauty of a landscape or 
~symphony, perhaps an awareness of truth suddenly conveyed 
to the astonished mind a sense of God's nearness. 1 This re-
cognition may well occur to a person "when in some use of 
2 his whole-idea he suddenly notes God standing there." He 
may nevertheless have no explicit awareness of the Whole --
passing from the "part" to God immediately. 
In both ways, human consciousness comes to an aware-
ness of God mediated by the World -- as a Whole or in part. 
Hence, perhaps, the reason why to the mystic the part "gives" 
or "stands for" the Whole; the experiences are ultimately 
1
cf. HGHE 230ff. 
2HGHE 234. 
149 
·valent. The intensity of religious experience may also 
eCJU:L 
from an awareness of some aspect of the overall rela-
,arY 
of the Self and God to an awareness of God's direct tiOD 
and immediate presence, culminating in the experience of 
~n which intersubJ'ective consciousness of I-and-Thou union ... 
way to the consubjective consciousness of We. 1 This qi'leS 
perhaps is why the great mystics, although in the "unitive 
way," have nevertheless been able to attend to worldly af-
fairs without lising consciousness of God's presence: God's 
presence and their own self-awareness are not experienced 
as distinct. Thus, Meister Eckhart's aphorism might be para-
phrased "The eye by which I see the World is the eye by 
which God sees the World." 
At this point, the chief difficulty I find in Hock-
ing•s account is precisely its completeness. Its major lines 
are clear, despite some internal fuzziness concerning the 
transition from social knowledge to God as the supreme Other 
Hind, as was noted before. However, the communications mod-
el on which Hocking based his structural paradigm of experi-
ence is a relatively closed system, given the all-encompas-
sing nature of the underlying Field of reference. An indefi-
nite plurality of finite fields -- selves, time, space, etc. 
-- prevents the system from being absolutely closed. But the 
possibility of novelty, creativity and freedom in any but a 
1c£. HGHE 279 - 80. 
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highly relative sense seems radically limited by the abso-
lute character of the divine field of (all possible) experi-
ence. Hocking's solution to this problem depended upon an 
exploration into the exigencies of mystical experience, and 
it is to a consideration of that dimension of religion that 
we must defer further comment. 
z. Reconceptions of Religion 
Hocking's method of precising the fundamental mean-
ing(s) of religion was to look to its primary functions in 
life as a whole. 1 Thus in his magnum opus he initially in-
vestigated religion as ~the mother of the arts,» its histo-
rical role. 2 But while a true function, fostering the arts, 
like other social functions, cannot constitute religion's 
ultimate meaning, for this is an effect of something far 
more characteristic. 3 
In this early period of Hocking's thought, religion 
had as its primary function and therefore its basic meaning 
"the anticipation of attainment. 114 By this Hocking meant the 
1
cf. MGHE 4, 11 and passim. 2MGHE 13 - 14, 18, 25. 
3
"To define religion by its function, that is, 
pragm.-a ticall.y, ~s to define it by its effects: but that is 
quite different from identifying it with its effects. We 
can only approach religion as we approach any other reality, 
through things which are external to the thing itself, as 
are the services which it renders to persons and society. 
To identify it with its services, however, is to lose the 
reality and thus, eventually, the services." ("HCCBFR 11 278.) 
4MGHE 3lf., 326 and passim. 
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power of religion to make present in current experience the 
goals, meanings and values which represent the highest as-
pirations of both individuals and the race. 
Both concepts continued to occupy a place of impor-
tance in Hocking's later thought. 1 But as his philosophy de-
veloped, certain significant shifts in emphasis occurred, as 
noted before. The early notions of religion were psychologi-
cal and individualistically oriented, despite Hocking's em-
phasis on their intrinsic connection with social process. 
As Hocking's interests. and activity extended to the fields 
of law, politics and practical religion {e.g., missionary 
endeavor), his attitude toward religion, like that toward 
experience, became more socially conscious, especially in 
its concrete manifestation. By 1936, when Hocking delivered 
the Hibbert Lectures (later published as Living Religions 
and a World Faith}, he had arrived at a new definition: 
If, to agree on a name, we were to characterize the deep-
est impulse in us as a "will to live," religion could 
also be called a will to live but with an accent of so-
licitude-- an ambition to do one's living well! or, 
more adequately, religion is ~ passion for righteousness, 
~ for the spread .2! righteousness, conceived ~ ~ ~­
mic demand.2 
-
1cf. "IHR 11 568, "WV" 33, "SSP" 399. 
2
rn clarifying his notion of "righteousness," Hocking 
observed that "The term 'righteousness' is not used in the 
conventional sense of compliance with a known law. It is a 
search for a law: there is a right way of living, it must be 
found. There is a primitive assurance ••• that living is in-
~ended to be good; and an equally primitive denial that liv-
lng as it offers itself is good! .. (LRI'i"F 27.) 
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Beset with accident, passingness and disease, in ad-
dition to the other manifold woes of life, the religious im-
pulse is the conviction that "There must be a way of life, 
distinct from this, a right way." 1 And thus salvation, as 
Hocking would later describe it, "means the discovery of 
that way of life which makes it possible for us to realize 
the potentialities of human nature." 2 Ideas operate in this 
regard as practical means to a=tion. 
Similarly recalling the "passionate" character of ex-
perience as implied in his second formulation, Hocking's re-
ference to "passion" in this description of religion .. im-
plies not a disturbed state of emotion but the inescapable 
urgency or 'seriousness' which belongs to the central stake 
of human existence -- ivhether one lives or misses living. " 3 
The existential urgency conveyed by this comment 
serves to relate Hocking's second notion of religion to his 
second formulation of experience, and also leads directly 
1Ibid. 
2
"CJ:C" 150. And salvation is "given" when''it is seen 
-- as the mystics have seen, and have best seen when the 
course of experience has been most against them -- that all 
.2£ experience is ahistory of intercourse between the soul 
of man and his God." ( 11 11GHE" 66.) 
3LRWF 28. He continued, " ••• human living proceeds un-
der a tension of concern, anxiety, such as no anima~ can 
feel; for it is only the human type of consciousness which 
knows that living, in its chief dimension, may be a failure. 
T~is anxious self-consciousness is the capacity for reli-
g1on; and the depth of concern is the measure of the man." 
{ LRWF 29. ) 
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to the element which figures so strongly in his final formu-
lation of experience, Destiny. 
In this, Hocking's last work devoted entirely to the 
subject of religion, he fused his notions of "cosmic demand" 
with the consciousness of the world as a shared whole, strong-
ly emphasizing the social dimension of religion. He also 
avoided the trap of moralism: 
Religion is a neighbor of morality, but it is not the 
same thing. The difference lies first in that factor of 
"cosmic demand." I\.nd then in the depth of the feeling: 
when this cosmic concern fuses with one's own there aris-
es that peculiar ardor for right living which dutiful-
ness alone knows nothing about. For if right living, what-
ever it is, lies in the nature of things, not simply in 
my free choice, then whether I go right or not is ~ 
solely ~ ~ concern: the total world, there, expects 
something of me, and my effort becomes a response; the 
moral scene acquires, as in binocular vision, a third di-
mension, a qualitatively new importance.l 
Here Hocking was alluding clearly to the concept of 
Destiny. Rather than a mere cultivation of solitude, the re-
ligious dimension of experience is a response to a summons, 
"a step out of privacy, a rejection of the illusion of pri-
vacy."2 In a striking, familiar passage, Hocking went on to 
1LRWF 26. 
2compare Jantes • notion of religion as 11 the feelings, 
acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so 
far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to what-
ever they may consider the divine ... (James, op. cit., p. 42.) 
~ot~ also vihi tehead' s characterization: "Religion is what the 
lndlvidual does with his own solitariness." (Religion in the 
Making [New York: The Hacmillan Co., 1926], p. 16. ---
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explain, 
In a sense, each self is alone with its experience: it 
issues its acts from a position of complete inner secur-
ity; it enjoys 'subjectivity.' And subjectivity is op-
portunity. All the primitive iniquities ••• are the ex-
ploiting of the subjective opportunity in the interest 
of my private gratification. Religion is the rejection 
of this exploit from the root, because of an elemental 
inkling that the privacy is conferred and therefore not 
absolute: religion is the redemption of solitude.l 
Thus, selfishness is the religious equivalent of solipsism; 
a morally culpable failure to come out of one's solitude and 
converse. The social function of religion does not suppress 
but in fact enhances individuality, however: "Even in Hindu-
ism, the most individualistic of all religions, the hermit 
2 
customarily leaves a path to his door." 
Religion as a passion for the spread of righteousness 
is therefore a response to a demand perceived as emanating 
from outside the Self and directing the Self into society, 
the realm not only of authentic experience, but of individu-
ation and, ultimately, of salvation. As a particularized 
phenomenon in the life of an individual, religion as Hocking 
now conceived it, finds both its meaning and function in the 
social \V'orld. 
3. Final Conceptions of Religion 




of religion as the bond between men and God, for which T~e 
f_omin_9. ~vorld Civilization provides ample evidence. Religion, 
he wrote, is "whatever unites the soul of man with the 
1 
whole," "the affirmation of the anchorage in reality of 
2 ideal ends" whose function is .. integrating the human will 
in view of the whole •••• " 3 He explicitly stated at one point 
that religion was, simply, the .. bond between the soul of man 
and the Real ... 4 Further, religion was still particular and 
yet universal: 
Religion must somehow present itself as the persona1 in-
timacy of the Whole to the Infinitesimal, as an inver-
sion both of the physical and of the conceptual perspec-
tives, an inversion adumbrated by Cusanus in his strange 
doctrine of the coincidence of opposites. In brief it be-
longs to the general essence of all religion that at 
some point it escapes generality, clothes itself in par-
ticulars, descends to the shaping of personal deeds and 
hopes, becomes "a" religion.S 
Nor did Hocking forget his notion of religion as a 
passionate concern for the spread of righteousness. In his 
last book, a prophetic study of what he called a Soviet-
American detente, he wrote, at age eighty-six, 
The deepest of issues pertains to the ultimate passions 
of mankind -- the passionate hatred of evil and also the 
passionate love of the infinite. It is the passion com-
monly called 11 religion" -- which we may simply identify 
as "world passion" -- a reach of kinship tmvard the to-
1
cHC 26. 2C'iJC 30. 
3c:qc 92. 4c:·;c 46. 
5CHC 180. 
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tality in ~hich at rare moments we not only feel but 
know ourselves to be immersed. It is that inner passion 
for what is beyond the evident that glorifies the man-
animal and spurs him to build into history, through art 
and faith, a fraction of his cosmic love -- which is, 
in fact, his love of life.l 
While understandably nuanced in a work on political 
issues, this passage contains implicit references to the 
major meanings of religion Hocking had hitherto explored 
the anticipation of ultimate integrity, the passion for a 
fulL life well-lived, the "cosmic demand" spurring man to-
ward the unification of history in love, even the bond be-
tween men and God -- here, unless I am mistaken, implied in 
"the passionate love of the infinite" and the 11 kinship" with 
the totality in which we are immersed. 
But despite the elegance and sophistication of its 
reiteration, this conception of religion appears as restric-
ted as was the second formulation of experience by a con-
cern for "living well" which remains largely "horizontal" 
and activistic. "The spread of righteousness" implies little 
depth of experience. The encounter with God as the ground 
of experience, the concern of Hocking's initial conceptions, 
is at best an implication. The social dimension, while pre-
sent, is limited to extending the "good life." The mediatory 
1 Strength of Men and Nations (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1959), p. 207; hereafter referred to as SMN. Cf. 
"Ernest Hocking," .!.!:!i2. is~ Faith, Stewart G. Cole, ed. 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 135, 145; here-
after referred to as TIMF. 
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potential of Nature and Society is barely even implied. The 
intersubjective and consubjective intensity of social rela-
tions is also implicit if not merely presupposed. In gener-
al, this conception reflects a preoccupation with external, 
"excursive 11 activity and the interfaces between Church and 
society. 
However, Hocking's concerns had, as we know, shifted 
at this time to the social world, wherein he exposed the 
place and function of religion, especially as an institu-
tion. But this perspective did not permit him to incorpor-
ate the deeper aspects of experience. I detect little if 
any advancement toward this end in further formulations of 
the concept of religion after 1940. I think, however, that 
there is a simple explanation for this apparent failure to 
move the concept of religion into a phase of development 
commensurate with Hocking's metaphysical appraisal of ex-
perience as the Fact-Field-Destiny constellation. In his fi-
nal stage of philosophical reflection Hocking had come to 
identify the fullest expression of religion with mysticism. 
It is consequently in the investigation of that aspect of 
religious experience that we should expect to find the equi-
valent of his third conceptualization of experience. 
III. ·rHE ELEl1lENTS AND STRUCTU~E OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 
As we have seen in the preceding exposition, in both 
latent and manifest form the essential elements of religious 
experience were for Hocking the Self, the World of nature 
and society as the general medium of revelation 1 and God as 
the Thou revealed in the World as well as in the depths of 
the psyche as the ground or field of experience. Briefly, 
the elements of religion are the same as those of experience 
as such. If and how, in actual experience, especially its 
social forms, the field of experience becomes manifest as 
God, and whether perceiving the relationship with this field 
is how religion arises in human consciousness can only be 
determined by an inquiry into that realm of experience where-
in such claims are found, especially its mystical territory, 
whose occupants typically report having had a direct and im-
mediate experience of God. 
In any event, God enters the scene not when Other 
Hind becomes capitalized, but in sudden or gradual "break-
through" events involving the reciprocal character of na-
tural and social experience. Having arrived at the point 
where the elements of experience (I, It and Thou[s]) inter-
sect, 
All that is needed is a step of breaking through the 
shell of human self-enclosure to the reality outside, 
or that ·this reality outside break through to us. This 
breaking-through, both ways at once, is, I believe, the 
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point at which God appears in experience. 1 
Hocking's structural description and analysis of re-
ligious experience, both as a general quality of all experi-
ence and as particular 11 breakthrough" events, addressed not 
onlY the static (synchronic) dimension -- how religious ex-
perience involves a reciprocal relationship between the 
self and God mediated by the World, but also the genetic 
(diachronic) dimension -- "how the idea of God first arises 
in human consciousness, "· 2 both in terms of individual aware-
ness and as a developmental social phenomenon. 
1. The Static Dimension 
'rhe development of religious consciousness through a 
dialectical process involving an interpretation of experi-
ences of Nature and Society concerns both the elements of 
religious experience and their structural relations. As we 
have seen, implicit in every experience, both in the infancy 
of the person and that of the social group, is an awareness, 
however "dim" (i.e., not fully conscious) of the grounding 
presence of God not only in the World but also in the depths 
of the psyche. This is the I-It-Thou relationship of nuclear 
experience which, raised to fuller awareness by reflection 
on actual, concrete encounters in Nature and Society, gives 
l"HGHE" 65. 
2MGHE 144 - 45. 
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explicit knowledge of the Self as a subjective field, of 
the world as a real and objective system of facts, and of 
the other as Thou -- first, as other selves in the immedi-
acy of sharing a common world, then as a supreme and Other 
Thou communicating his other selfhood as a personal call 
through the events of reflexive, natural and social experi-
ence. 
Two aspects of the Self are especially relevant here: 
the subconscious and the reflective self. For Hocking it 
seems safe to say that the nuclear experience of God and the 
world has its locus in the subconscious self, in particular 
the "allied" subconscious, that "apperceptive mass 11 which we 
1 think with but rarely think £!. Inasmuch as something like 
"pure immediacy" exists, it exists there, and as I read Hock-
ing, God is indeed present to each Self in that subliminal 
region of awareness, James' "back of the mind. 11 But God as 
the Other Thou is consciously recognized, though not as dif-
ferent from what is "al\<lays dimly perceived," 2 only by means 
of the mediation of idea-feelings acquired and sustained in 
social interaction. 
Attending to God as the "frame of the universal," the 
"Thou of the 'Ylorld," is an activity of the reflective self, 
having withdrawn its immediate attention from the business 
1
see above, pp. 62f.For the "allied" subconscious 
and the "apperceptive mass," cf. tv1GHE 527, 534, 537. 
21lHS" 191. Cf. "l•!GHE 11 65. 
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of the World. But because the reflective self enjoys a wider 
field of consciousness than the excursive self, in attending 
to the whole of experience, it reduces the borders of the 
allied subconscious so that the "God within .. can be appre-
hended with greater personal immediacy though in fact "al-
ways there." To that extent, the recognition of God in ex-
perience is not inferential, for the "God without," summon-
ing the Self to greatar intimacy through the World, is dis-
covered to be the same as the God present in the depths of 
the psyche. The remo·te and transcendent God without and the 
near and immanent God within coincide. 
The character of the relations between the Self, the 
World and God is multiform, but consistently reciprocal: the 
Self is related to the natural world as knower and known 
(cognition), as field and event (transaction), as exploiter 
and exploited (labor), even as victim and predator (misfor-
tune, suffering, death). The social world is related to the 
Self primarily in experiences summarized as love (associa-
tion) and duty (obligation), including science, art andre-
ligion. Selves are interrelated by both natural and social 
intermediaries; such mediation is best described as communi-
cation. This applies both to individual human selves in an 
I-Thou relationship and also to the relationship between 
the Self and God (revelation, adoration) in which all things 
and anything can serve as mediators. 
162 
Among the relations between the Self and God, wor-
as the chief act of religion, 1 is the characteristic ship, 
response of the Self to its awareness of God's communica-
tion through the media of Nature and Society. In worship, 
2 God is expressly addressed in the vocative case as Thou. 
In worship, God is adverted to as present "here and now," 
and in that presence the manifold experiences of the excur-
sive self are illumined in their character as intermediaries 
between the Self and God. Hence, for Hocking, as we shall 
see, mystical experience is the heightened awareness of God's 
presence in the form of an extension of the act of worship. 
Worship thus functions as the point of contact between ordi-
nary religion and its mystical expression inasmuch as it 
constitutes a conscious shift of attention away from the 
daily agenda of partial deeds to the meaning of the 'ivhole of 
experience. 
~orship is an activity of the reflective self in con-
trast to the activities of the excursive self. Nevertheless, 
the events of daily life are the intermediaries which, re-
fleeted upon as a whole, are rendered transparent retrospec-
tively as media of the presence and activity of God. However, 
the judgment that God is present is not a mere inference, be-
cause it is the God-idea now operating which illuminates 
1cf. 11 HH" 39 I HGHE 341. 
2ct. MGHE 342 - 44. 
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these experiences and which coincides with the presence thus 
revealed, of which the Self had heretofore been only "dimly 
,.1 
a\tlare • 
In addition to explicitating man's bond with God, 
worship has a social function: the "bonding .. of men in a 
peaceful and prayerful "meeting of minds." It brings 
the minds of individual disputants into a region of com-
mon human concern, and of common humility before that 
which is above them all -- the sense of humility being 
the psychological sign that the individual is being ac-
tually enlarged, restored to his normal dimensions, un-
til his periphery can once more make contact with that 
of his neighbor.2 
we shall return to the social function of religion below; 
here it is sufficient to note that for Hocking religion is 
revealed in its social nature by its fundamental act. ~'lor-
ship reaches its perfection only in the society of selves 
united in a common act of praise. 3 
1
rn developed mysticism by contrast, God is immedi-
ately discerned as present in events of daily life and the 
prayerfully reflective moment of 1-vorship is foreshortened or 
abolished altogether. In mystical experience, as the fuller 
development of the immediacy of religious experience, wor-
ship is in this sense made coterminous with the activities 
of the excursive self. 
2
"INR" 576. He continued, urn the contemplation of 
worship -- assuming that human minds, released from their 
prepossessions, tend to converge upon the same reality --
there is always the possibility that my enemy will reach the 
same premise from which I depart in refuting him, and so 
Will at least begin the process of refuting himself." 
3
cf. HGHE 522: 11 Horship is imperfect unless when I 
Worship, I am joining the race in worship." 
The Genetic Dimension 2. 
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The thought has long fascinated students of history 
that each individual seems to reproduce to some extent in 
hiS own career the progressive manifestation of religious 
awareness that occurred historically in the collective ex-
perience of his culture. In both cases, the religious ex-
perience of mankind has a temporal structure, indeed a dia-
lectic moving from stage to stage by affirmation and nega-
tion, that is, by overcoming obstacles in its forward move-
ment in time. For Hocking, the historical development of re-
ligion consisted in a progression from general animism --
the perception of the World as somehow alive and responsive 
to human interests-- to spiritism -- the belief that the 
cosmic forces behind and within Nature and Society are some-
how personal-- to polytheism and monotheism -- the concep-
tion of superhuman personal entities (or entity) as sover-
eign master(s) of natural and social destiny-- and finally 
to mysticism, the apex of theism -- the quest for and a-
chievement of union with the god(s) with its culmination in 
prophetic action. 1 
1Interestingly, Hocking seems never to have enter-
t~ined any notion of a primordial monotheism; for him, the 
d~scovery of unity is subsequent to the perception of plu-
rality. Cf. MGHE 6 - 7, 229 - 40, 317 - 37; GL Dec. 10, 
1938; "Hl\" 433; and especially LRHF 190ff. In MGHE he wrote 
"There is no such thing in history as a primitive mono-
t~eism; but there is a permanent singleness in the thought 
Of deity which man forever departs from, through loyalty to 
the variety of deity's manifestations ... (324- 25.) 
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The negative moments in this dialectic appear, first, 
in the discrimination between the living and spiritual from 
the merely material aspects of Nature, which marks the tran-
sition from animism to (poly)spiritism. 1 The emergence of 
the genuinely religious frame of mind begins in the discov-
ery of the personal nature of the .. powers .. in or behind Na-
ture, and the eventual segregation of the sacred and profane 
realms of experience. The second negative moment concerns 
the discernment of the divine character of the spirit tvorld 
-- the transcendent dimension of the gods, in contrast to 
the lesser natures of other numinous entities such as ghosts, 
demons, kings and heroes. 2 (At this point, presumably, the 
god[s] as well as other "supernatural" entities would be 
positively perceived as .. Thou[s].'') The third moment negates 
the plural aspect of theism in the discovery of the absolute 
nature of God: the many Thou's coalesce into the One. 3 
".Hth "the discovery of the Absolute," religion passed 
historically from a personal to an impersonal conception of 
God, who was no longer merely an other Thou, but the all-
present and inexpressible ground of being in which all dif-
ferences were reconciled. 4 This disc~very, which Hocking 
1cf. MGHE 317. 
2cf. 1-fGHE 319. 
3cf. HGHE 325f. 
4cf. HGHE 323; GL Dec. 10 I 1938; and "HA" 433. 
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called "the most important cultural achievement of antiqui-
ty,"l marks the first stage in the evolution of mysticism. 
The negative aspect of this discovery is expressed in the 
"neti neti " "nada nada " of the mystics East and West: ;;....--' __ , __ , __ , 
God is not this, not that particular entity, but somehow im-
plicated in the Whole. Pantheism is one historical manifes-
tation of this insight; monism is its philosophical counter-
part.2 But a further development took the dialectic forward 
a step: the belief in the possibility of realizing union 
with the Absolute by a life of moral discipline, i.e., 
11 right living." In renunciation and meditation, the 11 nega-
tive path 11 of the mystic, in which the motif is both person-
al and impersonal ("That art Thou"), the spirit is prepared 
for a transforming union with the Absolute. Even mystical 
withdrawal into contemplative union was, however, surpassed 
in the final stage of religious development, the mystic's 
return to the World of plurality and action. Mysticism gives 
rise to prophecy as its logical and natural culmination. 3 
Individual religious development does not reproduce 
the whole gamut of the historical phases with anything like 
microcosmic exactitude, although the animistic and polyspir-
itistic attitudes of the infant are similar to the early 
1 GL Dec. 10, 1938; "HA" 433. 
2cf. MGHE 326. 
3 c f • GL Dec • 1 0 , 19 3 8 ; '' HA" 4 3 3 - 3 4 • 
167 
stages of religious evolution in many respects, as Hocking 
observed and has been more systematically studied by Piaget 
1 
and others. Hocking clearly indicated, however, that indi-
vidual development in terms of religious awareness involves 
a progressive explicitation of the latent dimension of God-
awareness in nuclear experience, that is, the emergence in 
consciousness of events in Nature and Society, the expres-
sion of I-Thou relatedness in worship, and the culmination 
of both in the heightened awareness of God's presence in 
mystical experience with its actively prophetic consequences. 
Both the social and individual history of religious 
development are thus rooted in and productive of social ex-
perience. Hocking occupied dozens of pages in his magnum 
opus illustrating how the religious perception of Nature as 
the habitat or medium of God's presence is radically social, 
concluding that 
Social experience, then, becomes religious experience 
only when it is at the same time an experience of Nature 
power. And nature experience likevlise is religious only 
when Nature becomes an object of social apprehension. 
Soiritism and Animism are at bottom the same.2 
Nature, as we have seen, is known as a shared world 
--I know Nature as already known by Him (or Them), which 
1
cf. Piaget, op. cit. and below, p. 168, n. 2. Cf. 
als~ Erich Neumann, The Origins and gistory of Consciousness 
(Pr~nceton: Princeton University Press, 1969 ed.). 
to God 
(Sept. 
2HGHE 232 - 33. Cf. "Is the Group Spirit Equivalent 
for All Practical Purposes?" Journal of Religion, 1 
1921), pp. 489, 495f.; hereafter referred to as "IGSEG." 
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, 
accounts for its very knowability.~ The child, similarly, 
iS born into a social world, that is, into a system of struc-
tures already organized into meanings which he must largely 
assimilate by an active process of "construction. 112 All 
knowledge is thus social knowledge, for all experience is 
social experience and knowledge is the natural term of all 
. 3 exper~ence. 
Nature and Society together thus constitute in both 
historical and individual genesis a shared field of possible 
action in which one is always dealing with God whether he 
knows it or not. 4 A possible and sometimes actual mistake 
consequent on the "dim awareness 11 of God's omnipresence con-
sists in concluding that Nature and/or Society are God rath-
er than media of God's self-communication. It is therefore 
not surprising that one function of religion has been to 
5 
relativize both Nature and the State, an achievement made 
possible by the recognition of God as the Absolute -- "r,v-hat-
6 
ever else he may be. 11 
1
cf. MGHE 239 - 40: "At the source of all religion, 
so far as our analysis can discover, we find an experience 
Of God as Other Knower of our World, already in close rela-
tion to self, and also in some natural bond with our social 
and physical experience. Such is the report of the elemen-
tary religious consciousness ••.• " 
. 
2
cf. Jean Piaget, The Construction of Beality in the 
~h~ld, op. cit., and Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, 
The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Co., 1966). 
3
cf. MGHE 282, 64, 67£. 4cf. LRWF 278, "MS" 189. 
5
cf. "INR" 378. 6MGHE 206. 
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Overall, then, the structure cf religious experience 
is both historically and individually social in origin, de-
velopment and consequences. The nuclear foundation of all 
experience, the I-It-Thou relation, is explicitated in both 
dimensions as the awareness of God's presence in the events 
of Nature and Society, reaching in mysticism levels of in-
creasing explicitness and intensity, culminating in the di-
rect and immediate experience of God described as mystical 
union or communion. The outcome of this dialectical process 
of~plicitation is also social, and it is at the stage of. 
mystical experience that the transition from contemplative 
union to active, prophetic engagement in the world is most 
effectively realized and where it must be sought. Hence, it 
will be necessary to turn to an investigation of mysticism 
as the fullest development of nuclear experience in order 
to complete the analysis of the social structure of reli-
gious experience. 
IV. CONCLUSION: T!E EE.J..NING AND V.liLUE OF RELIGIOUS EXP:SRIE~TCE 
For Hocking, as was noted before, meaning is found in 
the dynamic relation of the parts to the whole -- of the par-
tial aspects and elements of experience to the whole frame 
of experience; of the universal to the particular; of the 
general to the specific. Meaning is dynamic in so far as it 
"descends 11 from the whole to the parts, from the real to the 
"less real," in a dialectical alternation with its inductive 
"ascent" from the partial to the holistic. The dynamism of 
meaning is also a function of its temporal structure; the 
dialectic of experience is a cumulative induction, a process. 
Hence meaning is discoverable in function; what something is 
will be most clearly understood in view of what it does --
1 its overall purpose, development and effects. So too with 
religion. 
In terms of its most immediate purpose with respect 
to its character as a bond between men and God, religion ex-
ercises a moral function, indeed an "ascetical" one: freeing 
men from "worldly" preoccupations by withdrawing their at-
tention temporarily ("detaching" them) from that world, but 
without thereby totally disengaging them from society, where 
they have a necessary place and destiny: 
If men are to live freely in a world of uncertain for-
tune it is necessary that their affections be in a meas-
1 See above, p.22, n. 1. Cf. also MGHE 409, n. 1. 
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ure detached from the world of objects, and from the ne-
cessity of success in the world, and yet they must con-
tinue to act there and with absolute power. They must be 
detached without losing attachment: it will not suffice 
that they are assured of really being identical with 
Brahm, if they must realize this identity by retreat 
from affairs.l 
How religion thus functions, and the variety of pas-
sible meanings it consequently possesses, can be seen in re-
spect to both the individual person and the social group, 
whether dynamically or statically considered: integration 
and growth. 
As mentioned before, for Hocking, the overall human 
function of religion is unification or integration -- the 
unifying process of individual persons, both at a given mo-
ment (integration) and over time (individuation), as well as 
the social unification of men currently (cohesion} and in 
history (progress}. Both processes are reciprocally related 
by a dialectic of alternation -- each person arising out of 
the social matrix, achieving individuality (or failing to) 
by seeking independence from society and then contributing 
to the development of society by free and creative social 
involvement. 
1. Individual Integrity a.nd Development 
Several instances of individual integration as a func-
. 
1
"HCCBFR" 282. This, Hocking's principle of asceti-
c~sm, is found in works from all periods of his life. Cf. 
e.g., MGHE 105, 493f.; HNR 353; TP 182, 187, 268, 270, 274; 
RM 58; "HGI.H" 462; CHC 123; NIHE 126ff., 129, 131, 154. 
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tion of religion 
1 have been cited already. Keligion tends 
to effect a unifying transformation of the instincts, sexu-
ality, aggression and ambition; also of the will and con-
science, stripping the person of artificialities in order to 
2 liberate the simple and sincere "real self," the whole man. 
It enables the individual to overcome evil and sin as frag-
menting forces by including them as partial aspects of a 
greater whole, that is, by "transmuting" them. 3 
Religion affects a greater harmony between the Self 
and the world of Nature, begetting objectivity of mind and 
thereby creating the conditions necessary for the emergence 
of science. 4 Religion endows the individual with a greater 
sense of self-worth and an assurance of the realism of his 
hope. It is his anticipation of attainment. 5 Religion thus 
promotes wholeness. 6 
1
see above, pp. 132, 138ff. 
2
cf. HNR 367; ewe 92; MS 429; l-1GHE 436- 38. 
3
c£. "HCCBFR" 281; MGHE 87f.;"WV" 88£. • TP 19; "INRu 
584. Cf. also Michael Galligan, God and Evil (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1976), pp. 36f., 55- 57; and David Toolan, 
S.J., Evil and the Hystic's Way.!£ God (Dissertation, South-
ern Methodist University, 1975). 
4
ef. MS 429, SIG 113, TIMF 145 - 46, etc. 
5
c£. "DCSNR" 39 and "HCCBFR" 277. 
6
c£. Bernard Heland, Faith and Culture (London: Allen 
and Unwin, Ltd., 1955), p. 166: "\jholeness as the ultimate 
condition of the spiritual life is generally associated with 
a monistic metaphysics. In Absolute Idealism, for example, 
religion and wholeness came to have identical meaning. Whole-
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With respect to the individual's relation to society, 
he is provided by religion with a measure of detachment from 
social norms and thereby independence in thought and action, 
primarily by a breaking down of socially conditioned habits 
of behavior. 1 By withdrawing a person from society tempora-
rily, religion thus catalyzes the process of individuation, 
which as a temporal period of growth prepares the person for 
2 
a return to society more creative and free. And by the on-
going dialectic of withdrawal and return, that is, of excur-
sion and reflection, continued growth is achieved. From a 
social point of view, then, religion is society's way of re-
juvenating its inner resources by enhancing the experience 
of its members. (This is not to say, however, that this is 
the main purpose of religion on the individual level, which 
is, rather, closer union with God. It is to say that closer 
union with God has important social consequences ~vhich are 
inseparable from the nature of religion as a social pheno-
menon.) 
ness in this sense is aluays in danger o£ obscuring the in-
dividual, a.s Josiah Royce \vell knew, and as Hilliam Ernest 
Hocking has clearly indicated in stating his principle of 
alternation.~~ 
1
cf. HNR 378; "DCSNR" 43; "INR" 568- 71, etc. 
2
cf. MGHE 25, 462££. 
social Cohension and Progress 2. 
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Turning then to the social effects of religion, the 
pattern of integration and growth is parallel: for Hocking, 
religion tends to increase social cohesion and to promote 
social progress, if it does not always in fact succeed. 
First, and most importantly, religion in its most character-
istic activity tends to achieve an historical union of wills, 
that is, of human persons. 1 Thus religion tends to produce 
'I 
the unification of history itself. 2 Religion further pro-
motes a contemporaneous 11 meeting of minds": it brings men 
together, perpetually reaffirming "that original human soli-
darity which underlies political and all other social group-
ing."3 Religion promotes an "impersonal interest in· man-
kind which political life increasingly demands, and yet in-
4 
creasingly tends to break down, 11 thereby maintaining the 
conditions necessary for the continuation of justice and 
law. Horeover, "worship sensitizes the individual conscience, 
and confirms that 'better reason' which law embodies or 
1
cf. "HCCBFR" 270: ~~ ••• one of the functions of reli-
gion is to join the minds of worshippers in the present time 
with the minds of worshippers in all past and all future time. 
~orship is imperfect unless when I worship I am joining the 
race in worship." Cf. HGHE 522, "DCSNR" 35. 
2
cf. 1-~GHE 515ff.; GL Dec. 10, 1938; "HA" 433. 
\rs 426 
-





' • II 1 ' '1 ' ' ' 1 ' ought to emooay, tnus contr1Dut1ng to c1v1 narmony, re-
ligion•s conservative influence. It also reduces aggressive-
ness on the social level as well as on that of individuals. 2 
More positively, religion has borne both the sciences and 
the arts. 3 Religion, by enhancing the individuality of so-
ciety's members, assures the on-going and humane renewal of 
the social enterprise itself and is also thus ~the redemp-
f 1 . d .. 4 tion o so 1tu e. Religion promotes the survival of the 
state by relativizing it, thus preventing or at least oppos-
ing political totalitarianism. 5 
In terms of social development, religion .. promotes 
6 
change in the direction we call progress." Here, Hocking 
alluded to the prophetic aspect of worship: 11 Every critic of 
the existing order is at heart a revolutionary; but worship 
is the radical and deliberate cult of revolution." 7 Religion 
is also progressive; it promotes the growth of civilization 
by eliciting the condition for the appearance of the State 
1MS 429. 
2 Cf • " INR" 57 5 f • 
3MGHE 13 - 14; "IUR" 568; TIMF 145 - 46, etc. 
4MGHE 404; LRWF 27; CWC 73, etc. 
5
"DCSNR 11 43. 
6Ms 430. 
7Ibid. Cf. MGHE 364. 
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as a "circuit of wills'': morale, the willingness to co-oper-
ate in forming an international human family. 1 Religion 
here functions as a cultural universal, present more or less 
effectively in particular religions as a "world faith." 2 But 
as a particularizing agency, religion also preserves nation-
al and regional differences, supporting the co-existence of 
~ 
world religions, not their amalgamation or abolition.-
Hocking's evaluation of religion was obviously posi-
tive and optimistic. In this, he was at odds with many in-
fluential philosophers who held that religions as particular 
had, if anything, exercized a retrograde influence on civi-
lization (the Marxist critique and Dewey's). He likewise dif-
fered from those of his more conservative co-religionists 
for whom society and religion were antagonistic, not anti-
thetical or collaborative agencies (Barth, Kraemer, et al.). 
A final assessment of the value of religion for society is 
not, of course, available. But Hocking's case for religion 
as the fuller development of human experience, based upon an 
analysis of religion as a collective (universal) phenomenon, 
a culturally particular entity, as well as an individual ex-
perience, has proved to be sufficiently seaworthy to have 
4 
weathered various storms of controversy. 
1
cf. MS 430; C~C 153. 
2
cf. Lm·IF, passim; "RF" 366. 
3
cf. c~c 150 - 54. 
4
cf. the articles by Van Dusen, ~ieman, Horton, 
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It would be tempting to fault Hocking as being over-
lY sanguine in his endorsement of religion except for two 
facts. First, he was 'tvell aware of the historical failings 
of organized religion despite a tendency to underestimate 
them. 1 Second, he was articulating a descriptive theory of 
religion based on its general manifestations; he was search-
ing for the meaning of its purpose, process and effects, not 
attempting to assess every respect and detail of religious 
history, much less to exonerate it. In concluding that in 
general religion proved to be a positive and constructive 
agency in the making and remaking of Self and Society, I be-
lieve that Hocking established a convincing case. But he al-
so fully realized that an analysis of religion in its ordi-
nary manifestations, culminating in the religious institu-
tion, was incomplete on both the individual and social lev-
els of experience. 
~e have already noted that to the extent that mankind, 
individually and collectively, wills to preserve its reli-
gious insights, values and achievements against the encroach-
ments of time, it resorts to institutions -- systematic ways 
of acting, thinking and valuing which are given corporate 
permanence in the form of customs, traditions, scriptures, 
monuments, etc. From these embodiments, the sagging reli-
K~aemer, Slater and Radhakrishnan in PRC~C as well as the 
Cl.tations in the works of ~·fach cited above. 
1Cf. HGHE 11, 459; "MS" 190 - 92; LRHF, passim. 
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gious spirit can and should be able to draw new energy, be-
ing brought again by their mediation into the ambience of 
the Holy. 1 But the very qualities which insure their perma-
nence also doom institutions to a diminishing capacity to 
renew religious feeling, to mediate the Holy to new genera-
tions. And thus mankind collectively and individually must 
sometimes revitalize the source of the institutions them-
selves -- by the personal rediscovery in experience of the 
meaning of the original insights, values and achievements 
which are worth handing on to the coming generations. 
In the sphere of specifically religious institutions, 
those who purport to have, and who demonstrably have had, 
the original insights, appreciation of value and ability to 
achieve lasting works are, for Hocking, the mystics: 
Religion is kept alive by the presence in the world of 
those who have known what religion is, and who interpret 
it to us; and of these interpreters we have to say, as 
the old Greek saying had it -- many are the thyrsus-
bearers, but few are the mystics.2 
Everyman may be a mystic at heart, but as in art and science, 
so too in religion, genius is infrequent. But genius there 
has been. 
As the explicitation of the nuclear dialogue of the 
Self with God mediated by Nature and Society, religion thus 
looks back on the varieties of ordinary experience and ahead 




to its own further explicitation in the mystical dimension 
of experience. There the social origin and goal of reli-
gion, as well as the immediate awareness of the presence of 
God, receive their highest and fullest expression and must 
find their ultimate evaluation. There too the deficiencies 
of religion can be expected to find their supplement. 
CHAPTER III 
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF MYSTICISM 
INTRODUCTION 
Mysticism was not a mere variety of religious experi-
ence for Hocking, but rather its culmination as the full de-
velopment of worship. For worship, the chief act of religion, 
embodies the conscious recognition of the bond between men 
and God expressed as an I-Thou communication. As the epitome 
of this consciousness, mysticism makes salient the principal 
features not only of religious experience, but also those of 
experience as such in its essential structure and deepest 
meaning. For as we have seen, religious experience is the 
manifest development of the nuclear structure of all experi-
ence. 
Consequently, in its explicit form, mysticism provided 
Hocking with an empirical testing-ground for his formulation 
of the meaning and value of religion, as i·t had for James. 
Hocking's particular genius lay in recognizing that in order 
to produce valid ''fruits for life" which always means 
life shared with others --, authentic religious experience 
and, ~ fortiori, mysticism must originate in a form of so-
cial experience (intersubjectivity). as well as eventuate in 
constructive social action. 
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As the essence of religious experience and as such 
the ground of all experience, the mystical dimension of ex-
perience was constituted for Hocking by a direct and immedi-
ate encounter with God which is nevertheless mediated in its 
explicit form by natural and social factors. Thus in the in-
vestigation of mysticism, we again and definitively encoun-
ter Hocking's two-fold philosophical agenda: to account for 
intersubjective experience as well as for the awareness of 
God as a direct factor in experience. 
By investigating mysticism as practiced, Hocking un-
dertook to determine whether or not his positive appraisal 
was in fact borne out in experience. The importance of his 
study lay in the fact that by the logic of his own dialectic 
the final validity of his case for the social meaning and 
structure of human experience depended upon the conclusion 
of this examination. 
In this chapter I shall argue that as articulated by 
Hocking mystical experience must be considered an intrinsi-
cally social phenomenon, that is, in its origin, development 
and consequences. Further, mysticism constitutes practical 
evidence for the awareness of God immediately and directly 
present in human experience. I shall also argue that Hock-
ing correctly concluded that as an extension as well as the 
inner meaning of religious experience, mysticism cannot be 
considered essentially extraordinary or exceptional, but 
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must differ from ordinary experience in degree and incidence 
rather than in kind. Nor can mysticism be reckoned an eso-
teric, elitest form of religious indulgence, but must be 
judged to represent a dimension of experience access2ble to 
everyman. 
An important corollary of the preceding theses is 
that religious experience is not only fundamentally mysti-
cal, but, conversely, mystical experience is fundamentally 
religious -- an encounter with God (excepting those experi-
ences which are illusory, pathological or, in James' words, 
diabolical1 ). ·rhe basic distinction between types of mysti-
cal experience is, then, between ••true" and "false" mysti-
cism, not that between "religious" and "non-religious" mys-
ticism.2 This equation of religion and mysticism raises a 
difficulty for an empirical theory of religion in so far as 
there are those who claim to have mystical experiences which 
are not theistic. 3 Hocking's solution to this problem rested 
on his theory of interpretation as well as on his view of 
1James, op. cit., p. 326. For a contemporary reitera-
tion, cf. William Johnston, S.J., Silent Husic, op. cit., pp. 
lOOff. Cf. also MGHE xxviii for Hocking s distinction be-
tween various types of mysticism. 
2
cf. MGHE xxviii. 
3
cf. the excerpt from Arthur Koestler's The Invisible 
Writing (pp. 232 - 36) and the editor's comment-rp. 27) in 
Walter Stace, The Teaching of the Mystics, op. cit. Cf. also 
Alister Kee, The Way of Transcendence (Harmondsworth, England: 
Penguin Books, 1971) and Julian Huxley, Religion without Re-
velation (New York: New American Library, 1958), pp. l38ff. 
183 
implicit experience: without a minimally adequate concept 
of God, an experience of God will hardly be interpreted 
theistically. 1 Interpretation, accordingly, is a necessary 
element in all explicitly religious experience. Conversely, 
one can have an immediate and direct experience of God with-
out recognizing it as such. Indeed, for Hocking God is al-
ways present in the pre-conscious "depths" of experience, 
that is, implicitly. 
The dynamic transition from nuclear experience to de-
veloped mysticism {i.e., God-consciousness) is, I believe, 
what Hocking meant by 11 the dialectic of experience." 2 This 
process of making explicit the implicit presence of God in 
nuclear experience is systematically cultivated by the mys-
tic, who in this differs from the ordinary religious devo-
tee content with the undeveloped consciousness of God's pre-
sence or its spontaneous occurrences, or who is unable to 
develop them further. Begun in acts of physical, mental and 
moral discipline which the mystic deliberately undertakes, 
this interpretive effort aims at conscious union with God. 
As the apex of mysticism, however, contemplative union in-
volves an element of human passivity which allows for the 
free action of grace. Hocking was no Pelagian. Moreover, he 
1
see below, pp. 313ff.For a similar position, cf. w. 
Donald Hudson, Wittaenstein and Religious Belief, op. cit., 
pp. l80ff. 
2cf. MGHE 538. 
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respected the value of spontaneous or undeveloped experi-
ences of mystical encounter as distinct from the deliberate 
cultivation of mystical states, especially with regard to 
the "very ordinary experience" of everyman, himself included .. 
In elaborating the meaning and structure of mystical 
experience, Hocking faced two major obstacles. Each had not 
only the accumulated force of two centuries of anti-mystical 
sentiment, but also vocal and articulate representatives at 
hand in Hendrik Kraemer and others. The first, the "protes-
tant" objection, held as we have seen that mysticism is radi-
cally anti-social, a privatized form of pseudo-religion 
based upon a flight from the real world to the untroubled 
recesses of "inner experience." Against this position, Hock-
ing contended that all authentic human experience, including 
mystical experience, is not only radically intersubjective 
but also inevitably social in expression. The second objec-
tion maintained that mystical experience is essentially ex-
traordinary, differing from ordinary experience in kind rath-
er than degree and characteristic of a few, elite souls 
called to a life of religious perfection denied to the major-
ity of mankind. Opposing this "catholic" objection, Hocking 
claimed that God was a direct and immediate factor in all 
human experience and, as a consequence, that au human per-
sons were at least latent mystics. 
Hocking met the first position by incorporating it 
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into his dialectic of experience, showing that social with-
drawal was but a preliminary, negative phase of the mystic's 
fuller involvement in society. He met the second objection 
by acknowledging that while religious genius was rare, the 
accomplishments of the saints presupposed a foundation com-
mon to all men. If not everyone in fact reached the heights 
of mystical development, all were nevertheless capable of 
reaching as high as they desired and sincerely strove for. 
In effect, Hocking not only enlarged the scope of mysticism 
temporally, he extended it socially. In thus democratizing 
mysticism, as I shall argue in the concluding chapter, Hock-
ing not only reclaimed the venerable tradition of classical 
Christianity, but concurred- with and even anticipated the con-
tributions of later exponents of mysticism. 
From a philosophical viewpoint, it can be concluded, 
then, that mystical experience entered Hocking's philosophi-
cal thought not as an illustration as Rouner asserts, 1 but 
as the instance upon which the validity for his case for the 
social dimension and theistic basis of experience rested. 
Hocking's insistence upon the philosophical importance of 
mysticism was the expression of a life-long study of both. 
In Types of Philosophy, he devoted four chapters to mysti-
cism as the seventh and final type of philosophy, the syn-
thesis of the most important features of the others. The 
1Rouner, WHE 243. See above, p. 8. 
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mystic is definitely a member of the academy, indeed a spe-
cial if reticent one: "the mystic, in the history of philo-
sophy, is the initiate, one who has attained a direct vision 
of reality, a vision which he is unable to describe." 1 How-
ever, as we shall see, the mystic-philosopher is not with-
out interpreters. He is especially fortunate to have had in 
Hocking an interpreter who was a philosopher-mystic. 
1TP 255. 
I. HOCKING'S CONCEPT OF J.1YSTICAL EXPERIENCE 
As developed over a lifetime of reflective analysis, 
for Hocking mystical experience consisted of a direct and 
immediate apprehension of the presence of God mediated by 
one's own psychic objects, Nature and Society. In other 
words, it was an explicit awareness of God as the Field 
grounding the elements' of what Hocking called "nuclear ex-
perience" -- the structural relatedness of "I," "It" and 
"Thou." Mysticism, the practice of the presence of God, is 
thus the cultivation of mystical experience, a practical de-
velopment of this field-awareness in relation to the reali-
ties of everyday life. 
Hocking held that mystical experience had two phases 
first, a primordial, constant but subliminal experience 
of God's presence underlying our nuclear experience of Self, 
Nature and Society, and, second, the explicitation of that 
presence in moments of feeling-charged insight, whether as 
spontaneous occurrences or in the form of deliberate shifts 
of attention from the objects of daily experience to their 
ground in the World as a whole, conceived of as a medium of 
the divine presence. These moments range in explicitness 
from a simple awareness of the underlying unity of the world 
to a more or less continual and intense consciousness of 
Union with God. 




cultivated practice of such explicit consciousness always 
tends to find expression in action. Hence, structurally, 
mysticism was also a temporally dynamic social process which 
alternates between the inward pole of God-consciousness and 
the outward pole of prophetic activity. For Hocking, mysti-
cism was thus essentially dialectical, manifesting itself 
processively in action and reflection according to the fun-
damental principle he called the "law of alternation." The 
prophet is the mystic in action; the mystic is the prophet 
in reflection and worship. 
Overall, Hocking's understanding of mystical experi-
ence was achieved by a long process of progressive articula-
tion. The fundamental concepts of his earliest writings re-
mained influential throughout his life-long exposition of 
the meaning of mysticism. But these, like his concepts of 
experience and religion, underwent development, widening 
from a predominantly psychological concept to include a more 
social dimension and ultimately finding metaphysical expres-
sion. In his later years, I believe that Hocking came to 
identify mystical experience with religious experience in 
its highest realization as the explicit manifestation of the 
systematic interrelationship between Fact, Field and Destiny. 
Hocking's .. final" conception of religion coincided with his 
developed concept of mysticism. 
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Fundamental Conceptions of Mysticism 
From the beginning Hocking approached mysticism not 
as "the 'speculative mysticism' of the textbooks," but as "a 
practice of union with God, together with the theory of that 
practice." 1 He did not deny the theoretical dimension of mys-
ticism, but 11 let its metaphysics come as a resultant, an in-
ference, a presupposition." 2 Mysticism was more than an ex-
perience, it was a practical art: 
the fine art, almost the lost art, of worship. Histori-
cally, the mystics are those who have carried the common 
art of worship to the degree of virtuosoship, they are 
those who have won eminent experimental knowledge of the 
way to God. And their technique, which is the refinement 
of worship, often the exaggeration of worship, is at the 
same time the essence of all worship.3 
Here in a stroke Hocking not only severed his ties from what 
Royce called "speculative mysticism," 4 but established his 
own case for mysticism as the pragmatic extension of reli-
gious experience in the form of developed worship. 
Worship, as Hocking came to view it, essentially 
1MGHE XXYiii. 
2
"MM" 39. He added, importantly, "There is a minimum 
of theory without which mysticism cannot develop even as an 
experience, -- perhaps this: that God is one, and that it 
is possible to be one with him. Beyond this minimum, it is 
a community of experience that unites the mystics rather 
than any community of explicit doctrine." Cf. MGHE 352. 
3Ibid. 
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amounts to an effort to "attain union with God in a mystical 
experience, other than in thoughtful attention to the mys-
teries of self-consciousness and existence •••• " 1 And thus, 
"mysticism and worship do stand or fall together. •• 2 The con-
nection between worship and mysticism as the practice of the 
presence of God is a function of immediacy; in worship, God 
is recognized and addressed in the vocative case. He is 
"there" as personally present. our response is no less per-
sonal, that is to say, intersubjective: 
we recognize here an other-than-theoretical relation to 
our object, a relation which surmounts objectivity with-
out destroying it, and which is seen quite simply in 
that transition in consciousness from "he't to "thou•• and 
from "thou" to "we. 11 3 
Mysticism brings to clearer manifestation that which 
all worshi~ intends in a less "transparent" manner. The agent 
of transition is the whole-idea, the working concept which, 
as that which we think the Whole with, constitutes the "equip-
ment" which shifts attention from the particular objects of 
1MGHE 356. 
2Ibid. Cf. 352: "the agreement of the mystics lies 
wholly in the fact that, prior to doctrine, and wholly coex-
tensive with religion, the practice of union with God [is] 
a special act of worship. 11 
. 
3MGHE 343 - 44. In "MM." he had written, "The mystic 
ls ~e who, finishing his philosophy, or more frequently, an-
tic1pating its conclusion, breaks through the film of objec-
tivity involved in the theoretical relation and adopts to-
wards his God the vocative case. In that new relation lies 
all.that is distinctive of mysticism." (p. 41.) Note the al-
luslon to consubjectivity in the transition from "thou" to 
"w " e. Cf. also MGHE 279 - 80. 
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experience to their ground. By means of it, worship directs 
our concern to the whole of things; it "places" life in the 
context of ultimacy. Thus "whatever recovers the worth of 
living ~ recovering the natural vigor of the whole-idea is 
~orship, or a part of worship."! But mysticism makes salient 
~hat in worship is found only as a general tendency. It also 
leaps beyond the Whole to its ground: 
Having been using the word mystic in a somewhat loose 
and generalized fashion, I now return to the mystic in 
our special sense, the man whose particular dissociation 
is between the whole of the system of things temporal on 
one side, and on the other the heart of the eternal, 
which he hones to make empirically present to his con-
sciousness.2 
The "wholeness" of mystical experience rebounds to 
both the mystic and his society as a promise and lure of ul-
timate integrity. It is in this sense that Hocking was able 
at a later date to identify mysticism with his original con-
ception of religion as an anticipation of attainment: 
To discern that one is in presence of a goal, though not 
the final goal, is a remedy for despair; and such'anti-
cipation of attainment," which I take to be the essence 
of religion, is an achievement which the practical mys-
tic reports and undertakes to make available.3 
1MGHE 419. 
2
"MM" 52. It should be noted here that Hocking dis-
tinguishes God, "the heart of the eternal" from the Whole. 
Mystical experience is a passage from the Whole to God as 
the field of_experience. Cf. also 54 and MGHE 477ff. 
3
"SSP" 399 - 400. Cf. MS 424: "In proportion as wor-
Ship is successful, the will is elevated and transformed as 
• 
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summarily, mystical experience as the manifestation 
of the relationship between the Self and God as the Ground 
of experience mediated by natural and social objects repre-
sents the further development of worship as the chief and 
characteristic act of religion. Moreover, as the extension 
of religious experience, it is the further explicitation of 
the nuclear structure of all experience, the I-It-Thou triad 
with its ground in the divine presence as the Field of ex-
perience.1 The mystic's perception of the "Thou" present 
within himself as well as in the midst of the world as the 
Ground of both constitutes the essence of his experience: 
The nuclear Thou-art (whose encounter is the theme of 
the mystics of all ages, and whose dialogue with the 
self has been described with such discerning power by 
Martin Buber) is never experienced merely as a co-sub-
ject, but as a creative will sustaining my own being 
(hence caring for my existence), an activity inviting a 
response, a launch as of "animal faith," a summons to 
by every vision of surpassing worth: it achieves not a fin-
ished perfection but a contact with perfection, a 'union 
with God' in which the quality of attainment lies at an in-
finite distance." It is because the ultimate goal still lies 
ahead that the mystic becomes the prophet: "The mystic in-
sight demands embodiment: the concentration and energizing 
of the will must be made good in action." (Ibid.) Cf. also 
MGHE 439: .. the meaning of the mystic experience is prophetic. 
It anticipates an attainment still to be won; it can be held 
only by preceding to that winning." 
1For nuclear experience as the fundamental structure 
of mysticism, Cf. MGHE xiii; "RF" 364; TP 309; LR~TF 9lff.; 
"LRT" 17 - 18· "OSSM" 257· SIG 114• .. FD II" 340- 41· C1V'C 




- 432, 441, 450. Cf. also "Forward," Charles Hartshorne, 
~ea1ity ~~Social Process {New York: Hafner Pub. co., 
1971 ed.), p. 15 and Experiment in Education, op. cit., p.l63. 
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find in experience directives that indicate Hthis way 
lies your fulfillment, your task, your destiny.»l 
Consequently, mysticism is to be understood as an in-
tegral aspect of human experience, rather than an exception-
al and possibly dispensable option, much less a tangential 
oddity. It must be seen as heightening and thus presupposing 
a prior if less clearly defined awareness of God's presence 
in Nature, Self and Society. 2 The dialectical process by 
which the nuclear awareness of God's presence is raised to 
direct and immediate consciousness is therefore a function 
of mediation. 3 God reveals or communicates himself through 
the World. Religion interprets this communication: worship 
provides the appropriate response. Mysticism is the epitome 
of both. 
More specifically, both spontaneous and cultivated in-
stances of mystical experience involve some element of Self-
1MGHE xiii. This passage from the 1963 edition also 
reflects Hocking's later notion of mysticism. Cf. also xxii, 
.. MGHE" 65, GL Mar. 18, 1938, "MS" 190, MIHE 241 and SMN 218. 
2
cf. "MS" 189: "The characteristic assertion of mysti-
cism in all its forms is that there is a vitally important 
and non-conceptual experience of God available to men who 
meet its conditions. The simplest and most usual expression 
of this thesis is that all men at all times are directly 
dealing with God, whether they know it or not." 
3
cf. "MS" 190: "The principle of the mystical conscious-
ness is the transparency of intermediaries. Vital awareness 
deals with what intermediaries represent. And if the Real is 
God, it is with God that we have to do from moment to moment 
of daily living. For each action the world concentrates it-
~elf into a point of resistance and support: and that point 
1s a Thou, not an It ... 
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awareness such as finitude, immortality, worth, goodness 
-
or depth; of Nature -- such as beauty, goodness, power and 
order; or of Society -- such as love, duty, sacrifice and 
compassion. 1 It is not so much that things or even persons 
as such reveal God to us but that in our experience of them 
we become aware of another dimension indicating something 
(or Someone) within yet beyond those things, events and per-
sons not only grounding our relations with them but also 
calling and responding to us through them. In this way, God 
"becomes .. present not only as the Other (He) but as Thou: 
through the intermediary agencies of common experience which 
are discovered to be "transparent .. by a shift in awareness 
from the part to the Whole. 
As noted previously, this transition from the part to 
the Whole, and the further transition from the Whole to God, 
is one of the more controversial aspects of Hocking's meta-
physics of experience. As one of his critics objected, '1 We 
never face the Whole that Hocking is concerned with." 2 Hock-
ing would agree that in thinking the Whole, we are unable to 
form an adequate concept of it. 11 0ur thought, 11 he maintained, 
1Hocking provided several examples of such mediation, 
some from his own experience, such as Nature, Time and Space, 
Self, Other Selves, Love and Duty. Cf. MGHE 272 - 73, 297, 
429 - 35; C~JC 73, 93, 99, 138, 183; MIHE 96- 97, 216; "FFD" 
546 - 47. 
2 Y. H. Krikorian, "Hocking and the Dilemmas of Hodern-
ity," Journal of Philosophy, 55, 7 (Mar. 27, 1958), p. 274. 
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"iS never, in point of time, adequate to its total object." 1 
we are nevertheless aware of it. 
Here Hocking had in mind the consciousness of the con-
text of objects as experienced, a psychological fact long 
subject to study by Gestalt psychologists and investigated 
by philosophers such as Husserl, Herleau-Ponty and Dewey. 2 
we are not "faced" by this Whole, as if it were something 
apart from us, but are rather placed in it. It is, simply, 
the ~iorld as total context of experience: "In thus nuclear 
experience there are always three factors, an I, a Thou and 
a common subject matter, let us say an It. Taken in its to-
tality, this It is simply the world in which the I must work 
out its life.•• 3 
The Whole is not simply "given" in experience -- it 
must be discovered and ~ be discovered by a shift in at-
tention from the objects of our consciousness to the "object" 
of consciousness in general, that is, the inclusive World, 
reality. Thus while there can be no concept fully adequate 
to the Whole as such, our awareness of the holistic quality 
l"SSP 11 397. 
2
cf. Edmund Husser!, Logical Investigations, J.N. 
Findlay, trans. {New York: Humanities Press, 1970), II, pp. 
463 - 489; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ~ Phenomenology of Per-
ception, Colin Smith, trans. (London: Routledge and Kegan-
Paul, 1962), passim, and The Structure of Behavior, Alden 
Fisher, trans. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), passim; and 
John Dewey, op. cit., p. 18. 
3MGHE xii. 
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of experience (and of reality) is actively cognitive -- our 
"Whole-idea" is what we think the ~·lhole with. As such, it 
depends upon an experience of the Whole, however marginal in 
consciousness, just as the God-idea depends upon an experi-
1 
ence of God but is not a concept of God. 
Further, God is not equivalent to the Whole: to as-
sert which would entail pantheism. On the other hand, God is 
never found as an object among other objects. 2 Nevertheless, 
the Whole can be a medium of God's revelation to the Self 
just as can any particular object. For the Whole mediates 
God's presence as the Field of the Whole, the "frame of the 
universal." 3 In short, God is related to the universe of our 
experience just as he is to discrete objects in our experi-
ence-- both transcendentally and immanently, that is, not 
contained by our experience although present within it. 
The inductive movement of consciousness from the part 
to the Whole has its correlative in the deducti .. Te movement 
from the Whole to the part, as noted before. God is mediated 
1
cf. MGHE 129ff., 408 - 12. 
2
cf. MGHE 321 I 323; "MGHE" 62. 
3
"Whole" in this sense need not be taken to connote 
more than "intact " "entire " or "full " as in "of a piece , , , , 
sound," indicating unity or integrity. (Cf. OED 3768- 69.) 
It need not refer to "totality" in the sense of "all-encom-
passing" or "the totality, .. meaning that there can be no-
thing outside it, thus requiring God to be contained within 
the Whole, which is exactly what Hocking does not want to 
say. Cf. in this regard, Levinas, op. cit., passim. 
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in Hocking's view by both the Whole and the part. But the 
whole and its parts are mutually entailed; every experience 
of God mediated by a particular object is virtually an ex-
perience of the Whole, that is, implicitly given with it. 
Not surprisingly, the equivalence of the part with the Whole 
is a fundamental element in the mystics• theory of reality, 
their metaphysics. 
It must be noted here that some ambiguity exists in 
Hocking's treatment of the Whole. Long an item in the philo-
sophical lexicon of Idealism, "the" Whole connotes an aspect 
of the Absolute -- primarily its unity. As such, it is osten-
sibly an ontological category. As frequently used by Hocking, 
and certainly as used by the Gestalt psychologists, Dewey and 
more recent scientific exponents of mysticism, 1 the \lhole is 
a csvchological category, a percept by which the unity of 
the experienced world becomes heightened. 2 
Our real knowledge of the world, that is, of Reality 
1
cf. Deikman, art. cit.; Roland Fischer, "A Carto-
graphy of the Ecstatic and Med1tative States," Science, 174 
(26 Nov. 1971), pp. 897- 904. 
2Fischer, art. cit., p. 902, thus comments: "During 
the 'I'-state of daily routine, the outside world is experi-
enced as separate from oneself, and this may be a reflection 
of the greater freedom (that is, separateness or independence) 
of cortical interpretation from subcortical activity. With 
increasing ergotropic and trophotropic arousal, however, 
~his separateness gradually disappears, apparently because 
1n the 'Self'-state of ecstasy and samadhi, cortical and sub-
cortical activity are indistinguishably integrated. This uni-
ty is reflected in the experience of Oneness with everything 1 
a Oneness with the universe that is oneself." Cf. p. 901. 
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in its most inclusive aspect, is surely founded on an ex-
perience of the Whole in this sense-- the fact that things 
"hang together ... Despite black holes in space, quarks and 
positrons, all known phenomena conform in essential respects 
to our mathematics, even in those cases in which mathemati-
cal development preceded these discoveries, as is clear in 
the confirmation of non-Euclidean geometries used by Ein-
stein in elaborating his theories of relativity. 
Thus, attending to the Whole means the disengagement 
or de-investment (Deikman) of attention in the manifold, 
discrete objects of daily concern and becoming aware of real-
ity as the total environment, that-which-is. This is the 
state, for instance, of the Zen Master as described by Deik-
man and others. It is the object of a true perception, not 
merely a concept or an inference. It has, moreover, ontolo-
gical as well as psychological implications for the mystic, 
who feels and knows that he is in contact with the deeper 
wellsprings of being, not merely beings. 
Hocking, I suggest, concerned himself more with the 
empirical aspect of the Whole, the 11 Whole-idea" or percept 
which we think the Whole with, rather than with the Whole as 
a concept, the "Idea of the Hhole." Nevertheless, in the 
psychological sense of the term, it can be held against Kri-
korian that we indeed "face" the Whole Hocking is concerned 
with, but not with reflexive adequacy. 
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2 • Reconceptions of Mysticism: Realism and Action 
Between 1920 and 1940, a period which began with a 
shift in Hocking's interests toward social issues and acti-
vity and ended with the series of prestigious lectures in 
America and abroad, Hocking's understanding of mysticism 
likewise)expanded to include a greater social dimension. He 
studied the incidence of mysticism in non-Christian reli-
gions, often at first hand, assessing its function and value 
in society. He similarly investigated history, appraising 
the first manifestations of mysticism in society. He also 
ventured beyond the psychological theory derived from mysti-
cal experience and began to expound the mystics' teachings 
about the nature of the world. 
His fundamental concept of mysticism as the practice 
of union with God was carried over into this period of de-
velopment. He elaborated upon the basic notion, however, 
characteristically describing the mystical experience as an 
awareness of the presence of the "Real," which is typically 
revealed in terms of an all-pervading unity: 
For the realist eye the values of experience run 
down and he [can] only restore them by reverting to the 
One. With recovered simplicity he might then recur to 
the particular tasks [of lifeJ, and with new efficiency. 
Life was an alternation, whose denouement was a grasp of 
reality in its fullness. 
This infinite task [is] sustained by the mystic's 
certainty that the Real, in its immediacy, was present 
throughout the entire adventure. It was only the mystic 
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realist who could realize the infinite as an operative 
factor in the finite, and live the life of reason in 
presence of the irrational and obdurate facts.l 
By "Real," Hocking fundamentally meant that which ex-
ists independently of the human mind. 2 As seen above, Hock-
ing further identified the Real in its ultimate expression 
with God. By employing the less obviously religious term, 
. he was able to avoid the need for theological distinctions 
based upon religious differences. As he would in later ac-
counts, he was also reaffirming his fundamental contention 
that the mystic perception was a common and universal endow-
ment: 
The mystic is indeed definable as the self aware of a 
unity in objective being, and of his own unitedness with 
that unity. But he is not an uncommon person. He is ~­
ery ~ who uses the definite article in referring to 
"the world"; for he implies thereby that the real world 
is one and identical, and, as such, an immediate deliver-
ance of experience for all alike. My heresy here, if it 
is one, is that I -- interpreting every man -- hold ·~he 
Real" to be always present in experience, the ultimate 
subject of predication, even while it is, in its full 
character and description, endlessly sought.3 
1GL Har. 18, 1938. Cf. "MGHE" 65 and "ABN" 93: "The 
history of religion in the West is not wholly alien to the 
search for realization, though it has been inclined to re-
gard such seekers as a separate and somewhat eccentric 
group, the 'mystics,' for whom worship is an experience of 
participation in the ultimate real. 11 Cf. also "HA" 433, 437 
- 38 and GL Dec. 10, 1938. 
2 Cf. MGHE 150, 161, 198, 269n. 1, 303, 308 - 10, 436, 
489, 502, 562, 568, 571. It was, of course, much more as well. 
3
"RPK" 280. Note Hocking's virtual identification of 
himself as a mystic in this passage. 
201 
Perceived as the Real and as the source of the unity 
of the World, God represents the "object" of mystical experi-
ence, whether explicitly identified as "God" or not. Jl.s such, 
God is ingredient in every perception of reality, prior to 
distinctions between theism and atheism and among competing 
religious traditions as to "what 11 God is. 
During this "middle 11 period, Hocking further sharp-
ened his case against the adequacy of any conceptual know-
ledge of God, finding in that denial the heart of the mys-
tic's epistemology and his meditative discipline: 
the mystic believes, as the agnostic does not, that the 
quality of the Real, though not describable, can be ~­
perienced in a sort of direct knowledge which is far 
more satisfactory than the remoter knowledge of concepts, 
just as acquaintance with a person is more satisfactory 
knowledge than the best description.! 
Mere intuition, however, does not give positive knowledge 
of what, but rather, that the One is. Horeover, mystical ex-
perience is not merely intuitive knowledge 2£: 
There is, so to speak, another stage of intuition, in 
which the sense of other-ness drops away and the knower 
realizes that he is identical with the inner being of 
his object. At least, such is the view of ••• mysticism, 
which teaches the absolute unity of reality. If reality 
is o.ne, \ve can only knO\v it truly when we merge t.vith it; 
that is, when knowledge in the objective sense of know-
ing something Q2! myself ceases.2 
1TP 262 - 63. For a further description of the analogy 
between mystical experience and intimacy, see below, pp. 234££. 
2TP 254 - 55. 
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Nysticism thus surpasses mere intuition in so far as "intui-
tion, which perceives the whole unique being of its living 
object with sympathetic intelligence, may still hold the ob-
ject as different from the one who knows it." 1 Hysticism 
characteristically teaches the unity of subject and object, 2 
and this theory of knowledge leads to a theory of being. Al-
though an epistemological dualist, holding to the identity-
in-difference of the knower and the known, the mystic is an 
ontological monist: 
The mystic is persuaded that the Real can be whole and 
entire in the minutest being, just as the salt-quality 
can be complete in every smallest drop of sea-water, or 
as one who is injured, however slightly, may truthfully 
say "I am hurt," -- I, the whole Self, am identified 
with the part that is injured.3 
The many thus participate in the One by a kind of 
metaphysical synechdoche, recalling the hermetical principle 
of antiquity, All is One. And hence arises the problem of 
the predication of attributes, which Hocking attempted to re-
solve by distinguishing between essence and existence. 4 But 
~ God is has less immediate importance to the mystic than 
1TP 254. 
2 Cf. TP 255: "Realism separates object and knower; 
idealism holds that all objects belong to some knower; mys-
ticism holds that the objects and the knowers belong to each 
other, -- they are the same reality, they are one ... 
3 TP 260. Se~elow, p. 272. 
4
cf. MGHE 142 - 43. 
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that God is; existence precedes essence in the priorities of 
;.;;.---
mystical experience. 1 This mystical existentialism is both 
theologically and pragmatically motivated. Faced with the in-
adequacy of the theistic concept of what God is and the athe-
istic denial that God is, "The mystic has something beyond 
nature to keep thinking about, to gain approximate or sym-
t . f d to l;ve by.~~ 2 bolic concep ~ons o , an • 
The main thrust of Hocking's writings on mysticism 
during this period concerned the mystic's prophetic activity, 
his "return to the world." New to his exegesis of the mystic's 
practical career was attention to the ethical content, the 
mystic's "code of action for the world • ., He summarized: 11 the 
principle of all mystical codes of ethics may be stated in 
this simple form: Be what you are. That is, be in action 
what you are in reality." 3 
1 Cf. TP 261. 
2TP 262. 
3TP 273. ne added, emphasizing the more-than-theoreti-
cal intention of the maxim, 11 This masterful attitude toward 
types of conduct which have the name of virtue fits the mys-
tic to be a moral originator, a reformer of laws and customs. 
He has so often filled this role that it would be interesting 
to enquire whether any great reform had occurred in history 
without some mystic at the bottom of it. 11 Many significant 
ethical ramifications of Hocking's writings on mysticism 
could be profitably explored but extend beyond the limits of 
this inquiry. As Alford Professor at Harvard, Hocking was 
professionally concerned with social ethics. Several of his 
major and minor works deal explicitly with that subject, es-
pecially its foundations, such as Morale and Its Enemies, 
Human Nature and Its Remaking, ~ and the State, The Lasting 
Elements 2f Individualism and Strength of Men and Nations. I 
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The principal achievement of the mystic's ethical 
code concerns the formation of conscience which, in one in-
stance Hocking clearly identified with mystical experience 
itself: 
In [Socrates] conscience appeared as an unanalzed sense 
of wrongness warning him away from certain courses of 
action which he was inclined to adopt. These actions 
were incongruous with ~ inner standard of whose na-
ture he was hardly aware. 'rhat inner standard, we may 
suppose, is si~ply the persistent mystical sense of unity 
with the Real; and conscience is the intuitive recogni-
tion that a proposed course of action is, or is not, con-
sistent with that unity.l 
Consequently, as Hocking assessed the function and value of 
mysticism, the "negative path" of mystical discipline "would 
be understood as the process of renewing the sensitivity of 
conscience ... 2 
In his comparative study of religion, Hocking similar-
ly addressed the active phase of the mystic's career in terms 
of the development of religions. Referring to the work as 11 a 
concluding chapter 11 of his magnum opus 11 Which remained un-
published, .. he noted that he had been 
attempting to present a realistic mysticism, one which 
turns its back on circumstance and the world's concerns 
believe that a strong connection exists between Hocking's 
ethics and his mystical vision, but this, too, lies beyond 




onlY to find the Real, and thereby to renew energy and 
grit for the particular task, and to regain certitude 
in action, that detailed action whose integral sum is 
history.l 
stated in its simplest terms, Hocking's contention 
was still that "Some notion of God lies in the line of devel-
opment of any mysticism; and mysticism is the common coin of 
all great religions.~ 2 The social dimension of mysticism re-
mained a function of the principle of alternation, but its 
ramifications were now seen to lie primarily in two direc-
tions -- the mystic's need for the community and tne communi-
ty's reciprocal need for the mystic. 3 Here Hocking brought 
into conjunction the individualistic perspective of his ear-
lier writings with the social consciousness of his "middle" 
period. 
Having found concrete corroboration in his Asian in-
vestigations for the mystic's necessary return to the world 
in order to complete his development, Hocking concentrated 
on the mystic's motive in a somewhat different light than he 
had before: "There are signs that the mystic feels at times 
that salvation cannot be complete in solitude -- as if the 
sin and lostness of other men penetrated one's own security." 4 
1 LR'ilF 7. 
2LR';oiF 190. 
3
cf. LRWF 41 - 51. See below, pp. 256, 26lff. 
4LRHF 41. Cf. 40. 
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The mystic's essential solidarity thus provides the incen-
tive to work for the salvation of all: 
unquestionably, the religious impulse in its more power-
ful representatives lifts personality into a region 
where the walls·of moral isolation between man and man 
grow thin. And where such a sense of community in sin-
fulness exists, it must lend a deeper gravity to the 
disposition to spread righteousness.! 
As noted before, the mystic's return to the world is 
also motivated by a sense of destiny, the factor of "cosmic 
demand": "the total worldf there, expects something of me, 
and my effort becomes a response •••• " 2 Destiny would figure 
pre-eminently in Hocking's later writings, in which he 
brought his concept of mysti~ism into conjunction with his 
more metaphysical interpretation of the concept of experi-
ence. Less explicitly developed, the notion of Destiny here 
figured in Hocking's concluding evaluation of the develop-
ment of world religions into a loose "world faith" organized 
upon the fact of everyman's access to God in the World and 
in his own psychic depths. As he looked ahead, he again saw 
the function of mysticism as one of unification in the emer-
gent structure of history: 
If men are to keep their hearts, they must have some way 
of seeing the non-futility of the futile! They have to 
1LRWF 43. 
2LRWF 26. See above, pp. 153ff. 
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be assured that there is another reckoning in which what 
they have done and what they are has its effect, is 
known, comes to the centre. They need to know that what 
they have done to the least and in the least corner of 
the unsurveyable swirl of world-happening, they have done 
to the highest. [ ••• ] History must have a peculiar struc-
ture in order to realize such a condition •••• The Whole 
alive in every conscious part; the One somehow present in 
the interstices of happening, aware like some all sensi-
tive Karma-principle of every intent, every purpose there 
flashing into being, and linking it somewhere with its 
due effect.l 
Such certitude, based on experience of the One-in-ev-
ery-part, the Real, is the mystic's contribution to society. 2 
To be sure, every man must experience the Real for himself to 
acquire such assurance. But for Hocking the intimate presence 
of God within each person was the condition for just that pos-
sibility. Confirmation of that presence and its cons~quences 
must be sought and, for Hocking, could be found, not only in 
the rapport bet>veen mystics themselves and their appeal to 
those attentive to them, but also in the facts of history. 
In his Gifford Lectures, Hocking retraced his outline 
of history, noting with regard to the "discovery of the Abso-
lute"' in the mystical phase of Indian religion that it was 
the demands of social existence which led to the passage be-
yond mystical withdrawal: "The spell of this absolute quies-
cence is broken (1) by the necessities of daily living, which 
it cannot differentially aid; and (2) by the attempts of the 
1LRWF 266 - 67. 
2 Cf. GL Mar. 18, 1938, cited above, pp. 199 - 200. 
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discoverers to expound and promote it." 1 
Here we encounter the principle of alternation applied 
not only to the experience of individuals but to the lives 
of whole peoples. The theoretical articulation of the Abso-
lute is corrected by adverting in experience to the needs of 
further experience. The limitations of the Absolute are ini-
tially empirical, not speculative -- its value for life is 
restricted and must therefore be overcome in the name of 
better meeting the world. The mysticism of contemplative ab-
sorption thus passed into the no less mystical activity of 
prophetic work and teachir.g. 
The mystic, in transcending the limitations of mysti-
cal experience by a dialectic of contemplative absorption 
and prophetic action more fully realizes himself and, in so 
doing,brings to fuller realization the values of religion in 
society and history. For Hocking the perfection of mysticism 
did not consist in abandoning it for a life of action, but 
in the dynamic rhythm of alternating phases of withdrawal 
and return in which mystical awareness expresses itself as 
prophetic action in turn demanding meditative reflection and 
and evaluation. 
1
"BA" 434.·He continued, "They can only pass beyond 
silence into speech and action by a descent which appears to 
involve a .!!2!2 sequitur if not outright inconsistency. It was 
necessary that history find its Absolute. It was also neces-
sary that it pass beyond ll•" 
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3 • Final Conceptions 
The major development in Hocking's final reflections 
on mysticism concern, I believe, its experiential e~bodiment 
of the elements of Fact, Field and Destiny. In this, the two 
strands of thought cente~ing about the ultimate meaning and 
structure of experience and religion are synthesized in a 
final conceptualization of the meaning and structure of mys-
ticism, particularly with regard to its social dimension. In 
arriving at this confluence of concepts, Hocking also brought 
into sharper focus the essential theses, as I see them, of 
his case for mysticism as both a direct and immediate experi-
ence of God and a fundamentally social phenomenon. 
In The Coming World Civilization, Hocking continued 
the line of development inaugurated in Living Religions and 
~ World Faith. A possible world community must have a common 
factual basis in shared experience which can provide men 
with sufficient assurance and incentive in order for them 
even to attempt bridging the chasms dividing person from per-
son and nation from nation. This common factor is the pre-
sence of God in individual, corporate and historical experi-
ence.1 The mystic represents the future citizen of the com-
ing world civilization as an embodied "anticipation of at-
tainment. 11 He is the prophet of a world brotherhood united 
not yet along political lines, but in spirit. 
1For 11 Corporate mysticism," see especially ''MS" 194. 
' 
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In so far as the mystic represents all men, then all 
must be mystics, at least potentially. Further, as Hocking 
had proposed before, mystical experience is thus a common 
element in human existence and history itself: 
the "mystic" here is simply that "any man" in any reli-
gion who opens the door of his self-built enclosure, and 
sees the world, perhaps for the first time, in his own 
experience, as not his alone but God's world, and there-
with every man's world, as held in God's care, the ego's 
personal entity included.l 
And hence, mystical experience cannot be isolated, extraordi-
nary or bizarre: 
Such seeing is not a rare and privileged event; it is 
not unnatural; it is a passing from the unnatural to the 
natural and true. It is present in some degree in every 
wakening of the mind to love, ·and every opening of the 
eyes to beauty •••• 2 
Ordinary experience, interpreted by religion raised 
exponentially by the mystic's acquired and native sensitivi-
ties, is the medium of the mystical encounter with God. 
Again, Hocking singled out the mystic's discipline, 
1cwc 100 - 101. Cf. "Rl?K" 280, cited above, p. 200. 
2cwc 101. Later, he clarified this point: "what I mean 
by 'the true mystic' is simply the person who in the course 
of his own experience ~as in sene moment become aware of the 
nature of things as supreme good." "Such vision may come whol-
ly outside the lines of formal religion •••• Or it may come in 
the way of meditative discipline •••• Or still more simply and 
widely in the waking of the mind to love and the opening of 
the eyes to beauty, when these. experiences are, as they may 
be, entrance gates to the nature of Being." (CWC 138 -39.) 
tlere Hocking is largely restating his principle of the trans-
parency of intermediaries with an eye to his reconception of 
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the practice of union with God, rather than any shared doc-
trinal tenets as the basis of a possible world faith which 
alone could ground a humane world civilization. 1 But he per-
ceived an even deeper foundation than their practices for 
the mystics • concurrence: ~~~ihatever their departures from 
one another in practice and theory, there is a tendency for 
the mystics in various traditions -- selectively -- to under-
2 
stand one another... Further, the long history of mysticism 
indicated to Hocking that "The several universal religions 
. . 3 
~ already fused together, .§..£ to speak, at the .!.£E." AnCJ. 
accordingly, "Theprimary identity involved in recognition 
of mystic by mystic is the essence of the religious world 
view, the perception of Being as beatitude -- God is, and 
God is One." 4 Such a vision is neither specialized nor re-
served to a few: "With this final and universal truth, what-
ever is implied in it, and that is much, is already implicitly 
the possession of every believer within his own faith." 5 
mystical experience as a heightened contact with the Real, 
that is, God as Being itself. 
1
ef. ewe 140 - 41. ef. above, p. 190 n. 2, 193 n. 2. 
2
eHC 141. Cf. Evelyn Underhill, quoting Claude de St.-
Hartin, "All mystics ••• speak the same language and come from 
the same country." (Mysticism [New York: World Publishing Co., 








The common faith of the future, as anticipated in the 
religion of the mystic, would find its natural expression in 
action, the work of love and justice governed by the rhythmic 
excursions and withdrawals of the Law of Alternation. But the 
mystic-prophet is not simply regulated by the alternation of 
contemplation and action. He is driven to manifest his vision 
of the unity of all-in-one in concrete deeds whereby his ul-
timate attainment is anticipated in actual experience and 
also to reflect on h~s deeds. Accordingly, 
To "love one 1 s neighbor 11 would be to deal with him, not 
blindly but with responsible provocation, on the basis 
of his favorable possibilities ~ creatively discerned 
£Y you, including therein that not actual but potential 
divinity which your deed may elicit. Then one understands 
that startling statement, 11 Inasmuch as ye have done it 
unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done 
it unto me." Since the finite self already participates 
to some extent in the infinite life, the true mystic 
finds his deity not alone at the end of the negative path, 
as the Absolute-that-is-not-the-finite, but also there 
on the highway, 
Where move in strange democracy 
The million masks of God.l 
The mystical path, essentially a practical way of liv-
ing, not only comes to realization in action, it finds there-
in its ultimate verification. Hocking concluded, returning to 
the theme of the unification of history as he had in his two 
major works on religion: 
these ministerings of man to man are not merely items of 
creature comfort bestowed on passing needs; they are acts 
1cwc 184. Cf. MIHE 232. 
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of transforming this human history into the pattern of a 
divine community through changing the relational schemes 
of its units.l 
--
Such a vision is less an assessment of the historical 
structure and present meaning of religion than a sanguine 
estimation of its potential and ideal function in a somewhat 
optimum future. Nevertheless, Hocking's prediction was based 
upon a critical study of the actual tendencies at work in 
world religions. History itself will prove his prediction 
right or wrong with respect to the eventuation of a world 
faith, even a pluralistic one. But as with his l959 forecast 
of the Soviet-American d~tente (as he called the coming post-
cold war thaw) in Strength of Men and Nations, recent events, 
including the ecumenical movement and the attention of the 
Second Vatican Council of the Catholic Church to 11 non-Chris-
tian religions, .. have seemingly borne out his expectations. 
Hocking•s emphasis on the role of action in a maturing 
world faith has been similarly echoed in the pastoral con-
cern of international religious organizations as well as the 
1cwc 184. A. R. Luther•s otherwise excellent discus-
sion of mysticism in Existence ~ Dialectical Tension (op. 
cit., pp. 55- 60, 108ff.) is marred by his failure to con-
sider the mystic 1 s motive in returning to the world. Conse-
quently, the rhythm of alternation appears to be a mechani-
cal oscillation in which the mystic is not so much guided 
from within as regulated by the pressure of external forces. 
As a voluntary activity, the mystic•s return is imperated by 
both love and duty -- a passion to save souls and to remedy 
the lack of integrity in the social fabric by fostering com-
munication, justice and well-being. 
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Vatican Council. His historical principle, moreover, has a 
t ring of truth after almost two decades of sluggish, qrea er 
top-level efforts to affect fuller religious and political 
co-operation. ',rhe pattern of history can only be modified 
-=· overall by pervasive change in the relationships among indi-
viduals as expressed in, not engineered by, changes in the 
social systems and structures. Ecumenical agreements among 
denominational leaders and professional diplomats remain in-
effectual if repugnant to their constituents -- a lesson un-
learned despite efforts to unite Eastern and Western Christi-
anity since the thirteenth century. 
As the prophet of religious community and world har-
mony, the mystic does not ~ fact remain content with the im-
mediate certainty of life's ultimate meaning in the conscious-
ness of God's immediate presence. In The Meaning of Immortali-
~ in Human Experience, Hocking argued again that mystical 
assurance, which is neither lasting nor directly communicable, 
is confirmed only in action: "immediate certainty is not 
enough. If living were so much its O\vn always available and 
sufficient apology there would be no reason for a program of 
1 
action and change." The mystic, then, is often by necessity 
(or, in more experiential terms, by Destiny2 ) a man or woman 3 
~liHE~ 160. 
2cf. iv1IHE 161. 
3
c:onsider, e.g., Catherine of Siena, Joan of Arc, 
·reresa of Avila, Catherine of Genoa, Dorothy Day and others. 
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of action, characteristically a tough-minded realist: 
He commonly finds himself, in practical affairs, a stren-
uously effective individual, like some Savonarola or 
Eckhart or Loyola. Sometimes he condescends to this 
"realism" with an uneasy sense of duplicity, as if he 
ought to be an alien in this world of fact. More often 
he perceives that the art of life must unite, in some 
fashion, its realistic with its mystical phases, and 
seeks some further understanding of this union. As a mat-
ter of practical program, we all tend to alternate be-
tween the two.l 
The mystic is not wholly comfortable with the World 
as it is. His vision unflinchingly encompasses Fact, but ex-
tends also to possibility, to what can be and should be. 
Further, the mystic feels a call to realize that possibility 
in personal action. Thus, as an element in the pattern of 
full mystical development, the c~aracteristic return to the 
world of the true mystic manifests the necessary aspect of 
action as the completion of that process. Again, the mystic 
experiences this "call to action" not as an externally im-
posed task, but as an inner compulsion corresponding to a 
summons from beyond which is so closely integrated with both 
his self-understanding and the exigencies of the situation 
that he can only refer to it as his "destiny," his proper 
vocation in history. Importantly, Hocking also reminds us in 
this passage that the dialectical structure of the mystic's 
life of action and reflection is rooted in the pattern of al-
1MIHE 160. 
ternation characteristic of all experience worthy of the 
· f · "human." qual~ ~er 
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In a passage dating from 1957, Hocking amplified his 
growing u~derstanding of the importance of the sense of des-
tinY and with it a measured reticence in the life of the mys-
tic. Here, I suggest, he brought his mature concept of ex-
perience into alignment with his final formulation of the 
meaning and structure of mysticism. He had already identified 
destiny as an interpretative schema employed by the mystic 
to account for the impetus to historically appropriate ac-
tion.1Anticipating "Fact, Field and Destiny," he contined, 
Many people have a feeling, perhaps a superstition, that 
they have a specific function to fulfill, \Thich has been 
assigned to them in the deeper councils of the world. 
They do not know what the function is. 3ut they are in 
search of it, kept from a sense of meaninglessness by a 
conviction that it exists.2 
This intimation of purpose in life is part of the nu-
clear awareness which makes all of us at least latent mys-
tics, as noted before: "Let us designate such persons as the 
mystics. They are at a disadvantage in giving an account of 
it." 3 The mystic's reticence thus results from a non-articu-
late sense of destiny. Nevertheless, he is rarely content 
merely to acknowledge the feeling, finding in it, rather, an 
1
cf. HIHE 161. 
2MIHE 96; cf. "FFD" 546ff., quoted above, pp. 99f. 
3MIHE 96 - 97. 
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imperative to act and thereby possibly to understand: 
the mystic has to find and decipher his own secret in-
structions. These strange souls demand that human action 
shall bear a stamp of cosmic appointment, and if they do 
not perceive that stamp in the actual present task, they 
are willing to continue its lead through a long pilgrim-
age, persistently expecting the day of recognition: "This 
is the thing for which I was born."l 
The mystical life is a quest for meaning as purpose 
in life less as understood than as achieved in action. It 
is this prophetic element of a pragmatic destiny only dimly 
understood which found further expression in Hocking's last 
metaphysical statement, "Fact, Field and Destiny." In this 
important article, the strands of his religious and metaphy-
sical doctrine were brought together in a surprising concate-
nation -- surprising in so far as the words mystic and mysti-
cism found no place in it. Nevertheless, the mystical element 
tacitly dominates and guides the entire essay thematically. 2 
Hocking's "last word" on destiny and mysticism was 
contained, however, in a posthumous article. In it he reiter-
ated several themes he had developed as early as 1912, round-
ing off his career with a return to the beginning. In discus-






cf. "FFD" pp. 545 - 47, discussed above, pp. 99ff. 
mystical_content Of the article and its connection with 
Gifford Lectures are discussed further in the Appendix, 
381 - 86. 
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t ed to society's inability to nourish the uniqueness of ver 
Person despite the necessity that it be done:. the 
Individuality is born at that moment -- and only at that 
moment -- when the soul in its loneliness sees its life 
in society -- necessarily under a system of rules -- ~ 
subjec~ !£ ~ goal-seeking beyond these rules. 
This goal is commonly the unspoken treasure of re-
ligion, conveyed to the seeker as a privately won vision. 
The individual is the potential prophet. His experience 
may be called mystical, not in the sense of a subliminal 
blur, but in the sense of a directive, seeking embodi-
ment, including the corrective function of the Socratic 
familiar spirit.l 
Religion and its mystical aspect still functioned for 
him as an anticipation of final attainment, guided, as he 
• 
added, by a sensitized conscience. Mysticism likewise pre-
ceded prophetic action for him as the condition for true in-
dividuality, the ability to make a difference, a contribu-
tion to human history no one else could add. 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
From his earliest to his last writings, Hocking con-
sistently maintained that the essential element in mystical 
experience is a direct and immediate apprehension of God 
culminating in its fullest expression in an experience of 
2 
union with God through a free act of grace. Such experi-
ences admit of a range of explicitness, from a somewhat dif-
l"ABN" 93. 
2
cf. HGHE xxviii, TP 257, "MS" 190. 
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fuse awareness of an aspect of the perceived world, such as 
itS underlying unity, total goodness or absolute beauty, to 
an intensely focused consciousness of God's pres.ence, includ-
ing a consubjective sense of oneness. 1 But all such experi-
ences are various modes of God's constant presence mediated 
either opaquely or transparently through the Self, Nature or 
the demands and delights of social existence. 2 Thus all ex-
perience is at least radically if subliminally mystical, la-
tent in everyman's "dim a\vareness" of the divine Thou ground-
ing all intersubjective as well as objective experience. 3 De-
veloped mysticism ensues when the latent mysticism of nuclear 
experience is raised to consciousness, especially in those 
persons peculiarly sensitive by nature, nurture or grace to 
the meaning of these experiences. No one, however, is barred 
by temperament or intelligence from the ranks of the mystics; 
fundamentally, all are mystics for all are directly dealing 
with God whether they know it consciously or not in every 
authentic experience of Self, the World and other selves. 4 
Further, mystical experience may be particular, corporate or 
historical~ depending on the level of its manifestation in 
1
cf. "1-i.H" 56, "WDP.S" 42, TP 314, ewe 138 - 39: TP 314, 
c:ve 101 I 139 o 
2
ef. "MS" 194. Cf. also 190, 11 MGHE" 65, ewe 99, "HA" 
433- 34: MGHE 430, xiii, 343ff. and..,MGHE 11 65. 
3
ef. "MGHE" 65, 11 HA" 433 - 34. 
4
ef. TP 314, 11 MS 11 189, CTtle 101. 
. 1 human exper~ence. 
2ZO 
In view of the preceding analysis of Hocking's treat-
ment of mystical experience, I propose the following overall 
definition of that experience: The Self directly and immedi-
ately meeting God, both subliminally in nuclear experience 
and consciously as explicitly mediated by Nature and s-ociety. 
By meeting, I here mean an active as well as receptive en-
counter, a "dialogue" conditioned by a shared field of ex-
perience -- in this case, God himself. 
Having followed the genetic development of Hocking's 
conceptions and reconceptions of mystical experience, we can 
now turn to a structural analysis of mysticism as he under-
stood it. 
l C f • "MS" 19 4 • 
!I. THE ELENENTS AJ:ID STRUCTURE OF HYSTICAL EXPERIENCE 
Hocking's philosophy of mystical experience was not 
systematic. Yet by thematically compiling and comparing re-
levant texts from his many writings on the subject, the out-
line of a system can be disclosed. For mysticism as Hocking 
came to view it was not a miscellaneous congeries of uncon-
nected events, but a developmental process regulated by dis-
cernable principles or laws similar to those fundamental to 
all human behavior. Further, he detected a variety of con-
stant factors in mysticism, both in its historical manifes-
tations and in individual experience. Accordingly, by more 
systematically articulating these principles, elements and 
structures as found in Hocking's more descriptive and ex-
ploratory presentations, the coherence of his doctrine can 
be more readily assessed and the cogency of his fundamental 
theses can be more easily evaluated. 
In the following section, I shall present, first, a 
phenomenology of mystical experience, that is, a profile of 
its essential characteristics as found in Hocking's writings. 1 
Second~ I shall articulate the fundamental elements, struc-
ture and functions of mysticism and the principle which re-
gulates them according to his account. Third, I shall in-
vestigate to a limited extent his treatment of the theoreti-
1
sy "phenomenology" I mean simply a descriptive anal-
ysis of the manifest features of an experience. 
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cal content of mystical experience, its objective aspect. 
Finally, I shall consider briefly the role of interpretation 
in the process of structuring mystical experience. 
1 • The Essential Characteristics of Mystical Experience 
In his effort to define the meaning of mysticism de-
scriptively, Hocking sought to determine the essential char-
acteristics of mystical experience, drawing on personal re-
ports as well as the work of James and other researchers. 
While little inclined to reflect on methodology, in his ear-
liest article on mysticism he nevertheless made a noteworthy 
distinction between the psychological characteristics of mys-
tical experience and its objective or metaphysical content: 
What I want to point out is that these words, unitary, 
immediate, ineffable, which at all events apply to the 
mystic's experience, are precisely the words which the 
metaphysician applies to the mystic's doctrine. And I 
suggest that the misinterpretation of mysticism here in 
question is due to the fact that what is ~ psychological 
report (and a true one) is taken as a metaphysical state-
~ {and a false one).l--
For Hocking, although neither the subjective nor ob-
jective aspect of mystical experience exist separately, each 
should be distinguished logically and described separately. 
Consequently, although the initial description of mystical 
experience will refer in some sense to both psychological 
and ontological aspects, these aspects must not be confused 
1
"HM" 43. Here, Hocking had Royce in mind. Cf. MGHE 352. 
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or reduced to each other. 1 The phenomenological unity of 
mystical experience thus not only precedes but also warrants 
the division into its psychological and ontological-theolo-
gical components. 
For Hocking, mystical experience, like the religious 
experience of which it is the extension, reveals in sharper 
relief the essential characteristics of all experience, as 
we might expect. Nevertheless, it manifests certain specific 
qualities which differentiate it (not in kind but in degree) 
from experience in general and ordinary religious experi-
ence in particular. 
As we have just seen, while mystical experience is 
associated with unity, immediacy and especially ineffability, 
these attributes are shared to some extent by all experience: 
Probably all experience in its immediate quality is in-
communicable; but the arts of communication draw infi-
nite material from the region nearer and nearer the 
heart of this immediacy. Immediacy and idea are not dis-
parate stuff, they are different stages of the same 
stuff, the same meaning and the individuals historically 
most active and fertile in this ideal exploitation of 
immediacy are none but the poets and mystics themselves.2 
1An epistemological realist,- Hocking maintained the 
irreducibility of subject and object while no less strenu-
ously maintaining their inseparability. Cf. TP 255, cited 
above, p. 202 n. 2. 
2
••MM" 44. By the same token, mystical experiences are 
thus not "purely'' or qabsolutely" immediate, for through an 
intrinsic relationship to ideas, the mystical state "is nev-
er so complete as to be wholly without fringes ••• , some 
awareness of the empirical self remains." ("MM" 46.) For 










Although common to all experience, the quality of ineffabi-
litY had, however, given the word mystical its significance. 1 
'!'he mystic is one who is "mum," who cannot or will not speak 
2 out. From a psychological perspective, Hocking would later 
refer to this character of mystical experience as the mys-
tic's "reticence." 3 
Faced with the paradox of the alleged ineffability of 
the mystics' experience as well as their notorious volubility 
in describing them, Hocking's insistence on distinguishing 
433. James treats of unity in The Varieties of Religious Ex-
perience, op. cit., 46 and 115. For immediacy, cf. "MM" 43; 
MGHE 410, 474; "RF" 365; ewe 99; MIHE 157; "ABN" 96. For in-
effability, cf. "MH" 43, NGHE 348, 353, 363; "FFD" 545 and 
James, op. cit., 292. 
1
ef. MGBE 348: "It is this difficulty of communica-
tion, this separation from the mass of people in thought and 
habit, this embarrassment of speech, which has embodied it-
self in the word mysticism." The alienation from ordinary 
people experienced by the mystic is a consequence not of a 
fundamental difference in the kind of experience had, but in 
the intensity. The mystic is rendered speechless by his ex-
perience; he is also driven to seclude himself, temporarily, 
from his fellow citizens. But all experience difficulty in 
describing experience, just as all must occasionally with-
draw from societal transactions in order to renew their en-
ergies for work. The mystic merely extenuates these aspects 
of common experience. 
2
ef. TP 255. The etymological origin of the word is 
the Greek verb muein, which means "to close" or "to shut. 11 
3
ef. especially LRWF 69 - 71. Hocking eventually ack-
nowledged that reality itself is also ineffable; it cannot 
be adequately described. ef. TP 255ff. 
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the characteristics of subjective experiencing from the ob-
ject(s) experienced would later permit him to save both the 
~alidity of the mystics' descriptions as well as his own com-
mitment to rational inquiry without either compromising the 
intimate mysteriousness of the mystical encounter or indulg-
ing in cryptic and premature metaphysical analysis. He wrote, 
"there is nothing in the mystic experience not expressible 
in idea, except the experiencing itself." 1 In one respect, 
Hocking was thus truly a rationalist, if he also acknowledged 
the ultimate incomprehensibility of the act of experiencing 
in its moment. Mystical experience might be, as a conse-
quence, inexhaustible (like all experience), but it remained 
subject to rational investigation and descriptive interpre-
tation.2 
For Hocking as for James, then, there was present in 
mystical experience a distinctively noetic character. 3 This 
Hocking sometimes described as "immediate insight," "realiza-
tion," or, ultimately, "revelation," that is of some truth 
about the world. 4 Mystical experience, like all experience, 
is in some sense cognitive. It eventuates in ideas about the 
1!<1GHE 451. 
2 For a contemporary discussion of the "mysteriousness" 
Of mystical experience and its susceptibility to rational in-
quiry, cf. Fritz Staal, op. cit., pp. 13ff., 163££. 
3
cf. MGHE 361 - 62, 428; TP 255£.; LRWF 166; "MS" 192. 
Cf. also James, op. cit., pp. 293ff. 
4c£. MGHE 362, 428. 
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nature of reality, out of which the mystic elaborates a 
world-view or metaphysic, a feature of mysticism which Hock-
ing only gradually came to appreciate, owing, perhaps,to his 
rejection of Royce's "speculative mysticism." Less conceptu-
al than aesthetical and practical, however, the noetic ele-
ment in mystical experience is typically manifested in cer-
tainty and praise of God and in creative activity. 1 That is, 
rather than elaborating a scheme of abstract concepts, the 
2 
mystic expresses his insight in song and poetry. Neverthe-
less, even this intuitive and immediate grasp of reality can 
be rendered conceptually intelligible by interpretation. 
With respect to certainty, Hocking (like James) found 
the mystics' assurance to be largely incommunicable; each 
must experience it for himself. 3 As such, the mystic's ex-
perience is not subject to fundamental doubt. However, the 
mystic's certitude in existential and pragmatic rather than 
theoretical. He is certain ~, rather than ~ God is --
more accurately, !h!1 he is in immediate contact with God. 
Further, mystical certitude was for Hocking neither derived 
nor circums~antial, but immediate. 4 
1
cf. MGHE 460. 
2
cf. MGHE 452. 
3
cf. James, op. cit., pp. 311, 323ff. 
4Cf. "MM" 52; MGHE 296, 449£.; LRWF 7, 220: "MS" 192; 
MIHE 156; "ABN" 95. See above, pp. 108ff. 
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A creative or novel element in mystical experience is 
found both as a quality and a function. '~at is new to the 
mystic is not only the ever-original awareness of God, ure-
~elationu in the ~ustomary sense, but the perceived charac-
ter of the World as well, to which he is awakened by the 
breakdown of habitual modes of perception, thought and ac-
tion.1 This sense of 11 newness, 11 of being at the origin of 
things, becomes manifest in the mystic's subsequent behavior 
2 
as freedom. 
Alternation is reflected in mystical experience in 
two respects: the active and passive phases of the experi-
ence as well as its character as continuous despite a funda-
mental discontinuity. Passivity was a quality of mystical ex-
3 perience emphasized by James. For Hocking passivity occurred 
developmentally as the culmination of active efforts to 
1c£. especially MGHE Chapter 31, pp. 462 - 84. Cf. 
also uMM" 54; MGHE xxviii, 424, 460~ TP 271; "MS" l92ff. 
2c£. MGHE 457: "Of this new knowledge, we have here 
to say that it comes to the mystic in the course of his re-
turn to the world, unsought by him. He has known God from 
the standpoint of the world~ now he begins to know his world 
from the standpoint of his new experience of God. As after 
every new experience the familiar experiences to which one 
returns are lit up with unfamiliar light, shining out strange 
and reborn: so as the mystic resumes his occupation with the 
many things, he finds that 'all things have become new,' and 
this novelty he will learn how to distil into the stock of 
human wisdom at large." 
3 Cf. James, op. cit., p. 293. 
p 
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achieve union with God: 
Various as the ways are which mystics in different ages 
have used in approaching their god, their resemblances 
run deep. In all of them there are efforts of the mind 
fairly described in the medieval terms, purgation and 
meditation. And in all of them these active efforts are 
brought to a close by a voluntary passivity.! 
This voluntary passivity is of course a form of activity and 
thus never "pure" in itself, for the mystic actively attempts 
to become passive. 2 Ultimately, voluntary passivity is trans-
formed into involuntary passivity ''when God accepts and lifts 
to himself the prepared soul. Its history [i.e~, that of the 
'negative path'] is that of an activity of self-suppression 
which must itself be suppressed." 3 
If Hocking avoided Pelagianism by stressing the neces-
sity of passive perfection by God's grace, he avoided Quiet-
ism by an equal if not greater stress on the active phases 
of the my~tic's preparation and his return to the world for 
4 the completion of his own and society's development. The 
active and passive moments of mystical development thus con-
stitute a dialectic of withdrawal, transformation and return. 
1MGHE. 371 - 72. Elsewhere he remarked, 11 the attempt 
at worship, in so far as it depends upon the mystic's own 
active efforts, is impossible." (MGHE 381.) 
2c£. MGHE 383 - 86. 
3MGHE 386. Cf. also "MS •• 190. 
4
cf. Hocking's critique of M. Guyon, MGHE 425ff. A 
failure to see passivity as a penultimate rather than ulti-
mate stage of mysticism mars Furse's otherwise excellent 




The mystical dialectic is also manifest in the alter-
nation of continuity and discontinuity, especially in the 
transience of mystical experience. By discontinuity I mean 
the mystic's disconnection from social ties, values and even 
physical presence, the withdrawal from the social world into 
solitude. 1 This break in experience is but a more deliberate 
explicitation of the natural tension an~ relaxation of human 
pursuits, however: 
For the mystic, strictly speaki~g, is the man whose dis-
connection is made between the whole system of things 
and ideas temporal on one side and the heart of the 
eternal on the other; whereas the subdued "mysticism" of 
our ordinary life merely flits from one body of ideas to 
another within that world system.2 
The transiency of mystical experience similarly ampli-
fies the in-built disconnection in the structure of ordinary 
human experience, the temporal limitation of sustained acti-
vity of any kind. 3 All experience has its endings: "if union 
with God were the whole sto~J of mystical experience, there 
could be no reason why that moment should pass. The mystic 
himself knows very well that his vision cannot last, so long 
as he remains a human being.u 4 Alternation signifies the 
overcoming of this limitation by successive, reciprocally 
1
cf. "MM" 54; MGHE 40lf.; ewe l40f. 
2MGHE 401. 
3 Cf. James, op. cit., p. 293. 
4MGHE 390. 
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reinforcing phases of activity and withdrawal which permit 
intermittent progress rather than eventual and final termi-
nation. Religiously, this alternation is experienced as the 
dialectic of worship and work. 1 
Discontinuity on one level of experience allows for a 
deeper continuity on another, however. This is most dramati-
cally reflected in the mystic's return to the social world 
and action. 2 For the mystic withdrew from a world whose es-
sential and manifold impress upon him was carried into his 
temporary retreat. Not least in this regard is the stock of 
ideas and values which the mystic rethinks and clarifies and 
which perdure through his active and passive purgations. In 
this respect, mysticism can be described as society's way of 
renewing its most valuable spiritual resources while modify-
ing and correcting them in the experience of its most sensi-
tive members. The spiritual history of humankind, while al-
lowing for revelational novelty, is thus basically continu-
ous just as is religious experience in the personal history 
of each man and woman: "Whatever religion adds to human 
wealth is not poured in, as an extraneous gift: it comes in 
1
ef. MGHE 426: "The whole of human experience falls 
into two phases, work and worship; the domain of duty and 
the domain of love, respectively." 
2e£ "MM" 49 52 56· MGHE 392 . , , , , 
MS 424; TP 189ff., 270f.; LRWF 43, 46, 
"MS" 192; ewe 139, 182ff.; MIHE 159. 
478f., 483, 511, 514; 
51; 11 HA 11 434, 437; 
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continuity with what that individual has known before." 1 
Thus mystical experience is characteristically a ~­
cial phenomenon, despite its interlude of solitary transfor-
____. 
~ation in which the mystic is but better prepared for his 
creative role in the social world. 2 Religion is not mgrely 
what man does with his solitariness, but in both its lesser 
and greater realization "the redemption of solitude." For it 
returns the individual to his world more an individual and 
more a social being than when he left it. 3 
Further, this mystical interlude of solitary "soul-
making" is not the prerogative of some spiritual elite; in 
its essential structures and functions, mysticism is both £Qm-
~ and ordinary. Hocking clearly insisted that mystical ex-
perience was not limited to those who by temperament or situ-
ation were somehow superior to the rest of mankind. Despite 
the fact that such experience admits of degrees of intensity, 
"The mystic is simply the person who does consciously and 
with the whole man that which we are all doing spontaneously 
and in fragmentary fashion in every moment of our effective 
living." 4 As such a universal factor in all experience, 
1MGHE 478. 
2cf. LRw"'F 43f., 49; 11 MS" 191: "ABN" 93. 
3cf. MGHE 414, 522. 
4MGHE 404. Cf. 361: " ••• note well that while the mys-
tic of genius is a natural product, the mystic impulse is not 
a matter of special temperament. For there are mystics in all 
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~hether latent or manifest, the mystical dimension is neither 
extraordinary, unusual or esoteric. 1 The great mystics de-
~elop to full explicitness what we all experience in at 
least rudimentary form. 
Finally, whether in a pervasively indistinct form or 
in a sharply focused realization, mystical experience for 
Hocking was essentially theistic. It is the consciousness of 
God's presence, recognized as such or not. 2 
While not wholly original, Hocking's elaboration of 
the characteristics of mystical experience, ·thus abstracted 
and somewhat systematized, is nevertheless unusual in its 
scope and richness. For Hocking, however, not even fourteen 
major characteristics adequately distinguished mystical from 
other forms of experience without taking into consideration 
the mystic's psychology, especially the factor of motivation. 3 
Similarly, the theoretical content of the mystics' reports 
of experience serve to differentiate mysticism from other re-
gions of experience, if -- once more-- not entirely. The mys-
tic will find his interpretation of reality in surprising 
congruence with the reports not only of poets but of scien-
tists.4 
temperaments. This incentive is deep enough in human nature 
to take various forms according to the disposition of the 
mind." Cf. also 422. -
2cf. ,._MM" 41, 55; HGHE xxviii, 352, 356, 448; MS 424. 
3 C.f • n MM.. 50 • 
4In this respect, cf. LeShan, op. cit. and Fritjof 
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The practical and theoretical elements of mysticism 
consequently provide a framework in which to sketch the fun-
damental structure of mystical experience as revealed in a 
preliminary fashion by the phenomenological description of 
its essential characteristics. 
2. The Fundamental Structure o£ Mystical Experience 
The basic structure of mystical experience, as Hock-
ing stated in the 1962 preface to his magnum ~' is the 
triadic rela.tion of the Self to God through the natural and 
social World. The dialectical transition from the implicit 
awareness of nuclear experience to an explicit consciousness 
of a personal relationship with God is accomplished on the 
mystic's ••negative path" through a progressive clarification 
of imtermediaries. These media of God's self-disclosure are 
manifold. They can be grouped generally in the categories of 
Self, Nature and Society, as we have seen. Specifically, 
these include certain experiences of time, of one's own in-
dividuality and, pre-eminently, the love of other selves 
which, beyond the more "ordinary" channels of derived know-
1 d f G d h . h' 1 e ge o o , us er us ~nto ~s very presence. 
The mystical experience itself may be of low intensi-
ty, analogous, as James had also observed, "with our occa-
Capra, !h! ~of Physics (Boulder: Shambala Pub., 1975). 
1MGHE 429 - 31. 
Fl""_,, ,, ~---
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sional experiences ~f realizing more or letts suddenly the 
111
eaning of words, sayings, points of view, which may have 
been familiar and empty possessions for a long time .. " 1 
Hocking also noted that "the commoner mystical experiences 
begin, I believe, with the concrete occasion, only suggest-
ing or foreshadowing the universal meanings which they have." 2 
Knowledge of ourselves may strike with a keen stab of recog-
nition and significance. But it is primarily with respect to 
the often sudden discovery of the individuality of another 
person that we are provided with the mystical paradigm par 
excellence: "at times we are granted something like a mystic 
vision: it seems to us that we have come into the presence 
of the individual and have seen the miracle as such. •• 3 Love 
penetrates beyond the individual's vision, beyond his inter-
ests in the outer world, to what Hocking had before called 
his "substance." 4 Such love is one key to the meaning of mys-
tical experience inasmuch as it is "a revelation like that 
of the mystic, full of significance. For in finding the in-
dividual, one has indeed found the individual's idea." 5 
1MGH·E 428 f J 't 294 ; c .. ames, op. c~ ., p. • 
2MGHE 428 - 29. 
3MGHE 432. 
4
cf. '"M!r1" 55 and MGHE 409 for Hocking's descriptive 
analysis of personal knowledge. 
5MGHE 433. Hocking added, "This is the central fact 
of all mysticism: namely, that the discovery of the indivi-
dual is always a discovery of truth, of a powerfully syn-
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P..n "idea" in the sense that Hocking here employed the 
term is far more than a mental image of someone loved. Al-
though he did not amplify the point, it can safely be sur-
mised that by ~ he meant the cognitive-and-emotional aware-
ness not merely that the beloved is, but what -- or, rather, 
who -- the beloved is, the essential character constituting 
-
individual personal identity; one's essence. 
Such analogues point to the meaning of mystical ex-
perience: "For what is the mystic experience but finding the 
1 idea of the whole, as love finds the idea of a person?" 
Hocking added, however, that "These other experiences are 
not only analogous to the mystic insight; they are, as ·we 
h ' d t - ' t 11 2 r.7 h th ' ' f t 1 ave sa1 , par s 2£ !_· " e er 1n exper1ences o empora 
existence, self-consciousness or the perception of another's 
individuality in love, it is nevertheless God who is encoun-
tered also, however dimly perceived. For "wherever the indi-
vidual is recovered, there is in some degree also a vision 
of God. God is the One of all these plural loves and plea-
sures; and it is the love of God which naturally includes 
and places all the rest." 3 Thus, "What the mystic knows is, 
~hetic idea, and yet not by way of effortful thinking. That 
1nterest in another soul which we call love is not an inter-
est in his idea as a matter of theory: it is an interest in 
~ as an individual substance, a being which knows and is 
more than its knowledge ... 
1Ibid. 
2MGHE 434, emphasis added. 
3MGHE 434 - 35. 
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first of all, that which he intends to know, namely God: and 
in so far as he is a mystic pure and simple he knows nothing 
than God."l else 
Such knowledge is , however, not generally -- if ever--
a matter of "pure" mysticism, for by virtue of the integral 
structure of nuclear experience, the World is necessarily 
present as the background of our awareness of God, and, it 
may be added, that of our Self as well: 
We must remember that in these experiences, to which we 
give the name of mystic simply because in them the indi-
vidual finds himself consciously at one with the whole 
of things, the world is not absent: it is with one's 
world-knowledge that one now knows his world-unity or 
God. The system of ideas is in no sense abandoned, but 
rather in the liveliest use, though not thought of.2 
Hence it is that developed mysticism heightens the 
awareness and explicitates the ffieaning of that dialectical 
triad which constitutes nuclear experience. From the view-
point of the dynamic process of temporal existence, the 
meaning of mysticism derives from the drive toward the World 
as the field of the mystic's love-in-action, now felt as an 
imperative: "the meaning of the mystic experience is pro-
phetic. It ~nticipates an attainment still to be won; it 
ca~ be held only by proceeding to that winning." 3 And the 
1MGHE 448. 
2MGHE. 450n. Cf. "MM .. 46 and MGHE 296. 
3 MGHE_ 439. 
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mystic returns to the World "not less a lover of men, but 
rather a lover in more intense and human fashion, because 
it is only the true worshipper who can find the world genu-
inely lovable." 1 
The mystic also returns creative. By means of the per-
sonal re-integration made possible by the purifying and re-
constructive efforts of the "nagative path," the mystic con-
tributes a creative impulse to society which is similarly 
re~integrative. 2 And as the mystic experienced the dissolu-
tion of habitual modes of ideas and conduct, as well as an 
opening to novelty in his relations with God, other persons 
and the World itself, so also he becomes a critic of socie-
ty's "habits" -- its customs and institutions. He returns a. 
reformer. 3 
In this highly condensed summary, we can conclude that 
for Hocking the fundamental elements of mystical experience 
are the Self, the World and the personal Other together with 
God as their ~ield of reference or Ground. The relations 
lMGHE 439 - 40. 
2
cf. MGHE 440ff. 
3
cf. ~1GHE 484. Cf. also 511: "The prophet is but the 
mystic in control of the forces of history, declaring their 
necessary outcome: the mystic. in action is the prophet. In 
the prophet the cognitive certainty of the mystic becomes 
historic and particular; and this is the necessary destiny 
of that certainty: mystic experience must complete itself 
in the prophetic consciousness." Cf. also TP 273. 
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among these elements are various, but chief among them is 
their binding unity, love. Taken together, the three ele-
ments, their Ground and the manifold of dynamic and static 
relations among them constitute the structure of mystical 
~ experience. 
r 
I As an extension of nuclear experience, mystical ex-
perience is temporally dynamic, an historical process whose 
characteristic operations can be described in terms of cer-
tain constants. Furthermore, regulated by a dialectical prin-
ciple or "law11 of alternation, the active and receptive 
phases of mystical development serve to facilitate the ex-
plicitation in consciousness of God's presence as the Ground 
or Field of experience as well as the unifying Goal of his-
tory. The characteristic function of mysticism is thus to 
make salient the divine Field of experience, differentiating 
it as an implicit dimension of all experience from other 
forms of experience by intensification rather than segrega-
tion. 
Conceived in terms of a temporal dialectic, mysticism 
can also be seen to possess an intrinsic social dimension, 
its major cadence being reiterated in the lesser, repeated 
alternations of activity and repose which result from and 
continue it. Both the greater and lesser manifestations of 
the principle of alternation are dialectical, that is, re-
ciprocally progressive; the difference lies mainly in the 
frequency of the latter in contrast_to the more probably 
single occurrence of the former. 
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The emergent pattern of individual and social mystical 
development is modified, however, by the exigencies of parti-
cular human psychologies, natural and social situations and 
the historical nature of the encounter with God. While these 
exigencies will be manifest in varieties of mystical experi-
ences, nevertheless constancies can be found in these varie-
ties. In order to discover and elucidate these common factors, 
Hocking investigated mysticism both in its historical mani-
festations as well as in particular instances in the lives of 
mystics East and West. 
The .. deep structures" of mysticism, especially in its 
developmental phases, concern us next. The common theoretical 
aspects of the mystics' experience, both their psychology 
and their cosmology, will warrant briefer attention, in so 
far as the fundamental structures of mysticism are primarily 
of the practical order. Still, the theoretical concurrences 
are important philosophically and bear upon practice, as 
Hocking gradually came to realize. For such conceptual rami-
fications of mystical experience inevitably guide further 
experience by becoming schemas for the interpretation of ex-
perience, especially as preserved in formal traditfons. The 
social dimension of mysticism is found not only in the world 
of action, but in patterns of thinking and behavior dialecti-
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callY intertwined with action. 
3• The Dynamics of Mystical Experience 
Hocking treated of mysticism both in its individual 
manifestations and as an historical phase in the development 
of religion in a variety of cultures, especially with regard 
to the mystical teachings of outstanding representatives 
which were institutionalized into traditions, schools and 
literature. Individual and ••historical" mysticism are, of 
course, interrelated ... Particularized" mysticism appears in 
the lives of individuals generally within a mystical tradi-
tion of one of the world's great religions, although not ne-
cessarily so. 1 Further, while distinct phenomena, individual 
and "social'' mysticism were at least structurally homologous 
for Hocking. As the withdrawal from the social world in indi-
vidual mystical development finds completion in the mystic's 
return to society, so, too, mysticism historically passed be-
yond the stage of unworldly absorption with the Absolute into 
an active, prophetic stage. The pattern in both forms of mys-
ticism is so remarkably similar in this respect that it is 
no distortion of Hocking's thought to say that individuals 
continuously and approximately recapitulate in their own de-
1
some of the great modern mystics such as Therese of 
Lisieux, a Carmelite, and Rufus Jones, a Quaker, thus either 
gravitated toward existing mystical communities or developed 
within them. 
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~elopment the pattern of the historical emergence of mysti-
cism, thereby perpetuating and also modifying it in the 
course of subsequent history. 
· Eistorical Mv_sticism l.· 
Mysticism appeared historically, as we have seen, as 
a response within the major religious traditions to the per-
ception of God as 11 the Absolute, .. that is, the discovery of 
the supreme sovereignty of "the One." 1 Individual mystical 
experience undoubtedly preceded the emergence of socially 
recognizable mysticism in so far as any person was aware of 
the personal nature of the god he discovered in his experi-
ences of his own existence as a Self or, more likely, in ex-
periences of Nature, social obligations and love -- a living 
presence attentive to him and whom he could address as "Thou. 11 
Thus, animism and even polytheistic religion were a prelude 
to mysticism. But the development of what we now recognize 
as mysticism was dependent upon the appearance of personal-
istic monotheism and the possibility that the "dim awareness" 
of the presence of God could be raised to explicit conscious-
ness by "everyman," an ability at least in part socially con-
ditioned by the availability of interpretative schemata and 
the sanction of the community. 2 The actual shift from poly-
1cf. GL Dec. 10, 1938; ••HA" 433- 37. 
2cf. LRWF 45 - 51, "HA." 433. 
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theism to monotheism and the attendant belief in the possi-
~ilitY of achieving union with the One was a widespread phe-
nomenon dictated by the structures and dynamics of human con-
sciousness itself: 
such changes were bound to occur, through the constancy 
of the need for integration in the human spirit; and 
they everywhere took the direction of bringing unity out 
of plurality. 
The logic is much the same everywhere: the many 
gods cannot be independent; and a subordinate or depen-
dent god cannot be the supreme Reality.l · 
Hocking pointed to India as the locus of breakthrough 
with regard to the development of true mysticism: 
It was in accord with the genius of India that this logic 
[was] pursued relentlessly to its conclusion in the doc-
trine that the Real is absolute unity, whereas such unity 
rejects description: the One, as inexpressible, culmi-
nates for our thought in Mysticism. What we may describe 
as the discovery of the Absolute marks, I believe~ the 
most important cultural achievement of antiquity.~ 
The realization that God is One, together with the be-
lief that it is possible to be one with him, constitutes the 
historical condition for the explicit manifestation of mysti-
cal religion, both in theory and in practice. 3 But the full 
development of mysticism awaited the "passage beyond the Ab-
solute": 
l"HA" 433. 
2Ibid. Cf. GL Dec. 10, 1938. Cf. also MGHE 329. 
3c£. ewe 149, ".t-1M" 39 and "MS" 189. 
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the moment of discovery is never final: it marks a divid-
ing line between two struggles: first the prior struggle 
out of Polytheism; second, the subsequent struggle be-
yond the absolute poise of the mystic to a recovered re-
levance !£ effective living, a more concrete realism.r-
With respect to the general thrust of religious conscious-
ness, therefore, "the Mystical -- shall we say watershed --
with its relative absence of leadership for the masses of 
mankind must foretell a further stage of historical advance." 2 
Hocking instantiated his contention by pointing to 
the impact of movements begun by the fifteenth century Chi-
nese sage, Wang Yang Ming, by the Buddha and by Jesus. Even 
Greek and Roman religion had refused to sacrifice the histor-
ical particular despite an overriding concern for eternal 
truth and beauty. 3 Nevertheless, the critical event in the 
ancient phase of religious history was the encounter between 
11 the realism of Rome and the Realism of Jesus in which the 
Jewish revolter lost his life, and apparently his cause." 4 
But the execution of Jesus concealed a victory which rested 
upon the identification of the universal and the particular, 
the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal in 
one, unique historical event: "the realism of Rome in full 
power is absorbed in the Realism of the prophetic conscious-
1
"HA 11 434; this passage has no correlative in the 
Herald text. 
2 





C . f' d ,.l ness of the rue~ ~e • 
Beyond the quiescent contemplation of the Absolute, 
even beyond union with it, there lies the completion of the 
process of religious development in active involvement in 
the World. Thus the greatest examples of religious genius 
are found promoting reform, attending to the needs of the 
poor, the diseased, the ignorant, the dispossessed and for-
gotten of every kind. The social legacy of mysticism is 
found not only in a magnificent body of literary remains and 
religious orders, but in schools, orphanages, hospitals, 
charitable agencies, social reform, peace and brotherhood. 
And thus for Hocking the mystical propheticism of 
Christianity historically represented an advance over the 
mystical absolutism of India by dint of the pragmatic cri-
terion of "better meeting the world. 11 The adequacy of this 
comparison of world religions is, of course, open to serious 
objection. The reforming efforts of Hindu and Buddhist saints 
is well known -- a point which, if anything, reinforces Hock-
ing's major contention concerning the active phase of reli-
gious development. But in his defense, it can be said, I be-
lieve, that the corporate commitment to social betterment 
institutionalized in Christianity has in Asian religions nev-
er passed far beyond the stage of individual efforts or a 
general commitment to compassionate solicitude such as is 
l"HA" 437. 
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found in Buddhism. In terms of concrete achievements, Chris-
tianitY may not rank higher than Buddhism philanthropically. 
aut with respect to an explicit tendency in the religious 
ethiC toward improving the general lot of mankind, no reli-
gion has proved as conscientious or, perhaps, as meddle-
some -- as Christianity. Writing as a Christian, Hocking may 
have betrayed some bias; as an historian, he was generally 
on secure ground. 1 
ii. Individual Mystical Development 
In particular instances, the transition from the la-
tent mysticism of nuclear experience to explicit mysticism 
repeats the pattern characteristic of the historical evolu-
tion of mysticism. The discovery of the Absolute in multi-
form experiences of Self, Nature and Society comes to ex-
1 In so far as the role of Jesus Christ is even and 
perhaps especially that of the historical mediator between 
God and mankind as God-made-man, the "human face of God" 
(LRliF 228; "What Is a Lost Soul?" Chicago Theological Semi-
nary Register, 23-[March, 1933], p. 10), Christianity is, 
for Hocking, the natural culmination of religious develop-
ment, the ~final" religion. There is, however, no developed 
Christology in Hocking's philosophy, and it is consequently 
difficult to assess his conception of the role of Christ 
further with regard to mystical theory. But as an historical 
fact, rather than an element of belief, the Christian reli-
gion is of course subject to philosophical scrutiny, and in 
so far as it might be shown to best satisfy criteria for ef-
fective living religiously, could be considered "final .. in 
a purely philosophical context. That, however, lies beyond 
the scope of this study to examine. (Cf. HNR, Part VII; 
"HCCBFR!' passim: LRWF 229 - 62; ewe 108ff. For commentaries 
on Hocking's "reconception" of Christianity, cf. Rouner, 
WHE. 256 - 86 and Andrew Reck, Recent American Philosophy 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1964], pp. 64ff.) 
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prass awareness through worship and its enlargement by mys-
tical ascesis, eventuating in greater social participation. 
Wide vari a·tions are, of course, possible (and indeed actual, 
as Hocking well knew} in the ways and means by which the 
mystical potential of "everyman" is realized. But the over-
all pattern or structure of development appeared to be re-
latively constant in East and ~vest over various temporal 
. d 1 perJ.o s. 
The temporal structure of mystical experience takes 
the form of a dialectical pattern of three stages: withdraw-
al from the world or "conversion," transformation or re-uni-
fication and, ultimately, action or return to the world. In 
his magnum opus, Hocking also adverted to the classic char-
acterization of the stages of development the purgative, 
illuminative and unitive "ways, 11 but without elaboration. 2 
What is important is not their designations but the fact 
• 
that it is possible to discern certain distinctive phases of 
development in the mystic's career. Hocking himself proposed 
the following description, which also correlates well with 
the stages of the mystical life as described by St. Teresa 
of Avila. First, the "overall moral character of the pro-
cess in the ideal of the 'pure heart' which is recognized 
as the condition of finding God in worship." 3 Second, the 
1cf. "MM. .. 39, MGHE 352. 
2c£. MGHE 373. Note the lack of reference to action 
in the classical description, which terminates with union. 
3MGHE 387. 
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••simplification of consciousness," usually attained by a pro-
o f mental discipline and prayer.
1 Third, the "repudia-
c:ess 
tion of effort," in which, as we have seen, God can freely 
qive himself to the mystic prepared to receive him. 2 
Whether called purgation, illumination and union or 
(with St. Teresa) the Prayer of Quiet, the Prayer of Simpli-
city and the Prayer of Union, the more significant stages of 
development in the mystic's life were not embodied for Hock-
ing in discrete periods but in the dialectical interplay of 
various depths of experience distinguished by a tension of 
opposition but also united by a central thrust toward expan-
sion and creativity. Further, a major difference between 
Hocking and the classical description concerns the phase of 
activity, the return to the world. ~~ile evident in the lives 
of the mystics, this stage of development received no explic-
it reference in their descriptions. Whatever the reason for 
this, the omission is not only striking but serious: 
This, at any rate, is what has impressed me in mysticism: 
That the turning away from the world in the negative path 
of worship (together with the mystic experience itself 
which marks the limit of the upswing) and the turning 
back again constitute a normal rhythm or alternation 
which has many analogies, and a vital function in the hu-
man mind capable of psychological expression.3 
1
rbid. Cf. also 438. 
2r· "d 
.OJ. • Cf. 385ff • 
3MGHE 392. 
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These alternating currents of world-love and God-
are not merely antithetical. They are reciprocal: 
We may say that beyond the limits of the mystic experi-
ence itself, the love of God takes on the form of human 
ambition; that these motives are, so to speak, allotro-
nic forms of the same. They alternate with each other, 
as the hour glass is turned, -- each one in turn becom-
ing the life of the other. With the idea of God, one 
loves- the world; and then with the idea of the world, 
one loves God again, -- and the two loves, or ambitions, 
are of one substance, though they involve alternations 
in the history of the empirical will.l 
Thus it becomes necessary to correct the traditional 
designation of the stages of mystical development to the ex-
tent that beyond the purgative, illuminative and unitive 
phases, or, rather, framing them, are the dialectical move-
ments away from the world and back to i~. The negative as-
pect of mysticism finds its positive meaning not only in the 
transforming union with God, but dynamically in the return 
to the work-a-day world where the social meaning and value 
of mysticism becomes manifest. Thus both the "three ages"of 
the mystical life as classical conceived and the "Prayers" 
of st. Teresa belong to the second phase of mystical devel-
opment as articulated in terms of Hocking's widened view of 
the process. Likewise, Hocking's three-fold description cf 
the purification of heart, simlification of consciousness 
and repudiation of effort similarly refer to the "inner" 
stages of mystical development, the "negative path." Conse-
1MGHE 424. 
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ntly five distinct moments can be discerned overall: que , -
~ithdrawal from the world, purgation, illumination, union 
and return to the world. 1 
(1) Practical Mysticism 
In his earliest writings, Hocking adverted to the dual 
aspect of mystical experience, its practice and the theory 
of that practice. 2 This was extended in his later career to 
specific statements about the nature of reality as experi-
enced as well as the nature of the experience in its subjec-
3 tive aspect. Thus disengaging the objective from the subjec-
tive aspects of the theory of mystical experience was a major 
development in his thought, one which took Hocking closer 
respectively to James and Royce in spirit if far beyond them 
in content. 
Hocking's "theoretical" mysticism was never merely 
speculative, however. The empirical origins of the mystic's 
metaphysics as well as his psychology always exercized a 
critical function in his approach to mysticism. The true mys-
tic was an empiricist; his practice preceded~eory. Conse-
quently, Hocking's attention to the practical aspect of mys-
1For a conteQpora~y discussion of this problem which 
concludes with a similar expansion of the stages of mystical 
development, cf. Kenneth l'lapnick, "Mysticism and Schizophre-
nia,11 The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1, 2 (Fall, 
1969, pp. 49 - 66. 
2c£. MGHE xxviii. 
3ct. TP Z.60 I "MS." 187. 
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ticism preceded and always outweighed his interest in the 
theoretical aspect. The unanimity of the mystics themselves, 
he consistently maintained, pertained primarily to elements 
of discipline rather than to theories.about reality or even 
God, if perhaps less so than Hocking believed at the initial 
f hi t . d f t• . 1 stages o . s compara 1ve stu y o mys 1c1sm. 
This discipline or pattern of life, as Hocking ab-
, 
stracted it from a variety of cases, involves a movement of 
withdrawal and return to the world, as we have seen, between 
which occurs a period of development he called "the negative 
path." This "path" includes the purgative and at least parts 
of the illuminative and unitive "ways." 
This first phase of the mystic's development once he 
has withdrawn from the world of ordinary life to pursue a 
greater intimacy with God, is negative in so far as it con-
sists mainly of voluntary efforts to detach oneself from the 
customary habits of thought and action of the world. 2 It is 
characterized by two cardinal elements to which we shall 
turn briefly: renunciation and meditation. 
The mystic characteristically withdraws from society 
not so much in terms of physical relocation as by a more or 
less voluntary renunciation of socially conditioned ideas, 
norms, values and behavior, including notions of "what 11 God 
1c£. u.HM" 39, MGHE 352. 
2cf. MGHE 386. 
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iS· By "more or less voluntary," I mean that the budding mys-
tic may only dimly perceive the need for and nature of the 
disengagement from conventional attitudes and only reluctant-
lY undertake surrendering them. But the process of dishabitu-
ation will occur despite initial resistance, for attaining 
the desired purgation of desires, habits and preferences en-
tails some "unlearning" of habitual modes of social partici-
pation.1 A reflexive awareness of the process by which this 
occurs is not necessary for the acquisition of detachment, 
however. 
Thus the mystic is gradually "mortified" in body, 
mind and spirit -- reduced, that is, to the state of feeling 
utter dependence on God alone. This is accomplished by ac-
tively and passively stripping oneself of all worldly attach-
ments, not because they are evil, but because they are not 
2 God. But the path of negation occupies only half of the 
mystic's method of purification and advancement. All turning 
away is also a turning towards; all detachment is for the 
sake of reattachment: 
the active part of worship still remains a path of nega-
tion. For the god whom the mystic seeks is in fact some-
thing other than any given natural object of pursuit; 
and since we are always better aware of what our abso-
lute is not than of what it is, the note of negation 
1cf. MGHE 372 - 73, HNR 27. 
2cf. MGHE xxix. 
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must remain predominant. But meanwhile, worship has its 
positive side also; the mystic has always in some way 
recognized the fact that passion can be cast out only 
by some greater passion.l 
Here is the positive foundation of Hocking's doctrine 
of asceticism, which has its analogue in "mundane" experi-
ence in the discipline, critical effort and hardships en-
tailed in artistic and scientific method. 2 Without the posi-
tive upswing of affirmation, the mystic's path would end in 
mere nihilism, which is of no value to the person or society. 
Negation is necessary but neither sufficient nor final. As 
we shall see, the mystic, like the scientist and the artist, 
acquires by his negative discipline a ne\'1 and powerful ap-
preciation of the common world, finding therein whole realms 
of meaning and value unnoticed before and yet unfathomed. 
Considering the role meditation plays in mystial ex-
perience, the mystic's attitude toward the world could hard-
ly be totally negative. Even the pu~ative phases of his 
path has its positive aspect. Hocking briefly but pointedly 
asserted that 
1MGHE 376. 
2Like the mystic, the artist and the scientist must 
undergo rigorous training, learning to perceive the elements 
of the common world differently, effectively ''stripping" 
themselves of socially conditioned modes of perception, at-
titudes and behavior which exercize a kind of divine but 
dulling power over social existence. For a contemporary ex-
amination of the role of "unlearning" habitual modes of be-
havior, cf. Arthur Deikman, "Deautomatization and the Mystic 
Experience," Psychiatry, 29 (1966), 324- 38. 
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Pleasure, recreation, friendship, the companionship of 
men and women, beauty -- all these recall the outgoings 
of ambition and moral effort, and reunite a man with his 
natural appreciation. Something in common these all have 
with the quest of the mystic, and with the mystic experi-
ence itself. ll.nd worship is the whole which includes 
~ .!!!.·1 
Purgation, which encompasses the efforts traditionally 
referred to as "renunciation," "mortification" and "detach-
ment," concerns both "outer" and "inner" experience, that is, 
both the body and the mind. By no means enamored of an anti-
corporeal spirituality, Hocking clearly saw the underlying 
function performed by the obviously negative bodily restraints 
characteristically undertaken by those entering upon the mys-
tical way: 
in all acts of the will, the body plays its part: and it 
is the physical side of all mental acts, whether one sets 
himself about thinking, or enjoying, or praying, which 
is most directly controllable. In proportion as the inner 
process is subtle and evanescent, the physical prelimi-
naries must be extensive.2 
The body, for the mystic, is the symbol of the sou1. 3 
The greater stress in the mystic's effort to prepare 
himself for the encounter with God is more likely to be 
placed on mental discipline than on physical control, how-
1MGHE 418· f 422 I C • • 
2 MGHE. 372. 
3For a similar treatment of the body as a metaphor 
of "subtle and evanescent .. process, in this instance social 
relations, cf. Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols (Harmondsworth, 
England: Penguin Books, 1973 ed.) 
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ever. Indeed, the concentration on the body is a means to 
greater command over the spirit and mind. This "inner" disci-
pline is traditionally referred to as meditation. 
In turning away from the world, the mystic has always 
needed something to turn toward; in all his purgation 
there has been an element of "meditation." He has done 
what he can to find his own positive ultimate will, to 
make real to himself what it is that he most deeply 
cares for. He has tried to remind himself of his abso-
lute good.l 
The positive achievement of learning to direct the mind's at-
tention by acts of restraint is "a condition of powerfully 
directed attention. Such as the term 'contemplation' sug-
2 gests." 
By training the mind to withdraw from the multitude 
of objects of attention ordinarily preoccupying conscious-
ness, the mystic learns how to advert to the whole of reali-
ty, and in that shift of attention to become aware of the 
infinite field of reference mediated by that Whole. The mys-
tical "vision" achieved by the art of meditation is a form 
1MGHE.376; cf. 378- 79, RM 4Sf., LR'W.F 227, CWC 138f. 
2MGHE 371. Hocking also noted the connection between 
the contemplative dimension of meditation and the stage of 
involuntary passivity which marks the mystic's final period 
of development: "'Contemplation,' as used by the medieval 
mystic, implies that the effort of 'meditation,' in which 
one holds the object before the mind by force of will, gives 
way to a state in which the object attracts and holds atten-
tion without further conscious effort." {Ibid.) This de-
scription of contemplation can serve as a working definition 
of the term for present purposes. 
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of intuiti~e knowledge which attains to the Whole by with-
drawing attention from the "parts" -- that is, particular 
objects of concern. It is thus an induction leading to a 
contemplative experience of God by means of the God-idea. 1 
This "working concept" of God, the pre-reflexive awareness 
of God present within us and in the World, is, like the 
whole-idea, beyond our ability to articulate conceptually. 
For all ordinary concepts are, as expressible, particular, 
limited and therefore inadequate to represent either God or 
the Whole. In this sense, Krikorian was right in his obser-
vation that 11 We never face the Whole that Hocking is con-
cerned with." 2 And thus the mystic remains certain but un-
able directly to convince anyone who has not 11 Seen .. what he 
bas seen, as James had observed. 
Yet in his quest for meaning, the mystic not only at-
tempts to reach further clarity in his ••conception" of God, 
he also persists in trying to share his vision. His "ac-
counts with reality" are never closed. His openness to ex-
perience is thus assured by his awareness of the inadequacy 
of all concepts and all expressions. His method, his "prayer 
of union," tends to approximate to a wholly non-effortful 
receptivity to God in which his concepts {which he must 
think with if he is to think at all) must play the most mi-
nimal role. While no stranger to theological reflection, his 
1
c£. MGHE 129££. 
2K 'k . . 274 r~ or~an, art. c1t., p. • 
o\tln \'lay is one 
is likewise an 
II • 1 H' of unknowJ.ng." J.S openness 
2 
openness to God's grace. 
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to experience 
Paradoxically, the fact that the mystic has a "true" 
concept of God or the Whole determines his inability to ar-
ticulate it. Thus the problem of verification arises, the 
real thrust of Krikorian's objection. Simply speaking, it 
would seem that Krikorian is right, as James had admitted: 
immediate verification by "objective" or· external criteria 
is ruled out by the mystic's inability or refusal to articu-
late his vision. The mystic, of course, is less interested 
in verification than in experience, and of his experience 
he is certain. He is not concerned to convince others that 
his concept is accurate, but to persuade them to join him in 
his vision, to follow his way, that is, to experience it for 
themselves. The mystic needs the community to confirm his ex-
1The Dionysian strand of "unknowing" (agnosia) so 
marked in Hocking's treatment of mysticism had its origins 
in the remote ages of Christian antiquity, perhaps as derived 
from Philo. It was strongly influenced by Nee-platonic 
thought from the third to the sixth centuries, finding ex-
pression as early as the writings of Clement of Alexandria 
(fl. 200) as well as those of Sts. Basil, Gregory Nazianzen 
and Athanasius among the Greek Fathers and Augustine in the 
West. Reaching a peak of development in the Mystical Theo-
~ of the Pseudo-Areopagite, the "way of unknowing" passed 
into the medieval period with the translation of this work 
into Latin by Erigena in the ninth century. On the Pseudo-
Dionysius, cf. MGHE 355 and 395, n. 2; on Plotinus, cf. MGHE 
329 and 395; on Bonaventure and High of St. Victor, cf. MGHE 
371 and 379, n. 1. 
2cf. "MS" 190. While mentioned here and implicit in 




perience, primarily by following his example, not by verify-
. 1 ing his doctr1ne. 
Thus mysticism entails immediate, personal experience; 
it is not found in books. In so far as it is knowledge, it 
is knowledge of, not knowledge about. It is also democratic; 
each must see for himself, and consensus indicates "truth." 
whatever else he is, the mystic is a radical empiricist. 2 
The highest stage of the mystical 11 ascent 11 and the 
culmination of the negative path is reached in the conscious 
experience of union with the divine presence. The mystic has 
raised to its highest level of awareness the ordinary nuclear 
experience of God's presence and now, surrendering his own 
efforts to become one with God, he can be "graced" with a 
special mode of that presence not exigent upon any effort of 
his own. But the mystic has not reached the end of his path 
with the transition to the positive experience of God's pre-
sence. 
The voluntary and involuntary passivity of the unitive 
phase of the mystic's spiritual transformation gives way to 
renewed social activity -- both voluntary and, in the sense 
of an irresistible inner compulsion, involuntary. Manifest-
ing the dialectical influence of the principle of alterna-
tion, the mystic returns to the world. This stage of mysti-
1
see below, pp. 263ff. 
2cf. LRWF 40, 44 - 46; ewe 182. 
I~' I 
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cal life, often overlooked by the mystics themselves in de-
scribing their development, is nevertheless an integral part 
of the structure of mysticism viewed from a social perspec-
tive. Hocking's signal accomplishment in the study of mysti-
cism lies, I believe, in his exposition of the fact and mean-
ing of this phase of the mystic's career. For the concluding 
social phases of mystical experience not only complete the 
dynamic process of individual development but accounts for 
I 
the mystic s role in society, apart from which mysticism ap-
pears to be merely an episode of religious alienation. Above 
all, Hocking's analysis revealed that mysticism is in its 
deepest structure a social process, finding in society both 
meaning and value beyond that which it has for the individu-
al. Further, this social dimension of mysticism contains the 
clues which helped him resolve some of the perplexities mys-
ticism had caused many of its thoughtful critics. 
Hocking did not discover the reciprocal relationship 
between action and contemplation, which found expression 
even in the writings of Aristotle and has antecedents in the 
work-rest dialectic of the Jewish Sabbath. 1 This dual ele-
ment of spirituality was a fundamental principle of medieval 
and later theologians, not only Thomas Aquinas, but through-
out the West. 2 Hocking, however, in realizing that there-
1
cf. Nichomachean Ethics, Book X, Ch. 8, 1178 b 33 -
1179 a 33. Cf. also Harvey Cox, Turning~ (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1977), pp. 68- 70. 
2For Aquinas• teaching, cf. his Summa Theologiae, 
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lationship between action and contemplation was dialectical 
and that the character of activity following upon the con-
templative development of the mystic was significantly dif-
ferent from that which preceded it, contributed a valuable 
and original insight to our understanding of the spiritual 
life. Further, Hocking was able to express this insight 
structurally and to use it to integrate the active phase 
• 
of mystical development into an overarching description of 
the mystical life without subordinating it to the contempla-
tive phase as a perhaps necessary but regrettable interrup-
tion. This he was able to do by showing that the dialectic 
of active involvement in the world and contemplative refleJ-
tion were the mystical expression of the principle of alter-
nation which regulated all human operations. 1 
II-II, Q. 188, a. 6 and Q. 182 1 a. 1 ad 5 and ibid., a. 3. 
1The significance of action has been approached from 
an historical viewpoint with regard to Ignatian mysticism by 
Joseph de Guibert, S.J. in The Jesuits: Their Spiritual E££-
trine and Practice (William J. Young, s.J., trans. and George 
E. Ganss, S.J., ed. [Chicago: The Institute of Jesuit Sources 
and Loyola University Press, 1964]). While recognizing the 
necessary connection between love and action in the mystical 
life (p. 58), De Guibert does not develop these connection 
theoretically nor does he explain its genesis in terms of 
psychological motivation. He denies, further, that Ignatius• 
mysticism was one of union and transformation (pp. 178- 79) 
despite the evident experiences Ignatius enjoyed of God's 
presence (pp. 32, 45, 55, 59) and his personal spiritual 
transformation (p. 28). This might be taken to imply that in 
Ignatian mysticism the contemplative aspect is subordinate 
to action rather than a complementary phase of development 
despite the clear affirmation that Ignatius was "a contempla-
tive even in the midst of action" (p. 45, citing Jeronimo 
Nadal). However, following de Guibert himself, the life of 
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For Hocking the mystical interplay of action and con-
templation provided the dynamism of the spiritual life of 
the individual as well as that of society, both of which 
move forward in time and advance in "maturity .. as a boat ad-
vances by tacking -- sailing obliquely in a zig-zag pattern 
rather than sailing directly into the wind. The initial con-
tribution of mysticism to society is thus a function of re-
flection: re-evaluating, re-thinking and re-organizing with 
respect to the structures, values, ideas, institutions and 
goals of state and church. But only in action can such re-
flection find its value for life and thereby its meaning. In 
applying his reconceptions in the World, the mystic becomes 
the prophet: critic, gadfly, truthsayer, reformer. 1 His task 
can be described as a struggle to overcome evil in the world, 
Ignatius can be seen to provide a paradigm of the stages of 
mystical development as outlined by Hocking: with~awal from 
the social world (pp. 24- 27); a period of renunciation and 
purgation, the "negative path" on which the mystic undergoes 
a complete personal transformation (pp. 28, 66- 67, 72- 73); 
meditative and contemplative exercize of the mind and will, 
culminating in experiences of the direct and immediate pre-
sence of God (pp. 32, 45, 55, 59££.); and a return to the 
world and a life of heroic service (pp. 32- 33, 58, 73, 177 
- 78). Ignatius • mysticism \'las neither "nuptial" ( p. 55) nor 
Dionysian {p. 59), but it nevertheless conforms to the clas-
sical pattern of Western tradition, particularly with regard 
to its expression in action. (Cf. MGHE 361, quoted below, p. 
). For a more recent study of Ignatius' mystical develop-
ment, cf. Harvey D. Egan, S.J., The Spiritual Exercizes and 
~ Ignatian Mystical Horizon (St. Louis: The Institute of 
Jesuit Sources, 1976). 
1ct. MGHE 473; TP 131 - 32, 271; .HIHE 160 etc. 
261 
but this is only the negative aspect of the mystic's positive 
contribution. He will be found at the bottom of reforms, agi-
tating for greater justice and more charity, a spokesman for 
the poor and oppressed, an originator of new movements for 
co-operation and peaceful co-existence (as Hocking was in 
his own life). In all of this, the motive of the mystic's re-
turn and the on-going source of his rekindled efforts is an 
imperative sense of duty and especially of love. 1 
Hocking was careful to point out that the alternation 
between action and contemplation which governs the mystic's 
development and subsequent career is not a natural cycle, al-
though analogous to one. Its period is regulated by voluntary 
and historical factors as well as by the inner dialectic of 
the mystic's development as a member of society: 
\ 
whatever the psychological phenomena associated with mys-
ticism may be, the thread upon which they are hung is --
as I must insist -- the mystic's intention; and if that 
intention is at all fairly conceived as an intention to 
worship, it involves an occupation of attention which in 
the nature of the case must alternate with attention to 
other affairs. I am driven, therefore, in the search for 
a psychology of mysticism, to look for further analogies 
among those normal alternations such as sleeping and wak-
ing, work and recreation, competition and co-operation, 
the hungers [for beauty, society, solitude, etc.] and 
satisfactions already referred to, conception and gesta-
tion, etc .. 2 
1cf. MGHE 424, 507; CWC 183. 
2
"MM 11 SO. He continued, "Every detail of physical op-
eration shows this method of action. Attention is a rapidly 
alternating current, perpetually withdrawn from its object 
and instantaneously replaced: but in the instant of withdraw-
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For Hocking, therefore, the alternation that obtained 
in the reciprocity of action and contemplation was not a mere 
biological rhythm manifested psychologically, but rather a 
harmony of active and receptive phases of experience that 
characterized many vital functions. It was a method of maxi-
mizing the available energy of a system. More than that, it 
was a description of the nature of cognitive experience from 
a philosophical perspective: "at the bottom of the psycholo-
gical alternation there lies an epistemological principle, 
which de~erves to be called the Principle of Alternation." 1 
The actual alternations of attention Hocking was concerned 
with fallinto t'vo categories, that between the part and the 
whole which defines the structure of the knowing process, 
and that between activity and receptivity which characterizes 
the structure of experience. In short, the principle of al-
ternation is the regulative aspect of the dialectical charac-
ter of experience in all its modes. 
In his later writings, the social dimension of mysti-
cism remained a function of the principle of alternation, as 
2 
we have observed above, the mystic's need for the community 
al, having recovered a better poise and a steadier termina-
tion, having wiped away the film of relativity with which 
self and object had begun to infect each other." Thus the 
mystic "only does consciously and totally that which we all 
are continuously doing in the minuter movement of psychical 
life, that which we all resort to in fragmentary and instinc-
tive manner." ("M~1" 55.) 
l,.MH" 55. 
2 See above, pp. 205ff. 
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and the community's reciprocal need for the mystic. 1 
First, the mystic discovers that he has a need for 
the community "'vith ali_ its particular marks in order to 
complete his religious selfhood." 2 This need is primarily or 
at least initially satisfied by the mystic's gathering about 
himself a band of disciples. "It is not that the mystic con-
firms in his disciples what he is already sure of; it is 
rather the negative side of this -- if he had no capacity to 
persuade, he would have to suspect himself." 3 Consequently, 
verification represents confirmation by the community through 
its representatives gathered around the mystic. This is but 
a partial satisfaction, however. A greater need lies in the 
continuity of experience, which is also a social exigency: 
the mystic is a bearer in his own person of the question-
ing out of which he was born. When he joins his communi-
ty in worship, he joins in its questioning -- for wor-
ship when it is alive contains a new grouping of the 
soul, not a wearing deeper of old ruts. And if he finds 
an answer, he must bring it back into the context of the 
questioning to which the answer belongs. He must vest 
his insight in that particular historical campaign.4 
The third and deepest need pertains to the decline of 
individual religious feeling and to the character of ritual. 
, 
·cf. LRWF 40 - 43, cited above, pp. 205ff. 
2LRNF 43. 
3LR1'1F 45. 
4 LRWF 46. 
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For feeling runs down in religion as elsewhere: "Religious 
feeling, underlying all others, is in the same case: it, too, 
runs down; savedness does not last: the passion for righteous-
ness needs to be renewed."l 
The religious need of the mystic for the community 
is therefore to renew his religious feeling, his awareness 
of value and meaning. Such a renewal takes place normally in 
the ritual of worship: "As feeling, religion takes the shape, 
for the community, of ritual." 2 Thus the mystic not only re-
ceives his original stock of ideas and values from his corn-
3 
rnunity, he also replenishes religious feeling at that store. 
Fourth, the mystic also needs the community in order 
to achieve the prophetic potential of his experience, "the 
prolongation of his deed" in history: 
The spread of righteousness is a task which cannot be lim-
ited by the reach of an individual either in space or in 
time. So far as his "work" deserves to continue, it can 
continue beyond his personal scope only if there is a 
community to continue it.4 
1LRWF 48 - 49. Hocking explained, "If we say that feel-
ing is our cognizance of value, or that feeling is the report 
of consciousness that value is present, it becomes a truism 
that without feeling life is valueless. But feeling, the most 
important element of experience, is also the most intangible. 
It cannot be conveyed from mind to mind in its own character: 
its expression necessarily is in another medium •••• Further, 
feeling is evanescent." For him, feeling was also "a natural 
response to the meaning found in an actual situation." (p. 49.) 




Not only does the mystic need the community for the 
completion of his development; the community also needs the 
mystic, as Hocking had first proposed in his magnum opus. 
Hocking consistently maintained and positively expressed this 
relationship as the mystic's value to society: his renewal of 
society's values and meanings in the crucible of personal re-
creation. In his later work, Hocking's point of view widened 
from the nature of the mystic's contribution alone to include 
the limits and deficiencies of society: "While the mystic is 
building up his own inner group, as a sort of leaven within 
the wider secular community, this wider community relies on 
such work as his for certain qualities which it cannot pro-
duce for itself."l 
The principal social need is for continuing morale: 
"The community depends for its indispensable morale upon the 
mystic and his findings." 2 Religion and its inner power to 
revitalize-- the mystic's experience of God, provides the 
basis for sustained social co-operation. S0 ciety in turn can 
be expected to favor "that mode of religion which is most 
nearly in harmony with its own moral direction." 3 For this 
reason, of course, the danger of co-optation is great -- per-




3LRWF 53. Imd hence, "The community must cultivate its 
mystics." (LRWF 52.) 
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despite the worsening situ~tion in Europe. (Oddly enough, he 
all but ignored the mystical-prophetic function of critical 
dissent at that time.) 
Convinced that society depended upon the mystic for 
its ess:ential vlell-being and development, Hocking • s original 
rejoinder to those who pitted prophetic social action against 
mysticism was to assert their fundamental connection, indeed 
their identity. For him prophecy was the extension of mysti-
cal awareness in action: "The mystic in historic action is 
termed the prophet: in a study of the prophet we may span the 
final term of religion's work in the world."l Prophecy is 
thus not merely a mode of social interaction, but the ripe 
fruit of a mystical encounter with God rooted deep in the 
meaning and structure of human experience. 2 
Consequently, prophecy should not be limited to a type 
of knowledge such as precognition. The transition from aware-
·ness to active social intervention is inevitable, given the 
prophet's mystical impulse toward communicating what he has 
experienced despite its ineffable character, as well as to-
ward leaving behind a permanent contribution to the world's 
1MGHE 484. Cf. 511: "The prophet is but the mystic in 
control of the forces of hi~tory, declaring their necessary 
outcome: the mystic in action is the prophet. In the prophet, 
the cognitive certainty of the mystic becomes historic and 
particular; and this is the necessary destiny of that cer-
tainty: mystic experience must complete itself in the pro-
phetic consciousness." 
2cf. MGHE 503, 511. 
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worth, as he feels he has been charged to do by a mysterious 
destiny: 
Prophetic power is the final evidence to each individual 
that he is right and real; it is his assurance of salva-
tion; it is his share of divinity; it is his anticipation 
of attainment. Hence it is that the greater mystics have 
been great founders, great agitators, and have if not a 
heavenly immortality yet unquestionably a mundane immor-
tality. There are no deeds more permanent than those of 
Buddha, of Mohammed, of Jesus. ~nd innumerable lesser 
deeds of equal validity have completed the substance of 
these mighty frames. The deeds of the mystics constitute 
the hard parts of history; the rest has its day and 
passes.l 
So it is that in the accounts and orders and sects 
left behLnd by the great mystics, the supreme values of soci-
ety, refined and renewed by the personal transformation of 
the mystic \vho embodies them, are readjusted to their insti-
tutional form and thus rendered more accessible to those less 
prone or able to endure the stresses of the nagative path, 
but who share the same nuclear experience and the same funda-
mental values. Prophecy is to that extent conservative. Per-
haps even more importantly, new values are also discovered, 
clarified and expressed by means of the mystical adventure, 
and thereby the race moves slowly and raggedly but definitely 
forward toward the unification of history in a common spir-
't 1 . ' Ad h h · · 2 1 ua v1s1on. n to t at extent, prop ecy 1s progress1ve. 
1MGHE 512. Cf. 518 and MIHE 160, quoted above, p. 215. 
2For further discussion, see below, pp. 294ff. 
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Hocking's belief in the unanimity of the mystics East 
and ~·Jest regarding the practical elements of mysticism may 
strike the reader armed with a half-century more of studies 
in comparative religion as somewhat naive. And yet, as these 
very studies have shown, despite real divergence, there is 
wide-ranging agreement on many major issues, including the 
necessity of social and physical renunciation, meditation, 
the suppression of conceptual thought, and some form of so-
cial action -- elements which Hocking recognized as being 
virtually universal. 1 In this respect, agreement lies less 
in the details of practice than in the more general patterns 
and underlying structures of behavior. Hocking saw clearly 
that despite the universal character of mysticism as a func-
tion of nuclear experience, because of the historico-cultur-
al particularities of peoples and nations, mysticism would 
be as variegated as were the religious traditions cut of 
which it emerged and into which it flowed. 2 
As noted in the introduction, within Christianity it-
self, there is widespread disagreement as welL as agreement 
1
cf. in this respect the works cited by Deikman, Furse, 
Johnston, Happold, Scharfstein, Smart, Staal, Stace and 
'iiapnick. Cf. also Hilliarn Johnston, ~ Still Point (New 
York: Fordham University Press~ 1970); Claude Geffr' and 
Gustavo Gutierrez, eds., ~ .Hystical and Political Dirnen-
~ of the Christian Faith (New York: Herder and Herder, 
1974 TConcilium, Vol. 96J); Margaret Smith, The Way 2f the 
Mystics (London: Sheldon Press, 1976); and Harold Coward 
and Terence Penelhum, eds., Mystics and Scholars (Waterloo, 
Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1977). 
2ef. MGHE 407, ewe 141 - 42, 180. 
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regarding the status of mystical experience and mysticism 
as a way of life. Given such a range of opinion, it is per-
haps safe to say that while differing in particulars, a ma-
jority of Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox theologians have 
traditionally considered mysticism to be in some way conso-
nant with essential Christian beliefs and practices. Possibly 
the most common points of agreement include the belief that 
in mystical experience God comes into close personal contact 
with the human spirit not as the result of human effort 
alone, but as a free gift of grace which the mystic has been 
disposed to receive by voluntary efforts as well a~ by in-
voluntary or "passive" purifications. Protestant \iri ters 
such as Harkness are wont to stress~ the notion of communion 
with God rather than union, especially in the sense of onto-
logical absorption. Further, greater emphasis is placed upon 
the sovereign role of grace and the inadequacy of human ef-
forts to attain such communion. But in either case, the aware-
ness of God's immediate presence is held to be a transitory 
state. characterized by intense love for God and human per-
sons, but ineffable as regards conceptual expression. Such a 
state is also held to be experienced after a progressive de-
velopment of the spiritual life and presupposes a high de-
gree of moral refinement. 
Reports of Catholic and Protestant mystical experi-
ences are similarly comparable and in many respects similar, 
270 
particularly with regard to a persistence of individual per-
sonality during the state of ecstatic union. 1 But it is im-
portant to observe that contemporary thought, much like Hock-
ing in his own development, has come to discover that the 
fundamental areas of agreement among the mystics are not lim-
ited to practical issues, but extend to significant areas of 
belief. Comparative mysticism also has a theoretical side. 
(2) Theoretical Mysticism 
While adverting to the mystic:'s 11 theory of reality" 
in his earlier writings, almost seventeen years elapsed be-
fore Hocking undertook, almost hesitantly, the articulation 
of a mystical metaphysics based on his analysis of important 
Eastern and' Western sources. Even then he subordinated theory 
to practice, consistently with his original view. 2 Three 
principles and their corollaries represent the major ele-
ment~ of the mystics• metaphysics of the person and the real-
ity encountered in mystical experience: 
I. That Reality is One, an absolute unity; 
II. That it is possible to reach an intuitive knowledge 
of or union with this absolute One by an effort 
which is primarily moral rather than theoretical; 
1
cf. Georgia Harkness, Mysticism, !i2, Neaning and 
Message (Nashville: Abingdon, 1973), p. 58. Ct. also Rudolf 
Otto, Mysticism East and ~, Bertha L. Bracey and Richenda 
c. Payne, trans. (New Yor}c: The Macmillan. Co., 1970) and the 
works cited by Fremantle and Rappold. See below, p. 377. 
2
cf. MGHE xxviii. 
271 
III. That all oppositions are reconciled in the One; 
the extremes coincide.l 
In arriving at these principles, the statements in 
"The Meaning of Mysticism" can be taken as Hocking's point 
of departure: "that God is One, and that it is possible to 
be one with him." 2 Implicit in this "minimum of theory" is 
1The original statement of the theoretical content of 
the mystics' teaching is found in Types of Philosophy, from 
which I have taken the three major principles and several 
corollaries (by which I mean subsidiary principles which can 
be subsumed under one of the major principles). Other corol-
laries are taken from later writings. 
2
"MM 11 40. Note the brief ramification in ewe: "God is 
and God is One." (p. 149; cf. also "MM" 39.) It should be 
noted in respect to the ontological character of these pro-
positions that, consistently with Hocking's idealistic out-
look, "God" is taken to be equivalent to "Being" and "the 
Real" in the sense of Ultimate Reality, that is, in so far 
as his reality is absolutely independent. (Without the capi-
tal, "reality" seems to refer to the factual world existing 
more or less independently of the human mind.) Hence the as-
sertions "God is One" and "Reality is One" are broadly equi-
valent although distinguishable by the context, namely the 
religious frame of reference. (ef. 11 MS" 187.) For Hocking 
God was always "the heart of Fact." (C~ie 198.) Further, what-
ever else God was, he was "the Absolute." ( ef. 14GHE 206.) 
The persistent influence of idealistic language here 
evident is not unproductive of some fogginess, betraying the 
fact, as many of his critics pointed out in their reviews of 
his magnum opus in particular, that Hocking was insufficient-
ly cured of Absolute Idealism. Hocking was no pantheist, but 
in equating "God" with "Reality,n he could be mistaken for 
one. In his defense it can be said that if God can be called 
"real" as he can be called "good," he can also be called 
"Reality Itself" as he can be called "Goodness Itself" --
here following the medieval via eminentiae as employed, for 
example, by Thomas Aquinas. (ef. Summa Theologiae I, Q. 13, 
aa. 1- 12.) On the basis of the identity of essence and ex-
istence in God, God "possesses" attributes substantially 
which are "accidental perfections" in creatures. Thus, while 
men are good, just and loving, God is Goodness Itself, Jus-
tice Itself. Although sanctioned by tradition and represent-
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an ontology, an epistemology and an ethics which, although 
limited by the mystic's circumscribed interests, are never-
theless both weighty and extensive. 
The force of the first principle is that "No pluralism 
can be a final metaphysic." 1 The underlying problematic here 
is the tension between the One and the Many. The mystic is 
not blind to the reality of the Many; he merely asserts that 
beyond all plurality is a fundamental unity which is in some 
sense divine. 2 Several corollaries flow from this ontologi-
cal axiom. First, that all of Being is present in each of its 
instances. Thus the part can stand for the whole: "In the 
world of minds, the part can include the whole, and is con-
tinually engaged in doing so, however partial a member it 
may be of any whole to which it belongs. 113 A kind of "meta-
physical synechdoche," this ancient principle has its moral 
implications: "In so far as ye did it to the least of these 
my brethren, ye did it unto me." 4 
The second corollary is that Reality (i.e., God) is 
ing a further development of the apophatic theology of the 
Greek Fathers, such employment of language does not result 
in greater clarity regarding "what 11 God is, as Thomas well 
knew. (Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 13, a. 2. Hocking refer-
red indirectly to. the via eminentiae in TP 261.) 
l"FFD" 525; cf. TP 256. 
2cf. TE 256, "MS" 188, "FFD" 525, "RPK" 280. 
3 MS 368; cf. TP 260. 
4 Matt. 25:40, cited in CWC 184. See above, pp. 202ff. 
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thus inescapably present to all, although we are generally 
1 
only "dimly aware" of that presence. 
Third, Reality is identical with the human Self. In 
its strong form, as in Vedanta, this refers both to the Ab-
solute and to the universe. In its softer form, such as that 
proposed by Hocking, this is taken to mean that "the Universe 
[i.e., the World] is a self," and "the world is kindred to" 
the Self of the mystic. 2 
Fourth, Reality is ineffable (indescribable). This ap-
plies both to the One and to the nequally indescribable es-
3 
sence of the human self •••• " I am led to suggest here that 
the ineffability of mystical experience is the product of 
the indescribability of both the subjective experiencing and 
the objective reality experienced, which are equally and per-
haps infinitely mysterious. The "reticence" of the mystic is, 
in other words, traceable to the inexpressible immediacy of 
experiencing but also to his immediate and therefore inef-
fable awareness of Fact, the certainty of which outstrips 
his conceptual ability adequately to conceive or to express 
as meaning. 4 Hence, the mystic chooses not to say anything 
1
cf. nr4GHE" 65, MIHE 156. 
2GL Mar. 18, 1938; Cf. TP 257, CHC 138. 
3TJ? 257; cf. "MS" 187. 
4
cf. "MM" 44, quoted above, p. 223. 
1 
or else to utter paradoxes. 
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As a consequence, fifth, all concepts of the One are 
inadequate and "all the predicates or descriptives which we 
1 t 't h . d ... . 11 2 app y o ~ are some ow ~n nee or correct~on •••• 
Finally, "in so far as the One eludes definitive char-
acterization, the sphere of the clearly definable remains 
plural and open toward future experience." 3 
As the first principle is largely ontological, the 
second is mainly psychological, or, more accurately, episte-
mological. It also stems from "The Meaning of Mysticism": 
"it is possible to be one with him [God]" and vitally impor-
tant to be so. 4 But whether conceived of as "an intuitive 
knowledge of, or union with, thi~ absolute One," this one-
ness is the result of an effort primarily if not wholly mor-
al.5 Inasmuch as it asserts the radical inadequacy of all 
conceptual knowledge of God, mysticism is thus voluntaristic 
and cognitively agnostic, renouncing the attempt to fathom 
God intellectually in order to find union with him in love, 
surrender and obedient service. 
1
cf. LRWF 69 - 71, MGHE 234, TP 315, "SSP" 397. 




.HM" 39. Cf. 11 MS" 189. 
5TP 257, 264; cf. LRWF 280, "MS" 180. 
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Conceptual knowledge is not simply abandoned by the 
mystic (as is all too clear from their writings)_ It is radi-
cally subordinated to action, which for Hocking as for those 
other students of mysticism, James and Bergson, is a function 
of the will. But as we have seen, the inadequacy of concep-
tual knowledge does not mean that the mystic does not know 
God. For he has another way of knowing, an intuitive grasp 
of the existential fact of God's presence. 1 Mysticism as a 
way of knowing transcends mere intuitionism, however. But as 
such it is a consequence of loving union in which the aware-
ness of differentiation between the lover and the beloved is 
lost in a sense of corporate identity. The cognitive "object 11 
of ~ystical knowledge is neither I nor He nor even Thou, but 
~. 2 God is known from within. 
Several corollaries may also be added to the second 
mystical axiom. First, obstacles to the realization of a 
union with God more profound than that of conceptual know-
ledge or the "dimly felt" nuclear experience can be overcome 
to an extent by the "right discipline 113 of the body, mind and 
spirit, mainly by renunciation and meditation. 4 
1 Cf. above, pp. 20lff. 
2
see above, pp. 201, 257. For consubjective experi-
ence, see above, pp. 49, 58f., 74f., 149 and 190. 
3
"MS 11 188. 
4
cf. "HS 11 189 - 90. 
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Second, however, all voluntary activity and even vol-
untary passivity -- the paradoxical renunciation of all ef-
fort, the voluntary sacrifice of the will -- are insuffi-
cient to attain to perfect union with God. Such union is a 
free gift of grace requiring involuntary passivity, the ab-
solute surrender of Self, else God would not remain free. 1 
Yet, third, in so far as freedom is a function of ac-
tual willing, i.e., the voluntary realization of personal 
possibilities, then because conscious union with God is a de-
liberate development of the theistic ground of nuclear ex-
perience, such union must be freely willed if it is to be ~ 
2 human experience at all. Theologically, Hocking thus asser-
ted the paradoxical necessity of both free will and free 
grace for salvation. 3 
1
cf. MGHE 380 - 86, "MS" 190. 
2
cf. SBF 173: "Freedom can grow great only as hope 
can find its possible good an object of genuine belief. Hence 
the life of freedom depends intimately on the validity of 
the mystic's worship." 
3
rn addressing this traditional theological paradox., 
Hocking simply pointed out "that there comes a stage of ef-
fort in which effort must be set aside in favor of a purely 
receptive attitude." The mystic "must render himself passive 
and wait in hope that.God will vouchsafe to reveal himself." 
( "!-15'' 190.) Involuntary passivity, as we have seen, represents 
a stage of development in which the mystic does not even try 
to receive the gift of grace, being simply content to receive. 
Freedom and grace are not antagonistic principles; in the 
dialectical unfolding of the mystical life, they are, rather, 
antithetical: equally necessary but equally incomplete. Their 
ultimate reconciliation occurs in the experience of union, 
the mystic's freely willed but purely receptive acceptance 
of God's self-communication. By locating grace and freedom 
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·rhe third major principle represents the dialectical 
tension preserving the real difference of the One from the 
many, subject from object, infinite from finite, whole from 
part-- while paradoxically maintaining their basic unity. 
The philosophical articulation of this principle is as old 
as the Hermetical writings and the speculations of Ananago-
ras. To the Greeks it was enantiodromia. To the late medi-
eval Platonists such as Nicolas of Cusa, it was the coinci-
dentia oppositorum. 1 
The principle of reconciliation tempers the mystic's 
metaphysical monism; all things do not constitute a unity of 
uniform identity, a "block universe," but one in which re-
lated elements are balanced in an equilibrium of dynamic ten-
sion. The many may well be aspects of the One, but they are 
real aspect. The Self thus both is and is not the Universe, 
the part both is and is not the Whole. Hocking's own posi-
tion was that the One and the many are equally rea1. 2 Thus 
within a dialectic, Hocking did not resolve the classical 
dilemmas of theological speculation about God's freedom and 
human responsibility. He nevertheless made a significant 
contribution by thus illuminating the non-contradictory 
character of apparently exclusive principles when related 
dynamically rather than sta.tically. 
1cf. ewe 180. Cf. also Armand 1-laurer I "Nicolas of 
Cusa," The Zncyclopedia E.! Philosophy,, ed. cit., 6, pp. 
496b - 498b; F.C. Happold, Mysticism: A Study and ~ Antho-
12gy (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970 ed.), pp. 333- 341. 
2For Hocking, however, the One was ontologically 
prior to the many: "The One we believe in must be a One 
which needs and is able to produce the many." (TP 276.) On-
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he and most Western mystics with him escape the dilemma of 
pantheism versus atomism by postulating a form of participa-
tion in which many particulars share a common or universal 
character. The mystic remains a realist to the extent that 
he must deal pragmatically with the world of discrete facts 
in which he exists. 1 To the extent that the mystic upholds 
the felt unity of the world, he remains an idealist. 2 In mys-
tical experience, the partial perspectives of both realist 
and idealist are reconciled not in terms of conceptual har-
mony but in terms of experience itself. 
In our experience, things do fit together; natural 
law describes all known phenomena. So much so, I might add, 
that Einstein's dream of a unified field theory describing 
all possible physical-energy transactions in the universe is 
not far from a realized possibility nor from the mystic's 
vision. Yet this is no block universe. The parts are real 
parts and their "fit" is not always perfect. There are loose 
tological dependence; however, does not render the many less 
real than the One. Conversely, Reality is constituted oy the 
reciprocity of the One and the many; apart from each other, 
neither is real: "The Real cannot be either the absolute One 
of the mystic or the absolute Many revealed by realistic anal-
ysis." (Ibid.) 
1c£. TE 274 - 75. 
2
cf. TP 276. Hocking qualifies the monism of the first 
metaphysical principle by means of a realistic criterion: 
the social dimension of mysticism, the return to the world, 
contains in its call to action an intrinsic corrective for 
the idealistic phase of mystical metaphysics. I am convinced 
that Hocking's own "objective idealism" was tempered by such 
a dialectic. 
strings and left-overs as well as novelty, development and 
loss which cannot be left out of account in any adequate in-
terpretation of experience. But here, I think, Hocking's com-
mitment to rationalism and idealism may have betrayed him 
into too tight a scheme of things, even granting his •ttenta-
tive pluralism." 
Certain elements of experience do not fit together 
well. Absurdity is also a fact of life, at least on the hu-
1 
man, macrocosmic level. Further, we do not grasp how cer-
tain elements of experience fit into somelarger context, even 
though they might well do so. To be sure, Hocking's tentative 
plur~lism could be taken to represent a confession that the 
underlying unity of the world is not only inaccess~ble to us 
in its nether depths, but that it may well be evolving. That 
is, the dynamic aspect of being, becoming, necessitates a 
modified monism as well as a modified pluralism. 
The mystic, on this reading, is one who has been en-
abled to experience the deep unity of all things as parts of 
a developing Whole. Process is, in that sense, absolute, even 
though there may well be a foreseeable term. Unity is thus 
as much a promise as a fact, or even more so. The mystic's 
vision of the Real is thus prophetic: it is a virtual unity, 
the actualization of which is the goal which leads him to 
spend himself bringing history to full expression as the King-
1For a religious and mystical interpretation of this 
point, cf. Raymond Nogar, The Lord of the Absurd (New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1966).------------
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dom of Heaven. 
The mystic's metaphysical allegiance remains to unity 
rather than to pluralism because his experience has been one 
of unity. His pluralism remains tentative not as a capitula-
tion to mystery, but as an obstacle to be overcome. He is 
not attempting to create a block universe, however, but a 
community of love and justice. 
Es I read Hocking, the tension between the One and the 
many is thus resolved in terns of the second theoretical ax-
iom. The real but as yet non-evident unity of all can be 
brought to mind, first, by a conscious shift of attention 
from the part(s) to the Whole, a shift which can occur spon-
taneously but is more commonly, perhaps primarily, voluntary 
and thus moral. The mystic's metaphysics is in this sense 
voluntaristic: the will is the human principle of unity. 
Second, the concrete and manifest unity of human society and 
the world of nature can be realized within history by action. 
Unification is a process as well as a task and a vision: it 
is achieved in time as well as seen in the depths of being 
opened in the moment of mystical revelation. Importantly, 
action, like attention, is also a function of the will. Ul-
timate integrity on both the individual and social planes of 
experience is a matter not primarily of cognition but of love. 
Several corollaries likewise pertain to the principle 
of reconciliation. First, that space and time, for instance, 
281 
exist both as all-pervasive yet independently plural fields 
united by a Self as a "field of fields." 1 Second, that all 
religions possess. a fundamental and universal character but 
are nevertheless historically and culturally particular; 
they are united "at the top" while rooted in the irreducibly 
plural soil of human differences. 2 Similarly, religious ex-
perience is fundamentally universal; it is no less discrete-
ly particular in the lives of individual persons. 
The third corollary is that the individual and the 
community are co-equally important and mutually implicated 
in all experience. 3 God and the World, fourth, are also in-
timately associated but not identical. God is neither Nature 
nor Society; yet God is in the World, which thus becomes a 
medium of his presence. Finally, as distinct, God and the 
S'elf are ••Thou" to each other. Yet as united, God and the 
Self constitute an inclusive and unitive "We." 4 
"iihile not all these interpretations of reality might 
be found in any particular mystical work, they represent the 
theoretical foundation of the mystic's reflections on his ex-
perience. But whether or not these principles accurately en-
compass the mystical worldview even as articulated by Hocking, 
1
ef. "FFD" 541 - 42; MIHE.. XV - xvi. 
2
ef. ewe 141 - 42, 149; "HS" 190 - 91. 
3
ef. LRWF 44ff., 49, 52. 
4
cf. MGHE 344, "MS" 194. 
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the fact remains that interpretation is structurally integral 
, 
to mystical experience and thus warrants further attention.-
4. Interpretation and Mystical Experience 
By abstracting, organizing and presenting even a 
sketch of a coherent metaphysics based upon the experiences 
of the mystics, Hocking was clearly engaged in hermeneutics. 
In calling attention in his magnum opus to the distinction 
between the mystic's description of his experience as a psy-
chological account and his metaphysical statements about the 
nature of reality, he was similarly engaging in critical in-
terpretation.2 While not prone to methodological discussions 
for the most part, 3 Hocking felt strongly enough about the 
need and place of interpretation with regard to mystical ex-
perience to devote explicit attention to it in several works. 
Significantly, he urged in his magnum ~ that the mystics' 
own interpretation, their "account," should be given sympa.-
thetic attention prior to any effort to re-interpret their 
experience. He thus not only raised the issue of the place of 
interpretation within mystical experience, but he also anti-
1
cf in this regard LeShan, Stace, Furse, Capra as \·Tell 
as the article cited above by Bertrand Russell. While agreeing 
neither with each other nor with the mystics themselves in 
many respects, these authors testify to the simple fact that 
mysticism contains at least the germ of a cosmology. 
2
c£. MGHE. 352 - 53 and "MM" 43. 
3
cf. however "Les principles de la m~thode en philo-
sophie religieuse," Revue de l•:i.E!taphysique et de Morale, 29 
(Oct.- Dec., 1922), pp. 431- 53. 
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cipated Smart's distinction between "auto-in·terpretation" 
and "hetero-interpretation ... l He wrote, 
we shall not do well to impose at first our own language 
upon the mystics. We must give ourselves over for the 
time to their guidance, to their modes of expression, 
and even -- so far as we can -- to their sentiments; re-
alizing that they are laboring with conceptions not whol-
ly literalized, and that we shali be able in due course 
to win our own freedom and our own interpretation.2 
3 Meaning and truth have their democratic aspects: the 
mystic will atempt to communicate his vision in order to cor-
roborate, judge and evaluate it pragmatically. Should it 
care to do so, society must therefore be able to interpret 
it in turn. But the mystic himself is as much in need of in-
terpretative skills in order to understand his own experi-
ences as well as to (or rather, in order to) make them ac-
cessible to his community. For the meaning of his experience 
may well be concealed in symbols, physical events or even 
viaceral promptings that require patient efforts to under-
stand.- In any event, all such experiences of God's presence 
1
cf. Ninian Smart, .. Interpretation and Hystical Ex-
perience," loc. cit., pp. 78ff. 
2MGHE: 369. E-lsewhere he noted "~e must allow the mys-
tic the first word in reporting, and also in interpreting, 
his experience. But while he dwells upon its unique, super-
lative, indescribable aspects, psychology helps our under-
standing of that experience by finding what is ~ unique 
about it, what analogies it has in more commonplace experi-
ences, undertaking thereby both to describe and to explain 
it." (MGHE 389.) 
3cf. "MS" 192. 
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and purpose are mediated in some way and thus require inter-
pretation. 
Hocking was well aware that the relationship between 
experience and interpretation was fraught with problems on 
the level of both individual and social experience. For ex-
ample, the alleged ineffability of mystical experience and 
the subsequent hesitance of the mystic to endorse any posi-
tive predicates of the One (d~spite a propensity nevertheless 
to do so) create an initial philosophical problem of classi-
cal proportions. 1 On the other hand, if the mystic's account 
of his own experience and his hesitant description of what 
he has encountered are extrinsic structures imposed upon his 
experience, as Dewey proposed, 2 and thus lacks an intrinsic 
connection with the experience itself, this would suggest a 
radical discontinuity between experience and interpretation 
which precludes any valid objective reference. Interpretation 
on this understanding would represent merely what one recent 
scholar of mysticism calls "superstructures" -- "considera-
tions" which are "laid over" experience from outside being 
generated by belief-systems adhered to for a variety of non-
related motives. 3 Such superstructures can easily be disen-
gaged and discarded as excess baggage, especially those con-
1
cf. MGHE 142 - 43, "MS" 191. See above, pp. 277ff. 
2
cf. Dewey, op. cit., pp. 35 - 38. 
3
cf. Fritz Staal, op. cit., pp. 16lff. 
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taining any metaphysical assertions, as Bertrand Russell re-
commended in his 1917 essay. 1 Mystical experience would thus 
be reduced to a description of various inner states of con-
sciousness which can be described but have no necessary "ex-
ternal relations" with reality outside the mystic's own mind. 
In this respect, Hocking came down unhesitatingly if 
cautiously on the side of a mystical realism in which inter-
pretation was part of experience and as a consequence objec-
tive references were not merely superimposed upon reports of 
subjective _or "inner" events. For him mystical experience 
was, after all, an extension of religious experience, both 
of which have their roots in ordinary experience -- not only 
in the F.ield grounding all experience, but in the concrete 
events of history and in the particular development of indi-
vidual persons. Such experience is integral, not riven into 
separate realms which operate independently as "subjective" 
states of consciousness and "objective" reality. 2 Experi-
ence is intentional. It is experience of something ~ some-
one met together in a common field of reference. Nevertheless, 
as we have seen, Hocking distinguished interpretation from 
experience. 
As diffe~ent, interpretation and experience are relat-
ed as dialectical moments in a whole-part process which pro-
, 
-cf. Russell, art. cit., p. 16 and Scharfstein, op. 
C i t • I PP • 3 I 16 9 • 
2 Cf. TP 255, quoted above, p. 201. 
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duces understanding or insight. But for Hocking, interpreta-
tion was not a separate kind of mental activity co-ordinate 
with intuition and reason, as he felt that Royce was propos-
ing, but an intermediate stage between them: 
In his last series of Gifford Lectures, Professor Royce 
defined "interpretation" as a method of knowledge taking 
its place beside perception and conception (or, let us 
say, beside intuition and reason) as a third type. This 
is a suggestion of large promise: and its bearing upon 
mystical knowledge will be immediately evident if we re-
gard interpretation rather as a mode of transition be-
tween intuition and reason than as a co-ordinate form of 
apprehension. Intuitions are not positions of stable 
equilibrium: they must submit to interpretation. In be-
ing interpreted, they become conceptual systems, and sub-
ject to all the mortality to which rational defenses of 
religion have alwys been exposed. But the destructive 
criticism of any interpretation does not (on this under-
standing) do away with the cognitive side of religion, 
as the critics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centur-
ies too hastily assumed. It leaves standing two things: 
the original intuition, which is irrefutable, and the 
interpreting process, which is infinite. The mystic, on 
this understanding, will not resign his certitude, from 
which an entire world has taken courage: nor will. he, to 
retain his certitude, evade the ordinary canons of judg-
ing truth.l 
As a form of cognitive activity intermediate between 
intuition and reason, interpretation for Hocking shared in 
the characteristics of both to some degree. 2-That_is, inter-
pretation was not simply inferential, unless divorced from 
the immediacy of direct apprehension. Although a rational ac-
tivity, interpretation likewise possessed an inner connection 
l"INR" 588 - 89. Cf. also 81 and "ORE." 61. 
2cf. "INR" 81 and "ORE,. 61. 
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with the process of perception or apprehension, if only in 
so far as all experience is mediated and mediation requires 
interpretation. 1 Without the element of rational judgment, 
however, interpretation shades into intuition. 
Such a position was logical and indeed inevitable for 
Hocking given his understanding of mediation. For interpre-
tation functions as the subjective correlate of the objec-
tive function of mediation in experience. Hence experience 
can be described operationally as interpreted mediation. 
Needless perhaps to point out, interpretation and mediation 
also include dimensions of experience beyond the immediate 
subject-object relation. Interpretation is laden with struc-
tures funded by past experience: selective attenti~n, inter-
est, patterns of perception, biases, etc. Likewise, media-
tion brings with it a host of external relations, for every 
object is situated in a context. Thus every interpretation 
bears with it the latent history of an individual in a par-
ticular culture and behind every objective mediation lies 
not only the intention of the mediating agent, but the full 
character of the mediator or medium, including, ultimately, 
the world-system as a whole. 
1c£. MGHE xxix, ewe 99. The immediacy of mystical ex-
perience does not constitute an exception for, as we have 
seen, experiential immediacy precludes the possibility of 
meaningful understanding. And thus "The immediacy of any ex-
perience must submit to interpretation by what is outside it 
and related to it ... (MGHE 354.) 
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It seems necessary here to advert to Hocking's distinc-
tion between levels or degrees of ''auto-interpretation~ in 
that interpretation not only partakes of the immediacy of con-
scious experience by providing a structure for thought, but 
represents as well a reflexive, conceptual scheme for further 
cognitive activity: inference. In brief, interpretation is 
part of the structure of experience but also distinguishable 
from it and susceptible to modifications which do not change 
the original intuition. That is to aay, further interpreta-
tions may well alter the understanding or meaning of an ex-
perience, e.g., a slap on the face, when new information is 
acquired, such as the motives of the agent and the effect on 
the recipient. The fact of the slap remains unaltered. Misre-
presentation, while not inevitable, always remains possible 
in experience because of the variable factors in interpreta-
tion. But interpretation always remains corrigible by further 
interpretation. 1 
As any connecting medium between minds may be con-
strued as either transparent or opaque, permitting or ob-
structing communication, interpretation can likewise be 
viewed as either a bridge across o~ a barricade before the 
psychological and metaphysical chasm between minds and be-
tween minds and reality. 2 On one side of this issue stand the 
realist and the ~objective idealist~~'; on the other the skep-
1c£. MGHE 66 and "INR" 588 - 89. 
2cf. MGHE. 266. 
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tic and the subjective idealist, still imprisoned by the 
"ego-centric predicament." 
F 0 r Hocking the integral function of interpretation 
as an element in mystical experience was to render the mean-
ing present in the encounter available for understanding and 
communication, both individually and socially. Despite the 
fact that extraneous factors can enter into the interpreta-
tive process and to some extent always must, distorting or 
enriching meaning, there remains a nucleus of "truth" in any 
interpretation in which the factual character of the world 
is accurately reflected. Thus, in the art of hermeneutics, 
the primary condition for the attainment of truth is a moral 
one:: the willingness to see what is there, to be "objective," 
to face the facts squarely and to render as honest an account 
of them as possible. 
The objectivity of mystical experience as a process 
and the integral character of interpretation within it thus 
become susceptible of "verification" by a comparative study 
of mystical reports, not only of the paths proposed but also 
of the character of the goal attained. 1 Actual widespread 
consensus among the mystics of E.ast and I.Yest, including mem-
1
"The position of mankind toward the whole wonderful 
history of mysticism would be vastly improved if attention 
were given to the extent to which the reports of the great 
mystics corroborate one another and indicate a common nature 
in the paths proposed; and it were further shown how deeply 
the more extraordinary varieties of mystical experience are 
akin to very normal and, indeed, inescapable experiences of 
men everywhere." ("HS" 201.) 
, 
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bers of various traditions, cultures and periods, might not 
prove the mystic-realist's case beyond a reasonable doubt, 
but it would at least pose a serious problem for the skeptic 
and the reductionist. Whence comes the agreement? Why are 
the evinced structures of consciousness and the character of 
the reality experienced so similarly elaborated? 
Summarily, interpretation is a structural element of 
the process by which nuclear experience is explicitated in 
mysticism. All experience is mediated -- by ideas of Nature, 
Self and the social Other. As the subjective correlate of 
mediation, interpretation is a meaning-giving process of 
thought, corresponding to the objective aspect, the self-
revelation to us by God through the mediation of the World 
and the Self. To put it differently, no experience, includ-
ing mystical experience, is "finished" until it reaches the 
level of interpretation (or at least the first level of in-
terpretation, here excluding inference) and is confirmed in 
action. 
Thus, as Smart proposes, there are many levels of in-
terpretation which are more or less integral to the act of 
experiencing as such. These range from the minimal structur-
ing of recognition, which conditions the possibility of hav-
1 ing a truly conscious experience at all, to reflection in 
1
cf. in this regard Roland Fischer, art. cit., p. 899: 
"experience can be said to consist of two processes: the pro-
grammed (subcortical) CNS [ Central Nervous System] activity; 
II'" I i, I 
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the sense of immediate inference based on direct presence, 
to the abstraction or remotion of conceptual analysis in 
which all objective immediacy has been lost or never oc-
curred, e.g., acts of pure fantasy. Only the first level of 
interpretation is an intrinsic part of experience, supplying 
the relatedness necessary for that mediation without which 
only pure immediacy and therefore no conscious experience 
would prevail. 
s. Conclusion: The Mystical Dialectic 
The dynamic structure of mystical experience in indi-
vidual history is, then, the process by which the fundamen-
tal and immediate structure of ali experience is raised to 
further consciousness by an interpretative shift of atten-
tion away from the details of everyday life toward the Whole 
of life. It reveals the presence thereby of God as the Field 
of experience mediated by the S-elf, Nature and Society. Fr9m 
a social perspective, this dynamic is an intrinsic moment in 
a process of withdrawal from and return to social interaction, 
both in the lives of individuals and in the history of pee-
ples. The shifts of attention involved in contemplative medi-
tation and the withdrawal from and return to society are 
both governed by the principle or "law" of alternation which 
describes the dialectical movement by which a system advances 
and the symbolic or perceptual-behavioral (cortical) inter-
pretation, or metaprograms, of the CNs· activity." 
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bY reciprocating activity and passivity, that is, by exten- . 
sion and reflexion (excursion and reflection). 
As a more or less self-regulating system of social in-
teraction, mysticism does not terminate in a burst of activi-
ty, but continues the dialectical alternation of action and 
contemplation both in the life of the mystic and to a limit-
ed extent in the history of religions. Here, however, the 
analogy between individuals and religious traditions tends 
to be weak; the social history of mystical withdrawal and 
prophetic action in Hinduism and Christianity, for example, 
is much harder to trace than the ebb and flow of contempla-
tion and action in the life of a mystic such as Gandhi or 
Hammarskjold. 
There are other problems worth noting in Hocking's 
treatment. His portrayal of the historical development of re- -
ligion, especially the emergence of the prophetic conscious-
ness in Christianity, tended as we have seen to rely heavily 
upon large, general strokes of characterization, almost of 
caricature. He likewise smoothed over the factual wrinkles 
and scrubby details that admittedly and confusingly obscure 
the contours of history. Further, his occasional tendency to 
exemplify an entire religion historicalLy in terms of a speci-
fic characteristic, such as the Absolute-mysticism of India 
and the prophetic consciousness of Christianity, represents, 
I believe, a regression to an interpretation of religious 
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lution unacceptable by more modern standards of evaluation. 1 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the evolution and. char-
acter of religions are more complex and various than Hocking 
might have suggested, the historian of religion still often 
employs a dialectical model which accomodates the tension of 
action and contemplation without resorting to a strict typo-
logy encompassing the "character" of an entire religion. 
Moreover, Hocking's description of types of religious experi-
ence have been widely and favorably cited among scholars of 
religion in this regard, both in terms of the action-contem-
plation dialectic as well as of the universal-particular po-
larity.2 
1
cf. for example GL Dec. 10, 1938 and "HA" 433ff. For 
an instance of a more complex approach to religions based on 
linguistic structures and "logical strands" of doctrinal de-
velopment, cf. Ninian Smart, Reasons and Faiths, op. cit. 
2
cf. Joachim Wach, Types of Religious Experience, op. 
cit., pp. 17 - 32; The Comparative Study of Religions, 
Joseph M. Kitagawa, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1958), pp. 68, 84. Cf. also the articles by Kitagawa and 
Long in ~ History of Religions: Essays 2n ~ Problem of 
Understanding, Joseph M. Kitagawa, ed. (Chicago: The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1967). 
III. THE FUNCTIOl~ AND VALUE Or, NYSTICAL EXPERIENCE 
One of the principal advances of Hocking's approach 
to mysticism was placing it and assessing it in its social 
context, as James had suggested but had not carried out. 1 
Like James, Hocking evaluated the effects of mysticism on 
the individual, but he also realized that to the degree 
that society is constituted by the interactions and rela-
tions of individuals well or ill-equipped to promote the 
common welfare, a social dimension of mysticism is not only 
entailed but acquires a special significance and importance. 
The criterwn Hocking employed in gauging the social 
function, value and therefore meaning of mysticism were si-
milar to those of James: whether mysticism actually promoted 
social well-being. 2 That is, the ability of society's mem-
bers to live well in a difficult natural and social environ-
ment, meeting the challenges and risks of daily life as well 
as furthering the highest ideals and goals of the race, such 
as the appreciation of human dignity, the worth of life, 
beauty, moral excellence, social harmony and co-operation. 
1. Individual Functions and Values 
The mystic's withdrawal from society, his period of 
negation in which social ties are severed and social values 
1c£. James, op. cit., p. 35. 
2 . 
Ibid., pp. 308, 326. 
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apparently rejected, would invite an equally negative judg-
ment on the worth of mysticism if that were all there were 
to the mystical path. However, history shows clearly enough 
1 that, despite exceptions to the contrary, at least the 
greater mystics were far from social liabilities. The social 
study of mysticism also shows that the mystic's negative 
path is completed by a positive turn back to the world. 
With regard to the individual, the overall social 
function of mysticism requires alternating phases -- both 
negative and positive -- to accomplish its purpose: integra-
tion, independence, originality and growth. (It is important 
to note that Hocking was describing the ideal function of 
mysticism based, to be sure, on concrete historical facts as 
well as on real tendencies present in all true mysticism. He 
was not merely idealizing mysticism in the sense of projec-
ting a utopian situation or indulging in wishful thinking.) 
i. Individual Integration 
Many positive values of mysticism are embodied in 
those »negative" functions grouped under the general cate-
gory of renunciation, ~hat is, those of the "nagative path." 
As we have seen, the effect of these activities is positive 
1c£. MGHE. 459, where Hocking adverts to the counter-
values of mystical enthusiasm. For a detailed study of the 
social dysfunctions of some forms of mysticism, cf. Ronald 
Knox; Enthusiasm (New York: Galaxy Books, 1961) and Norman 
Cohn, The Pursuit of !h! Millenium (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1971). 
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__ detachment aims at re-attachment, disengagement aims at 
re-engagement and withdrawal aims at return. But a differ-
ence has been made by the specific function of negation. 
Hocking generally referred to this function as "breaking 
down" or .. through" habitual modes of perception and behavior. 1 
Detachment from reliance on a single set of socially-
determined and sanctioned patterns of perception and behav-
ior enables the individual to acquire greater psychological 
independence from society. His viewpoint is to some extent 
(if never totally) "decentered, 11 enabling him to recognize 
social norms more readily and to evaluate them as well as 
the institutions which emobody and perpetuate them. The mys-
tic thus enjoys greater freedom to see, judge and act. 2 This 
freedom is reinforced by an assurance of self-worth and hope. 3 
The mystic's vision is clarified with respect to the 
facts of experience. By "cleansing the doors of perception," 
he gains and communicates "a recovered sense of proportion," 4 
a "sense of the whole." 5 He "renews the ever-ebbing values 
of the daily task by restoring the amplitude of horizon to 
the detail of living." 6 He achieves a new awareness of the 
values of things. 7 He is more sensitive than before to their 
1cf. MGHE 364, 570: TP 318, 274: ewe 138. 
2cf. MGHE 440, SBF 173, TF 274. 




7 Cf. TP 274. 
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1 individual qualities and their goodness. But he is also more 
objective -- he sees things as they are, he ~faces facts,~ 
2 thus contributing to the development of science and art. 
This occurs in three major areas:"First of all, the power of 
plain scientific observations" or objectivity." 3 For "the 
chief conditions of truth-getting are moral •••• " 4 This in-
eludes "simplicity and open-mindedness, 11 the "love of the 
thing." 5 Second, "the mystic recovers the power to appreci-
ate facts of the qualities 2£ things, achieving a new inno-
f th " 6 Th' d cence o e senses.... ~r , "he acquires or recovers 
the power to face the facts of social intercourse, and thus 
to extend his capacity for friendship." 7 The mystic widens 
and deepens the scope of experience itself by the negative 
discipiine of renouncing conceptual knowledge as a means 
whereby to attain union with the Absolute, restoring feeling 
8 
and will to their rightful place. He has a renewed appreci-
1
e£. TP 275, 314; e~ie. 138. 
2 
e£. TP. 274, 320. The interrelationships between mys-
ticism, science and art constitute a theme running through 
most of Hocking's writings; cf. MGHE 513, "LRT" 43, SIG 113, 







c£. MGHE 451; HNR 410£.; "RF" 365; TP 318; "SSP" 397; 
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ation of the positive role the body plays_ in the spiritual 
life. 
Morally, the negative path sensitizes the mystic's 
conscience; he is better able to perceive both justice and 
injustice. 1 His ability to face the facts of social inter-
course also increase his capacity for friendship and love. 2 
ii. Individual Growth 
Growth and development constitute the most positive 
phase of the dialectical process of the mystic along his 
path toward full individuality. Having endured the system-
atic disintegration of his artificial self and its world 
(i.e., both Weltanschauung and Weltbilt), and successfully 
having reintegrated them in the light of his deeper insight 
into the religious foundations of social existence, he re-
turns to society a "new man." His creative capacity has been 
enlarged as a result of the greater freedom he enjoys with 
regard to perception, evaluation and action. His refusal to 
declare adequate and therefore closed the stock of concepts 
culturally available to describe experience renders him uni-
quely open to future experience. 3 The prophetic aspect of 
"HS" 188; MIHE 127. 
1
cf. TP 272; HS 429. 
2
cf. T.P 275, CHC 101. 
3
cf. "SSP" 397. 
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"realized" mysticism, its directly social relevance, is char-
acterized by innovation, creativity and originality as the 
positive aspects of dissent and reform: "The vital function 
of mysticism is origination, the creation of novelty." 1 What 
the mystic discerns to be lacking in society, the prophet 
can and will create, if need be. 2 
2. Social Functions and Values 
The individual contributions, values and therefore 
meanings revealed by the actions of the mystic-prophet accrue 
of course to society because he is a social being. But there 
are also particular social values which mysticism as such 
contributes to society. Hocking did not claim that only mys-
ticism can make these or more individua1ized contributions. 
Rather, the mystic realizes in a distinctive manner what 
many other members of society also value and strive to ef-
feet. 
As in the case of the individual mystic, the social 
body is affected in areas which can similarly be divided into 
integrity and growth, i.e., social cohesion and progress. 
Again, this description is characteristic of the positive 
tendencies present in mysticism and actualized more or less 
evidently in history. It does not refer as such to specific 
l"MM" 54 
• 
2 Cf. TP 273. 
episodes. 
· Social Cohesion l.e 
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By gathering a band of disciples around himself, the 
mystic inaugurates a movement potentially capable of reorgan-
1 izing society completely. For the values expressed by the 
mystic are the deepest values, the ideals, of the social 
group to which he belongs, purged, however, of customary ex-
cresences and raised to a new level of awareness. The mystic 
thus "reminds" society of its truest and deepest character. 
This "conservative" function of mysticism is expressed nega-
tively as a critique of institutions, laws and customs 
society's "habits." The purpose of this critique is construe-
tive: the recapturing of the original purpose of these in-
stitutions, laws and customs in the lives of the people they 
are meant to serve. The mystic as prophet brings society 
back to its original values by calling for and even institu-
ting reforms. More positively yet, the mystic increases so-
cial cohesion by providing for society what society cannot 
provide for itself: morale, the will to co-operate. 
Co-operation is achieved in part by a "meeting of the 
minds" on both a civil and a religious plane of social en-
counter. Historically, mystics have been pre-eminent peace-
makers, often at the cost of initial and even lasting con-
1
cf. MGHE 518ff. 
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flict. 1 No less is this the case in the distinctively reli-
gious sphere, where even in originating new movements and 
sects, the mystics have not only tended to preach universal 
brotherhood but generally have attempted to practice it. 
They have sometimes united whole cultures and civilizations 
in their embracing outreach, e.g., the Buddha, Jesus, Francis 
of Assisi, George Fox, Ramakrishna and Gandhi. The ecumeni-
cal impetus of the coming world faith, Hocking proposed, 
will also be a mystical contribution, both among Christians 
but also between Eastern and Western religions. 2 
ii. Progress 
Finally, the "liberal," even revolutionary impetus 
of the mystic-in-action is realized in the form of social 
progress as a function of creative innovation. The mystic 
often tends to anticipate the direction of social growth, 
acting as both a spur and a guide, creating a way where 
there seemed to be none: "the religious will tends to cre-
ate the conditions for its own success." 3 
1
cf. "INR" 573 - 77; 
Mukerjee, op. cit., p. vii; 
Gandhi and Dag Hammarskjold 
this regard. 
MS 426 - 27• TP 275· "Foreword " , , , 
CWC 141. Catherine of Siena, 
immediately come to mind in 
2
cf. "MS" 190f.; ewe 141 and LRWF passim. For con-
crete examples, one need only think of Thomas Merton, 
Mother Teresa of Calcutta, Vivekananda, D. s. Suzuki, the 
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi and other "missionaries 11 of both East 
and West. 
3MGHE 517. Cf. 518: The prophet "must~ in the 
302 
3. Conclusion 
By this evaluation, Hocking obviously identified mys-
ticism and religion functionally in terms of their own so-
cial consequences. 1 This is but another way of indicating 
that for him mysticism was a fuller expression of the reli-
gious impulse, not a distinctively different kind of experi-
ence. 
As idea, the meaning of mysticism is revealed in the 
dynamic structure of nuclear experience as it is explicated 
by a social dialectic of individuation: the mystic's with-
dra.wal, purgation, integration and creative return to the 
World a process wherein God, heretofore hidden as the 
Field of all experience and the aboriginal partner in dia-
logue, becomes manifest as the intimate companion along 
life's way-- both that of the individual and of the race. 
The personal revelation of God as the "intimate, infallible 
2 
associate, present in all experience" and guiding the 
course of history but with whom fully conscious union is 
possible, is thus the essential meaning of mysticism. 
current of history ~ unity ~responding to the unity of 
~ physical universe, £E else he must create it. And what 
I want to point out is that it is just such a conscious 
unification of history that the religious will spontaneous-
ly tends to bring about ... Cf. also 519ff. 
1 See above, pp. 171- 75. 
2MGHE 224. 
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As function, the meaning of mysticism is the achieve-
ment of individual and social integrity and development, the 
creation of a world community founded on universal peace, 
love and justice by means of union with God and its effects, 
the "unification of history" among them. 1 Viewed socially, 
the specific religious purpose and value of mysticism is the 
renewal of the vital spirit in religious and therefore of 
all social life. For over time, as we have noted, institu-
tionalized religion tends to lose its vigor, its ability to 
relate men to God experientially and meaningfully. Hardened 
by custom, law and doctrinal conservatism, it no longer 
touches the hearts of ordinary people. Mystical movements, 
conversely, are those which precisely claim to relate men 
directly to God, that is, in immediate experience. Hence, as 
a function of religion, mysticism serves to break through 
the encrusted forms stifling the religious impulse by means 
of its critique of institutions, its call to personal ex-
perience, its recovery of values and its creative develop-
ment of the historical traditions. 
Hocking•s exploration of the meaning and structure 
of religion and mysticism supports their functional identi-
fication in terms of their progressive realization of ulti-
mate values. In this respect, mysticism is not only continu-
ous with religion but its inner meaning and fullest mani-
1cf. MGHE 515 - 24; LRWF 266f.; CWC 184. 
festation. With this conclusion, we turn to the specific 
theses which this study is concerned to defend. 
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IV. THE MEANING AND STRUCTURE OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE 
According to the preceding analysis of Hocking's writ-
ings, the central dialectic of mystical experience is the 
transition from the implicit dimension of nuclear experience, 
the I-It-Thou relationship with its divine field of refer-
ence which undergirds all human experience, to the explicit 
dimension of developed mystical consciousness and its ex-
pression in prophetic activity. In this dialectical movement, 
God becomes consciously present in ever greater intimacy, 
even to the limit of felt communion with the human spirit. 
The dialectical transition is accomplished during the inter-
val between social withdrawal and return. At that point, the 
common experience of worship, whether latent in the waking 
of the mind to truth, goodness, beauty and love, or manifest 
in prayer and religious ritual, becomes deepened, clarified 
and enriched by the discipline of renunciation and medita-
tion. The realization of affective union with God then ex-
presses itself socially in activity. That is, the unitive di-
mension of mystical experience tends toward diffusion to 
others by teaching, example and direct social intervention. 
Further, prophetic action and mystical contemplation con-
tinue to alternate in the mystic's life in an on-going dia-
lectical process, enabling him to meet new situations cre-
atively while preserving the highest ideals of the past. 
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This idealized and somewhat abstract schematization 
points to the overall character of mystical experience as a 
process within a social context. It is, in sum, a self-regu-
lating and open system of transformations by which civil and 
religious life is revitalized on both an individual and col-
lective level. From this perspective, it is possible to de-
velop the argument of this dissertation in a series of con-
nected theses b.ased on the foregoing structural and function-
al analysis and systematic reconstruction of Hocking's teach-
ings. 
The whole thrust of Hocking's thought was aimed at 
establishing the essential social relevance of mysticism, 
which he did, I believe, by showing that (1) developed mys-
ticism is rooted in and the explicitation of the fundamental 
intersubjective relation which grounds all experience ~ so-
cial {i.e., nuclear experience), and (2) that mysticism not 
only arises in a social situation but incorporates as a 
structural element a social dimension in the form of pro-
phetic action. 
With regard to the first part of this proposition, 
Hocking argued that if experience is ever truly social, it 
is always social. That is, experience is intersubjective in 
origin as well as social in its effects. The principle under-
pinning this argument is, as we have noted before, the 
classical axiom actus prior~ potentia. 1 Mysticism is that 
1
see above, pp.S2£HOcking's statement of this prin-
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manifestation of the religious dimension of primordial inter-
subjectivity, the I-Thou dialogue with God grounding the pos-
sibility of consciousness, which comes to later awareness as 
the sense of the presence of God disclosed through the mani-
fold media of Self, Nature and Society. The same reasoning 
holds here: if experience is ever mystical, it is always mys-
tical. That is to say, if God is ever found within human ex-
perience, it is because in some way he was already there. 
Various "degrees" of consciousness of that presence are pos-
sible, including a heightened form which human effort alone 
can never fully actualize. Thus the possibility of the free 
gift of grace is left open. However, the native and radical 
capacity for union with God is disclosed by this token as a 
characteristic of the human person as such; grace, as the 
ancient theology insisted, does not destroy nature but per-
fects it. Further, this radical capacity for union with God 
provides the logical basis for Hocking's thesis that all 
persons are at least latent mystics and hence that all mysti-
cal experience is "ordinary." 
Moreover, just as all experience is radically social, 
i.e., an interpersonal transaction, so also it is social in 
its expression. In the scope of actual life considered in 
its integrity there is no purely private and subjective ex-
ciple is found in MGHE 274 - 78 • 
• 
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?erience. Thus mysticism, the epitome of solitary experience, 
is in fact "the redemption of solitude," 1 finding its natu-
ral outgrowth in social activity. (The classical axiom opera-
tive here would appear to be agere sequitur esse what is, 
for instance, social in principle will be social in expres-
sion.) 
Both arms of this case have empirical minor premises: 
the fact of social experience in the first instance and the 
fact of mystical experience in the second. What Hocking 
needed to clarify perhaps more than he did was the differ-
ence between social experience and intersubjective experi-
ence. As he used the term, social experience is clearly a 
wider notion and empirically subsequent: actual social ex-
perience is a development of radical intersubjectivity. 
Briefly, intersubjective as a quality of experience refers 
to the "I-Thou" awareness (or at least a dim version of it) 
a more or less direct and immediate but not necessarily 
reflective apprehension of the Other as "Thou." Social, on 
the other hand, includes some reference to the totality of 
human relationships in society, including the I-It relation-
ships which refer to other persons indicatively. The syntac-
tical difference here points to the distinction between so-
cial experience as a function of one dimension of the nu-
clear triad (Self-World) and true intersubjective experi-
1
cf. MGHE 404, etc. 
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ence (Self-Thou). Social experience also connotes, contextu-
ally, the quality of experience as determined or influenced 
by institutions, customs, values, goals, etc. which reflect 
human interactions in a remoter sense. 
Thus not all social experience is intersubjective, 
but all intersubjective experience is social. Nevertheless, 
and more importantly, the possibility of any social experi-
ence in the broader sense is dependent upon the prior fact 
of a special mode of intersubjectivity. The consubjective 
"we-consciousness" constituting true community on whatever 
level is the condition necessary for the emergence of soci-
ety both in the history of the race and in the life-history 
of each person. Hocking's distinctive contribution in arti-
culating the concept of intersubjectivity, as noted by Har-
cel,1 is that there is an intersubjective ground necessary 
as the condition for the first instance of human "I-Thou" 
relationships. This is the relationship between the Self and 
the divine Field of experience, the "intersubjective Thou-
art" which establishes the possibility of any and therefore 
of all communication. All experience is therefore both the-
istic -- related to God as its ground, and dialogical -- a 
dialogue with God as Thou. Hence also the characterization 
of mystical experience as an extension of the ordinary act 
of worship. 
1Marcel, "Solipsism Surmounted," PRCWC 23 - 31. 
.. 
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Other theses flow from Hocking's main contention, 
i.e., that mysticism has an integral, social (intersubjec-
tive) dimension, raised to explicit consciousness from a 
primordial but dim apprehension of God's presence in the 
depths of the Self and the World. 
First, God can be both directly and immediately ex-
perienced in mystical encounter even though all experience 
is mediated. For immediacy as existential space-time proxi-
mity is not antagonistic to mediation by idea or feeling. 
Thus God could be immediately and directly present, for in-
stance, in the burning bush without being the bush. God can 
be no less present in the consciousness of one's own psyche 
or in experiences of Nature or in the awareness of social 
obligations, love, etc. "Natural" religion is therefore not 
only possible, but the prior condition for the possibility 
of revealed or "supernatural 11 religion. 1 That is to say, 
the religious capacity must be present in the World as well 
as in the Self before explicit consciousness of God can be-
cqme meaningful. This capacity is the radical presence of 
God in the depths of the human Self and also in the struc-
tures of the World, including the social world. All media-
tion, as a form of communication, presupposes a common 
field of reference. 
Second, if mysticism can accurately be described as 
1e£. MGHE 390 - 91, ewe 99ff. 
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the development of nuclear experience by means of the inter-
pretation of the various media of God's self-disclosure, 
then mystical experience cannot be intrinsically extraordi-
nary, as Rouner, for instance, occasionally asserts. 1 As ar-
gued by Hocking, mystical experience has precisely this ori-
gin as the basis of its manifest forms. In fact, all mani-
fest experience is rooted in the manifold, grounded I-Thou-
It relationship. Extraordinary instances of mystical experi-
ence, that is, unusually intensified or otherwise exception-
al states of God-consciousness, serve mainly to point out 
the triadic and mystical dimensions of ordinary experience. 2 
In stressing this point~ Hocking found himself in accord 
1But not consistently. Thus: " ••• the experience of 
the classical mystics of whatever religion is extraordinary, 
and the whole point of Hocking's 'mysticism' is precisely 
its ordinariness. It is the basic, common experience of ev-
eryman to which he appeals." (Rouner, HHE 242.) "Hocking's 
appeal," he adds (ibid.), "is not to some esoteric, special-
ized mystic vision. 11 However, in earlier treating of James' 
influence on Hocking, he wrote, "The religious experience 
of the mystics ••• is therefore not to be regarded as an aber-
ration, radically distinguished from the religion of Every-
man. It is rather the 'original source' of ordinary, conven-
tional religion." (Ibid., p. 23.) Hocking, he went on, ar-
gued "that the 'true mystic' is the one most acutely aware 
of the 'original sources• of Everyman's knowledge of God." 
(Ibid. Cf. also pp. 123, 242, 302.) If Rouner means by ex-
traordinary merely "most acutely aware," then his character-
ization of mysticism as estraordinary in intensity is accu-
rate enough if somewhat misleading. To pit that against Hock-
ing's "ordinary" mysticism is, however, erroneous. If Rouner 
means "of a different kind, 11 then he is plainly at odds with 
Hocking. It seems to me that Rouner in fact uses the term 
in both senses somewhat indifferently, thus rendering his 
argument at least ambiguous. 
2 C£. MIHE 216. 
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with the major trend of Western and many Eastern traditions 
for which raptures, ecstacies, visions and the panoply of 
strange physical and mental phenomena commonly associated 
with mysticism are considered to be of little value if not 
downright harmful. 
Third, and for the same reasons, every human person 
is potentially a mystic, for God is always present in human 
experience. 1 The media of God's self-disclosure are the com-
mon inheritance of the race: self-consciousness, the World. 
of Nature and Society, and especially felt obligation and 
love. More specifically, the "occasions" of mystical experi-
ence, even in 11 extraordinary" cases, are found in fact to be 
both ordinary and common, such as friendship, music, prayer, 
sickness, bereavement, flowers, animals, the sea. All experi-
ence thus has a mystical dimension or capacity. Further, ev-
ery person has the ability to develop that native capacity 
given the will and the opportunity to do so. Accordingly, 
mysticism can only be incidentally elitest and esoteric. His-
tory shows that, in fact, most·mystical movements were wide-
ly catholic. 2 
Fourth, in so far as nuclear experience comes to full 
awareness in the common experience of worship as an explicit 
dialogue with God (which can be mediated in any number of 
ways), mystical awareness is an extension of ordinary reli-
1
ef. MGHE 402ff., ewe 73. 
2
ef. MGHE 398, nMS" 189. 
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gious experience, differing in degree rather than kind. For 
worship is not only the chief act of religion, the explici-
tation of the personal bond between the Self and God as 
"Thou," it is also the basis of mystical experience in its 
implicit form, as we have seen. That worship involves a dia-
logical relationship with God should be evident from consid-
ering any basic definition of prayer, such as "the raising 
of the mind and heart to God.'* That mysticism is a heightened 
form of worship should also be clear inasmuch as the objec-
tive of the mystic's quest is communion or even union with 
God, that is, transcending the objective consciousness of 
the Self in an intersubjective experience of personal immedi-
acy and intimacy, possibly eventuating in the undifferenti-
ated consciousness of consubjectivity. 1 
This conclusion implies that all mysticism is funda-
mentally religious. The explicitation of the religious di-
mansion of experience is a social contingency, however. That 
is, it is dependent upon culturally available and personally 
acceptable categories of interpretation. Thus, a given inter-
pretation of mystical experience, influenced by social ''pres-
sure" or personal decision regarding, for instance, the ante-
cedent improbability of the existence of God, may well even-
tuate in a form of "atheistic" mystical experience. Such 
1In this regard, Hocking directed a new generation of 
readers to the works of his younger contemporary, Martin 
Buber. (Cf. MGHE xiii.) 
forms have been defended by philosophers such as Stace, 
Russell, Huxley, Scharfstein and others, as we have seen. 
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For Hocking, however, such an interpretation, while 
deserving respect, need not be definitive. For as contingent, 
all interpretation is corrigible, although the "original in-
tuition" remains unaltered as a fact. 1 From his metaphysical 
viewpoint of mystical experience as the explicitation of the 
encounter between God, the Self and the World in nuclear ex-
perience, there is no room for non-religious mysticism. But 
from an empirical viewpoint and especially by conceding to 
the mystic the first word in interpreting his experience, 2 
Hocking would seemingly leave open the possibility of non-
religious interpretation of mystical experience. This he 
does by adverting to the "dimness" of the perception of God 
in our on-going experience. The "God" encountered in such ex-
periences may be anonymous, that is, unrecognized in reli-
gious terms, but does not thereby cease to be God. 
Given Hocking's fundamental position regarding the 
structure of experience, then all mystical experience, in-
deed all experience, remains an implicit encounter with God, 
whether brought to consciousness as such by the mediation of 
religious concepts and symbols or not. 3 Thus while not all 
lCf. "INR" 588f. 
2C£. MGHE 369, 389. 
3Cf. "MSu 189. 
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mystical experience nor mysticism need be explicitly reli-
gious, both remain structurally theistic and thereby im-
plicitly religious. 
Having established the cogency of Hocking's argument 
for the social character of mysticism as a common and ordi-
nary dimension of human experience, we can now turn in con-
cluding this study to the question of Hocking's own mystical 
status. In the light of his analysis of the meaning and 
structure of mystical experience, we shall also evaluate 
his teachings on mysticism with respect to contemporaneous 
criticisms and ether, more recent investigations of mysti-
cal experience. 
CHAPTER IV 
HOCKING RECONSIDERED: AN EXPERIMENTAL FAITH 
Having considered Hocking's teachings on mystical ex-
perience by analyzing its characteristics, elements, struc-
ture, meaning and value, two questions remain for us to con-
sider: whether Hocking was a mystic himself and whether he 
was correct in his appraisal of mysticism, that is, whether 
his concept was at variance with the received notion of mys-
tical experience as Rouner implies. 
C0 nsequently, in this chapter I shall evaluate Hock-
ing's major theses as I have articulated them in terms of 
his own status as a mystic, other contemporaneous views of 
mysticism, critical objections and a representative selec-
tion of more recent investigations. It is my contention that 
Hocking was a mystic and that his philosophy was substantial-
ly mystical. Further, his views on mysticism, while defici-
ent in some respects, nevertheless possess considerable clas-
sical as well as modern support. Moreover, I believe that 
Hocking not only recovered the classical Western concept of 
mysticism but also anticipated many later "discoveries." As 
a consequence, his dynamic model of mystical experience re-
presents a valuable instrument for organizing past findings 
and directing future explorations into the field of mystical 







I. HAS HOCKING A MYSTIC? 
As noted earlier, denials that Hocking was a mystic 
and that his philosophy was in any substantial sense mysti-
cal have been issued by various commentators. 1 )•Jhile some-
what tangential to the central argument of this dissertation, 
these denials are nevertheless relevant for they implicitly 
challenge the adequacy of Hocking's understanding of mysti-
cism, his self-understanding, and his understanding of the 
intention and character of his life's work. 
Against these views, I contend that Hocking was in-
deed a mystic according to his own definition and by his 
virtual admission. Further, Hocking should be considered a 
mystic on the basis of the experiences he related as signifi-
cant in his own life as well as in regard to his teachings. 
The latter, as X shall substantiate, incorporate important 
elements he identified as mystical and conform in major re-
spects to mystical teachings identified by other investiga-
tors. 
Among recent commentators denying Hocking's mysticism, 
Hal Bridges simply dismisses the issue on the basis of an 
alleged cognitive bias. 2 However, he fails to provide even 
minimal grounds for his claim. Consequently, given Hocking's 
emphasis on feeling as the "most important element in experi-
1
see above, pp. 8ff. 
2





and his explicit rejection of the adequacy of con-
ceptual knowledge in the apprehensivn of God, Bridges' claim 
can be dismissed as beside the point. Leroy s. Rouner, while 
not in doubt that Hocking's philosophy included a great many 
references to mysticism, also denies, if as we have seen 
somewhat ambiguously, that Hocking himself was a mystic or 
that the mystical element in his philosophy wa-s more than 
incidental. 2 For although able to admit that Hocking could 
be called a mystic in some sense, 3 Rouner claims that it is 
not the ordinary sense, which is to say as extraordinary. 
Here, clearly employing a concept of mystical experience at 
variance with Hocking's, he writes (cleaving mysticism from 
prophecy) that 
The mystic is a key figure in the dramatis personae of 
[Hocking's] religious dialectic-- along~ the pro-
phet. The mystic is, if anything, even more important 
to his philosophy of history, for it is the mystic who 
best apprehends the emerging elements of world faith. 
Hocking himself had one or two experiences of extrasen-
sory perception, and he did indeed have a good old-fash-
ioned conversion experience when he was a boy. But the 
experience of the classical mystics of whatever religion 
1LRWF 48. Cf. MGHE 64 - 72, 137. 
2
see above, pp. 8ff., 311. 
3
cf. Rouner, WHE 51- 52: "In spite of his 'mysticism,' 
or perhaps because of it, the thrust of Hocking's meaning is 
always toward the specific and the concrete." In his disser-
tation, Rouner was less equivocal about Hocking's mystical 
status: "If I labor the significance of prophecy in his 
thought it is because I think it is easily missed in concen-
trating too exclusively on the fact that Hocking is a mys-
tic." (Op. cit., p. 105.) 
---------------------------------------
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is extraordinary, and the whole point of Hocking's 'mys-
ticism' is precisely its ordinariness. It is the basic, 
common experience of everyman to which he appeals.l 
Claiming {but without substantiation) that Hocking's 
interest in mysticism was not intrinsic to his philosophy, 
Rouner goes on to question whether he was a mystic at all: 
Despite the fact that Hocking has written a great deal 
about mysticism there is no developed mysticism in his 
own philosophy. I think Hocking had moments when he 
would have liked to have been a mystic; those times in 
his own experience when insight became a "searing flame" 
helped him appreciate mysticism as "a momentous thing." 
But he remains an outsider to the mystic vision.2 
As noted before, Rouner's argument is at least ambi-
guous. For in order ultimately to claim Hocking as "a Metho-
dist, not a mystic," 3 he is forced to fall back on a concept 
of mysticism explicitly rejected by Hocking. That is, Rouner 
believes classical mysticism to be essentially extraordinary 
and an elite ~ of religious experience opposed to the 
common experience of everyman. He thus misses the whole 
point of Hocking's teaching on mysticism with regard to the 
1Rouner, \ffiE 241 - 42; emphasis added. He continues, 
"Hocking's appeal is not to some esoteric, specialized mys-
tic vision. His appeal is simply to what we really see in 
our first wide open look, before we start narrowing down to 
our own specialized corner of the field." (Ibid., p. 243.) 
Rouner seems not to have perceived that Hocking saw his "re-
conception" of mysticism not in radical discontinuity from 
the classical tradition, but as a development of it. For 
Hocking, classical mysticism is the basic, common experience 
of everyman, focused and concentrated. 
2Rouner, WHE 242. 
3Ibid. 
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very ordinary media of God's felt presence in beauty, both 
in Nature and as culturally embodied in music and art: 
Hocking wants a religious sensitivity which feeds its 
vitality into the workings of the world. He wants men 
like Dag Hammarskjold who work at day in the frenzy of 
the U.N. and chart their Markings in the still of the 
night. But when Hocking's own telephone was stilled and 
the visiting delegation departed, he was not usually to 
be found in his closet at prayer, or recording an in-
tensely spiritual journey. One might have found him lis-
tening to Tchaikovsky, or watching the last touch of the 
sun on the peak of Mt. Washington: but he was usually in 
his study philosophizing on what it all meant. It is mis-
leading to call this 'mysticism.•! 
It is difficult to grasp the intent of Rouner's con-
clusion here, much less follow it, given Hocking's great em-
phasis on the mystics' quest for meaning. Two of his own 
most important works, both dealing with mysticism, contain 
the word "meaning" in their titles. In so far as the mystic 
is a philosopher, his whole enterprise can be seen as a 
quest for the meaning of God and of human life. For Hocking 
himself, mysticism was undoubtedly a philosophy, as noted 
before. 2 Some of the greatest mystics were philosophers, 
endlessly seeking to discover "what it all meant"-- Plotinus, 
Augustine, Eckhart, Spinoza, the Cambridge Platonists, Nico-
las of Cusa, Jonathan Edwards, Goethe, Novalis, Schelling, 
Emerson and Rufus Jones among them. Hocking himself possessed 
at an early age what he called 11 the mystic's sense of the 
1Rouner, WHE 244. 




The meaning sought by the mystic is not abstr~ct, how-
ever. It is concrete, religious and primarily expressed in 
action, not concepts. Moreover, meaning is often conveyed by 
the ordinary media of Nature and Society, in truth, beauty, 
and goodness found in pleasure, art, music and friendship. 2 
It is far from misleading to call such a quest mystical. 
Rouner nowhere explains ~ it should be misleading 
to call such an experience of natural beauty, music or the 
quest for meaning "mystical." Hocking himself, further, had 
expressly taught that such media were capable of communicat-
ing the very presence of God. 3 Finally, inasmuch as Hocking 
had consistently identified mysticism with the quest for 
meaning in the whole of experience, it is difficult to see 
Rouner's concept of mysticism other than as embodying the 
historical misunderstanding Hocking had endeavored to ccr-
rect.4 
In brief, Rouner's assertions are warranted neither 
by the facts of Hocking's own experience nor by his teaching 
l"SSP"' 388. 
2 
ef. MGHE 418, 422; ewe 101, 138f. For some major re-
ferences on meaning and mysticism, cf. MGHE 97, 362, 388, 
428, 452, 460; TP 56, 62, lOOf., 116, 132, 262, 314; ewe 23, 
99, 122n., and MIHE 96, 97, 98, 159 and 162. 
3 See above, pp. 210ff., 216f., 234, 282 and 291. 
4
cf. TP 314, MIHE 159. 
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as noted by Rouner himself~ In fact, the very evidence 
Rouner marshalls against Hocking 1 s mysticism-- his love of 
nature, music, art and philosophy -- strengthens the case 
for it, as I shall substantiate more specifically. Moreover, 
on the basis of Hocking's own testimony, the conclusion is 
evident that according to his own criteria and somewhat reti-
cent admission, he was not only a mystic but that his meta-
physics was substantially mystical as well. 
To begin with, unlike William James, Hocking never 
denied that he was a mystic. Coupled with a somewhat peri-
phrastic admission that he indeed was a mystic, this non-de-
nial assumes greater positive force. In a revealing comment 
from the 1963 preface to his magnum opus, Hocking referred 
to his two-fold philosophical agenda in highly personal terms: 
Modernity completely failed to resolve the dilemma of 
"solipsism 1': and with its inability to find an experi-
ence of other selves would follow its deeper inability 
to find an experience of God~ I had for some time been 
of the belief that these barriers could be surmounted 
and that they would fall together. In my own experience 
they did; this book is to that extent autobiographical.! 
Given the impo.rtance Hocking immediately and pervasively at-
tached to mystical experience in his major work, this refer-
ence assumes greater significance. 
In similar fashion, virtually the opening lines of 
"Some Second Principles" find Hocking claiming an immediate 
1MGHE xii. 
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and ineffable sense of the worth of existence, a character-
istic he would single out as mystical: 1 
The peculiar coloring of immediacy which belongs to re-
ligion, the pervasive sense of an unevident value in ex-
istence, cannot be precisely transmitted. But it is sure 
to be recognized, thought about, sought after. It is al-
most as sure to be critically regarded at some time or 
other, to be analyzed and explained away or rejected, as 
a preliminary to independent building. This was my own 
very ordinary experience.2 
In a review from 1933 appended to ~ Coming World 
Civilization, ~what if God is Gone?", Hocking added a valu-
able· footnote to his personal understanding of the meaning 
of mysticism, alluding to his own mystical tendencies in a 
remark introducing a letter from one of the authors of the 
book in question, Max c. Otto: 
I am impelled to share [the letter] -- first for what it 
says about him, his extraordinary willingness to recon-
sider a firm position, and then for the evidence it 
brings that what I have called the recognition of mystic 
by mystic, and their rapprochement across apparent gulfs, 
are not limited to relations between avowed faiths.3 
This remark must be interpreted in light of Hocking's refer-
ence to his claim that "The true mystic will recognize the 
true mystic across all boundaries and will learn from him." 4 
Possibly the most convincing proof of the mystical 
character of Hocking's position is conveyed by his explicit 
1cf. MIHE 157 - 58. 
2




endorsement of theses cited by him as mystical. In refer-
ring, for instance, to his magnum opus in the preface to Liv-
ing Religions and ~ World Faith, he stated, as we have al-
ready seen, that 
I was attempting to present a realistic mysticism, one 
which turns its back on circumstance and the world's 
concerns only to find the Real, and thereby to renew en-
ergy and grit for the particular task, and to regain 
certitude in action, that detailed action whose integral 
sum is history.l 
In Types of Philosophy he similarly adopted as his 
own the realism of the mystic. 2 He also claimed a mystical 
idealism, which constituted with mystical realism the nucle-
us of his philosophy. 3 Further, he clearly espoused the mys-
tics• tenets that the world is charged with unfathomed signi-
ficance and value, 4 and that the world is a Self "infinite 
in its depth and mystery." 5 In "Some Second Principles," 
Hocking openly admitted that his philosophy incorporated a 
"tentative mysticism, .. reaffirming his own belief in the in-
adequacy of conceptual knowledge to grasp reality in its full-
ness.6 In~ Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience, as 
1LRWF 7. 
2
cf. TP 318. 
3
cf. TP 320, MGHE xxviii. 
4
cf. TP 314 - 15. 
5TP 315; cf. "SSP" 397, GL Mar. 18, 1938. 
6
cf. "SSP" 397. 
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in Strength of Men and Nations, Hocking reiterated his con-
viction that the mystic was right in asserting the total 
meaning in life. 1 He also affirmed the mystic's sense of des-
tiny, not so much in terms of his own life as of that of his 
generation. 2 Likewise, in the earlier book, he stated of the 
mystic, "In my judgment, he is right in his primary asser-
tions, that there is a total meaning in things, and that we 
are always dimly aware of it, and may thus be certain that 
it exists ... 3 
Other instances can be brought forward more systemati-
cally with respect to Hocking's inclusion of the principal 
teachings of the mystics as he specified them in his own 
teaching. 
First, Hocking expressly testified in several works 
to his belief that "God is and God is One." 4 He also main-
tained in various places that it is possible to be one with 
God. 5 Elaborated in the form of the three mystical .. axioms," 
with their corollaries, Hocking's assent to these fundamen-
tal theses of authentic mysticism can be briefly indicated: 
1c£. MIHE 159, SMN 210. 
2c£. MIHE 96 - 97, SMN 218. 
3MIHE 159; c£. TP 320. 
4cwc 149; cf. "MM" 55, MGHE 409 - 10; ewe 198. 
5c£. HGHE xxviii, HNR 352, C\'iC 198. 
1 I. Reality is ultimately One (in God), etc. 
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II. It is possible to be one with God by following the 
right moral discipline.2 
III. All oppositions are reconciled in the One. 3 
Hith respect to his life-experiences, inasmuch as he 
stated his belief that all men are "avowed or unavowed mys-
4 tics, -- even the Schopenhauers," there is no reason to as-
sume that Hocking meant to exclude himself. More to the 
point, apart from his early conviction that 11 the mystic's 
5 
sense of the universe is in substance a true one," the spe-
cific experiences in his life that can be adduced in support 
of Hocking's mysticism include the encounters with Time 
(1892) and Space (1941} recorded in The Heaning of Immortali-
~ in Human Experience, 6 which gained for him at least a mo-
mentary certainty of immortality. Both experiences were medi-
ated by Nature, involving situations of great beauty and an 
1Axiom: TP 275, "FFD" 525. Corollaries: HS 368, TP 
316, CWC 184; "MGHE" 65, "MS" 191; TP 315, "SSP" 397, GL Mar. 
18, 1938; HNR 410 - 11, TP 318, "SSP" 397 - 98. 
2Axiom: LRf~ 280, CWC 198. Corollaries: MGHE 376 - 83, 
RM 45-46, LR~iF 227, CWC 138- 39; SBF 169, 173; ":t-1S"' 190. 
3Axiom: MS 343, TP 276, 316, "SSP" 397 - 98; MIHE 99 -
100. Corollaries: SBF ix, 31, 34, MIHE xv - xvi, 216; LRWF 
105 - 06, C\'lC 123, 149; CiiC 101; "MGHE" 65, "HS" 190. 
4TP 314. 
S"SSP"' 388. 
6MIHE 215 - 16, XV - xvi. 
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insight into some truth about the world. Other experiences 
include his conversion at age twelve, which Rouner perhaps 
exaggerates as 11 probably his most important 'mystical' ex-
perience";1 his love for Agnes Boyle O'Reilly {the basis, as 
we saw, of the famous passage in his magnum opus); his inter-
est in and practice of art and music. 2 Hocking's active ca-
reer as a teacher, soldier, political analyst, writer, re-
former, farmer, churchman and citizen testifies eloquently 
to the excursive, prophetic aspect of his life. 3 
In sum, Hocking can safely be called a mystic accord-
ing to his own criteria and somewhat oblique confession as 
well as on the basis of his teachings. Similarly, his reti-
cence itself can be considered a mystical attribute. 
Hocking indeed resisted the temptation to articulate 
a mystical ontology until long after the main lines of his 
general metaphysics were set, although there is ample evi-
dence that he had long studied the mystic's metaphysics both 
under Royce and on his own. Further, when he did take up the 
metaphysics of mysticism, he did not hesitate to disagree or 
1Rouner, WHE 2. 
2 Cf. Rouner, PRCWC 7. 
3Hocking's diverse involvements in the world are re-
flected in the variety of the 294 items in Richard Gilman's 
bibliography, of which roughly 56 concern political issues, 
71 religion and the philosophy of religion, 131 other as-
pects of philosophy, law and mathematics, with 36 others 
dealing with science, education, architecture, farming and 
similar interests. 
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to correct or even to amend when he saw fit. 1 As we have 
seen, Hocking espoused a tentative pluralism, if also one 
which was in many respects still too committed to a ration-
alistic vision of the cosmos. Unlike James, Hocking seems 
discontent with the prospect of real loss in the evolution 
of the universe. There is little of the shadow of tragedy in 
his writings that haunts the pages of 1-Jhi tehead • s metaphysics, 
however. Like the mystics about whom he wrote, Hocking was in 
the final analysis incu~ably optimistic. But nowhere does 
he indicate that he understood his "ordinary" mysticism to 
differ in kind from that of the classical mystics he so long 
studied and undertook to interpret. I submit that however re-
ticent his admission, Hocking conceived of his own religious 
experience in terms of continuity with the mystical tradition 
of the West. The often remarkable concurrence between his 
account of the tenets of mystical teachings and the compo-
nents of mystical experience with those of other serious 
students of mysticism indicates that in this estimation of 
his place in religious history, Hocking was not in error. 2 
Thus, however one wishes further to distinguish the 
meaning of the term "mystical" with respect to Hocking's ex-
perience, it can safely be concluded that Hocking was a mys-
1cf. TP 275 - 76, "SSP" 397 - 98. 
2c£. in this regard the works cited by Bertrand Rus-
sell, Evelyn Underhill, Lawrence LeShan, Georgia Harkness 
and Margaret Lewis Furse. 
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tic in his own eyes and in terms of his conception of the 
classical Western tradition, and also that his mysticism was 
not idiosyncratic, as Rouner implies. 
II. HOCKING AND HIS CRITICS 
In the later years of Hocking's long career, critical 
estimation of his interpretation of religious experience and 
mysticism tended to be benign and favorable. 1 However, in 
the years immediately following publication of !£! Meaning 
2£ God in Human Experience, critical reaction_was less posi-
tive, much of it founded upon what was held to be Hocking's 
continuation of a form of idealism growing rapidly more un-
fashionable in American philosophical circles. 
Ralph Barton Perry • s caustic r.eview of Hocking's ma-
jor work, largely a critique of his alleged identification 
of the real and the ideal, first attacked the conception of 
God as the Other Knower of our common World. Content, how-
ever, merely to characteriz-e as "obscure" the connections by 
which Hocking achieved the transition between "other mindu 
and Other Mind, Perry passed on to accuse Hocking of promot-
ing a conception of God having the "social value of a com-
1c£. The Development .91. American Philosophy, Walter 
Muelder and Laurence Sears, eds. (Boston: Houghton Mifflen 
Co., 1940), pp. 487£.; Joachim Wach, Types of Religious Ex-
perience, op. cit., pp. 17 - 21, 230 and passim; Urban, op. 
cit., pp. 169n., 257; Rouner, 11 Rethinking Hocking," Religion 
in Life, 32 (1963), pp. 553- 63; Reck, op. cit., pp. 48- 64; 
Schneider, op. cit., pp. 176- 77, 206- 07, 234; Raymond E. 
Gibson, God, Man and Time (Philadelphia: United Church Press, 
1966), pp. 53£., 60£.; Charles A. Moore, 11 Professor Hocking 
and East-West Philosophy," PRCWC 342; R. H. L. Slater, "Re-
ligious Diversity and Religious Reconception," PRCHC 260££.; 
H. P. VanDusen, "A Half-Century of Hocking's Reflection, 11 
330 
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panion in misery. u.l As for the report of the mystical con-
sciousness, Perry simply dismissed the whole business as an 
experience of subjective conviction. Further, "The convic-
tion itself is more simply accounted for [as a psychological 
reaction] than by the reality of the object which it re-
ports."2 In its immediacy, the mystical experience remained 
for Perry equivocal and variable. 
Hocking did not reply formally to Perry's article, as 
far as I know. 3 He would no doubt have acknowledged his col-
league's accurate perception of his passage beyond James's 
reluctant concession of ontological objectivity to the mys-
tics' report, appealing to their own metaphysical reticence 
but also noting their widespread empirical consensus on the 
minima of mystical theory: God is and God is One. More im-
pprtantly, he might have simply stated that Perry missed the 
whole point of his definition of religion as the anticipa-
!i£n of attainment -- a present awareness and even tentative 
possession of what would be fully achieved only at the telos 
and therefore a goal to be striven for and a ground for hope, 
not for supine acquiescence in present evils. 
PRCWC 179, 182; D. s. Robinson, Royce and Hocking-- American 
Idealists (Boston: The Christopher Publishing House, 1968), 
pp. 79 - 121; John E. Smith, Themes in American Philosophy 
(New York: Harper Torchbook~, 1970}, pp. 155- 58, 163; 
ARdrew Reck, "Idealism in American Philosophy since 1900, 11 
Contemporary Studies in Philosophical Idealism, ed. cit., pp. 
24 - 25. 
1Perry, art. cit., p. 386. 2Ibid., pp. 388f. 
3
cf. however "INR" 587 - 88. 
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While extreme in several respects, Perry's reaction 
nevertheless touched upon a problem other critics would note 
and which I believe Hocking never satisfactorily resolved. 
It can be granted that all experience is intentional, even 
metaphysically so: ideas are of something other than them-
selves, ultimately of Being. But as the study of illusions, 
delusions and dreams has shown, the actuality of the objects 
of ideas is not guaranteed by merely entertaining their 
ideas. Clarity is not immediacy. 
To be sure, Hocking frequently acknowledged the force 
of the realist's objection. Further, his elevation of the on-
tological argument to the status of a special case shows that 
he was fully alive to the dangers inherent in attempting to 
infer existence from abstracted mental aspects of experi-
ence. However, if the nuclear I-It-Thou triad as Hocking ex-
punded it accurately represents the structure of human ex-
perience, then the direct concepts of Self, of other Self or 
"Thou, 11 of the World as a whole and of God as the Field of 
experience are always rooted in present experience and there-
fore intentionally objective. But such ideas or concepts, 
when adverted to ~ concepts, that is, when the object of re-
flexive consciousness, are always more or less inadequate, 
especially in the case of the Whole and of God. Further, 
Hocking's insistence that we can be more certain in experi-
ence that God is than what he is suggests that essence and 
, 
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existence can be differentially intuited whether ontological-
ly united or not and that, moreover, existence has an empiri-
cal priority at least with regard to the knowledge of God if 
not also to that of the s-elf, other selves and the World. 1 
The cognitive distance introduced by reflexion, where-
by direct concepts (what we think with: the God-idea, the 
whole-idea, etc.) are made the content or obje~t of other 
concepts (what we think 2f: the idea of God, the Whole, etc.), 
occasions the inadequacy that renders conceptual knowledge 
of one's Self, Others, the World and God always provisional, 
corrigible and uncertain. In this respect, the mystical dis-
cipline of suppressing conceptual thought can be seen as an 
attempt to enhance the direct immediacy of the God-concept, 
Self-concept and Whole- concept co~present as the structural 
components of consciousness itself. The distinctively reli-
gious character of meditation and its unitive consummation 
is constituted by our awareness, however peripheral, that 
God is the Field uniting I-It-Thou(s) and simultaneously the 
Thou grounding and addressing us through that relation. Me-
ditation is thus functionally an effort to raise the God-
concept {or even the Self-concept or Whole-concept) to ful-
lest consciousness without thinking reflexively about "God," 
that is, employing a concept of God. 
If this extrapolation of Hocking's teaching on medi-
1cf. "ORE" 60 - 62. 
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tation is correct, then the problem of interpretation as an 
extrinsic factor in experience is partially solved. For the 
culturally determined concepts of God to which the mystic 
sometimes resorts in attempting to articulate his experience 
are precisely those he attempts to suspend in repressing 
conceptual reflexion. This allows for originality both in 
the experience itself and also in subsequent reflection, as 
the socially-funded concepts of God are compared to the God-
concept raised to fuller consciousness by the meditative 
process. Conversely, of course, the mystic can also evaluate· 
his God-concept in terms of the accepted doctrine of God in 
his culture or religious tradition. But it does not follow 
that the mystic's previously-held cultural concept is fully 
determinative of his articulation of his God-concept. And 
thus the interpretive process includes a "free" dimension 
the God-concept itself as a factor in experience which ex-
ercizes a critical function in later reflection. Further, it 
is important to note that for Hocking this operational God-
concept is God as cognitively present to the mystic in the 
very structure of consciousness itself. This, I believe, is 
the basis for HocKing's original treatment of the ontologi-
cal argument. 
Hocking's insistence on the necessarily empirical 
character of our knowledge of God was taken up in a more 
stringent if less acrimonious critique by a Yale colleague, 
, 
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Douglas c. Macintosh. Macintosh more fully appreciated Hock-
ing•s reljqious realism. He took issue, however, with his ad-
herence to an idealistic perspective and his epistemological 
intuitionism, particularly with respect to the "most primi-
tive and fundamental of all intuitions, the intuition of the 
whole ••• the ess€ntial thing, it is claimed, in the religious 
experience of the mystic." 1 For Macintosh the idea of the 
Whole lent no more force to the reality of the Whole than it 
did to the equally likely mystical claim that "reality" is 
illusory. 0 ere Macintosh taxed Hocking for not taking his 
principle of empirical duality further: 
There is equal justification for the view that the rela-
tive unreality or merely ideal existence of the physical 
and the finite, and the absolute perfection and timeless-
ness and practically undifferentiated divinity of the 
Whole, together with other features of absolute ideal-
ism which seem to be confirmed by the mystical experience, 
are mistaken applications to the object of what is simply 
a transient modification of the subject.2 
A still more fundamental criticism dealt with Hock-
ing•s supposedly too-exclusive identification of religious 
experience with the mystical phase of that experience. This, 
Macintosh averred, underplayed the all-important role of 
morality in "practical religion'': "Indeed our contention 
would be that, so far from the distinctly mystical experi-
ence being the only phase of religious experience, it is not 
1MacJ.'ntosh, art c~t p 39 
• .&. • I • • 
2Ibid. I p. 40. 
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even its primary phase." 1 Thus Hacintosh concluded that the 
ontological argument can have any force only in so far as it 
is buttressed fore and aft by "practical religion," not mere-
b t . 1 . 2 ly y a rnys ~ca consc~ousness. 
In his large volume, The Problem of Knowledge, which 
incorporated much of the preceding article, Macintosh added 
a critique of Hocking's doctrine of social experience the 
immediate awareness of another Self (other mind) through 
sharing common objects. 3 While sufficiently penetrating to 
have earned Hocking's later concession of inadequacy regard-
ing the spatial metaphor in the celebrated passage of his 
maqnum opus~Macintosh's refutation was based on the mistaken 
assumption that Hocking's argument rested on "an immediate 
inner experience of other mind" in the sense of a non-medi-
ated intuition of another Self. In the experience of loving, 
there was indeed for Hocking a direct intuition of the ·~sub-
stance" or "idea" of a person, but one not only mediated by 
objects, but as ineffable as the God-concept or one's own 
5 Self-concept. Nevertheless, both in his magnum ~ and 
1Ibid., p. 41. 
2Ibid., p. 45. 
3 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915). 
4In a letter to D.s. Robinson almost fifty years later 
Hocking wrote in this regard that 11 The spatial language of my 
report in The Heaning of God is both inadequate and mislead-
ing. Yet it is hard to find an equivalent for the metaphori-
cal 'within.' Whitehead finds the same difficulty •••• " (D. s. 
Robinson, op. cit., p. 168.) 
5cf. MGHE 432ff. 
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elsewhere Hocking explicitly denied the possibility of an 
immediate and meaningful experience of another mind apart 
from the contents of that mind. 1 He later went on to insist, 
"Human beings can approach each other only by way of third 
objects.u 2 
Although Macintosh's criticisms were based solely on 
Hocking's major work, his trenchent observations retain some-
thing of their force even considering Hocking's later clari-
fications. For instance, while in subsequent ,..-orks Hocking 
stressed the mqral aspects of mysticism, it is nevertheless 
true that he tended to grant mysticism a place of importance 
over other aspects of religion which needed to be carefully 
established rather than presumed. But it should be clear 
from the preceding analysis that Hocking did not simply 
equate religion and mysticism nor did he claim mysticism to 
be the "primary phase" of religion. 
Second, although Macintosh's discussion of Hocking's 
nascent doctrine of intersubjectivity was off-center regard-
ing an imputed "inner experience" of another mind, he never-
theless hit upon a fundamental weakness in Hocking's theory 
of immediate social (i.e., intersubjective) experience, es-
pecially as grounds for the validity of the ontological argu-
ment. As we have noted elsewhere, Hocking's case for the so-
1c£. HGHE 256 - 69 and "MGIM" 453, 459. 
2LRHF 33. Cf. also 34, 227 and "MGIM'• 451. 
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cial character of experience (and against solipsism) is sum-
marized in his claim that the "Idea of a social experience 
1 
would not be possible unless such an experience were actual." 
But it is not the same thing to say that "In any sense in 
which I can imagine, or think, or conceive an experience of 
Other mind [sic], in that same sense I have an experience of 
Other Mind, apart from which I should have no such idea ... 2 
While it might obtain that my idea of other mind rests upon 
the presence to my mind of Other Mind, that does not give me 
the factual experience of other mind(s). Only concrete, par-
ticular encounters can do that, as Hocking himself admitted. 3 
The capacity for all social experience may well be founded 
upon the continuous presence of God as Other .Hind (thus also 
providing the ground for the ontological argument as an em-
pirical proof for the existence of God); but actual social 
experience can only be accounted for in terms of itself. In 
this respect Whitehead's apodictic "Hang it all! Here we 
are: we don't go behind that, we begin with it •••• " is pos-
sibly a more honest admission of the antecedent improbability 
of solipsism than an appeal to Hegel's universal spirit ne-
cessarily clothing itself with particulars. 4 In life, as 
1MGHE 274. Cf. 273: "If, then, experience ever becomes 
social, it has, in more rarefied condition, always been so; 
and hence is, in the same fundamental sense, continuously so." 
2Ibid., emphasis added. Cf. alsop. 282. 
3
cf. l-1GHE 279, "MGI:W' 459. 
4on 'i'ihitehead's remark, cf. C~>TC 27, TP 309, 11 MGIM" 451f. 
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Hocking once said, immediate experience is always better 
1 than proof. But as a philosopher, Hocking necessarily con-
cerned himself with proof, that is, with the reasons why 
solipsism is antecedently improbable. He discovered them, I 
believe, by going "behind" experience and articulating the 
primordial intersubjectivity of nuclear experience. In this, 
following Marcel, Hocking was perhaps first effectively to 
refute subjective idealism. 
Thus, intersubjectivity in the sense of actual human 
I-Thou encounters is both an achievement and a condition. 
Human experience is antecedently intersubjective radical..ly 
and necessarily inasmuch as it is a 11 dialogue with God" as 
a unique Thou. In so far as nuclear experience is also a 
Self-awareness and an awarenes5 of the World as a whole (It), 
the QOssibility of particular experiences of others is a 
real one. But their actual presence, unlike that of God, the 
Self and the World-as-a-whole is neither assured nor con-
tinuous. It is, in short, contingent. Human intersubjectivi-
ty presupposes not only the existence of the 11 Thou's" but 
also immediacy. The vocative case is a response to a per-
ceived presence. 
Hocking, of course, realized that even the infant's 
first experience was social, if not precisely intersubjective 
in any conscious sense. He was intent on uncovering the meta-
1
cf. MIHE 213 - 14, cited above, p. 7. 
, 
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physical ground of that sociality, which, in the form of the 
mystical I-Thou encounter of nuclear experience, I believe 
he did. But a ground need not be a cause. It may well be a 
condition for the possibility of any event in particular, 
and so, I believe, is the mystical dialogue in nuclear ex-
perience. But the other condition necessary for the actuali-
ty of social ~ intersubjective experience is the realistic 
premise that other selves in fact exist independently of my 
own mind. As we have seen, Hocking did adopt this realistic 
perspective. For him, the transition from the possibility to 
the actuality of particular intersubjective experience is 
achieved just as is that regarding any other particular ex-
perience-- by the course of experience itself as a recipro-
cally active and receptive meeting of the Self with the 
World which makes differences. 
As might be expected, one of the strongest attacks on 
Hocking's treatment of mysticism came from James H. Leuba, 
to whose reductionistic interpretations Hocking had taken 
continuous exception from his earliest writings on the sub-
ject. In his lengthy book, The Psychology of Religious Mys-
ticism, which incorporated most of the preceding article on 
the immediate apprehension of God according to James and 
Hocking, Leuba, like Perry, centered his major objection on 
Hocking's willingness to accept the mystic's interpretation 
of his experience as indicative of the reality of the object 
, 
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encountered. To account for the mystical experience in terms 
of an encounter with God was for Leuba, moreover, a regres-
sion to "causal thinking." 1 For Leuba, as for Perry, the ex-
planation was far simpler: the interpretations of the mys-
tics .. are unavoidable products of the psychological condi-
tion in which an entranced person finds himself." 2 
Curiously, Leuba never seemed to perceive the irony 
of prohibiting the mystic from engaging in causal explana-
tion while doing so himself. It should be observed, however, 
that nowhere did Hocking speak of 11 causality" with regard to 
the mystic's claim of an immediate experience of God, nor 
did he countenance the inevitability of inference. Rather, 
Hocking spoke of "recognition .. or "realization," further re-
quiring that interpretation be included structurally within 
experience itself as the correlate of mediation - at least 
as I read him. The "occasions" of mystical experience are 
the elements of experience itself: Self-awareness, the pre-
sence of natural and social agencies and the Field of ex-
perience. 
Hocking's teaching on mysticism emerged relatively 
1Leuba, art. cit., p. 710. In his book, Leuba soft-
ened his charge to one of confusing nan immediately given 
and invulnerable revelation of the nature of God 11 with an 
inference imported from previously accepted beliefs. (Cf. 
p. 312.) 
2 Leuba, art. cit., p. 711. In his book, Leuba was 
more specific: "many of the curious phenomena to which most 
great mystics owe in great part their fame or notoriety are 
due to perturbations of the sex function consequent upon its 
repression." (Op. cit., pp. 119 - 20.} 
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intact from these critical encounters, 1 especially to the ex-
tent that he was able to develop his doctrine in later works. 
But it is important to note that in regard to his articula-
tion of mysticism, none of his strongest critics faulted him 
for misrepresenting its character as traditionally received, 
however they evaluated it themselves. Most of them objected, 
rather, to his use of mysticism to bolster the sagging the-
ses of idealism. Leuba in fact regretted Hocking's failure 
to reconceive mysticism according to the reductionist model 
of the psychologist. 2 Much later, a critic with the advan-
tage of thirty years more of Hocking's writings would tax 
him, curiously, not so much for misrepresentation as under-
representation: "It may be remarked that liocking limits him-
self to one type of 'valid' mysticism, which is activistic, 
and moralistic." 3 In fact, while Hocking included references 
to over t\venty classical mystics in his magnum opus alone, 
1 In 1915, Hocking's interpretation of the ontological 
argument was subjected to a brief criticism by John E. Rus-
sell, which need not occupy us here. ("Professor Hocking's 
Argument from Experience," Journal of Philosophy, 12 [Oct. 
14, 1915], pp. 68- 71.) 
2 Leuba, op. cit., pp. 316 - 17. 
3James A. Martin, Jr., Emoirical Philosophies of Re-
ligion (Morningside Heights, N.Y.: King's Crown Press, 1945), 
p. 15. Martin further comments, "If one seeks an empirical 
grounding for a philosophical or religious concept, it is of 
dubious value to appeal to a selected type of experience, 
since the selection itself indicates that the validity of 
the experience is bound up with the validity of its inter-
pretative concepts." (Ibid., cf. alsop. 27.) 
• 
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the majority of citations are from the writings of St. Ter-
esa, Tauler, Eckhart and Madame Guyon. Further, although 
Martin's evaluation of Hocking's selectivity is perhaps ex-
aggerated, Hocking did not attempt or at least publish a 
comparative survey of the mystics' teachings on either prac-
tice or theory. Moreover, the sources Hocking drew from were 
also cited by almost all contemporary students of mysticism 
from the French alienists to Leuba. Thus, while somewhat di-
verse, the range of variation among these classical repre-
sentatives is not as great nor as illustrative of the nature 
of mystical experience concretely as it would have been had 
Hocking taken a wider sample, as James had done. 
However, adverting to the virtual unanimity of the 
mystics concerning practice and theory, Hocking went beyond 
James 1 tentative proposals and disregarded both James' and 
Royce's disclaimers concerning the metaphysical validity of 
the mystics• reports. As more recent research suggests, 
Hocking was on surer ground methodologically and philosophi-
cally than his critics were able to concede. 1 In fact, how-
ever, few if any of his critics faulted him for that, pre-
ferring to fall back on the antecedent improbability of his 
being correct in view of his adherence to the tenets of 
idealism. 
1 Cf. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, op. cit., and 
the works cited by LeShan, Capra and Furse. 
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III. MYSTICISN RECONCEIVED: HOCKING AND ':'HE CLASSICAL CONCEPT 
The failure of even his sternest critics to tax Hock-
ing for distorting the meaning of mysticism strongly suggests 
that Rouner•s dis~unction of Hocking's mysticism from clas-
sical mysticism is ill-founded. Having thus surveyed the 
critic isms of his cont.emporaries, we may pursue this line of 
inquiry further by a survey of the classical tradition it-
self. 
1. Classical Western Mysticism 
The comprehensive and critical study of Western mys-
ticism hardly antedates the late nineteenth century, as I 
pointed out in the Introduction. But to his classic Chris-
tian Mysticism (1899), Dean Inge was able to append a list 
of twenty-six lengthy definitions or descriptions of mysti-
cism emanating from that century alone-- of which only Inge•s 
need concern us here: 
Now it will be found that these men of acknowledged and 
pre-eminent saintliness agree very closely in what they 
tell us about God. They tell us that they have arrived 
gradually at an unshakable conviction, not based on in-
f~rence but on immediate experience, that God is a Spir-
it with whom the human spirit can hold intercourse; that 
in Him meet all that they can imagine of goodness, truth, 
and beauty; that they can see His footprints everywhere 
in nature, and feel His presence within them as the very 
life of their life, so that in proportion as they come 
to themselves they come to Him.l 
1
rnge, op. cit., p. 325. 
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;lilliam James, it is noteworthy to recall, declined 
to define mysticism, but characterized it by its four "marks" 
of ineffability, noetic quality, transiency and passivity. 1 
However, he did associate religious mysticism with what he 
called a "sudden realization of the immediate presence of 
God." 2 Similarly, a contemporary and life-long student of 
mysticism, Rufus Jones -- a Quaker and himself a mystic3--
stated in his Studies in Mystical Religion (1909) that 
I shall use the word mysticism to express the type of 
religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness 
of relation with God, on direct and immediate conscious-
ness of the divine presence. It is religion in its most 
acute, intense and living stage.4 
In her monumental work, Mysticism (1910}, Evelyn 
Underhill offered the following observations: 
I understand it to be the expression of the innate ten-
dency of the human spirit towards complete harmony with 
the transcendental order; whatever be the theological 
1James, op. cit., pp. 292- 93. 
2Ibid., p. 302. 
3
cf. Bridges, op. cit., pp. 25 - 26. 
4 Rufus Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion (New York: 
Russell and Russell, 1970 ed.T; p. xv. Cf. also his ~ Ex-
ponents of Mystical Religion (London: Epworth Press, 1930T; 
pp. 31 - 32: Mysticism uis a form of religion that builds 
primarily on consciousness of acquaintance with God through 
direct and immediate experience of Him, instead of on logi-
cal and forensic arguments about Him, or on scribal inter-
pretation of ancient records that tell of Him." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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formula underwhich that order is understood. This ten-
dency, in great mystics, gradually captures the whole 
field of consciousness; it dominates their life, and, in 
the experience called "mystic union," attains its end.l 
Among Catholic writers, Dom Cuthbert Butler, in his 
Western Mysticism (1922) wrote, 
the mystics' claim is expressed by Christian mystics as 
"the experimental perception of God's Presence and Be-
ing, .. and especially "union with God" -- a union, that 
is, not merely psychological, in conforming the will to 
God's will, but, it may be said, ontological [,] of the 
soul with God, spirit with Spirit. And they declare that 
the experience is a momentary foretaste of the bliss of 
heaven.2 
Similarly, Fr. Joseph Marechal, in his Studies in the Psvcho-
logy of the 1-lystics ( 19 2 7) , quotes with approval the opinion 
of his fellow Jesuit of a generation before, Auguste Poulain, 
that mystical states represent "~ experimen.tal intellectual 
knowledge of this presence [of God]." 3 
1
underhill, op. cit., p. xiv. Later she described mys-
ticism as "that organic process which involves the perfect 
consummation of the Love of God: the achievement here and 
now of the immortal heritage of man. Or, if you like it bet-
ter -- for this means exactly the same thing -- it is the 
art of establishing his conscious relation with the Absolute." 
(Ibid., p. 81. Cf. also pp. 68, 72 and passim.) In Practical 
Mysticism (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1915), she wrote, 
"Mysticism is the art of union with Reality. The mystic is a 
person who has attained that union in greater or less degree; 
or who aims at and believes in such attainment ... (p. 3.) 
2wester~ Mysticism~ foreword by Dom David Knowles 
{New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968 ed.), p. 5. 
3Marechal, op. cit., p. 102, citing Poulain, ~ 
Graces of Interior Prayer (1912 ed., p. 64). He added, "This 
is, in truth, the fundamental mystical phenomenon -- the di-
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In 1932, the eminent philosopher and theologian, 
Jacques Haritain, described mystical experience as 
~ experiential knowledge of the deep things of 2.2£, .2£ 
~ suffering of divine things, an experience which leads 
the soul through a series of states or transformations 
until within the very depths of itself it feels the 
touch of divinity and "experiences the life of God." 1 
A more recent writer, Dom Illtyd Trethowan, describes 
mysticism as "an awareness of God which, although mediated 
by the finite, is nevertheless in itself a direct knowledge 
of him, ~ contact with him." 2 
From this brief survey of representative authorities 
on mysticism, there is no evident reason to conclude that 
any fundamental disparity exists between Hocking's concept 
and the so-called "classical" concept as articulated within 
the Catholic and Protestant traditions. For, as we have seen, 
Hocking also held that mystical experience was an immediate 
intuition or perception of God's presence (Inge, James, 
Jones, Butler, Poulain, Marechal) mediated by the natural 
and social World (Inge, Trethowan), including among other 
characteristics ineffability, noetic content, transiency, 
and passivity (James) and marked by an awareness of goodness, 
truth and beauty (Inge), an unshakable conviction (Inge) 
tending toward personal union with God through a progressive 
rect feeling of God's presence, or the intuition of God as 
present." (Ibid.) 
1M . t ' arl. aJ.n, 
2 Trethowan, 
op. cit., p. 247. 
op. cit., p. ix. 
, 
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transformation of experience (Underhill, Butler, Maritain). 
Many of Hocking's other salient teachings also find 
support among these and other writers, both traditional and 
recent. Of these, it is illuminating to note the widespread 
agreement that the essential experience of the mystics is 
not to be identified in itself with the extraordinary or 
even "supernatural" phenomena that sometimes accompany the 
higher forms of mystical union. 1 Mystical experience, as we 
shall note again, is the common capacity of everyman accord-
ing to the classical tradition as well as Hocking. 
2. The Recovery of the Classical Concept of Mysticism 
Rather than departing from the classical concept of 
~<vestern mysticism, I believe that by emphasizing the continu-
ity of the mystical life with religious life in its ordinary 
manifeatations, especially that of worship, Hocking in fact 
1The "ordinariness" of mystical experience, that is, 
its essential difference from highly unusual states of con-
sciousness or the awareness of strange aspects of reality, 
is supported by the following authors, taken here as repre-
sentative of the Western (Christian) tradition: Underhill, 
Mysticism, op. cit., pp. 72ff., and her introduction to her 
edition of The Scale of Perfection by Walter Hilton (London: 
John M. Watkins, 1948-ed.), pp. xxxf.; Reginald Garrigou-
Lagrange, O.P., Christian Perfection and Contemplation, op. 
cit., pp. 46, 235ff.; Marechal, op. cit., pp. 176 - 77; 
Maritain, op. cit., pp. 247, 259; Stace, Mysticism and Philo-
sophy, op. cit., pp. 51 - 55; Bridges, op. cit., p. 6: Johns-
ton, Silent Music, op. cit., pp. 72ff, here following Joseph 
de Guibert, S.J., The Theology of the Spiritual Life (New 
York: Sheed and Ward, 1953). 
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recovered a tradition common to the Christian world from the 
third through the sixteenth centuries. 
After the controversies and condemnations surrounding 
Quietism at the end of the seventeenth century, this ancient 
concept had been severely modified as Catholic spiritual 
theologians began to distinguish sharply between the "ordi-
nary" life of the Christian and the "extraordinary" stages 
of mystical experience with its special graces, odd pheno-
l 
mena, etc. Similarly, under Calvinist and later Lutheran 
influence, Protestant theologians had already all but sti-
fled the mystical element of religion in Germany, England 
and the Low Countries. 2 Despite the protests of many great 
mystics and theologians, the tendency to reduce mysticism to 
the quaint, odd or pathological and thereby to the irrele-
vant periphery of ordinary life continued both to divide 
Catholic 11 ascetical" and "mystical" theology and also to pit 
Protestants against each other regarding mysticism versus 
prophecy well into the twentieth century. At that time, the 
1Garrigou-Lagrange ironically summarizes the attitude 
of those authors who "thus distinguish[ed] a unitive life 
called 'ordinary,' the only one necessary, they say, to per-
fection, from a unitive life called 'extraordinary,' which 
according to them, is not evenEquired for great sanctity. 
From this point of view, asceticism does not lead to mysti-
cism, and the perfection, or 'ordinary' union, to which it 
leads, is normally an end and not a disposition to a more 
intimate and elevated union. 11 (Garrigou-Lagrange, Christian 
Perfection and Contemplation, op. cit., p. 28.) 
2
cf. Happold, op. cit., pp. 294, 306; and~ Pro-
testant Mystics, op. cit., p. xi. 
p 
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work of both Catholic and Protestant scholars (and mystics) 
began to reverse the trend. 
By emphasizing the continuity of religious and mysti-
cal experience, Hocking supported and (in 1912) even antici-
pated the agruments of Catholic theologians such as Garrigou-
Lagrange. In some instances he went beyond them in recover-
ing the authentic tradition of Christian mysticism, as in, 
for example, his insistence that human experience as a whole 
was at root mystical. For by this contention he returned to 
the pre-Enlightenment understanding of the progressive unity 
of the Christian life. He also regained the ancient Chris-
tian tradition of the Greek Fathers, namely that mystical 
refers to the quality of the whole Christian life in its 
rootedness in scripture, the liturgy and the uinner" experi-
ence of the Spirit of God. 1 This tradition has been pre-
served in an apparently unbroken continuity only in the 
Orthodox Church, which still recognizes the radical common-
ness of the mystical life. ~riting in 1944, the theologian 
1Fr. Louis Bouyer, the liturgical historian and spir-
itual theologian, clearly affirmed this as the common teach-
ing of the early Church: "The Christian texts, in fact, in 
which the word mystikos is acquiring the particular reli-
gious and doctrinal meaning which it has never had before 
may be classed, roughly speaking, in three great groups: Bi-
blical, liturgical and spiritual. The most ancient texts are 
found in the first category; those which have a liturgical 
character come later, and last of all appear those which be-
long most decidedly to the third group •••• But-- and this 
is most important -- it is evident that nowhere can a clear 
boundary be drawn between these three different uses of the 
word. We pass from one to the other without any breach of 
p 
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Vladimir Lossky noted that ~If the mystical experience is a 
personal working out of the content of the common faith, 
theology is an expression, for the profit of all, of that 
which can be experienced by anyone." 1 
Hocking can thus be said not only to have been in fun-
damental agreement with the ancient and classical Christian 
tradition, East and West, but to have recovered it to a 
large extent by departing from the later, reactionary con-
ception. He did not deny the extraordinary aspects of ulti-
mate mystical union with God. He did, however, deny that 
these aspects constituted either the whole or essence of mys-
ticism. These were, rather, rooted for him in the common ca-
pacity of everyman -- not those only of the Christian faith 
if they in fact reached a climax in Christianity unequalled 
in many respects in other traditions, as Bergson would also 
conclude. 2 
3. The Social Dimension of Mysticism 
As I noted before, I am unaware of any philosophical 
attempts prior to Hocking's to explicate the tendency of mys-
continuity ... (Louis Bouyer, "Mysticism': An Essay on the 
History of a Word," ~lystery and Systicism, op. cit., pp. 123f. 
Cf. also lnge, op. cit., pp. 349 - 55.) 
lvladimir Lossky, The Hystical Theology of the ~­
ern Church (Cambridge: James Clarke and Co., 1957 ed.)pp. Sf. 
2Henri Bergson, The ~ Sources .£!. Horality ~ Reli-
gion, R. Audrey Audra and Cloudesley Brereton, trans. (Gar-
den City, New York: Doubleday and Co., n.d.), p. 227. 
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tical contemplation to express itself in action as an inte-
gral part of the structure of the process of mystical devel-
opment itself, although the relationship between action and 
contemplation had long been part of the Christian tradition. 1 
In 1932, Bergson observed that Plotinus had actually dis-
paraged action as 11 a weakening of contemplation.n 2 As are-
sult, "mysticism in the absolute sense in which we have 
agreed to take the word, was never attained by Greek thought." 3 
He likewise claimed that Hindu and Buddhist religion, while 
achieving true mysticism, nevertheless did not achieve the 
4 
complete mysticism of action, creation and love. For Berg-
son, the completion of the historical development of mysti-
cism occurred only with the advent of Christianity, as was 
the case for Hocking. 5 
1Hocking based his "principle of alternation" on the 
psychological research of Delacroix and Godfernaux. Evelyn 
Underhill also noted the presence of activity in the lives 
of mystics as a function of what she called "conation," but 
she did not attempt to develop the matter much further. (Cf. 
Mysticism, op. cit., pp. 46f., 67, 83.) For her, the five 
stages of mystical development were complete with union. And 
although the unitive life in fact leads to action (pp. 172ff.), 
Underhill did not account for this fact other than as an ex-
pression of the wholeness of Christian mysticism which, per-
haps following Delacroix, she, too, found largely superior 
to non-Christian mysticism. (p. 172. Cf. also pp. 416, 436.) 
2 Bergson, op. cit., p. 221, citing The Enneads, III, 
viii, 4. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. I p. 225. 
5Ibid. I p. 227. Bergson noted here the work of Dela-
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Bergson's position, while illuminating and in many 
respects strikingly parallel to Hocking's position in the 
Gifford Lectures and Living Religions and !!, Horld Faith, 
noted the fact of activity in the mystic's life but, like 
Underhill's, did not account for it by showing its necessary 
function in the mystic's development. A more recent writer, 
Dr. Kenneth Wapnick, also adverting to the constant tendency 
of the great mystics to express their vision in action, sug-
gests a structural modification of the model of their devel-
opment as proposed by Underhill, that is, sudden conversion, 
purification, illumination, the "dark night of the soul" and 
union. 1 To these Wapnick adds a sixth, a "return ••• to the 
requirements of social living," which, he claims, "consti-
tutes the most important part of [the mystic's] path." 2 
In a passage highly reminiscent of Hocking's asceti-
cal principle, Wapnick observes that 
croix and Underhill. The apparent source he gave for the 
mystics' activity was "their increased vitality" unleashed 
by the Christian belief in the efficacy of action and which 
"radiated an extraordinary energy, daring, power of concep-
tion and realization." (Ibid., pp. 227- 28.) Their accom-
plishments in the field of action represented "the culminat-
ing point of the inner evolution of the great mystics." 
(Ibid., p. 228.) Paramount here were the functions of teach-
ing and the creation of small groups of disciples whose sur-
vival and proliferation would eventually lead to a "radical 
transformation of mankind." (Ibid., pp. 233, 236.) 
1
cf. Mysticism, op. cit., pp. 169ff. 
2Kenneth Hapnick, art. cit., p. 53. 
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The mystic now no longer finds his involvement with the 
world to be abhorrent, but, in fact, seems to welcome 
the opportunity to move in the social world he had aban-
doned. This seeming paradox becomes understandable when 
one considers that it was not the world the mystic was 
renouncing, but merely his attachments and needs relat-
ing to it, which precluded the development of his per-
sonal, asocial experience. Once he was able to abandon 
these dependent, social needs, and felt freed of the 
pull of the social world, he experienced the freedom to 
live within society in conjunction with his inner striv-
ings, mther than experiencing society's customs and in-
stitutions as obstacles to his self-fulfillment.l 
On the basis of clinical research as well as a com-
parative study of the mystics, particularly of st. Teresa, 
Wapnick observes that their return to the world constitutes 
the ultimate purpose of withdrawal. But in order to return 
to the demanding world of social action, the mystic must 
first acquire the ability to face the prior demands of "in-
ner" experience: 
The entire mystic path may be understood to be a strenth-
ening process whereby the mystic gradually develops the 
"muscles" to withstand the experiences of this "inner 
world." It is this strengthening that is responsible for 
the long periods of suffering and fallowness that are 
often the mystic's fate, as well as the mystic's faith 
in the positive outcome of his experience.2 
The mystical path, from Wapnick's perspective, is a 
psychological strategem for ensuring effective presence in 
the social world. l/lhat endows mysticism with the ability to 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., p. 63. 
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achieve personal integration of "inner" and "outer" experi-
ence is its structured, gradual approach to the expansion of 
consciousness involved "until its utmost depth is reached, 
what [the mystic] usually refers to as the Self or God, 
wherein he feels at one with the universe." 1 
Wapnick's emphasis on the requirement of social inte-
gration for full human life, an integration which mysticism 
pre-eminently facilitates, supports Hocking's similar con-
tention. Nonetheless his account falls short of Hocking's 
in that it lacks reference both to the mystic's own motiva-
tion for his return to society and also to the reciprocal 
character of all human operations which provides the dynam-
ism of processive advancement. Wapnick also fails to note 
the actual contributions distinctive of the mystic's return 
to the world, giving the impression that mysticism is func-
tionally a religious form of preventive psychotherapy evolved 
to promote social adjustment, whereas in fact the mystic 
often returns to society as a reformer and revolutionary, 
not merely a more adequately adjusted wheel in the social 
machinery. 
Another recent discussion of the social dimension of 
mystical development can be found in William Johnston's 
study of meditation and mysticism, Silent Husic. Even more 





















gral character of social activity in the course of mystical 
development based on twelfth century Chinese Buddhist texts 
and the writings of St. Teresa. 1 He does not, however, pro-
vide an explanation of the phenomena in terms of the struc-
ture of mystical development other than, as for Underhill, 
the increased compassion of the mystic as a result of his 
unitive vision. Similarly, W. T. Stace, in his study Mysti-
cism and Philosophy, devotes several pages to a considera-
tion of the ethical elements in mysticism. But although he 
adverts to the active character of the mystic's response to 
his awareness of the oneness of all and repeats the judgment 
that Christian mysticism appears superior in this regard to 
other forms, he, too, fails to account for the active phase 
of mystical development in terms of the structure of that 
process itself in its social context. 2 
Thus while adducible in support of Hocking's articu-
lation of the integral character of action within the over-
all development of the mystic, these studies generally lack 
either Hocking's clearly expressed accounting for the return 
to the world in terms of the structure of experience or of 
the motivational elements such as love and the desire for 
justice as well as the need to communicate his vision which 
1Johnston, Silent Nusic, op. cit., Chapter 7: "Return 
to the Market Place," pp. 80 - 90, especially pp. 86 - 87. 
2 Cf. Stace, Hysticism and Prophecv, op. cit., pp. 323 
- 40. 
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impel the mystic to return to the World. 
In my opinion, Hocking's association of alternation 
with motivation was consequent on his insight into the so-
cial character of mysticism, in the context of which the mys-
tic's return to the World can be seen to be part of the dy-
namic structure of social development itself. In contrast, 
all the above-mentioned theories were proposed from the view-
point of individual development only, without taking into 
consideration the social aspect of mysticism both historical-
ly and contemporaneously. Finally, while each of the inter-
pretations we have considered affirms the social effects of 
mysticism, none includes the antecedent social aspect of 
mystical experience, the intersubjective relation of the 
Self and God in the depths of all human experience. 1 
4. Mysticism and Prophecy 
Much as Hocking's case for the social character of 
mysticism, at least in its manifest expression, finds sup-
port from other and more recent studies, so also his dialec-
tical identification of prophecy and mysticism as aspects of 
1
stace acknowledges that to assert that "mysticism is 
ultimately the source and essence of all religion" would re-
quire maintaining that umystical experience is latent in all 
men but is in most men submerged below the surface of con-
sciousness." (Hysticism and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 343.) 
He declines, however, to assert more than a close "associa-
tion" between religion and mysticism, thus declining in ef-
fect to elaborate and defend the hypothesis. (Cf. also Under-
hill, Hysticism, op. cit., p. 68.) 
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a unified process can be supported by an appeal to the under-
standing of prophecy on the part of many modern biblical 
scholars. 
Hocking himself first defined the prophetic conscious-
ness in terms of its historical and active character: 
I mean the knowledge that this act of mine which I now 
utter is to succeed and hold its place in history. It 
is an assurance of the future and of all time as deter-
mined by my own individual will, embodied in my present 
action.l 
The prophetic consciousness is realized, however, in the 
2 felt presence of God. Thus the prophet is the mystic in ac-
tion: ,.The prophet is but the mystic in control of the for-
ces of history, declaring their necessary outcome: the mys-
tic in action is the prophet." 3 
Among modern scripture scholars, several are in more 
or less evident agreement with this view. B. Napier, for in-
stance, adverts to the mystical dimension of prophecy in dis-
cussing the prophet's title of~: 
prophet and seer, by either signation, were understood 
Lby the Hebrews] as exercizing in common the function of 
1 MGHE 503. 
2cf. MGHE 508. 
3MGHE 511. Hocking added, characteristically, "In the 
prophet, the cognitive certainty of the mystic becomes his-
toric and particular; and this is the necessary destiny of 
that certainty: mystic experience must complete itself in the 
prophetic consciousness." (Ibid.) 
p 
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'seeing,• --i.e., apprhending that which is not normal- 1.11,· 
ly accessible and 'speaking forth, ' proclaiming, that II 
which is thus seen and apprehended •••• His function, pro- :
1
• 
phetism, is never reception alone, but reception-articu-
lation.l 
In a passage recalling Hocking's concept of Destiny, 
J. Lindblom affirms that 
a prophet may be characterized as a person who, because 
he is conscious of having been specially chosen and 
called, feels forced to perform actions and proclaim 
ideas which, in a mental state of intense inspiration or 
real ecstasy, have been indicated to him in the form of 
divine revelations.2 
H. H. Rowley defines a prophet not only as "a man who 
knew God in the immediacy of experience," and felt "an ines-
capable constraint to utter what he was profoundly convinced 
was the word of God," but also was ''a true prophet and the 
measure of his experience was the measure of his receptive-
3 
ness and his response." 
John L. McKenzie even more explicitly recognizes the 
mystical aspect of prophecy: 
The only satisfactory parallel to the prophetic experi-
ence is the phenomenon of mysticism as described by 
writers like Teresa of Avila, John of the Cross and 
1Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, 3 (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1962), p. 897. 
2J. Lindblom, Prophecy in Ancient Israel (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1962), p. 46, original emphasized. 
3H. H. Rmvley, The Servant of the Lord (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 45. 
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others. They affirm that the immediate experience of God 
is ineffable; like the prophets, they must employ imag-
ery and symbolism to describe it, with explicit warnings 
that these are used. They describe it as a transforming 
experience which moves one to speech and action beyond 
one's expected capacities. It grants them a profound in-
sight not only into divine reality but into the human 
scene. Thus the prophetic exoerience is such ~ mystical 
immediate experience of the reality and presence £f God. 
The prophets disclose the nature and character of the 
God so experienced, and they state the implications of 
the divine nature and character for human thought and 
action.l 
Hocking's argument for the dynamic and intrinsic con-
nection between mystical and prophetic experience thus finds 
solid support among outstanding Protestant and Catholic bibli-
cal scholars. Not all contemporary writers on mysticism are 
of this mind, however. 
In sharp contrast to the scripture scholars, the emi-
nent philosopher of religion, Ninian Smart, still maintains 
a radical division between mysticism and prophecy. In his 
article "Interpretation and Mystical Experience," he writes, 
for instance, 
mysticism is not prophetism, and can be distinguished 
from devotionalism or bhakti religion (though mysticism 
often intermingles with these forms of religious life 
and experience). I would propose that the following are 
not mystics in the relevant sense in whicr. the Buddha 
and the others are mystics: Isaiah, Jeremiah, Muhammad, 
Rarnanuja, Nichiren and calvin.2 
lJ h L v ~ . S J o n • .;.'!C.t\enz~e, • • , 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 
added. Cf. also p. 698. 
2 Smart, art. cit., p. 75. 
Dictionary of the Bible (New 
1965), p. 697, emphasis 
f 
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Similarly, in his article on mysticism in the Zncyclopedia 
£E. Philosonhy, Smart reiterates his position: 11 there is 
auite a difference between mystical experience and prophetic 
and, more generally, numinous experience, but it is not easy 
to bring out this phenomenological fact in a short defini-
tion."1 
Whereas in the former article, Smart adduces no rea-
son for his sundering of mysticism and prophecy, he indi-
cates in the encyclopedia that although 
the experiences·of Old Testament prophets, those of 
Muhammad, and the theophany described in the Bhagavad-
Gita [can be included under certain definitions2] these 
differ so markedly from the interior illumination of 
such figures as Eckhart, Teresa of Avila, Sankara, and 
the Buddha that it is misleading to bracket the two kinds 
of experience.3 
Herein lies one clue to Smart's insistence on the dif-
ference between mysticism and prophecy. For him, as for Rus-
sell, Scharfstein and others, mysticism is essentially an 
''interior" event, a subjective experience having its origin 
and term within the mystic's consciousness. In his earlier 
article, Smart wrote, 
For the purpose of this article, I shall treat mysticism 
as primarily consisting in an interior or'introvertive 
1
smart, ed. cit., Vol. 5, p. 420. 
2For instance, that of Sidney Spencer: 11 What is char-
acteristic of the mystics is the claim which they make to an 




quest, culminating in certain interior experiences which 
are not described in terms of sense-experience or of 
mental images, etc.l 
In Reasons and Faiths, Smart likewise espouses an op-
erational description of mystical experience. 2 In The Reli-
gious Experience of Mankind, however, although he avoids ex-
act definitions of either mysticism or prophecy, he clearly 
indicates the reasons for his disjunction between them: 
First, the mystic looks within, into his own soul and be-
yond. In this imageless state he expericnes something in-
effable and blissful. But the prophet, such as Isaiah, 
has a vision that seems exterior to himself •••• Second, 
mysticism can occur ••• in a context where there is no 
concept of a Creator God and where the experience is not 
brought directly in relationship to, or interpreted as, 
an experience of any deity or numinous being. But it is 
nonsense to try and conceive of a prophetic experience 
which does not involve such a concept. Of course, mys-
tics often find in their own experience a strong intima-
tion of the divine presence operating inwardly. But this 
is not universal. 
Third, the language of the prophet, and especially 
of the prophets of the Hebrew tradition, is strongly per-
sonal, even anthropomorphic ••• while contemplative lan-
guage is frequently impersonal •••• 
Fourth, the Jewish prophets taught a way of life 
1 Smart, art. cit., p. 75. 
2
"Let us say that a mystical experience is one which 
is reported by a class of persons generally referred to as 
'mystics' -- such as Eckhart, St. John of the Cross, Plotinus, 
the Buddha, Sankara, and so on. Such men are characterized 
by spirituality and asceticism and pursue a certain method." 
(Reasons and Faiths, op. cit., p. 55.) He adds, however, "For 
a most important characteristic, one which we may regard for 
the purposes of linguistic legislation as the defining char-
acteristic, of the mystic is that he undertakes a certain 
sort of mystical discipline.•• (Ibid.) The evident circularity 
of his definitions may present no linguistic problem, but it 
remains unclear what warrants calling a discipline "mystical .. 





that was powerfully dynamic and activist: typically, 
though not universally, the mystic aims at stilling acti-
vity.l 
While interesting, these characterizations hardly pro-
vide solid grounds for a radical disconnection of prophecy 
and mysticism. First, we have little or no evidence about 
the interior states of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Muhammad or other 
prophets with which to form a true comparison. We even lack 
such information about most of the mystics. Further, the mys-
tics in fact often report visions or other experiences which 
indicate realities "exterior" to themselves. Moreover, where-
as it is possible to grant that not all mystical experience 
involves explicit theism, this need mean no more than that 
the unavailability of appropriate interpretive schemata by 
which the religious character of the mystical experience can 
be recognized impedes not only that recognition but even the 
expression of that experience in activity. But in fact most 
of the great mystics were religious figures par excellen~. 
They were also effective agents of social change, as pointed 
out by Hocking, Underhill, Bergson and others-- not perhaps 
universally, as Bergson noted of Plotinus, but at least in 
the West, typically. Mystical language, in addition, while 
sometimes impersonal, is, as Hocking and others have amply 
shown, more frequently personal, especially with regard to 
1Ninian Smart, The Religious Experienc~ of Mankind 
(London: Collins, 1971), pp. 366- 367. 
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Almost a point-by-point refutation of the theses this 
dissertation concerns, Smart's treatment of mystical experi-
ence as a wholly 11 inner" event betrays an inadequate concep-
tion not only of mysticism but also of experience. He fails, 
further, to place mystical experience(s) in the context of 
the mystic's life as a whole, socially and in an historical 
perspective, thus isolating particular episodes as "mystical" 
while ignoring their antecedent conditions and their effects. 
The disjuction Smart proposes between mystical "stillness" 
and prophetic activism arises out of this selctive inatten-
tion to development. 
Thus, Smart's separation of mysticism and prophecy 
does not appear to be well-founded. It clearly departs in 
significant respects from the views of many outstanding bi-
blical authorities as well as students of mysticism. The rea-
son possibly lies in Smart's covert adherence, like that of 
Rouner, to a concept of mysticism tainted by reaction. It is 
possible, however, to grant to Smart that mysticism and "pro-
phetism" are conceptually distinct, although in actual experi-
ence, especially when viewed developmentally, they are not 
only associated (as Stace might allow) or·intermingled (as 
he admits), but are conjoined as internally related moments 
in a unified process, prophetic activity being the natural 
outgrowth of mystical receptivity as McKenzie insists and 
Hocking consistently maintained. 1 
1In her otherwise excellent study, Margaret Lewis 
p 
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5. The Elements and Structure of Mystical Experience 
Despite the widespread agreement Hocking claimed to 
exist among mystics regarding practice and theory, the study 
of mysticism has yet to produce an extensive consensus among 
investigators as to what those areas of agreement are, al-
though various schools of thought exist, as Staal has shown. 1 
""' / Rather than attempting a detailed resume of various points 
of agreement and disagreement between Hocking and other writ-
ers, some of whom were admittedly influenced by him, 2 I shall 
simply note agreement with respect to several major features 
of Hocking's teaching. 
We have already examined in some detail the social 
and prophetic characteristics of mysticism as presented by 
Hocking in view of more recent studies and have noted in pas-
sing a tendency toward affirming that at least in principle 
all are possessed of the capacity for mystical experience. 3 
Furse similarly overlooks the intrinsic connection between 
mysticism and action, despite her reliance on some of Hock-
ing's writings. Cf. Furse, Mysticism, op. cit., pp. 13, 142f. 
1
staal, op. cit., pp. 68 - 122. 
2E.g., Bennett, Wieman, Urban and Hartshorne. 
3Regarding the social (i.e., prophetic) dimension of 
Christian mysticism, cf. ~Mystical and Political Dimension 
.2f the Christian Faith, ed. cit.; for the commonness of mys-
tical experience as a capacity of human nature, see Urban, 
op. cit., pp. 422, 434ff., 443; Harkness, op. cit., pp. 16 -
17; Hartshorne, art. cit., p. 467~ Hilliam Earle, "Phenomeno-
logy of Mysticism," ibid., p. 520; Lossky, op. cit., pp. 8 -
9; Johnston, The Still Point, op. cit., pp. 26 - 27; Illtyd 
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Other topical areas in which recent writers concur with Hock-
ing include the metaphysical and theological intentionality 
of mystical experience, 1 mediation as a factor in all experi-
2 
ence, the ordinary as opposed to an "extraordinary" charac-
ter of true mysticism, 3 and the differential certitude of 
the mystic regarding the perceived existence and essence of 
God. 4 The practical aspects of mysticism, especially the 
function of the "negative path" in renunciation and medita-
tion has recently been subjected to examination in regard to 
dishabituation (or 11 deautomatization") by several psychologi-
cal writers. 5 The dynamic explicitation of the latent capaci-
ty for mystical experience into manifest and theologically 
expressive forms has been noted by Urban, who acknowledges 
Trethowan, Mysticism and Theology (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 
1975), pp. 80- 81. 
1 Cf. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 
146ff., Trethowan, op. cit., pp. 4, 23ff. 
2 Cf. Urban, op. cit., pp. 428 - 29; Trethowan, op. 
cit., pp. ix, 50; Asher Moore, "Mysticism and Philosophy," 
The Monist, ed. cit., p. 499. 
3ct. Stace, Hysticism and Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 
47 - 55; Trethowan, op. cit., pp. 47, 80 - 81; Johnston, ~ 
Still Point, op. cit., pp. 26 - 27; Underhill, ed. and intro. 
to~ Scale of Perfection of ~alter Hilton, op. cit., pp. 
xxxf. 
4
c£. William Johnston, S.J., The Mysticism of the 
Cloud of Unknowing (New York: Desclee-ind Co., 1967T, pp. 
47 - 48. 
5
cf. Deikman, art. cit., pp. 324 - 388; Edward w. 
Maupin, "On Meditation," Charles Tart, ed., Altered States 
of Consciousness (Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday Anchor, 1972), 
pp. l81 - 190; Claudio Naranjo and Robert Ornstein, On the 
Psychology of Meditation (New York: Viking Press, 1971):-P.s. 
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in this respect his debt to von HUgel, Underhill and Jones. 1 
Buber, of course, developed a comprehensive account of the 
I-Thou relationship(s) available to human persons in terms 
similar to those elaborated by Hocking. 2 Likewise, the con-
cept of intersubjectivity, especially as developed by Gabriel 
Marcel, not only bears a resemblance to but has its origins 
at least partially in Hocking's metaphysics of experience. 3 
Hartshorne's social theory of reality was also influenced by 
4 Hocking, if less openly acknowledged as such. 
The theoretical aspects of mysticism, specifically the 
principles that Al~ is One, that the way to union with God is 
by non-conceptual knowledge and love, and that opposites are 
reconciled but not abolished in the one, are found in many 
writers in various combinations and permutations. 5 Other ele-
ments articulated by Hocking which find contemporary support 
include the "dim" awareness of God always present in experi-
1
urban, op. cit., pp. 434ff. Urban makes no mention of 
Hocking in his chapter on mysticism. 
2Martin Buber,! and Thou (1923), Walter Kaufmann, 
trans. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970). Buber, how-
ever, tended to oppose I-Thou relations to I-It relations, 
whereas Hocking saw them as conplementary and conjoined. 
3Harcel, "Solipsism Surmounted," PRCWC 23ff. 
4 Hartshorne, op. cit., pp. 18 - 19. 
5
cf. Stace, Hysticism and Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 64-
67, 79, 131; Russell, op. cit., pp. 17- 19, 20- 22; Moore, 
art. cit., pp. 495- 96, 505; LeShan, op. cit., pp. 44ff.; 
Urban, op. cit., pp. 431, 446; Harkness, op. cit., p. 58; 
Gilson, op. cit., pp. 115 - 126. 
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ence,
1 the fusion of fact and being, 2 and the theory of in-
terpretation as an integral part of experience. 3 
The point of citing these references is not to "prove" 
somehow that Hocking was correct because of the corrobora-
tion that can be marshalled on behalf of his· teachings, but 
to suggest, mther, that these teachings, while expressly di-
vergent on some issues from almost all the authors cited, 
are nevertheless harmonious with the general drift of recent 
studies. In some cases Hocking was clearly ahead of that 
drift. Further, no recent author seems to have suggested or 
implied that Hocking's approach or findings departed from or 
misrepresented the traditional concept of mysticism. 
Hence, on the basis of this comparison with contempo-
raneous and recent authorities, I conclude that no compelling 
reason exists to doubt Hocking's essential continuity with 
the classical tradition of Western mysticism. His differ-
ences from the tradition, especially his corrections of it 
in light of the pragmatic-realistic perspective of American 
philosophy, fall \-Jell within the scope of typical variability. 
1 Cf. Trethowan, op. cit., pp. 17, 110; Hartshorne, 
art. cit., p. 465. 
2c£. Urban, op. cit., pp. 257, 431. 
3
cf. Stace, Mysticism~ Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 
31 - 38; Smart, art. cit., passim. 
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Furthermore, his correction of the idealistic bias of pre-
vious mystical theories by the incorporation of pragmatic 
and realistic elements brought the philosophy of mystical 
experience closer to rather than farther from the earliest 
strands of classical Western mysticism. 1 
1In this regard, compare the work of Trethowan, op. 
cit., passim. 
III. CONCLUSION: THE ACHIEVEMENT OF WILLIAH ERNEST HOCKING 
Despite Hocking's reconception of mystical experience 
along lines more in accord with the classical Christian con-
cept of the West and congruent with many subsequent studies, 
as opposed to the exotic and reactionary notion generated be-
tween the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, there are 
some deficiencies in his treatment worth noting. 
To begin with, Hocking's reliance upon the Christian 
mystics from the third ·to the sixteenth centuries, while en-
abling him to establish continuity with the major Western 
tradition, also restricted the range of his investigation to 
classical sources somewhat unduly. His major reconception 
was largely finished before he had widened the scope of his 
inquiry to include the mystics of Eastern and even less Cath-
olic Western traditions than those drawn on in his magnum 
opus. Moreover, unlike James and more recent investigators, 
Hocking paid little attention to contemporaneous instances, 
the mystical experiences of ordinary men and women and the 
analogues found in drug-induced and other non-religious forms 
of ecstatic experience. Hocking was particularly attentive to 
metaphysical mystics like Eckhart and the classic Hindu ex-
ponents of absolute monism, whose philosophical tenor was 
more or less proximate to his own. Thus, Hocking was less at-
tentive to the variety of mystical experiences than a com-
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prehensively representative account requires. 
In general, Hocking's philosophical sensitivity to 
language was noticeably underdeveloped, perhaps as a reaction 
against what he perceived as the excesses of the analytical 
approach to philosophy. In this he rem~ined true to his em-
pirical heritage. But Hocking was perhaps too impatient with 
the special problems presented by the mystics• distinctive 
use of language, especially the hermeneutical difficulties 
of s~~bolic discourse and the logical ones pertaining to 
paradox, oblique reference and hyperbole. His theory of in-
terpretation was less well-developed than those noted above 
by Stace and especially by Smart, although it anticipated 
contributions made by both. 
Further, a more critical study of the influence of 
society upon the mystics and their impact on society and cul-
ture, whether constructive or destructive, would have greatly 
aided Hocking's analysis of the social dimension of mysticism. 
The effect of the mystics on the development of vernacular 
literature in the late Middle Ages and their propensity to 
gravitate toward heretical movements, at least in the eyes 
of orthodoxy, warrant particular attention. 
The cognitive priority in Hocking's writings, particu-
larly his earlier ones, should not be decried too hastily, 
however. For despite an emphasis on the "discovery" of God 
as the Other Knower of our common world, Hocking was consis-
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tently sensitive to the intrinsic connection between idea 
and feeling -- eventually characterizing feeling as the most 
important element in experience. 1 Moreover, Hocking stressed 
the inadequacy of conceptual knowledge as a means of achiev-
ing union with God in favor of an immediate apprehension or 
intuition of pres-ence and the unitive power of love. Even in 
his magnum opus he matched the cognitive awareness of God's 
presence with the affective realization of that presence as 
an intimate, loving companion. Hocking also gave consistent 
priority to the practical aspects of experience. (It should 
perhaps be recalled here that Hocking's typical stress on 
certitude, while cognitive, was not primarily a conceptual 
certainty, but a practical, even existential conviction, if 
one which, more than for James, had metaphysical significance 
as well as social implications.) Finally, Hocking's God was, 
even as the All-Knower, not omniscient in the classical 
sense; his knowledge of future events was limited by the 
fact of human creativity in time. 2 
As I understand it in general, Hocking's conception of 
God owes less to Hegel than to the personalistic tradition of 
the Judeo-Christian mystics, perhaps especially with respect 
to his association with Whitehead, Hartshorne and the begin-
nings of process philosophy. His God was no "thought thinking 
1
cf. LR~~ 48, cited above with other references, p. 318. 
2
cf • .HIHE 63. 
---
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itself," nor the ;.bsolute Spirit marching through history 
(or out of it, as in Vedanta). Hocking's God was historical, 
concrete and immanent, intimately accessible within human 
experience rather than 11 \vholly other" in the radically tran-
scendent nee-orthodox sense. Hocking's historical sensitivi-
ty led him to place Jesus Christ in the center of history 
as ~ mediator between God and the human race, "the human 
face of God." But he was disconcertingly reticent as to the 
meaning of Christ's divinity, the resu~rection and the Holy 
Spirit. ·rhe vagueness of his trinitarianism may be over-
stressed with regard to a philosophy of religion, however; 
Hocking nowhere claimed to be doing dogmatic theology. In 
sum, his formal concept of God seems largely that of the 
liberal Protestantism of the early twentieth century, given 
his openness to a God limited by time, as was also true of 
James. Hocking, on the other hand, did not fully embrace the 
concept of a finite God as found in the later process thought 
of Whitehead and Hartshorne. 
If philosophical success can be measured by the 
achievement of a satisfying account of a problematic situa-
tion as well as by exercizing a lasting effect upon subse-
quent efforts to deal with the same or similar problems, 
then Hocking's attempt to develop a rational and socially 
sensitive theory of mystical experience and religion can be 
adjudged a qualified success. That is, he succeeded in terms 
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of elaborating a solution to a problem, as Marcel recog-
nized, but failed to the extent that despite his great in-
fluence on many of his contemporaries, Hocking's account of 
the ontological argument, our knowledge of other minds, and 
even the dialectical connection between mysticism and pro-
phecy have not been widely adopted. 1 (Marcel's puzzlement 
at the relative neglect of Hocking in America is perhaps 
answerable in terms of his identification with idealism, 
which earned him the quick and lasting opposition -- much of 
it uncritical-- of some of ~~erica's foremost philosophers.) 
Nevertheless·, if I am correct in my appraisal of Hock-
ing, his development of the concept of nuclear experience, 
the intersubjective relation grounding all manifest experi-
ence, as an explanation of the eventual social expression of 
mysticism can be said to be cogent. His account is likewise 
coherent, uniting elements and structure not only meaning-
fully but in accordance with the facts of actual experience. 
Historically, it can hardly be gainsaid that the most 
active and effective individual religious figures were in 
fact mystics -- if not all mystics have been effective nor 
all effective religious figures mystics. Further, the pro-
cess of mystical development as described by Hocking conforms 
in all important respects with the reports of the mystics 
1A recent exception, but one which falls short of ade-
quacy in exploring Hocking's thought is Hargaret Lewis Furse's 
Mysticism, op. cit. See especially pp. 13, 142ff. 
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themselves and also to those of psychologists who have 
studied the dynamics of mystical development in its entirety 
and especially in its social context. The counter-factual 
instances that can be -- and were -- brought against Hock-
ing's case, Quietism, elitism and extraordinariness, have 
been shown to be exceptional rather than typical, represent-
ing incomplete development, hypertrophy or partial observa-
tion. Authentic mysticism is ultimately activistic in orien-
tation, a common capacity of all persons and as such an ordi-
nary dimension of human experience (even in its extraordinary 
manifestations!). 
Similarly, Hocking's case for the mystical and social 
character of all experience and especially of ordinary reli-
gious activity is also compelling despite some remaining ob-
scurities. Moreover, his exposition of the meaning of mysti-
. cism as its value for l~fe as a whole -- that is, as an in-
tegrating power by which the common concerns and partial pre-
occupations of human existence are evaluated in terms of the 
meaning of human life in its totality as an on-going dialogue 
with God in individual experience and social history-- ef-
fectively linked the basic religious experience of mankind 
to the democratic spirit of American philosophy, an accom-
plishment denied both James and Royce. 
In Western philosophical experience, perhaps the most 
crucial development since the Cartesian "revolution" was the 
376 
shift in thought from a monarchical, absolutist perspective 
to one characterized by the democratic outlook, which recog-
nized the value of the common experience of everyman. Royce 
and especially James attempted to secure the success of the 
transition in American thought, and with Dewey the achieve-
ment can be said to have been consummated. Hocking's accom-
plishment in this regard can fairly be described as the exe-
cution of the crossing with respect to what until his time 
was largely taken as a bastion of esoteric elitism, the last 
refuge of Absolutism: mystical experience. By democratizing 
mysticism and with it the Absolute, i.e., locating them with-
in the experience of everyone, Hocking established the tie 
between the classical Western tradition and the spirit of 
the New World in the area of religion and religious experi-
ence. In so doing, however, Hocking did not, like Dewey, re-
ject the idealistic element in American thought, but inclu-
ded it as a partial aspect of a more adequate because more 
realistic view of the experienced world. 
In this synthesis of idealism and realism in mysti-
cism, Hocking's insistence on the necessity of mediation was 
a key element in his reconception of the absolutist model of 
mystical union, often conceived of as an ontological merger 
of subject and object. This, I believe, is a point missed by 
John E. Smith in his characterization (and subsequent rejec-
tion) of mystical union as 11 the individual's merging with an 
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ultimate reality or ••• his becoming absorbed in the object 
of his quest." 1 Hocking's triadic model of experience pre-
eludes the simple absorption of subject by object in so far 
as all experience of an object by a subject is mediated by 
"thirds," that is, some other entity. In the integrity of 
mystical oneness, God remains God, the creature remains 
2 
creature. 
Given the difficulties still attendent on discussions 
of mediation and immediacy, Hocking's treatment of the is-
sues involved is not without significance today, even though 
he never fully developed his solution theoretically. Perhaps 
it is more significant since it has received scant attention 
save ~y Marcel. Even Hocking's major commentators (notably 
in this instance, Rouner, Luther and Smith), while generally 
attentive to the theme of experiential immediacy in his writ-
ings, manifest a lack of sensitivity to the depth of his 
treatment. All overlook his explicit articulation of "rela-
tive immediacy 11 and ignore his consistent employment of this 
doctrine. Further, many of their objections to his notion of 
an immediate experience of God were anticipated and suffi-
ciently refuted by his exposition of the meaning of mediated 
1
smith, art. cit., p. 231. 
2
cf. especially MGHE 390. For a discussion of the per-
during individuality of the Self and God in mystical union, 
Cf. Underhill, Mysticism, op. cit., pp. 32, 35, 170f.,-and 
passim; Johnston, Silent Music, op. cit., pp. 66, 83, 147ff.; 
and Harkness, op. cit., pp. 23ff. 
378 
immediacy. 
Similarly, Hocking's largely undeveloped analogy be-
tween the structure of social and individual religious his-
tory seems a particularly apt paradigm by which to express 
the emergence of a world faith out of the common and univer-
sal elements in religious experience-- e.g., the felt pre-
sence of God as a unifying, non-competitive Spirit and the 
development of explicit mysticism from the nuclear experi-
ence of God's presence to the Self through the media of Na-
ture and Society. In this respect it is not surprising that 
for Hocking the prophet of the coming world faith was the 
mystic. It should be recalled, however, that for him the in-
termediary agencies in the converging religious experience 
of individuals and societies are particular religious tradi-
tions, especially those with a universalizing tendency--
Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, Islam and to a lesser ex-
tent, Hinduism. Further, the temporal interaction between 
the individual and the group indicates that the analogy is a 
dynamic one -- i.e., the terms are mutually implicated in 
process. Religious development is thus in factual experience 
an interconnected system of individual and social transforma-
tions, two phases of an alternating process in time. 
Regarding Hocking's own mysticism, although Rouner 
erred in denying that he was a mystic in the "classical" 
sense, Hocking was clearly not an ordinary mystic. Like 
~lato, ~lotinus, Eckhart and Schelling, he was a philosopher 
379 
a philosophical mystic, then, or a mystical philosopher; 
it makes little difference. He was not a religious figure 
in exactly the sense than Eckhart was, much less John of the 
Cross or George Fox. Yet he was a religious leader in his 
time and, as a man of action, both reformer and critic, he 
was prophetic. 
No one who reads with an open mind Hocking's "Confes-
~ F; dei '' -- the epilogue to Types of Philosophy -- can 
miss the fact that the mystical element of religion as he 
exposed it permeated his thought and life extensively. But 
Hocking proposed a 11 realistic mysticism" (or a "mystical 
realism"-- which also amounts to the same thing). His was a 
reconceived mysticism in which the residual absolutism per-
haps inevitable in any mysticism was strongly tempered by 
the pluralistic realism of everyday experience. Such a mysti-
cism not only accords better with the "Gospel Christianity" 
such as Hocking professed, but by its openness also admits 
of comparison and exchange with the temperate absolutism he 
found at the heart of all great religions. 
In sum, beyond recovering the true "classical" con-
cept 'of Western mysticism, Hocking's structural model of the 
mystical undertaking as a whole, while never fully system-
atized, can also serve as a heuristic instrument of in~er­
pretation and evaluation both for philosophical and scienti-
fic investigation and for ecumenical dialogue. For it takes 
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into consideration above a.ll the structure and function of 
social process as well as the psychological motives for 
action. 
Ultimately and conclusively, Hocking himself, I am 
convinced, ade~1ately and prophetically embodied the ecumeni-
cal, inquiring spirit of the "mystic of the future" as he 
confessed with regard to her personal faith, 
We must treat things in the day's work as if they were 
independent, naturalistic, over against us, or at least, 
not for us. Struggle to build a human habitation in the 
midst of an alien universe; unremitting effort to expel 
by the aid of science whatever is evil from our point of 
view; expecting no good from the universe other than what 
we human beings construct in the fa.ce of nature, except 
the universe itself; and admitting no wrong as inherent 
in the constitution of things: -- this is the program 
in which we join the realist. 
But who has the eye for this humanistic work, and 
the endless patience and energy for it, in view of the 
fact that the task defined is nothing short of infinite? 
Who can wait until the end of evolution for an achieve-
ment which only remote posterity can ever see? Only one 
who in some way is at the goal, as the mystic is (who 
for us represents the religious spirit). For him,reality 
in its fulness is always accessible where he is: he is 
always in the middle of time and space and history; he 
is never neurotically anxious to catch the dernier cri, 
nor hurried on to a remote goal. He alone can labor with 
endless resources and patience for what may yet be; for 
he knows that the nature of things is with him. He knows 
that there can be no incommensurable relation between 
the task and the power to deal with it. He knows that 
what is in him is the same substance that has set the ob-
ject and established its over-againstness. He is assured, 
with Confucius, that the "good man is a ternion with 
Heaven and Earth."l 
1 TP 318 - 19. 
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APPENDIX 




FROH THE GIFFORD LEC'l'URES TO "Fl1.CT, FIELD AND DESTINY" 
The most important element to emerge in Hocking•s 
metaphysics in the interim between 1939 and his revisions of 
the Gifford Lectures in 1951 and 1966 was the central cate-
gory of Field -- a notion present in his thought from his 
early career, but which achieved mature development only in 
the last decade of his life. The concept of the Self as "a 
Field of Fields 11 enabled Hocking to bring together the major 
metaphysical elements of his philosophy:: intersubjectivity, 
the reality of the objective world, the plurality of space 
and time, and the apprehension of God as "Thou 11 in the natu-
ral and social experience of mankind. 
However, the connections between mystical experience, 
the historical development of mysticism in religion and the 
metaphysics of 11 Fact, Field and Destiny .. are not obvious 
from a reading of the articles themselves. Yet there is an 
important element of continuity between the Gifford Lectures 
and the 1958 articulation of Hocking•s metaphysics. I be-
lieve that continuity was provided by his abiding interest 
in mysticism. 
Hocking delivered twenty lectures in two series at 
the University of Glasgow which were distributed as a mimeo-
graphed summary in seventeen pages. He also prepared summa-
ries of the lectures for the Glasgow Herald and the Edin-
burgh S~otsman, the former especially appearing with very 
minor editorial changes on the day following each lecture.l 
Although Hocking intended to publish the Gifford Lec-
tures in book form as a systematic metaphysics, the outbreak 
of the Second World War forestalled him. By the end of the 
war, the philosophical climate had changed considerably and 
Rocking began to plot an extensive revision of the lectures 
for publication. The first series was revised and presented 
in article form in 1950 and 1951 as "Fact and Destiny (I) 11 2 
and 11 Fact and Destiny (II) .3 
1The first series, "Fact and Destiny," appeared on 
Jan. 18, 21 and 28, 1938, and on Feb. 4, 11, 18 and 25, and 
Harch 4, 11, and 18 of the same year. The second series, 
"History and the l ... bsolute," was printed on nov. 30, Dec. 3, 
7, 10, 14 and 17, 19-38, and Jan. 11, 14, 18 and 21, 1939. 
2Review of Metaphysics, 4 (Sept. 1950), pp. 1- 12. 
3Ibid., (March, 1951), pp. 319 - 42. 
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The first article related the Gifford Lectures as a 
whole to the philosophical situation more than a decade lat-
er, dwelling mainly on the metaphysical status of Fact. This 
article did not appear in any form in the Herald or the Scots-
~· The second article, subtitled "Argument of the First 
Five Lectures," was thus in fact a revision of only part of 
the first series. It must be read in con~unction with a yet 
later article, "Fact, Field and Destiny" {1958) in order to 
grasp Hocking's revision of the entire first series. 
The second series of Lectures, "History and the Abso-
lute," was not published until 1966, when Hocking summarized 
and revised it for inclusion in the Festschrift edited for 
him by Leroy Rouner PhilosoEhY, Religion and the Corning 
World Civilization.~ But Hocking died within the year, leav-
ing unfinished the comprehensive and systematic statement of 
his metaphysics he had so long prepared for. 
"Fact, Field and Destiny" was the title of Hocking's 
presidential address before the Metaphysical Society of 
America on Harch 28, 1958. It was published in an abbreviated 
form later that year, apparently (at first glance) as a se-
cond reworking of the first series of Gifford Lect~res. 
Closer inspection, especially in comparison with the Herald 
version of the Gifford Lectures and "Fact and Destiny (II)" 
indicates, however, that this is not the case. In fact, the 
1958 article is the revision of the sixth to the tenth of 
the first series of Lectures, expanded to include the concept 
of Field. This connection with the Gifford Lectures has, as 
far as I know, been overlooked by Hocking's commentators. It 
merits attention, nonetheless, at least in connection with 
the present subject of investigation. 
As noted before, "Fact and Destiny (II)" was identified 
as a summary statement of only the first five Gifford Lec-
tures, which Hocking indicated at the time and is mentioned 
in mo.st references. 3 Comparing this article with the He.rald 
text shows that Hocking actually reworked the first five and 
hal£ of the sixth Lecture in "Fact and Destiny (II)," ending 
with a consideration of Schopenhauer's notion of the will as 
the agency of access to reality, and a brief, proleptic sum-
mary of the. remaining lectures in the first series.~ These 
l"F>='D" t 't 
.. ar • CJ. • 
2ERCWC 423 - 463. 
3
cf. "FD (II)" 319 and PRCW.C 484. 
4
•tFD (II)" 341. The material from the sixth Lecture be-
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were to deal with the logic of the infinite, the tension be-
tween the plurality of facts and meaning, and the unity of 
the \vorld.l "Fact, Field and Destiny" begins, by comparison, 
with a summary but extensive revision of the first lectures 
on Fact as a fundamental metaphysical category, followed by 
what appears to be a wholly new treatment of the concept of 
Field as another such category. Yet it seems evident that 
the problems Hocking was considering in the remainder of the 
article are, once more, the plurality of Fact(s), the unity 
of meaning, and the wholeness-of the world, which, with the 
question of character or telos (Destiny), comprised the pro-
gram of the four concluding lectures of the first series in 
1938.2 
What is lacking in this program in "Fact, Field and 
Destiny" is an explicit elaboration of the logic of the in-
finite, which occupied half of the sixth and all of the sev-
enth of the first series of Gifford Lectures. Otherwise it 
is clear from the content that despite changes of.language 
and emphasis, "Fact, Field and Destiny .. continues and de-
velops the Gifford Lectures, particularly the last three lec-
tures, which concerned the problem of the unity of the world 
and its character. 
This connection between the original lectures and the 
1958 article is important for the present study in several 
respects. For altough there is no explicit reference to mys-
ticism in the latter piece, unlike the concluding lectures 
of the first series, nevertheless the structure and content 
of Hocking's argument remains virtually the same. Here, I 
suggest, Hocking has translated the earlier references to 
mystical experience into less religious language, incidental-
ly providing a clear indication of the relationship between 
the empirical content of mystical experience and more ab-
stract metaphysical categories, that is, their fundamental 
equivalence. (Hocking's explicit return to the theoretical 
and historical_ aspects of mysticism in the 1966 revision of 
his second series of Gifford Lectures, 11 History and the Jl4b-
solut~" shows that he had by no means abandoned. his earlier 
views, as also demonstrated by his intervening writings.) 
Specifically, in "Fact, Field and Destiny" Hocking 
was finally able to connect satisfactorily the empirical, 
gins with the section entitled "Teleology of the Particular." 
1cf. "FD (II)" 342. 
2Ibid. 
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realistic elements of his philosophy with its idealistic ele-
ments by means of the concept of Field, which, in experi-
ence, links together human selves, the World and God in a 
system of triadic relations ultimately constituting a unified 
but diverse Whole. 
Hocking identified this connection as well as the clue 
to the equivalence of mysticism and metaphysics theoretical-
~ by expressly relating his concept of Field with what he 
had described in his earlier writings as the mystic's "felt 
unity of the world." In an important passage he wrote: 
He have too long identified- the empirical with the item-
ized, the separate, the plural aspects of experience. 
The illusory attraction of sense-data as the primary 
building-stuff of knowledge consists largely in the cir-
cumstance that we can count them, identify them, name 
them. But there is no law of being that the real, in its 
major aspects, must come, as it were, in spots, and un-
scrambled. For this reason, I have dwelt on the Field-
concept which underlies all discontinuities, and which, 
once recognized, accounts for the simply felt unity of 
the world.l 
He continued, employing language previously used in regard 
to mystical experience, by re-introducing a crucial category 
of thought and being, nuclear experience: 
Within this felt unity, there is a richness of experi-
ence \"'hich is at a disadvantage for recognition, partly 
because it is too near us, beneath the level of specific 
language, and partly because its aspects are mutually in-
volved. To refer to it, we must use speech; and every 
translation into speech does it some injustice. 
Let me refer to this region as our nuclear aware-
ness of the world. ~Hthin it there is, for example, a 
nuclear awareness of our Self, so central and so engaged, 
that Hume and many others after him, interested in sepa-
rate impressions, not only fail to find it but deny its 
existence. There is a nuclear awareness of the intersub-
jective Thou-art. There is also a nuclear awareness of 
bodily well-or-ill being, of certain instinctive powers, 
of a general direction of process in time, involving 
what is now pertinent to us, a sense of destiny.2 
l"FFD" 545. 
2
"FFD" 545 - 46. 
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The immediate context of this passage should be con-
sidered , first of all, the original Gifford Lectures in 
which Hocking indicated the overriding aims of the series and 
later developed them specifically with respect to mystical 
experience. In the introductory lecture, Hocking referred to 
the "rational use of intuition," espt:lcially as articulated 
by Bergson, as "the opening of a new style of thought" for 
the West. It involved two techniques: 
(1) The clarification of the theory of the infinite-- a 
new distinction between the legitimate and the illegiti-
mate uses of this slippery conception; and (2) the utili-
zation of the insights of mystic and artist in indicat-
ing the significant unity of the world. These would form 
much of the content of the subsequent lectures.l 
"The mystic," the article continues, "might remind us, 
among other things, that the world had an aspect of simplicity 
as well as of complexity, and that the native certitudes of 
the soul could. not be abandoned."2 
The theory of the infinite, which occupied more than 
two lectures in the original series, survived only in greatly 
altered form in the later versions. But mystical and aesthet-
ic experience remained central empirical elements for Hocking 
in formulating his metaphysics, appearing most significantly 
in this regard in the 1966 revision of "History and the Ab-
solute." It is the development of the notion of mystical ex-
perience in the original lectures and the revisions of 1950, 
1951 and 1966 that thus provides the link between the Gifford 
Lectures and the metaphysics articulated in the 1958 article. 
In particular, it is the experience of the underlying unity 
of the world that is the common element of mysticism and meta-
physics. But with regard to Hocking's own philosophical de-
velopment, I believe that this connection also indicates that 
the most clearly indicated metaphysical aspects of his thought 
have their roots in prior mystical aspects of experience. 
1GL Jan. 18 1938 I • 
2Ibid. 
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